Fanery Ta Plyty, Pat v. Ukraine
Remainder inadmissible (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria; (Art. 35-3-a) Manifestly ill-founded; Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings; Criminal proceedings; Article 6-1 - Fair hearing); Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions); Respondent State to take individual measures (Article 46-2 - Reopening of proceedings); Respondent State to take measures of a general character (Article 46-2 - General measures); Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage; Just satisfaction)
Berörda konventionsartiklar
- artikel 35 EKMR
- artikel 35 punkt 3 led a EKMR
- artikel 6 EKMR
- artikel 6 punkt 1 EKMR
- artikel 1 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
- artikel 1 punkt 1 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
- artikel 46 EKMR
- artikel 46 punkt 2 EKMR
- artikel 41 EKMR
FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF FANERY TA PLYTY, PAT v. UKRAINE
(Application no. 51121/17)
Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Access to court • Absence of judicial review of the proportionality of the fine the Anti-Monopoly Committee of Ukraine (“ACU”), an administrative authority, imposed on the applicant company for anti-competitive practices • Legislation in force at the time left the amount of the fine to the ACU’s unfettered discretion without requiring any specific criteria to be taken into account • ACU’s failure to provide reasons why, having identified only mitigating circumstances, it imposed the maximum penalty • Domestic courts declined to review proportionality of the measure • Lack of access to a “tribunal” with full jurisdiction
Art 1 P1 • Peaceful enjoyment of possessions • Domestic law, as in force at the relevant time and as interpreted and applied in the applicant company’s case, did not meet the “quality of law” requirements • Interference not lawful
Art 46 • Execution of judgment • General measures • Respondent State to ensure that judicial review of ACU’s decisions was of sufficient scope to satisfy Art 6 requirements • Individual measures • Reopening of the proceedings if requested, most appropriate way of ending violation and affording the applicant company redress
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.
12 November 2026
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Fanery ta Plyty, PAT v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Kateřina Šimáčková , President , María Elósegui, Andreas Zünd, Diana Sârcu, Mykola Gnatovskyy, Sébastien Biancheri, Nicholas Emiliou , judges , and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 51121/17) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Ukrainian company, Fanery ta Plyty, PAT (“the applicant company”), on 10 July 2017;
the decision to give notice to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, set out in paragraph 1 below, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 13 October 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1 The case concerns proceedings brought against the applicant company for anti ‑ competitive practices. The applicant company alleged that the decisions in those proceedings had been contrary to Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto.
THE FACTS
2 The applicant company was registered in Kyiv. It was represented by Mr V.S. Bunyak, a lawyer practising in Kyiv.
3 The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko, of the Ministry of Justice.
4 The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.
5 . On 13 June 2012 the Anti ‑ Monopoly Committee of Ukraine (“the ACU”) imposed on the applicant company a fine of 15,903,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – equivalent to about 1,540,934 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) (“the first decision”). The fine represented 10% of the applicant company’s turnover for 2011, which is the maximum amount allowed under the Protection of Economic Competition Act (“the Competition Act” – see paragraph 25 below). The fine was imposed for anti ‑ competitive practices in the course of buying timber from public timber producers. The ACU found that the applicant company had conspired with other timber buyers to manipulate timber auctions in order to purchase timber at uncompetitive prices. The ACU stated that, in fixing the amount of the fine, it had had regard to the fact that it was the first time that the applicant company had breached competition law and that it had not obstructed the investigation.
6 By the same decision, the ACU also imposed fines calculated on the same basis on 11 other companies involved in concerted practices, including companies that had previously breached competition law and which had obstructed the investigation. The maximum possible fine was therefore imposed on them. With regard to three other companies, the ACU found that they had admitted their wrongdoing and had requested a reduction of their fines. On that basis, the ACU imposed fines of UAH 30,000 on them.
7 The applicant company challenged the decision on the grounds that the ACU had erred in finding that it had engaged in anti ‑ competitive practices and had taken into account inadmissible evidence (such as audio ‑ recordings of certain meetings). It argued, for example, that the association of timber processing companies in which it had participated had not coordinated anti ‑ competitive activities, and that its limited participation in the auctions had merely indicated its desire not to overpay for raw materials.
8 . On 9 October 2012 and 21 May 2013 respectively the Kyiv City Commercial Court and the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) upheld the ACU’s first decision, finding that the alleged anti ‑ competitive behaviour had been established.
