C-5/62

JUDGMENT OF 14. 12. 1962 —JOINED CASES 5 TO 11 AND 13 TO 15/62 SAN MICHELE v HIGH AUTHORITY

CELEX: 61962CJ0005
Datum: 1962-12-14
Källa: eur-lex.europa.eu

In Joined Cases 5 to 11 and 13 to 15/62

THE COURT composed of: A. M. Donner, President, L. Delvaux (Rapporteur) and R. Rossi (Presidents of Chambers), O. Riese, Ch. L. Hammes, A. Trabucchi and R. Lecourt, Judges, Advocate-General: M. Lagrange Registrar A. Van Houtte

gives the following

JUDGMENT

Issues of fact and of law

I — Conclusions of the parties

A — In Cases 5 to 11/62

The applicants claim that the Court should:

a) In the applications for annulment of the implied Decisions of refusal (Article 35) after noting that the applicants categorically deny, as will be stated in more detail during the course of the proceedings, having prevented the officials of the High Authority from carrying out an adequate check of the factors serving to establish the amount subject to assessment for the purpose of equalization by the alleged lack of a considerable part of the accounting and non-accounting documents of their undertakings,

declare that the applications for annulment of the implied Decisions of refusal are admissible;

consequently annul the implied Decisions of refusal for infringement of essential procedural requirements, infringement of the Treaty and misuse of powers;

order the defendant to pay the costs.

b) In the applications for annulment of the express individual Decisions (Article 33), The defendant contends that the Court should:

declare that the applications for annulment of the individual Decisions of the High Authority of 23 February 1962, notified to the applicants on 12 March 1962, are admissible;

consequently annul the individual Decisions for infringement of essential procedural requirements, infringement of the Treaty and misuse of powers, in accordance with Article 33 of the Treaty;

order the defendant to pay the costs;

order the defendant, in accordance with Article 23 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice, to produce at the hearing all documents capable of leading to a better understanding of the dispute, with regard in particular to the alleged failure to produce a considerable part of the accounting and non-accounting documents of the applicant undertakings.

declare that the claims based on Article 35 of the Treaty against the alleged silence on the part of the High Authority following the applicants' letters of 27 December 1961 giving formal notice are inadmissible;

dismiss in addition all the claims included in the applications;

order the applicants to pay the costs and expenses of the proceedings.

B — In Cases 13/62, 14/62 and 15/62

The applicants claim that the Court should:

after noting that the applicants categorically deny, as will be stated in more detail during the course of the proceedings, having prevented the officials of the High Authority from carrying out a check of the factors serving to establish the amount subject to assessment for the purpose of equalization by the alleged lack of a considerable part of the accounting and non-accounting documents of their undertakings,

declare that the applications for annulment of the individual Decisions of the High Authority of 23 February 1962, notified to the applicants on 12 March 1962, are admissible;

consequently annul the individual Decisions for infringement of essential procedural requirements, infringement of the Treaty and misuse of powers, in accordance with Article 33 of the Treaty;

order the defendant to pay the costs.

The defendant contends that the Court should:

dismiss all the claims contained in the applications;

order the applicants to pay the costs and expenses of the proceedings.

II — Summary of the facts

The facts of the cases may be summarized as follows:

By letters of 27 November 1961 the Directorate General for Steel of the High Authority called upon the iron and steel undertakings using electric furnaces for their production to provide, or to ask their suppliers of electric energy to provide, the High Authority with the invoices relating to the electric energy consumed during the period from 1 April 1954 to 30 November 1958 and to certify that the invoices covered the total amount of electric energy consumed. The Directorate General indicated that the purpose of this request was to check the factors necessary for the application of equalization relating to imported scrap.

The applicants in Cases 13 to 15/62 sent letters dated 21 December 1961, claiming that the demand was unlawful and setting out the reasons why they could not comply with it.

The applicants in Cases 5 to 11/62 sent letters, dated 27 December 1961, in which they made the same objection and also invited the High Authority either to withdraw its request or, alternatively, to confirm it in the form of a Decision applying to all undertakings in the same sector.

By individual Decisions of 23 February 1962, notified to the applicant undertakings on 12 March 1962, the High Authority, relying on the provisions of Article 47 of the ECSC Treaty, ordered the documents referred to in the letters of 27 November 1961 from the Directorate General for Steel to be supplied, and fixed a time limit for compliance with the order.

