Trifunovski and Jakshovski v. North Macedonia
Remainder inadmissible (Article 35-3-a - Manifestly ill-founded); No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings; Article 6-1 - Impartial tribunal)
Berörda konventionsartiklar
SECOND SECTION
CASE OF TRIFUNOVSKI AND JAKSHOVSKI v. NORTH MACEDONIA
(Applications nos. 5074/20 and 39826/20)
Art 6 § 1 (civil) • Impartial tribunal • Alleged lack of impartiality of second-instance Appeal Panels owing to the State Judicial Council’s extensive powers in respect of their members’ careers in professional misconduct proceedings against the applicants (former judges) • Applicants’ fears not objectively justified
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.
10 November 2026
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Trifunovski and Jakshovski v. North Macedonia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Arnfinn Bårdsen , President , Jovan Ilievski, Péter Paczolay, Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, Gediminas Sagatys, Stéphane Pisani, Juha Lavapuro , judges , and Andrea Tamietti, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications (nos. 5074/20 and 39826/20) against the Republic of North Macedonia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Mr Miroslav Trifunovski (“the first applicant”) and Mr Goce Jakshovski (“the second applicant”), Macedonians/citizens of the Republic of North Macedonia, on the dates indicated in the appended table;
the decision to give notice to the Government of North Macedonia (“the Government”) of applications;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 13 October 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1 The case concerns the alleged lack of independence and impartiality of appeal panels formed within the Supreme Court (“the Appeal Panels”), which reviewed decisions of the Judicial Council of the Republic of North Macedonia (“the SJC”) in professional misconduct proceedings against the applicants, who are former judges. The applicants complained that the Appeal Panels, being composed of judges, had not been independent and/or impartial because of the extensive powers of the SJC over judges’ careers.
THE FACTS
2 . The first applicant was born in 1946 and lived in Tetovo. He was represented before the Court by Mr D. Karev, a lawyer practising in Tetovo. Following the death of the first applicant on 14 August 2021, his son, Mr Nenad Trifunovski, informed the Court that he wished to pursue the application in his father’s stead and authorised Mr D. Karev to continue to represent him in the proceedings before the Court.
3 The second applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Ohrid. He was represented before the Court by Mr N. Loteski, a lawyer practising in Ohrid.
4 The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms D. Djonova.
5 The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.
6 The applicants were judges until 2009, when they were dismissed from judicial office with final effect. The proceedings for their dismissals were described in the case of Jakšovski and Trifunovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (nos. 56381/09 and 58738/09, §§ 7-18, 7 January 2016).
7 . In a judgment of 7 January 2016 the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the proceedings for the applicants’ dismissals, holding that the SJC had lacked the requisite impartiality. It found that the fact that members of the SJC who had carried out the preliminary inquiries and had instigated the professional misconduct proceedings against them had subsequently taken part in their dismissal decisions cast objective doubt on the impartiality of those members (ibid., §§ 44-45 and point 3 of the operative provisions). The Court further declared admissible the applicants’ complaints that the Appeal Panels which had decided their appeals against the SJC’s decisions had not been independent and impartial vis-à-vis the SJC, being composed of judges whose careers had been dependent on the SJC. However, it considered that it was not necessary to examine that issue separately (ibid., § 47 and point 4 of the operative provisions).
8 . On 15 February 2018 the SJC allowed the applicants’ requests for the reopening of the proceedings.
9 . On 10 September 2019 the SJC established professional misconduct on the part of the first applicant. It referred to section 94 of the 2006 SJC Act as amended in 2010 (“the 2010 SJC Act”, see paragraph 19 below). It noted that the first applicant had in the meantime retired, and, consequently, could not be dismissed.
10 . On 12 November 2019 the SJC dismissed the second applicant for professional misconduct with effect from the date on which his initial dismissal had become final (see Jakšovski and Trifunovski , cited above, §§ 11 and 12).