9 . On 14 June 2013 the applicant company lodged a cassation appeal with the Higher Commercial Court (“the HCC”), arguing that the fine had been disproportionate and that the ACU had imposed the maximum fine despite the fact that it was its first fine for a breach of competition law and it had cooperated with the ACU’s investigation. This was contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which has been incorporated into domestic law (see paragraph 31 below). The lower courts, however, disregarded this.
10 The applicant company withdrew its appeal after the ACU reduced the fine (see below). On 14 August 2013 the HCC returned the appeal to the applicant company without consideration.
11 On 23 July 2013 the ACU reduced the fine to UAH 30,000 (“the decision to reduce the fine”) at the applicant company’s request and the applicant company paid the reduced amount. The ACU reasoned its decision to reduce the fine by the fact that the applicant company had admitted wrongdoing, had committed a violation of competition law for the first time, had taken steps to prevent future violations, was not profitable, and had incurred financial losses of UAH 8.9 million in 2012 (on turnover of UAH 122,715 million) and UAH 5.1 million in the first quarter of 2013. It also stated in detail the reasons for the applicant company’s difficult financial position (rising energy prices, the squeeze on consumer purchasing power etc.). The ACU added that the applicant company was the sole Ukrainian producer of a certain composite wood panel employing hundreds of people and would face bankruptcy in the event of the enforcement of the original fine.
12 In February 2016 the Deputy General Prosecutor of Ukraine lodged an application in the Commercial Court against the ACU, with the applicant company participating as a third party, seeking to have the decision to reduce the fine set aside. The ACU and the applicant company argued that the claim had been lodged outside the two ‑ month time ‑ limit set in the Competition Act (see paragraph 28 below).
13 . The case went through first instance and appeal proceedings and was then decided by the HCC. On 28 December 2016 the HCC quashed the Court of Appeal decision rejecting the prosecutor’s claim and upheld the first ‑ instance decision allowing the claim. The ACU decision of 23 July 2013 to reduce the fine was thus set aside. On 28 December 2016, having regard to the relevant exchange rate, the amount of the fine, as originally imposed by the ACU (see paragraph 5 above) was equivalent to EUR 570,719.
14 . The applicant company alleged, but did not provide proof, that it received the HCC decision of 28 December 2016 on 12 January 2017.
15 The HCC and the first-instance court held that the time ‑ limit set in the Competition Act did not apply to prosecutors. They considered that the general period of limitation to bring claims was three years [1] and that it had started to run on 9 October 2014 when the General Prosecutor’s Office had learnt of the ACU’s decision to reduce the fine. On the merits, they observed that the Competition Act provided for an exhaustive list of circumstances in which the ACU may reverse its decisions (see paragraph 27 below) and that there had been no such grounds in the applicant company’s case.
16 . On 17 January 2017 the applicant company lodged another cassation appeal against the lower courts’ decisions of 2012 and 2013 upholding the ACU’s initial decision (see paragraph 8 above). In its appeal, the applicant company argued as follows:
(i) It was for the lower courts to review the proportionality of the measure under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, both of which have been incorporated into domestic law (see paragraph 31 below) . Failure to conduct such a review, or the absence of the possibility to conduct such a review provided for by law, would be in breach of the relevant provisions. It referred, in that regard to the judgments in A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy (no. 43509/08, §§ 59 and 62, 27 September 2011), Silvester’s Horeca Service v. Belgium (no. 47650/99, §§ 28 and 30, 4 March 2004), and OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia (no. 14902/04, § 655, 20 September 2011).
(ii) The lower courts had not set aside the decision disregarding the fact that the ACU had imposed the maximum fine although it was the applicant company’s first fine for breaching competition law, and despite the fact that it had cooperated with the investigation. The ACU had also failed to take into account the applicant company’s real financial situation and whether the fine would force it into insolvency.
(iii) In the case of the three other companies involved in the same dispute with the ACU, in February 2013 the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal had set aside the ACU’s decision, finding that the fines imposed had been disproportionate. Divergences in the Court of Appeal’s case ‑ law were contrary to the principle of legal certainty.
(iv) The proceedings were “criminal” in nature within the meaning of the Convention. Accordingly, in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine (see paragraph 22 below) and Article 7 of the Convention ( see Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, § 108, 17 September 2009), the courts were under the obligation to apply retroactively the more lenient law, which, in the present case, were the guidelines adopted by the ACU in 2016 concerning fines (see paragraph 36 below).
(v) Referring to the setting-aside of the decision to reduce the fine, the applicant company submitted that its appeal should be accepted on the basis of an extended time-limit. It argued that the decision to reduce the fine and the subsequent withdrawal of the cassation appeal had constituted, in substance, a friendly settlement and that, when the appeal was withdrawn, it could not have known that the decision to reduce the fine would be set aside years later.