All the applications seek the annulment of these individual Decisions. The applicants in Cases 5 to 11 /62 seek in addition the annulment of the implied Decision of refusal which, according to them, arises from the silence of the High Authority after the receipt of their above-mentioned letters of 27 December 1961.

III — Submissions and arguments of the parties

The submissions and arguments of the parties may be summarized as follows:

A — As to admissibility

The defendant disputes the admissibility of the actions for failure to act (Cases 5 to 11/62) under Article 35 of the ECSC Treaty, claiming first the absence of the conditions required by Article 35 for the valid institution of such an action and secondly the lack of any legal interest.

1. Absence of the conditions required by Article 35

Article 35 is an exceptional provision. Apart from the cases prescribed by that Article, silence does not constitute grounds for an action. There are only two cases prescribed. The High Authority must either be required to take a decision or be empowered to do so, and in either case its failure in this respect must constitute a misuse of powers. The applicants have not adduced any proof in their claims that this case falls within either of the two situations prescribed.

The letters of 27 December 1961 sent by the applicants to the High Authority gave the latter formal notice either to withdraw its demand for production of documents or, alternatively, to confirm it by an express decision applying to all undertakings.

The High Authority was in no way obliged to choose between the two alternatives put forward. It was not bound in fact to withdraw its request for production of documents, since it could have let it lapse by omitting to re-enact it in a compulsory form, still less was it under an obligation to repeat it in the form of an express decision, since checks are not obligatory and, according to the case law of the Court in Case 31/59, Brescia v. High Authority, nothing in the wording of Article 47 of the ECSC Treaty ‘allows one to infer from it the implied provision that a preliminary decision is to be adopted before any check is made’ (Rec. 1960, p. 172).

And in the second case where silence may be legally relevant, that is, when the High Authority is empowered to act, its failure to do so could not constitute a misuse of powers, since its silence was to the advantage of the applicants.

The applicants reply that the defendant's argument applies to a matter of sub-stance and has no bearing on the admissibility of the applications. They cite the sixth heading of the summary of the judgment in Joined Cases 42 and 49/59, SNUPAT v. High Authority:‘The question whether the High Authority had the right to take the decision sought and whether it was obliged to take it within a period of two months following notice depends on an examination of the sub-stance of the case. For an action for failure to act to be admissible, it suffices that the High Authority has taken no decision by the expiry of that period’ (Rec. 1961, p. 106).

The defendant answers that this case is essentially different from those decided in the latter judgment, where the Court had been asked to make a decision on the validity under Article 35 of a notice to obtain from the High Authority a measure which, in its opinion, could not in fact be adopted within the period of two months fixed by the notice.

Consequently it was a question of establishing the effect on admissibility of the actual impossibility of taking a decision asserted by the High Authority, whereas its obligation to take a decision did not enter into the dispute since it was settled in a previous judgment. In this case, however, the High Authority denies having been obliged to take action on the notice or, if it was so empowered, it denies having committed a misuse of powers by its silence. To render these applications admissible the applicants would have had to adduce proof of the existence of one or other of those conditions.

2. Lack of any legal interest

In the defendant's opinion, no legal importance can be attached to a formal notice which in this case was intended solely to achieve a measure which the applicants themselves admit is not merely illegal but also contrary to their interests. This establishes a lack of any legal interest and is enough to render the action for failure to act inadmissible.

The applicants reply that the criterion of adopting the fixed parameter of 900 kwh per metric ton to be used in calculating the consumption of electric energy is discriminatory and that an intention to obtain the abolition of this criterion constitutes for the applicants a legal interest. Further, the formal notice was the only means which enabled the applicants to avoid the application by the High Authority of the sanctions prescribed by Article 47 of the ECSC Treaty and constituted the most responsible and appropriate policy by way of reply to the High Authority's letters of 27 November 1961.

The defendant replies that the applicants could have claimed a legal interest if a measure based on the criterion criticized had perhaps been adopted, which is not the case here. In addition, under Article 47, above-mentioned, the sanctions can only be applied for failure to fulfil an obligation resulting from a decision of the High Authority, and not for failure to observe the letters of 27 November 1961 which only constitute a preliminary act as opposed to any final decision. Thus the applicants had no interest enabling them to give formal notice in their letters of 27 December 1961 or to institute an action based on Article 35 of the ECSC Treaty.