11 . The applicants appealed against the SJC’s decisions. In his appeal, the second applicant argued that the Appeal Panel could not be independent and impartial, given that its members’ careers entirely depended on the SJC.
12 . On 4 December 2019 and 29 January 2020, respectively, the plenary of the Supreme Court determined the compositions of two Appeal Panels which were to decide the applicants’ appeals. It based its decision in the first applicant’s case on section 96 of the 2006 SJC Act, as amended in 2018 (“the 2018 SJC Act”; see paragraph 20 below and Gerovska-Popchevska v. North Macedonia (no. 2) , no. 30989/20, § 34, 5 May 2026), and in the second applicant’s case on section 72 of the 2019 SJC Act (see paragraph 21 below and Ilievska and Zdraveva v. North Macedonia , nos. 19689/21 and 42794/22, § 39, 13 November 2025).
13 . On 25 December 2019 and 21 February 2020 the Appeal Panels, referring to section 96 of the 2010 SJC Act (see paragraph 19 below), dismissed the applicants’ appeals, respectively, and upheld the decisions of the SJC referred to in paragraphs 9 and 10 above. The Appeal Panel in the second applicant’s case found that his arguments about the alleged lack of independence and impartiality of the Appeal Panel (see paragraph 11 above) concerned the statutory provisions regulating its establishment and that it had no jurisdiction to assess the compliance of those provisions with the Convention. The decision of 21 February 2020 was served on the second applicant on 4 March 2020.
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
14 . The relevant provisions of the Constitution and the corresponding amendments were presented in Ilievska and Zdraveva (cited above, §§ 29 and 31-36) , K.M. v. North Macedonia (no. 59144/16, § 17, 4 March 2025), and Vlaisavljevikj v. North Macedonia (no. 23215/21, § 18, 25 June 2024).
15 . Most of the relevant Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court, in force until 1 September 2024, have been summarised in Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia (nos. 11811/20 and 13550/20, §§ 26 and 30, 13 December 2022).
16 . In addition, under Rule 27, the Constitutional Court could stay the enforcement of individual decisions taken on the basis of a law or regulation which was subject to constitutional review, if the enforcement could cause consequences which would be difficult to remedy. In such cases, the Constitutional Court was obliged to finalise the proceedings as soon as possible. Under Rule 73, in deciding whether to strike down a law, regulation or other general act with an ex tunc or an ex nunc effect, the Constitutional Court was to take into consideration all circumstances relevant to the protection of constitutionality and legality, and in particular the seriousness and nature of the violation and its significance for the exercise of citizens’ rights and freedoms, for the legal relations established on the basis of such acts, for legal certainty, and any other circumstances relevant to its decision. The enforcement of final individual decisions adopted on the basis of a law or regulation quashed by the Constitutional Court was not permitted, and if enforcement had already started then it would be discontinued (Rules 80 and 81). Rule 81 further provided that every person whose right was violated by a final individual decision based on a law or regulation quashed ex tunc ( поништен ) by the Constitutional Court was entitled to seek the quashing of the individual decision in question; if this did not remove the consequences of the application of the law, the Constitutional Court could order restitutio in integrum , payment of compensation or other measures.
17 . The relevant provisions of the Courts Act (Official Gazette nos. 58/06, 35/2008 and 150/10, “the 2010 Courts Act”) read as follows:
Section 1
“Judicial power shall be exercised by the courts ...
The courts are independent State bodies.
...”
Section 6(2)
“In the determination of civil rights and obligations, and in the determination of a criminal charge, everyone has the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
...”
Section 11
“A judge must decide impartially and on the basis of the law ...
Any form of influence over the independence and impartiality of a judge in the performance of his [or her] judicial function[s], for any reason and by anyone, is prohibited.
...”
Section 38
“... A judge is appointed with no [time-] limit on his or her term of office.
...”
18 . The 2006 SJC Act was amended in 2010, 2011, 2015, 2017 and 2018.