17 . On 7 March 2017 the HCC extended the time ‑ limit for appeal and accepted the new appeal for consideration.
18 . On 14 March 2017 the HCC rejected the appeal as unfounded. It held, in particular, that the lower courts had correctly established – having regard to the exclusive powers of the ACU in this area – that the applicant company had failed to disprove the ACU’s reasons for finding that it had been engaged in anti ‑ competitive practices. Moreover, the applicant company had admitted during the hearing before the HCC that it had breached competition law. Accordingly, the lower courts had correctly concluded that the ACU’s decision had been made within the limits of its authority and there were no grounds for setting it aside.
19 The HCC rejected the applicant company’s argument that the ACU had abused its powers by imposing the maximum fine since, in setting the fine, the ACU had acted within the limits of its powers and had not violated the law. It concluded that there were no grounds for setting aside the ACU’s decision, as set out in the relevant provision of the Competition Act (section 59 – see paragraph 27 below). The same was true of the assessment of the notions of “reasonability”, “correspondence between the sanction and the nature of the violation” or “reasonable balance” since those matters fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ACU, not the courts.
20 . On 5 May 2017 the Deputy Prosecutor General brought a claim against the applicant company for the recovery of UAH 15,873,000 (the amount of the fine imposed by the ACU’s first decision minus the amount paid by the applicant company pursuant to the decision to reduce the fine (UAH 30,000)) and UAH 15,903,000, corresponding to statutory interest for the delay in payment (see paragraph 26 below).
21 In the ensuing proceedings, on 13 December 2017 the HCC upheld the first-instance and appellate court judgments of 30 June and 12 September 2017 respectively, allowing the Deputy Prosecutor General’s claim. The applicant company paid the amounts stated in paragraph 20 above and, in addition, it also paid to the State Bailiffs: UAH 3,177,600 in statutory enforcement fee (representing, by law, 10% of the amount collected by Bailiffs) and UAH 1,355 in enforcement expenses.
RELEVANT DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
22 . Article 58 of the Constitution states that laws cannot be applied retroactively, except in cases where they mitigate or annul the liability of a person.
23 Section 1 of the Anti ‑ Monopoly Committee of Ukraine Act 1993 defines the ACU as a special State body with the role of ensuring State protection of competition. Sections 9 to 11 provide that the President of the ACU is appointed by the President of Ukraine, with the consent of the Parliament of Ukraine. The ACU President proposes candidates for other ACU members to the Prime Minister, who submits proposals to the President of Ukraine for appointment. AMC members are appointed for a seven ‑ year term.
24 . Section 40 of the Protection of Economic Competition Act 2001 provides that parties are entitled to familiarise themselves with materials of the case file in a competition-law case, present evidence, receive copies of decisions and lodge appeals, among other rights. Section 39 provides that the processing of competition-law cases may involve the collection of documents and expert opinions and the collection of statements from individuals involved in the case, or from any other individuals, either upon their request or on the ACU’s own initiative.
25 . Section 52(2) sets fines for anti ‑ competitive practices (of the type for which the applicant company was held liable) of up to 10% of the economic entity’s turnover for the year preceding the year in which the fine is imposed. If unlawful profit was derived from a breach, the fine can be up to three times the amount of profit made.
26 . Section 56 provides that the fines imposed by the ACU must be paid within two months and, in the event of a delay, penalty interest of 1.5% per day is payable. The penalty interest is capped at an amount equal to the fine, and no interest accrues while a claim to set aside the decision imposing the fine is pending before the courts.
27 . Section 59 provides that an ACU decision may be amended, set aside or declared invalid for the following reasons: (i) failure to establish the material circumstances of the case in full; (ii) failure to prove the material circumstances of the case that the decision treated as established; (iii) inconsistency between the conclusions drawn in the decision and the circumstances of the case; (iv) breach or incorrect application of the rules of substantive or procedural law.
28 . Section 60 provides that complainants, respondents, and third parties involved in the competition-law proceedings before the ACU have the right to challenge an ACU decision before a commercial court within two months from the date of receipt of the ACU’s decision. Section 39 of the Act sets out who is considered a party to a competition ‑ law case before the ACU: the respondent (the person that is accused of a breach of competition law), the complainant (the person that complained to the ACU of an alleged breach of competition law), and a third party (a person that the ACU decided to involve in the proceedings because the decision might substantially affect that party’s rights and interests).