B — On the substance of the case

The applicants base their actions for failure to act under Article 35 (for Cases 5 to 11/62) and their applications for annulment under Article 33 (for Cases 5 to 11/62 and 13 to 15/62) on three submissions: infringement of essential procedural requirements (in this case lack of reasoning), infringement of the Treaty and misuse of powers. These submissions are set out as follows:

1) The letters of 27 November 1961 from the Directorate General for steel are vitiated by lack of reasoning and by misuse of powers because they state that the applicants evaded investigation, which is not so;

2) These same letters are vitiated by lack of reasoning, infringement of the Treaty and misuse of powers because they call upon the applicants to send, or ask their suppliers of electric energy to send, to the High Authority the invoices relating to the different amounts of energy consumed, and to certify that these invoices are authentic and that they cover the total amount of the energy consumed;

3) These same letters, and in addition the Decisions of the High Authority of 23 February 1962, are vitiated by lack of reasoning and infringement of the Treaty because the invoices relating to consumption of electric energy are not a valid method of determining the quantity of scrap used;

4) These same letters and these same Decisions are vitiated by lack of reasoning and infringement of the Treaty because the powers conferred on the High Authority do not allow it to order that documents subjected to checking be presented at Luxembourg.

1. The letters of 27 November 1961 incorrectly state that the applicants evaded supervision

The applicants state that the demand for the production of documents contained in the letters in dispute was justified by the fact that ‘as a result of the lack of a considerable part of the accounting and non-accounting documents of the undertaking, it has not been possible to carry out an adequate check of the factors serving to establish the amount subject to assessment for the purpose of equalisation.’

This allegation is totally untrue, which is confirmed moreover by the fact that the High Authority did not repeat it in the reasons expressed for its Decisions of 23 February 1962. A statement of reasons such as that contained in the letters amounts to an absence of reasons. In addition, by making certain excessive demands upon the applicants, the High Authority, relying on this false allegation, distorted the facts in pursuance of an illegal objective: consequently it committed a misuse of powers. These complaints apply equally to the Decisions of 2 February 1962. These constitute in effect a clear rejection of the claims contained in the letters of 27 December 1961 giving formal notice; they constitute a belated indication of intention on the part of the executive, by confirming the legal position already created by the implied Decision of refusal.

The defendant replies that the action for failure to act is inadmissible for the reasons set out above (c.f. supra III, A, As to admissibility) and that the letters of 27 November 1961 have not been made a cause of action by the applicants. As for the applications for annulment of the Decisions of 23 February 1961, the defendant states that these Decisions are quite sufficiently reasoned. According to the judgment delivered by the Court in Case 31/59, Brescia v. High Authority,‘the need for information required by the High Authority must emerge from the decision with certainty. In view of this, it is only the object in view which must serve as the criterion and not an a priori statement of the results expected which, drawn up unilaterally and without knowledge of the facts, may change by reason of the checks when they are carried out” (Rec. 1960, p. 173). The Decisions in dispute show clearly the object of the order given to send the invoices relating to the consumption of electricity and the supplementary certificate by mentioning specifically the need to check the tonnages subject to equalization contributions and by recording that the consumption of energy by the furnaces constitutes an appropriate factor for checking.

2. The letters of 27 November 1961 could not require declarations of authenticity, either direct or from a third party

The applicants point out that the letters in question required them to send, either direct or through their suppliers of electric energy, the invoices relating to their consumption of electricity, or certified true copies, accompanied by a certificate that the documents supplied covered the total amount of electric energy used. This claim to be furnished with declarations of authenticity, whether direct or from a third party, is in no way justified. Article 47 of the Treaty authorizes the High Authority to “obtain the information it requires to carry out its tasks” and to “have any necessary checks made”. The claim that declarations of authenticity are required contains a presumption of bad faith against Community undertakings and exceeds the powers devolving on the High Authority under Article 47. It also constitutes a misuse of powers, because it is deliberately intended to fall upon a small number of specific undertakings thereby completely ignoring the criterion of equality.

For the reasons set out above (c.f. supra III, B, 1), these complaints also apply to the Decisions of 23 February 1962, subject however to the fact that those Decisions no longer require that the copies of the invoices be certified as true copies.