19 . The relevant provisions of the SJC Act as amended in 2010 (“the 2010 SJC Act”) read as follows:
Section 94
“[The SJC] shall dismiss a judge ... for [professional misconduct] ... in the circumstances set out in ... the Courts Act.”
Right to appeal
Section 96
“Against a decision of [the SJC] for dismissal or for disciplinary sanctions [against a judge], the judge has the right to appeal before [the Appeal Panel] set up within the Supreme Court, within eight days from the day of receipt of [the SJC’s] decision.
[The Appeal Panel] shall be composed of nine members, three of whom shall be judges of the Supreme Court, four judges shall be from the appeals courts and two judges shall be from the court where the judge against whom the proceeding were conducted sat as a judge.
The President of the Supreme Court may not be a member of [the Appeal Panel].
[The Appeal Panel] may confirm or quash [the SJC’s] decision...”
20 . Pursuant to section 52 of the 2018 amendments to the 2006 SJC Act, the 2018 amendments applied to dismissal and disciplinary proceedings initiated under the previous versions of the SJC Act. The relevant provisions of the 2006 SJC Act as amended in 2018 (“the 2018 SJC Act”), including section 96 which regulated the right to appeal against a decision of the SJC, were presented in Gerovska-Popchevska (no. 2) (cited above, § 34).
21 . On 30 May 2019 a new Act on the SJC (“the 2019 SJC Act”) entered into force, replacing the 2006 SJC Act and its amendments. Its relevant provisions, including section 72 which regulated the right to appeal, were presented in Ilievska and Zdraveva (cited above, § 39). In 2025 the 2019 SJC Act was replaced by a new SJC Act.
22 . Under section 9-a of the Obligations Act, every person has the right to the protection of his or her personal rights ( лични права ), which include the right to life, physical and mental health, honour, reputation, dignity, personal name, privacy of personal and family life, freedom, intellectual creativity, and other personal rights.
23 . Section 189 allows a person whose personal rights have been violated to claim compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
24 . On 15 September 2010 in its decision У.бр.56/2010-1 the Constitutional Court struck down with ex nunc effect certain provisions of the then-applicable Rules on professional misconduct proceedings against judges. By decisions У.бр.20/96-0-0 of 9 October 1996 and У.бр.12/2011-1 of 29 February 2012, the Constitutional Court struck down with ex nunc effect provisions of the Courts Acts in force at the material time.
25 . By final judgments ГЖ-2315/19 of 24 December 2019 and ГЖ ‑ 3091/20 of 16 December 2021, the Skopje Court of Appeal, relying on sections 9-a and 189 of the Obligations Act (see paragraphs 22 and 23 above), awarded with final effect compensation for non-pecuniary damage to former judges who had been dismissed in proceedings in respect of which the Court had found violations of Article 6 of the Convention (see Poposki and Duma v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , nos. 69916/10 and 36531/11, 7 January 2016, and Mitrinovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , no. 6899/12, 30 April 2015).
26 . The Government submitted information according to which, in the period between 2006-2021, 52 of the appeals lodged with appeal panels against the SJC’s decisions were dismissed and eight were upheld with the cases being remitted for rehearing by the SJC.
27 In Opinion (CDL-AD(2018)022), adopted in October 2018, the European Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe (Venice Commission) addressed, inter alia , the composition of Appeal Panels regulated with the 2018 SJC Act (see paragraph 20 above). The relevant part of the Opinion read as follows (emphasis in the original, footnotes omitted):
“37. The need to provide for an appeal to a court against the decision of a disciplinary body (in this case, [the SJC]) has been stressed by the Venice Commission and by some other international bodies. Thus, for example, the CCJE, in its Opinion no. 3 considers that “the arrangements regarding disciplinary proceedings in each country should be such as to allow an appeal from the initial disciplinary body (whether that is itself an authority, tribunal or court) to a court” (p. 72). The Committee of Ministers in its Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 indicates, in p. 69, that the judge should be able to challenge the decision in a disciplinary case (without indicating, however, whether this means an appeal to a court of law or to another body). Thus, the availability of an appeal to a judicial body against the decisions of [the SJC] in disciplinary sanctions appears to be in line with the European standards.