29 . Article 111-7 § 1 of the Code of Commercial Procedure 1991 provides that the Court of Cassation (the Higher Commercial Court at the material time), on the basis of the established facts of the case, reviews the application of the rules of substantive and procedural law by the lower courts. Article 111-7 § 2 states that the Court of Cassation does not have the right to establish or take as established circumstances that have not been established by a lower court or were rejected by it, to decide on the reliability of evidence or the preponderance of one piece of evidence over another, to gather new evidence, or to carry out additional examinations. Article 111-7 § 3 provides that the Court of Cassation cannot accept or consider claims ( вимоги ) that have not been examined at first instance.
30 . Article 320 provides that a party to the case may request the reopening of the proceedings in his or her case in the event that an international judicial body, whose jurisdiction is accepted by Ukraine, has found a violation by Ukraine of its international obligations during the judicial examination of the case .
31 . Section 17 of the Execution of Judgments and Application of Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights Act 2006 provides that the courts, when deciding cases, must apply the Convention and its Protocols, and the Court’s case-law as a source of law.
32 Section 19 of the International Treaties Act 2004 provides that international treaties are considered to form part of domestic law and prevail over conflicting provisions of domestic legislation.
33 . The Government referred to the ruling of the Commercial Cassation Court within the Supreme Court of 15 April 2021 in case no. 910/17929/19. The Supreme Court stated that the court was obliged to verify whether the ACU had complied with the relevant legislation and whether the ACU’s decision fell within the scope of its authority as provided for by the legislation. If it finds that the grounds set out in section 59 of the Competition Act (see paragraph 27 above) have been met, the court may amend, set aside, or declare the ACU’s decision invalid, depending on the scope of the claims asserted by the claimant. Overturning the lower courts’ decisions, the Supreme Court declared the ACU’s decision in that case invalid on the following grounds set out in section 59 of the Competition Act: incomplete examination of the material circumstances of the case; lack of proof of the material circumstances of the case treated as established; and incorrect application of substantive and procedural law (specifically the Supreme Court found that the ACU had failed to examine in sufficient detail the temporal and geographical limits of the relevant cigarette market, specify which specific breaches were committed to distort the market and to create barriers to entry, failed to take into account the ACU’s decision to discontinue proceedings after its recommendations concerning the relevant markets had been taken into account).
34 The Government also referred to several other cases involving violations of competition law, in which the courts had set aside the ACU’s decisions on the grounds set out in section 59 of the Competition Act. The Government stressed that the judicial practice on reviewing the amount of the fine imposed by the ACU was well-established and consistent: domestic courts verify whether the amount of the fine exceeded the statutory upper limit of the percentage of the economic entity’s turnover for the year preceding the year in which the fine is imposed (set in section 52 of the Competition Act – see paragraph 25 above).
35 . The Higher Commercial Court, in paragraph 20.1 of its recommendations for the commercial courts concerning the examination of competition law cases (dated 26 December 2011 no. 15), stated that the Competition Act did not allow the courts to reduce fines imposed by the ACU.
36 . On 15 September 2015 the Anti ‑ Monopoly Committee enacted guidelines ( рекомендаційні роз’яснення ) on the application of the Competition Act’s provisions concerning fines. They were subsequently replaced by the guidelines of 16 February 2016 no. 6-рр and 9 August 2016 no. 39-рр. The guidelines laid down the principle of proportionality, requiring, first, that a baseline level of fines should be set and, second, for the level to be increased or decreased on the basis of any attenuating or aggravating circumstances. The baseline level must be determined on the basis of a number of factors, including the profit derived by the economic entity and the losses suffered by consumers as a result of the violation of competition law in question.
THE LAW
37 The Government raised several preliminary objections concerning the admissibility of the application as a whole.
38 The Government submitted that the application had been lodged outside the time-limit set in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Referring to 4 September 2018 as the date when the application was lodged (a date erroneously mentioned when notice of the application was given to the Government), they submitted that the application had been lodged more than six months after the final domestic decision – that is, the HCC’s decision of 14 March 2017 (see paragraph 18 above). Moreover, the Government submitted that there had already been a final decision in the case – that is, on 14 August 2013 when the applicant company withdrew its original cassation appeal, thus allowing the court decisions upholding the ACU’s first decision to become final (see paragraph 9 above). The applicant company’s belated attempt to reopen proceedings in 2017 had not affected the finality of the 2013 decision.
39 . The Government also argued that the applicant company had not exhausted effective domestic remedies. Before the lower courts it had merely contested the substance of the ACU’s findings as to the existence of anti ‑ competitive practices. It had not raised the issue of the proportionality of the fine until the cassation appeal stage. Moreover, it had not raised the argument before the domestic courts that its admission of wrongdoing had been unduly used against it, that the ACU was not a “tribunal”, or that the domestic legal framework for imposing fines was flawed.