The defendant replies with the arguments already set out under point 1 (c.f. supra III, B, 1), and adds that the double requirement contained in the Decisions of 23 February 1962 — namely the production of invoices and a certificate that they represented the total consumption — was indispensable for checking. In fact, the mere production of the invoices without the certificate would have allowed the undertakings to evade the investigations by concealing part of the invoices without assuming the responsibility of issuing a false certificate.

With regard to the allegation of misuse of powers, the defendant claimed during the course of the oral procedure, and was not contradicted by the applicants, that all the undertakings using electric furnaces had been called upon to submit to the same checks.

3. The consumption of electric energy does not constitute a sure basis for establishing the tonnages of scrap used

The applicants state that the order contained in the letters of 27 November 1961 and in the Decisions of 23 February 1962 to produce electricity invoices has as its object the assessment by inference of the consumption of scrap. The letters of 27 November 1961 and the disputed Decisions refrain from explaining how inspection of the consumption of energy can enable one to ascertain the assessable tonnages and do not indicate the reasons which led the High Authority to resort to a calculation by inference in spite of the monthly declarations supplied by the applicants. The letters and Decisions are consequently vitiated by lack of reasoning.

In addition, this method of investigation is totally unreliable. In fact, the consumption of electric energy varies considerably according to the systems of production adopted by the various steelworks. The High Authority is aware of the applicants' consumption of bought scrap, which is notified to it every month in compliance with the Decisions setting up the equalization machinery. It has no need to resort to checks based on inference, unless it considers that the applicants have knowingly furnished it with false information, and in such case the High Authority can have recourse to the third paragraph of Article 47 which enables it to impose fines and periodic penalty payments. By carrying out illegal and irregular checks it is infringing Articles 8 and 47 of the ECSC Treaty and the Decisions setting up the equalization machinery, especially Articles 16 and 17 of Decision 2/57.

In reply, the defendant first puts forward the arguments set out under point 1 above (c.f. supra III, B, 1), and adds that, according to the very wording of the disputed Decisions, the consumption of electric energy by the furnaces constitutes only one of the elements by reference to which the High Authority arrives at its decision regarding the basis of contribution. Once the investigation has been completed, the applicants are free to contest the justification for using electricity invoices for the purpose of adjusting the data taken from the declarations of scrap consumption.

4. The High Authority cannot validly order the production in Luxembourg of the documents subjected to checking

The applicants point out that the order in the letters of 27 November 1961 and in the Decisions of 23 February 1962 to send the invoices relating to the electric energy consumed to Luxembourg for the purposes of inspection is not justified. By making this demand, the High Authority has in addition infringed Articles 8, 47 and 86 of the ECSC Treaty. According to Article 8 of the Treaty, it shall be the duty of the High Authority to ensure that the objectives set out in the Treaty are attained in accordance with the provisions thereof. Article 47 of the Treaty confers on the High Authority the right to obtain information and have checks made. The right to obtain information does not include the power to order the production of documents. As for the right to make checks, it can only be exercised through inspections carried out by the officials of the High Authority at the place of business of the undertakings during normal working hours. These conditions are in accordance with Article 86 of the Treaty which confers on the inspectors of the High Authority the powers granted by the laws of the Member States to their own revenue officials, in this case the Italian revenue authorities. These powers are laid down in Decree No. 645 of the President of the Italian Republic dated 29 January 1958, in Decree-Law No 762 of 19 June 1940 relating to the general tax on turnover, in Article 37 of Law No 4021 of 24 August 1877, and in Article 13 of Law No 1608 of 17 September 1961. None of these texts allows a revenue official to order production at his office of the documents which he considers necessary for his investigations.

The applicants also pointed out in the oral procedure that it might prove to be impossible to comply with the High Authority's order for the production of invoices relating to electric energy covering the period from 1 April 1954 to 30 November 1958 because according to Italian law invoices need to be kept for only five years.

In reply, the defendant first puts forward the arguments set out in point 1 above (c.f. supra, III, B, 1), and points out secondly that Article 47 of the Treaty, in conferring on the High Authority the power to ‘obtain information’ and ‘make checks’, makes use of the widest possible terms, and it follows from this that those powers have no other limits than what is ‘necessary’ for the enquiry.