...
40 The third question relates to the composition of [the Appeal Panel]. The 2015 opinion observed that “entrusting the power to a permanent court of law (instead of an ad hoc body) would probably be a preferable solution” (§ 96). In the old version of [section 96 of the SJC Act], the method of selection of [the Appeal Panel] was not defined. The Venice Commission noted that “it is very important that the composition of the appellate judicial body be predetermined by law” (§ 96). Now the law describes that the members of [the Appeal Panel] are to be selected by lot at a plenary session of the Supreme Court and other relevant courts. Indeed, [the Appeal Panel] remains, to some extent, an ad hoc body, but now there is more certainty for the participants of the procedure about how it is to be formed. The selection of its members by drawing lots (if conducted fairly) reduces the risk of manipulations, and the fact that judges of all levels are represented ensures that it will reflect the broad range of opinions within the judiciary. So, one may conclude that this amendment goes in the right direction.”
THE LAW
28 Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.
29 In reply to the Government’s observations, the first applicant complained about the length and outcome of the proceedings against him described in paragraphs 8-13 above and the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the SJC to establish professional misconduct on the part of retired judges. He further argued that the Minister of Justice had been a member of the SJC when the latter had decided his case and that he had not had access to the documents in the case file. The second applicant further submitted that his request to adjourn a hearing during the proceedings before the SJC had not been accepted. The Court notes that these grievances were not part of the complaints raised in the applicants’ application forms which were communicated to the Government, nor do they constitute an elaboration on those complaints. The Court will therefore not examine them separately (compare, for example, Ribarev v. North Macedonia , no. 39987/22, § 61, 13 November 2025).
30 The applicants complained that the members of the Appeal Panels had not been independent and/or impartial as regards the SJC, in view its extensive powers over judges’ careers. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
31 . The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to claim damages under sections 9-a and 189 of the Obligations Act (see paragraphs 22 and 23 above) following the Court’s judgment of 7 January 2016 (see Jakšovski and Trifunovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , nos. 56381/09 and 58738/09, 7 January 2016; see also paragraph 7 above). The practice of the civil courts (see paragraph 25 above) confirmed the effectiveness of that remedy.
32 . The Government further contended that the applicants should have challenged the constitutionality of the provisions of the SJC Act which had regulated the composition of the Appeal Panels and the jurisdiction of the SJC, an option available to them pursuant to Article 110 of the Constitution (see Vlaisavljevikj v. North Macedonia , no. 23215/21, § 18, 25 June 2024) and the relevant Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). They referred to the case-law of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 24 above), which confirmed that that court had previously struck down as unconstitutional certain statutory provisions related to the subject matter of the applicants’ cases. In such cases, the person concerned could subsequently seek the reversal of individual decisions taken under those provisions, as well as restitutio in integrum and compensation. The applicants had not raised, even in substance, any complaints under Article 13 of the Convention.
33 The Government further submitted that the applicants had failed to comply with the six-month rule applicable at the time when they had lodged their applications. Namely, they had awaited for the outcome of the proceedings before the Appeal Panels, which had not had competence to address the complaint concerning the alleged lack of independence of their members vis-à-vis the SJC (see paragraph 13 in fine above).
34 . Lastly, the Government submitted that the first applicant’s son (see paragraph 2 above) had no standing to pursue the application in his father’s place, as the alleged violation concerned a right of a personal nature.