40 . The Government also argued (see paragraph 70 below) that the applicant company did not admit fault before the ACU and did not ask for mitigation of sanctions before the ACU, which was the authority with exclusive powers in that field. Therefore, those considerations could not be grounds for overturning the ACU decision by the courts since they were not before the ACU when the decision was made. The Government stated, in general terms, that, overturning the ACU’s decision on the basis of an argument not raised before the ACU would be contrary to the legislation and case-law.
41 The applicant company responded that it had exhausted domestic remedies. In particular, there was consistent domestic case-law relating to the fact that the courts could not change the amount of the fine imposed by the ACU (see paragraph 35 above), with only the Higher Commercial Court able to depart from that position. The applicant company argued that the ACU had been obliged to take proportionality into account and that it had raised relevant arguments before the ACU, notably that only a small part of its income had been generated by the raw materials allegedly acquired in violation of competition law and that it had been experiencing financial difficulties.
42 The Court takes note of the Government’s argument that the applicant company had withdrawn its first cassation appeal against the court decisions upholding the ACU’s first decision in its case, thus allowing those decisions to become final. However, the Court observes that the appeal was withdrawn in the light of the ACU’s decision to reduce the fine. The applicant company did not complain about the situation that existed while the decision to reduce the fine was still in effect. Its grievances relate, in particular, to that decision being set aside following the reopening of the matter on the initiative of the Prosecutor General’s Office.
43 After the decision to reduce the fine had been set aside, the applicant company lodged a new cassation appeal which the High Commercial Court accepted and examined on the merits. The Court therefore considers that it is appropriate to take the date of the High Commercial Court’s decision on that appeal – that is, 14 March 2017 – as the date of the final domestic decision in the present case, except insofar as the complaint about the principle of legal certainty is concerned (see paragraph 59 below).
44 The application before the Court was lodged on 10 July 2017 – that is, less than six months after the date of the final domestic decision and therefore within the time ‑ limit in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
45 Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government’s objection in that regard.
46 The Government argued that the applicant company had not raised the issue of the proportionality of the fine imposed on it before the first-instance and appeal courts, raising it for the first time in its cassation appeal.
47 The Court does not consider it necessary to rule on whether, as a general rule, in cases concerning Ukraine raising a complaint for the first time before the Court of Cassation would meet the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies. In the particular circumstances of the present case, following the setting aside of the ACU decision to reduce the fine, the proportionality of the fine was the only issue remaining and the Higher Commercial Court extended the time-limit to lodge an appeal and accepted the cassation appeal in which the issue was raised (see paragraph 17 above).
48 . The Government did not argue that the Higher Commercial Court had been prevented from addressing the arguments raised before it on account of the provision of the Code of Commercial Procedure preventing the Court of Cassation from considering new claims that had not been considered at first instance (see paragraph 29 above). Indeed, the term “claim” under Article 111-7 § 3 of the Code appears to refer to the type of remedy claimed in the proceedings and not to the arguments raised. In the present case, the “claim” examined by both the first-instance court and the Higher Commercial Court related to the setting aside of the ACU’s decision.
49 While the Government argued that for the Higher Commercial Court to address the issue of proportionality would have been contrary to the legislation and the case-law (see paragraph 40 above), it did so only in general terms, referring to all legislation and case-law discussed in the case, rather than to any specific provision or court case which would stand for that proposition.
50 They also implied that the only way for the applicant company to argue proportionality would be to admit fault before the ACU that had the “exclusive” power to impose sanctions for competition-law violations. The Court is not convinced by this argument. It has already held, in the context of Article 10 of the Convention, that the requirement for an applicant to admit the acts of which he is accused, as a condition of claiming Convention protection, would be contrary to the right not to incriminate oneself, which lies at the heart of the notion of a fair trial protected by Article 6 (see, for example, Yılmaz and Kılıç v. Turkey , no. 68514/01, §§ 39-41, 17 July 2008, Müdür Duman v. Turkey , no. 15450/03, § 30, 6 October 2015, Zülküf Murat Kahraman v. Turkey , no. 65808/10, § 45, 16 July 2019, and Kilin v. Russia , no. 10271/12, §§ 55-58, 11 May 2021). The Court considers that, in the particular circumstances of the present case, similar considerations should apply.