In answer to the applicants' argument that Article 47 must be interpreted in the light of Article 86 which refers to national laws — and in this case Italian law — the defendant submits that the judgment of the Court in Case 31/59, Brescia v. High Authority, excludes all possibility of any connexion between the two provisions in the sense alleged by the applicants. In that judgment, the Court stated that ‘to define the general scheme and the exact scope of the first paragraph of Article 47, there is absolutely no need to resort to the provisions of the fourth paragraph of Article 86 of the Treaty, the aim of which is in no way to define the extent of the power to obtain information and make checks but solely to make available to the High Authority the compulsory powers afforded by national revenue laws for the direct and compulsory execution by its own officials of inspections capable of affecting the area of individual liberty and of departing from the principle of the inviolability of private premises’ (Rec. 1960, pp. 172 and 173).

According to the defendant, if one were to follow the erroneous reasoning of the applicants and refer to Italian law not solely to establish the nature of the compulsory powers at the disposal of officials but also to determine the extent of the powers to obtain information and make checks, then this reasoning would destroy the applicants' argument. In fact, by Italian Law No 4021 of 24 August 1877, revenue officials ‘may summon a taxpayer to appear in person and supply explanations and proof’. It must therefore be presumed that the applicants would approve the actions of the High Authority if the latter, by using such powers and instead of restricting itself to ordering the transmission by post of the invoices and certificates, were to summon the representatives of the undertakings subject to inspection to Luxembourg and to call on them to present the invoices and certify that they fully covered the total consumption of the undertaking.

IV — Procedure

On 27 September 1962 the Court made an order joining Cases 5 to 11/62 and 13 to 15/62 for the purposes of the oral procedure and the judgment.

At its hearing on 18 October 1962, the Court, after hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur and the opinion of the Advocate-General, decided to proceed without any preparatory enquiry.

Grounds of judgment

I — As to admissibility

The parties have not objected that the procedure was in any way irregular.

The letter described by the applicants as a formal notice under Article 35 and dated 27 December 1961 was received by the High Authority on 29 December 1961. The latter took a Decision on 23 February 1962 which reached the applicants on 12 March 1962, according to their statement which was not contradicted by the defendant.

The Decision of 23 February 1962, whether or not it was considered by the High Authority as a reply to the applicants' notices, meets in fact the desire expressed by them, namely ‘to take a preliminary decision under Article 14 in which (the High Authority) gives a ruling on all the points in dispute set out in this letter’.

Without dealing expressly with all the points contained in the letter of 27 December 1961, some of which appear to be of doubtful relevance, the Decision settled, at least indirectly, the questions raised by the applicants, thus opening for them the possibility of an action under Article 33 of the Treaty.

The fact that this indirect reply differs from that sought by the applicants cannot open the way for proceedings under Article 35, because that provision would apply only if the High Authority had made no decision on the matter referred to in the applicants' notices.

The applicants, moreover, seem to share this opinion as, at the same time and with identical arguments, they have brought an action under Article 33 against the Decision in question.

The applicants allege that the period of two months provided for in Article 35 was not observed, since the Decision of 23 February 1962 did not reach them until 12 March 1962.

It is not necessary in this case to settle whether a decision within the meaning of Article 35 of the Treaty should not merely be taken but whether it should also be communicated within the period of two months, for it is not disputed that the Decision reached the applicants before they brought their action for failure to act.

In these circumstances, the applicants had no legitimate grounds for complaining of a failure to act which no longer existed at the time the actions were brought, since their legal protection was sufficiently assured by the possibility of making an application for annulment of the Decision under Article 33 of the Treaty.

Consequently, the actions for failure to act must be ruled to be inadmissible owing to lack of legal interest.

The admissibility of the applications for annulment under Article 33 of the Treaty is not disputed and in this case there is no necessity for the Court to raise the matter of its own motion.

II — On the substance of the case

The applicants allege the lack or insufficiency of grounds, infringement of the Treaty, especially of Article 47, and misuse of powers with regard to the Decisions of the High Authority of 23 February 1962. Each of these three submissions is quoted under several heads.

a) First, the applicants assert that the Decisions of 23 February 1962 are vitiated by infringement of the Treaty and misuse of powers, because they call upon the applicants to send to the High Authority the invoices relating to the various amounts of electricity consumed by them and to certify that these invoices cover the total amount of energy used. The complaint alleging infringement of Article 47 of the Treaty is not well founded. The limit of the High Authority's powers when applying Article 47 is determined by the requirements of the checks. In this case, the demands for the production of the invoices and for a certificate that the documents supplied cover the total amount of the electric energy consumed by the undertaking during the period in question do not in the circumstances constitute an excessive requirement on the part of the High Authority. Further, the complaint of misuse of powers arising from the fact that the same orders were not made by the High Authority to all undertakings is not well founded. In fact, the High Authority asserted during the oral procedure, without receiving any denial from the applicants, that all undertakings using electric furnaces had been called upon to submit to the same checks and that orders identical to those contained in the disputed Decisions were sent to all the undertakings which did not comply with that demand.