35 The first applicant contested the Government’s objections. The second applicant did not comment on them.
36 The Court must firstly ascertain whether it has jurisdiction to consider the applicants’ applications without encroaching on the prerogatives of the respondent State and the Committee of Ministers under Article 46 of the Convention. It must also examine whether the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention were applicable to the reopened professional misconduct proceedings against the first applicant, who was no longer a sitting judge when those proceedings ended. These matters go to the Court’s jurisdiction, which is therefore obliged to examine them of its own motion (see Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, § 107, 1 June 2023, and Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (no. 2) , no. 3324/19, § 54 and 55, 13 February 2024).
37 The Committee of Ministers’ role in the sphere of execution of the Court’s judgments does not prevent the Court from examining a fresh application concerning measures taken by a respondent State in the execution of a judgment if that application contains relevant new information relating to issues undecided by the initial judgment (see Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, § 33, ECHR 2015; Serrano Contreras v. Spain (no. 2) , no. 2236/19, § 24, 26 October 2021; and Mehmet Zeki Doğan , cited above, § 56). Whether there is a “new issue” very much depends on the specific circumstances of the case in question, and distinctions between cases are not always clear-cut (see Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], no. 19867/12, § 47 (d), 11 July 2017).
38 The applicants’ complaints in the present case relate to an alleged lack of independence and/or impartiality of the Appeal Panels which heard their cases, following their successful applications to have the earlier dismissal proceedings against them reopened. The Court considers that these complaints involve “new issues” which do not concern the legal issues examined in Jakšovski and Trifunovski (cited above), namely the lack of impartiality of the SJC which had initially dismissed the applicants from judicial office (see paragraph 7 above). The Court therefore concludes that it is not prevented by Article 46 from examining the applicants’ complaints as raised in their present applications nos. 5074/20 and 39826/20.
39 The relevant general principles concerning the applicability of Article 6 under its civil limb were recently summarised in the case of Gerovska-Popchevska v. North Macedonia (no. 2) (no. 30989/20, § 47, 5 May 2026).
40 The Court observes that the first applicant’s case did not concern his dismissal from his judicial post, as he had in the meantime retired, but rather concerned the SJC’s finding that he had committed professional misconduct while he was performing his judicial functions (see paragraph 9 above, and compare Gerovska-Popchevska (no. 2) , cited above, § 48). The Court considers that the SJC’s finding concerned the first applicant’s personal integrity and professional competence as a former judge, and had a direct impact on his social and professional reputation (ibid, §§ 48-50; see also Skrcheski v. North Macedonia , no. 37954/21, §§ 31-33, 12 May 2026, with further references). The professional misconduct proceedings against the first applicant therefore directly concerned his civil right to enjoy a good reputation. The Court concludes that the civil limb of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is applicable to the first applicant’s case.
41 In ruling on whether an applicant has complied with the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies having regard to the specific circumstances of the case, the Court must first identify the act of the respondent State’s authorities complained of by the applicant (see Kitanovska and Barbulovski v. North Macedonia , no. 53030/19, § 41, 9 May 2023, with further references). The Court further refers to the general principles regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies set out in Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 21881/20, §§ 138-45, 27 November 2023). In particular, to be effective, a remedy must be capable of directly redressing the impugned state of affairs and must offer reasonable prospects of success (ibid., § 139). There is no obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (ibid., § 141).
42 The Government’s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies is twofold: firstly, that the applicants did not make a claim for compensation for the alleged violation of their personal rights, and secondly, that they did not apply to the Constitutional Court for a review on whether the provisions of the SJC Act which had regulated the composition of the Appeal Panels and the jurisdiction of the SJC (see paragraphs 31 and 32 above).