51 In any event, the Court observes that non-exhaustion of domestic remedies cannot be held against an applicant if, in spite of the latter’s alleged failure to observe the forms prescribed by law, the competent authority has nevertheless examined the substance of the exact claim that he or she is bringing before the Court (see Savickis and Others v. Latvia [GC], no. 49270/11, § 140, 9 June 2022, with further references). In the present case the HCC did not consider that the applicant company was barred from raising the proportionality issue before it because of the stage at which the proceedings were (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above).
52 The applicant company did argue before both the Higher Commercial Court and this Court that the fine had been disproportionate. It asked the domestic courts to review the amount of the fine, and then lodged a complaint before this Court. In both instances, it explicitly relied on Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraphs 9 and 16 above).
53 It has therefore, sufficiently raised before the domestic courts the complaints currently raised before this Court.
54 The Court therefore rejects the Government’s objection in that regard.
55 The applicant complained that the proceedings had been in breach of Article 6 of the Convention which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law...”
56 The Government argued that Article 6 was not applicable under its criminal limb. They submitted that competition-law fines were not intended to stigmatise or incapacitate an applicant and referred to Produkcija Plus Storitveno podjetje d.o.o. v. Slovenia (no. 47072/15, §§ 41-44, 23 October 2018) and OOO Neste St. Petersburg, ZAO Kirishiavtoservice, OOO Nevskaya Toplivnaya, ZAO Transservice, OOO Faeton, OOO PTK-Service v. Russia ((dec.), nos. 69042/01 and 5 others, 3 June 2004), where the Court found that the criminal limb of Article 6 was not applicable in competition ‑ law proceedings.
57 The applicant submitted that the criminal limb of Article 6 was applicable to the proceedings and that the purpose of the fine had been punitive, not restorative. This was also evidenced by the fact that the authorities had not analysed the impact of the fines imposed on market participants or the proportionality of the fines in respect of the income derived from the relevant market. The proceedings before the ACU were called an “investigation” and had features of a classic criminal investigation: for example, intercepted communications were used as evidence. Unlike the cases cited by the Government, a substantial fine had been imposed in the present case, instead of an order to cease unlawful conduct or for the recovery of profit.
58 The applicant company argued that, by accepting the prosecutor’s claim against the decision to reduce the fine, which had been brought outside the two-month time-limit set in the Competition Act for challenges against ACU decisions (see paragraph 28 above), the domestic courts had breached domestic law and the principle of legal certainty.
59 . The Court observes that the relevant proceedings ended in the decision of the Higher Commercial Court of 28 December 2016 (see paragraph 13 above) and the complaint was lodged on 10 July 2017, that is more than six months later. The applicant company alleged, without providing proof, that it received it on 12 January 2017 (see paragraph 14 above). The Court notes that it is uncertain whether that latter assertion as to the date of receipt is true but also observes that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons.
60 There is no indication of arbitrariness or manifest unreasonableness in the domestic courts’ interpretation of domestic law to the effect that the two-month time-limit did not apply to the prosecutor’s claim, which was lodged within the general three-year limitation period established under domestic law. Indeed, section 60 of the Competition Act establishing the two-month time-limit does not mention prosecutors and, on the basis of its wording, applies only to challenges by the parties who actually participated in the proceedings before the ACU, and the prosecutor did not participate. There was thus no uncertainty on the question of which time limit applied. The applicant company did not argue that the three-year time limit was, given its length in absolute terms, incompatible as such with legal certainty and the Court will not deal with that matter.
61 The Court finds that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and should be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
62 The concept of a “criminal charge” in Article 6 § 1 is an autonomous one (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, § 122, 6 November 2018). The Court’s established case-law sets out three criteria, commonly known as the “ Engel criteria”, to be considered in determining whether or not there was a “criminal charge” (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands , 8 June 1976, § 82, Series A no. 22, and Gestur Jónsson and Ragnar Halldór Hall v. Iceland [GC], nos. 68273/14 and 68271/14, § 75, 22 December 2020). The first of these criteria is the legal classification of the offence under national law, the second is the very nature of the offence, and the third is the degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks incurring. The second and third criteria are alternative, and not necessarily cumulative. This, however, does not exclude a cumulative approach where separate analysis of each criterion does not make it possible to reach a clear conclusion as to the existence of a criminal charge (see, among other authorities, Ezeh and Connors v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39665/98 and 40086/98, § 82, ECHR 2003 ‑ X; Jussila v. Finland [GC], no. 73053/01, §§ 30 ‑ 31, ECHR 2006 ‑ XIV; and Gestur Jónsson and Ragnar Halldór Hall , cited above, §§ 75, 77-78). The fact that an offence is not punishable by imprisonment is not by itself decisive for the purposes of the applicability of the criminal limb of Article 6 of the Convention since, as the Court has pointed out on numerous occasions, the relative lack of seriousness of the penalty at stake cannot deprive an offence of its inherently criminal character (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá , cited above, § 122; Gestur Jónsson and Ragnar Halldór Hall , cited above, § 78; and Vegotex International S.A. v. Belgium [GC], no. 49812/09, § 67, 3 November 2022).
