Maslova v. Ukraine

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 62947/14 Antonina Mykolayivna MASLOVA against Ukraine

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 7 July 2026 as a Committee composed of:

Lorraine Schembri Orland , President , Faris Vehabović, Anne Louise Bormann , judges , and Uğur Erdal, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 62947/14) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 29 August 2014 by a Ukrainian national, Ms Antonina Mykolayivna Maslova (“the applicant”), who was born in 1956 and lives in Donetsk, and was represented by Mr D. Agranovskiy, a lawyer practising in Moscow;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their then Acting Agent, Ms O. Davydchuk, Office of the Government Agent, Ministry of Justice;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1 The factual background relevant for the present case is presented in detail in the admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.) [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 2 others, §§ 690-95, 30 November 2022) and the judgment in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ([GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, § 331, 9 July 2025). In particular, in April 2014 the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”) and the “Luhansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”) were declared in Donetsk and Luhansk by groups of separatists and, as of 11 May 2014, all areas in the hands of separatists were under “DPR” and “LPR” control and remained under the effective control of the Russian Federation. A chronology of the conflict in the relevant parts of the east of Ukraine can be found in the above-mentioned judgment (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia , cited above, §§ 35-63).

2 The applicant alleged that on 9 August 2014 artillery shelling carried out by Ukrainian governmental military forces had destroyed the flat she had owned in Donetsk and in which she had lived.

The applicant submitted copies of her passport, inheritance certificate, ownership certificate in respect of the flat, household register, certificate of damage and photos of the damaged flat.

3 Relying on Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention, she complained that she could not effectively exercise the rights guaranteed by these provisions because all State institutions in the east of Ukraine, including the courts, had suspended their work and had been relocated to government‑controlled territory.

4 She also complained under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that she had been forced to change her place of residence on account of the alleged destruction of her property. She did not indicate where she had been forced to relocate, nor did she submit any supporting evidence in this regard.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

5 . The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, which had been effective and accessible to residents of the occupied territories. They also indicated and provided evidence thereto that the applicant had regularly travelled from Donetsk to government‑controlled territory. They also submitted that following the application being notified to them by the Court, on 10 November 2018 the domestic investigative authorities had proprio motu launched a criminal investigation into the complaints raised by the applicant. No other information thereto was provided.

6 . The applicant complained that her apartment had been destroyed as a result of the military operation by the Ukrainian authorities and therefore she could not live in her home anymore. She alleged that she had had no domestic remedies available in that regard and that in any event there was no evidence she could have provided to the Ukrainian authorities in support of her claims that would have been accepted by them in their investigation.

7 The Court emphasises the subsidiary nature of the Convention system and the requirement that an applicant must first give national authorities the opportunity to address alleged violations (see A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], no. 25579/05, § 142, 16 December 2010). The general principles on exhaustion are set out in Vučković and Others v. Serbia ((preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69–77, 25 March 2014).

8 In the present case, the relevant provisions of domestic law and practice, as summarised in Ryashentseva and Others v. Ukraine ((dec.), nos. 54680/15 and 3 others, §§ 10-16, 9 September 2025), indicate, essentially, that Ukraine established legal frameworks and specialised units capable of investigating shelling incidents (ibid., §§ 41-49) similar to those described in the present case.

9 The applicant, however, has made no attempt to address her complaints, all directed against Ukraine, to the relevant domestic courts, albeit relocated from Donetsk, in particular having regard to the fact that the applicant regularly travelled to government-controlled territory (see paragraph 5 above). In that connection, the Court has already found that courts relocated by Ukraine from Donetsk were operational and accessible (ibid., §§ 54-55; see also Tsezar and Others v. Ukraine , nos. 73590/14 and 6 others, §§ 53, 55 and 70, 13 February 2018).

10 On the basis of the above, the Court has not found any fact or argument in the applicant’s complaints capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion than that in Ryashentseva and Others (cited above), which concerned issues similar to those in the present case.

11 Furthermore, in relation to the investigation launched proprio motu by the Ukrainian authorities into the incidents complained of by the applicant shortly after the application was notified to the respondent Government (see paragraph 5 above), the Court must take into account the applicant’s general submissions as to the lack of effectiveness of any such investigation (see paragraph 6 above). Noting therefore the applicant’s failure to cooperate in any way with the Ukrainian investigative authorities in the criminal investigation initiated by them in 2018, or to submit any potentially useful evidentiary material therein, the alleged lack of an effective investigation into the circumstances relied on by the applicant in the present case cannot be held imputable to the respondent State mainly owing to the applicant’s own failure to display due diligence in her dealings with the authorities and to pursue her complaints before them (see, mutatis mutandis , Bekoyeva and Others v. Georgia (dec.), nos. 48347/08 and 3 others, §§ 48-49, 5 October 2021).

12 The Court, having regard to the facts above and considering the applicant’s failure to make at least some attempt to have recourse to the existing domestic remedies prior to applying to the Court, finds that her complaints raised under Articles 6, 13 and 8 (right to a home) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention are inadmissible under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.

13 In so far as her complaint relating to the forced relocation may be regarded as raising separate issues to those relating to the applicant’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 8 (right to a home), it should be noted that the applicant provided no evidence to show that she had in fact relocated (see Lisnyy and Others v. Ukraine and Russia (dec.), no. 5355/15, §§ 25-31, 5 July 2016). The complaint in that respect is therefore unsubstantiated and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 10 September 2026.

Uğur Erdal Lorraine Schembri Orland Acting Deputy Registrar President