43 . The Court has previously accepted that a compensation claim under the Obligations Act could be an effective remedy for a violation of certain rights under the Convention (see Vraniskoski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 39168/03, 22 June 2010, concerning a complaint under Article 8 of the Convention; see also, for illustrative purposes, Bekir and Others v. North Macedonia (dec.) [Committee], no. 46889/16, §§ 34 and 35, 24 June 2021, raising an Article 3 complaint concerning the allegedly traumatising effect of the demolition of the applicants’ homes, and the cases cited therein). However, those cases did not concern complaints that a domestic court had not been independent and/or impartial, which is the gist of the applicants’ complaint in the present case. The domestic practice to which the Government referred concerns cases in which the domestic courts awarded compensation following violations previously found by the Court (see paragraph 25 above). In the case of Jakšovski and Trifunovski (cited above, §§ 46-47), the Court did not consider it necessary to examine separately the complaint concerning the alleged lack of independence and/or impartiality of the Appeal Panels, raised in the present case. In other words, the violation found in the case of Jakšovski and Trifunovski (cited above) did not concern the complaint raised by the applicants in the present applications. No examples of domestic case-law have been submitted in which, in circumstances similar to those in the present case, the domestic courts awarded compensation without the Court previously having found a violation. In such circumstances, the Court does not find that a civil compensation claim brought under sections 9-a or 189 of the Obligations Act (see paragraphs 22 and 23 above) would have succeeded in the applicants’ cases (compare, mutatis mutandis , Janakieski v. North Macedonia , nos. 57325/19 and 16291/20, § 59, 14 November 2023).
44 . The Court is also not persuaded that it would have been adequate or effective in this case for the applicants to have applied for a review of whether the provisions of the SJC Act, which regulated the composition of the Appeal Panels and the jurisdiction of the SJC, were constitutional. Firstly, it could not be expected from the applicants to challenge the constitutionality of the provisions regulating the composition of the Appeal Panels before those provisions became relevant to them, that is, before the SJC adopted its decision in the reopened proceedings. Secondly, if the applicants challenged the relevant provisions after the SJC’s decision was adopted, it cannot be anticipated whether the constitutional review proceedings would be completed before the Appeal Panels decided the applicants’ cases, which took approximately three-and-a-half months (see paragraphs 9, 10 and 13 above). Whereas the Constitutional Court could in the meantime stay the enforcement of individual decisions taken on the basis of a legislation which was subject to constitutional review (see Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court, cited in paragraph 16 above), it has not been demonstrated that it could suspend the appeal proceedings in the professional misconduct proceedings in which an individual decision had not yet been taken. Thirdly, even in the case of an ex post finding of unconstitutionality of those provisions, it does not appear that there were reasonable prospects of the said provisions being struck down with ex tunc effect so as to allow the applicants the possibility, provided under Rule 81 of the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 16 above), to seek the removal of the consequences of their application. Indeed, the examples provided by the Government (see paragraph 24 above) in the present case concern striking down of certain provisions with ex nunc effect. The Court therefore does not find that an application for a constitutional review would have been capable of remedying the situation complained about (compare and contrast Mendrei v. Hungary (dec.), no. 54927/15, § 35, 19 June 2018). In so far as the Government’s objection concerns a potential constitutional review of the provisions of the SJC Act regulating the jurisdiction of the SJC concerning careers of judges, that jurisdiction is regulated with the Constitution (see Amendment XXIX to the Constitution, cited in Ribarev , cited above, § 33). A constitutionality challenge would therefore not likely have a prospect of success. The applicants were therefore not required to seek that remedy before lodging their application with the Court (compare, mutatis mutandis , Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia , nos. 11811/20 and 13550/20, §§ 54-56, 13 December 2022, and Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC], nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13, §§ 77-82, 17 May 2016).
45 The Government’s objection as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must therefore be dismissed.
46 . Article 35 § 1 cannot be interpreted so as to require an applicant to inform the Court of his complaint before his position in the matter has been finally settled at the domestic level, otherwise the principle of subsidiarity would be breached (see, among many other authorities, Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], no. 36480/07, § 65, 11 December 2018). The Court therefore finds it reasonable for the applicants in the present case to have waited for the final resolution of the professional misconduct proceedings against them before making their application to the Court (compare, mutatis mutandis , Vlaisavljevikj , cited above, § 33). The Appeal Panel issued a final decision in the first applicant’s case on 25 December 2019 (see paragraph 13 above) and his application to the Court was lodged on 15 January 2020. The second applicant’s appeal was dismissed by the Appeal Panel’s decision of 21 February 2020, which was served on him on 4 March 2020 (ibid.), and his application was lodged on 2 September 2020. Accordingly, both applicants complied with the then applicable six-month time-limit.