63 Having regard to the first of the above-mentioned Engel criteria, the Court observes that, under national law, the proceedings in question were classified as relating to the protection of competition rather than as “criminal”. That conclusion was not, however, conclusive.
64 As to the other two Engel criteria, the Court notes that in previous cases it has found that the criminal limb of Article 6 applied to competition ‑ law proceedings which were not classified as “criminal” under national law, but which involved the imposition of considerable fines for deterrent purposes (see Lilly France v. France (dec.), no. 53892/00, 3 December 2002, and A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy , no. 43509/08, §§ 23-24, 94-101, 27 September 2011). This approach can be contrasted with cases in which violations of competition law had led only to a declarative decision or the recovery of unlawfully obtained profit and the criminal limb of Article 6 was found not to be applicable (see Produkcija Plus Storitveno podjetje d.o.o. , § 42, and OOO Neste St. Petersburg, ZAO Kirishiavtoservice, OOO Nevskaya Toplivnaya, ZAO Transservice, OOO Faeton, OOO PTK-Service , both cited above).
65 In particular, the applicable legislation in Menarini Diagnostics (cited above, §§ 24, 40-44) shared important parallels with the relevant legislation in the present case, as it involved the imposition of penalties amounting to up to 10% of an entity’s turnover. The fine imposed on the applicant company was not intended to recover unlawfully obtained profit, nor was it set in relation to any such profit (see paragraph 25 above).
66 In the light of the above and taking into account the severity of the fine imposed on the applicant company, the Court considers that the criminal limb of Article 6 is applicable.
67 The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill ‑ founded, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.
68 The applicant company submitted that the ACU was not a “tribunal”, that it had not had access to a court with full jurisdiction and that domestic law did not allow for the courts to review the amount of the fine imposed. The applicant company’s admission of wrongdoing, which was part of an agreement with the ACU in exchange for a reduced fine, had been used against it even though the reduced fine had in the meantime been annulled and the initial fine reinstated.
69 The Government submitted that the Anti-Monopoly Committee was an executive body with a special status, not a “tribunal”. However, the applicant company had been afforded procedural guarantees before the ACU, including the right to be informed of the case against it in advance and the right to present its arguments. Furthermore, the ACU’s decision had been subject to multi-tier review by courts which had full jurisdiction. The Court’s own definition of “full jurisdiction” was autonomous and required “sufficient review”, rather than requiring that the domestic court substitute its own assessment for that of the relevant authority. The courts’ review in the present case complied with that definition, even though they could not interfere with the ACU’s discretionary power. The courts had the power to verify whether the ACU’s decisions had been taken in compliance with the law and to amend them or declare them invalid. This included cases where the material facts of the case had not been fully established, there was a discrepancy between the ACU’s conclusions and the established facts, or there was an error of substantive or procedural law. When reviewing the amount of the fines, the courts had the authority to verify whether they were within the limits set by domestic legislation and whether the ACU had taken permissible factors into account.
70 The Government also submitted that, in the course of the proceedings, the applicant company had changed its litigation strategy on numerous occasions. The case did not demonstrate any structural deficiency in the legal system but the applicant company had deliberately used mutually exclusive strategies that depended on the situation. This was contrary to the requirement to act in good faith. The Government also made submissions summarised in paragraph 40 above: the applicant company did not admit to having breached the competition law before the ACU and did not plead for mitigation of penalties before the ACU which had exclusive powers in this field, those considerations could not be grounds for overturning the ACU decision by the courts since they were not before the ACU when the decision was made. In those circumstances, overturning the ACU’s decision on the basis of an argument not raised before the ACU would be contrary to the legislation and case-law. Moreover, the court of cassation, before which the argument was raised for the first time, had limited powers of review and could not, moreover, decide questions of fact. The new arguments raised by the applicant company before the court of cassation had amounted to a request for the case to be reviewed in its entirety.
71 The Court observes at the outset that it has not been alleged that the Anti-Monopoly Committee was a “tribunal” for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention. The parties agreed that it was an executive authority. The Court sees no reason in the file to find otherwise.