b) The applicants allege that the Decisions of 23 February 1962 are vitiated by lack of reasoning and by infringement of the Treaty, because the invoices for the consumption of electric energy do not constitute a valid means of determining the amount of scrap used. The complaints of the applicants are not well founded. In fact, according to the very terms of the Decisions of 23 February 1962, the consumption of electric energy by furnaces is only one of the factors on which the High Authority was to base its determination of the tonnages to serve as a basis for the equalization contribution. Even though, as the High Authority recognizes moreover, the consumption of electricity is not by itself sufficient to calculate the consumption of scrap, it may nonetheless be a valid basis for verification when taken with other factors. Moreover, it would have been possible for the undertakings subsequently to discuss the amount of their contribution and the bases on which it was fixed.

c) The applicants claim that these same Decisions are vitiated by lack of reasoning and by infringement of the Treaty because the powers conferred on the High Authority do not allow it to order that the documents subjected to checking be presented at Luxembourg. The complaint concerning lack of reasoning is not well founded. In fact Article 47 of the Treaty conferring on the High Authority the power to ‘obtain the information it requires’ and to ‘have any necessary checks made’ is formulated very widely. It was not absolutely necessary for particular reasons to be given for the demand for production of documents at Luxembourg. Furthermore, the complaint concerning the infringement of the Treaty is not well founded. The applicants were wrong in maintaining that the right to make checks must be limited to inspections carried out by officials of the High Authority at the place of business of the undertakings during normal working hours, in accordance with Article 86 of the Treaty, which confers on inspectors of the High Authority the powers conferred by the laws of Member States on officials of their own revenue departments — in this case the Italian revenue authorities — and that Italian law does not permit revenue officials to require that documents which they consider necessary for their investigations be sent to their offices. This argument must be rejected. The provisions of the fourth paragraph of Article 86 are not intended to define the extent of the power which is conferred on the High Authority by Article 47 of the Treaty to obtain information and to make checks; it is merely intended to put at the High Authority's disposal the compulsory powers afforded by national revenue laws for the direct and compulsory execution by its own officials of inspections capable of affecting the area of individual liberty and of departing from the principle of the inviolability of private premises. As there is no express rule on this matter in Community law, it is for the Court to determine whether the measures of investigation taken by the High Authority were excessive. In this case, and having regard to the circumstances, the demand for the production of the invoices at Luxembourg was not excessive and disproportionate to the aim in view. The inspections previously carried out on the spot by officials of the High Authority and of the Swiss Trust Company gave reasons for seriously doubting the veracity of the declarations made by certain undertakings with regard to their consumption of scrap. Consequently, checking in detail in the offices of the High Authority consituted a more adequate method and one which moreover was less likely to disturb the functioning of the undertakings concerned than fresh inspections carried out on their premises. Finally, the applicants pointed out during the oral procedure that the fact that, according to Italian law, invoices have to be kept for only five years might make it impossible for them to produce invoices for electric energy relating to the period from 1 April 1954 to 30 November 1958, as required by the High Authority. This objection raised by the applicants cannot affect the validity of the disputed Decisions. It is for the High Authority to consider whether the non-production of certain invoices is justified, taking into account the provisions of the relevant legislation and drawing the appropriate conclusions from them. For these reasons the applications against the Decisions of 23 February 1962 must be ruled to be unfounded.

III — Costs

Under Article 69 (2) of the Rules of Procedure the unsuccessful party shall be ordered to pay the costs. The applicants have failed in all their submissions and must therefore bear the costs.

On those grounds, Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur; Upon hearing the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate-General; Having regard to Articles 8, 14, 33, 35, 47 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community; Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community; Having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities;

1 Dismisses the actions for failure to act under Article 35 of the Treaty as inadmissible;

2 Dismisses the applications for annulment of the Decisions of the High Authority of 23 February 1962 as unfounded;

3 Orders the applicants to pay the costs.