47 The Government’s objection under this head must therefore be dismissed.
48 Where the applicant has died after an application was lodged, the Court has accepted that the next of kin or heir may in principle pursue the application, provided that he or she has sufficient interest in the case (see, among other authorities, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 97, ECHR 2014, with further references, and Petrov ić v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , no. 30721/15, § 15, 22 June 2017). Also, human rights cases before the Court generally have a moral dimension and persons near to an applicant may thus have a legitimate interest in ensuring that justice is done, even after the applicant’s death (see Karastelev and Others v. Russia , no. 16435/10, § 51, 6 October 2020).
49 The Court considers that the first applicant’s son, Mr Nenad Trifunovski, who expressed his intention to continue the proceedings (see paragraph 2 above), has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the application is pursued on behalf of his father. The Court therefore concludes that the first applicant’s son has standing to continue the proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis , Petrović , cited above, § 16) and dismisses the Government’s corresponding objection (see paragraph 34 above).
50 The Court finds that the applicants’ complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.
51 The applicants submitted that the judges in the respondent State, including those sitting on the Appeal Panels, and with the exception of the judges of the Constitutional Court, were entirely dependent on the SJC, as the latter was responsible for their appointment, dismissal and promotion. The first applicant further submitted that six of the nine judges on the Appeal Panel in his case sat in courts lower than the Supreme Court and their promotion was within the remit of the SJC.
52 . The Government submitted that both the SJC and the Appeal Panels were independent and impartial tribunals established by law (the Constitution and the SJC Act). The 2018 SJC Act applied to the applicants’ cases, pursuant to section 52 of the 2018 amendments to the 2006 SJC Act (see paragraph 20 above). The SJC had a balanced structure in which the judges outnumbered the lay members. The independence of the SJC’s members was ensured by their manner of appointment and term of office, and the incompatibility of their functions with membership in a political party or with another public function or profession. The Appeal Panels had been composed of qualified judges with permanent term of office. More than 13% of the appeals lodged against the SJC’s decisions had been upheld by the Appeal Panels (see paragraph 26 above). Nothing suggested that the Appeal Panels’ members in the applicants’ cases had acted other than independently and impartially.
53 The Court refers to the general principles concerning judicial independence and impartiality summarised in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal ([GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, §§ 144-50, 6 November 2018) and Denisov v. Ukraine ([GC], no. 76639/11, §§ 60-65, 25 September 2018).
54 In Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine (no. 21722/11, § 130, ECHR 2013) and Denisov (cited above, § 79), the Court found that in view of the structural shortcomings and the appearance of bias in the procedure before the Ukrainian High Council of Justice, judges of the Higher Administrative Court who had considered the applicants’ cases on appeal and who could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings before the High Council of Justice could not have demonstrated the requisite independence and impartiality. Subsequently, in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá (cited above, § 163) and Donev v. Bulgaria (no. 72437/11, § 96, 26 October 2021), in the absence of a finding of such deficiencies in first-instance proceedings, the Court assessed whether there had been any specific evidence or concrete elements of lack of impartiality, such as, for instance, the existence of pending disciplinary proceedings against members of the benches that had examined the applicants’ appeals or concrete elements of lack of impartiality.
55 Turning to the present case, the Court notes at the outset the Government’s argument that the 2018 SJC Act applied to the applicants’ cases (see paragraph 52 above). Whereas in the first applicant’s case the SJC referred to a provision of the 2010 SJC Act (see paragraph 9 above), it did not make an express finding as to which SJC Act was applicable (contrast Gerovska-Popchevska , cited above, § 61, in which in circumstances similar to those in the present case the SJC had expressly found that the 2018 SJC Act had been applicable). The Government’s argument also appears consistent with section 97(10) of the 2018 SJC Act (ibid., § 34), under which professional misconduct proceedings which have been reopened following a judgment of the Court were to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the 2018 SJC Act. Given this, the Court must accept the Government’s argument that the 2018 SJC Act applied to the applicants’ cases.
56 The Court recently assessed the structural features of the SJC governed by the 2018 SJC Act (ibid, §§ 61-66). Taking into account the guarantees of independence and impartiality provided for in domestic law (ibid., §§ 63 and 65), it found that the SJC was a “tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (ibid., § 67). For the same reasons as those set out in Gerovska-Popchevska (cited above), the Court cannot find that there were any structural deficiencies in the proceedings before the SJC in the present case. Furthermore, the applicants have not submitted any convincing arguments that there was any appearance of bias in those proceedings. The Court will therefore assess whether there were any specific evidence or concrete elements of lack of impartiality in the proceedings before the Appeal Panels.
57 The Court observes that the Appeal Panels in the applicants’ cases were established under section 96 of the 2018 SJC Act and section 72 of the 2019 SJC Act (see paragraph 12 above; see also Gerovska-Popchevska , cited above, § 34, and Ilievska and Zdraveva v. North Macedonia , nos. 19689/21 and 42794/22, § 39, 13 November 2025). Under those provisions, the Appeal Panels were established separately for each case. However, they were composed exclusively of professional judges who held office for an indefinite term (see Article 99 of the Constitution and Amendment XXVI thereof, cited in Ilievska and Zdraveva , cited above, § 32). Three Appeal Panel members would be Supreme Court judges, four appellate court judges, and two judges from the court of the judge concerned. The members of Appeal Panels were selected from among the judges of the relevant courts by the drawing of lots. The President of the Supreme Court could not sit on an Appeal Panel. The Constitution (see Amendment XXV, cited in Ilievska and Zdraveva , cited above, § 31) and the Courts Act (see sections 1 and 11, paragraph 17 above) guaranteed the independence and impartiality of judges. The Court finds no reason to conclude that the structural features of the Appeal Panels in the applicants’ cases were such as to cast doubt on their independence and objective impartiality in ruling on appeals against SJC’s decisions. It also notes that the statistics submitted by the Government demonstrate that there was no blanket policy of dismissing appeals against decisions of the SJC (see paragraph 26 above).
58 As to whether there were any specific evidence of lack of impartiality, the Court observes that there have been no disciplinary proceedings in the SJC against any of the members of the Appeal Panels which decided the applicants’ appeals. Furthermore, although all judges sitting on those panels were under the SJC’s disciplinary jurisdiction and were subject to performance appraisal, three of the nine judges sitting on each of the Appeal Panels (namely those who sat in the Supreme Court) could not have been further promoted. There is nothing to suggest that the SJC used its functions of evaluating and promoting judges to influence any of the other judges sitting on the Appeal Panels in the applicants’ cases.
59 For these reasons, the Court finds that the applicants’ fears that the Appeal Panels in their cases had lacked impartiality owing to the extensive powers of the SJC in respect of the careers of their members cannot be regarded as objectively justified.
60 . Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
61 The second applicant further complained under Article 6 Convention that there had been a series of shortcomings in the proceedings before the SJC.
62 In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
63 It follows that this part of the second applicant’s application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 November 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Andrea Tamietti Arnfinn Bårdsen Registrar President
APPENDIX
No.
Application no.
Case name
Lodged on
Applicant Year of Birth Place of Residence
Represented by
1.
5074/20
Trifunovski v. North Macedonia
15/01/2020
Miroslav TRIFUNOVSKI 1946 Tetovo
Darko KAREV
2.
39826/20
Jakshovski v. North Macedonia
02/09/2020
Goce JAKSHOVSKI
1959 Ohrid
Naum LOTESKI