72 The Court reiterates that while entrusting the prosecution and punishment of minor offences to administrative authorities is not inconsistent with the Convention, the person concerned must have an opportunity to challenge any decision before a tribunal that affords the guarantees of Article 6 and has full jurisdiction ( see Öztürk v. Germany , 21 February 1984, § 56, Series A no. 73; Flisar v. Slovenia , no. 3127/09, § 33, 29 September 2011, and SA-Capital Oy v. Finland , no. 5556/10, § 72, 14 February 2019).
73 The characteristics of a judicial body with full jurisdiction include the power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and law, the decision of the administrative body. It must have jurisdiction to examine all questions of fact and law relevant to the dispute before it ( see Grande Stevens and Others v. Italy , nos. 18640/10 and 4 others, § 139, 4 March 2014).
74 In the present case, there is no indication that the courts exercised any control over the proportionality of the penalty imposed (see Silvester’s Horeca Service v. Belgium , no. 47650/99, § 28, 4 March 2004, and contrast A. Menarini Diagnostics , cited above, §§ 63-67, where such control was exercised and the penalty was reduced).
75 . The applicable legislation provided for a range of possible penalties, but did not establish how those penalties should be graduated and did not explicitly require a proportionate approach (contrast Malige v. France , 23 September 1998, §§ 49-51, Reports 1998-VII, in which the legislation itself made provision for the proportionality of the sanction by ensuring that the number of points deducted from the offender’s licence corresponded to the seriousness of the traffic offence committed by the accused and, in view of this, the Court found a review conducted by the domestic courts sufficient).
Nor is there any indication that the legislation was structured in a way that incorporated the requirement of proportionality into the scale of sanctions provided by the legislation (contrast Segame SA v. France , no. 4837/06, §§ 59 and 60, ECHR 2012 (extracts), in which the legislation fixed the rate of a tax fine at 25% of the unpaid tax and the Court found no violation of Article 6 § 1 even though the domestic courts had lacked the authority to reduce the fine, and see also, concerning mechanisms through which respect for proportionality can be ensured in the domestic legal system : Advisory opinion on the proportionality of a tax fine calculated at a statutorily fixed rate [GC] request no. P16-2026-001, Ukraine’s Supreme Court, § 91, 29 September 2026).
76 Rather, in the present case, at the relevant time, the legislation left the amount of the fine to the ACU’s discretion, without requiring any specific criteria to be taken into account. The ACU, while exercising that discretion, did not provide any reasons which would indicate why, having identified only mitigating and no aggravating circumstances in the applicant company’s conduct (see paragraph 5 above), it decided to impose the maximum possible penalty. The courts declined to review proportionality of the measure.
77 . In other words, in the proceedings in question, which are considered to be “criminal” for the purposes of the Convention, the penalty was determined at the discretion of an administrative authority, not a “tribunal”, and the courts did not exercise any control over its proportionality.
78 These considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that the applicant company did not have access to a “tribunal” with full jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention and that it is not necessary to examine the rest of the applicant company’s arguments under that provision.
79 There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
80 The applicant complained that there had been a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
81 The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill ‑ founded, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.
82 The applicant submitted that the interference with its possessions had been unlawful and disproportionate. The prosecutor’s office brought its claim against the ACU’s decision to reduce the fine more than two years after that decision had been taken and made public. Even if it were accepted that the ACU’s decision had been made in error, errors must not be remedied at the expense of the individual concerned ( see Batkivska Turbota Foundation v. Ukraine , no. 5876/15, § 61, 9 October 2018). According to the applicant company, none of the ACU officials involved in taking the decision to reduce the fine were held liable, because their actions were considered to be lawful. The ACU’s decision reducing the fines of nine other companies were not challenged. The fine imposed on the applicant company was disproportionate and bore no relation to the losses supposedly suffered by other market participants or to the profit obtained by it. Only the decision to reduce the fine took those factors into account. The decision to apply the maximum fine was never explained. Lastly, the applicant company argued that the penalty interest for late payment of the fine, equal to the amount of the fine itself, had been retroactively and unjustifiably applied.
83 The Government acknowledged that there had been interference with the applicant company’s “possessions”, but submitted that it had been lawful, had pursued a legitimate aim in the general interest – to ensure the effective functioning of a competitive environment on the market – and had been proportionate. The legal framework had been clear, accessible and foreseeable, in so far as it had established a turnover-linked ceiling for fines and set objective statutory criteria guiding the determination of the fine within that ceiling. They therefore argued that such interference had been lawful and compatible with the proportionality requirement. Moreover, the penalty imposed could also be challenged by way of full judicial review.
84 The imposition of the fine and other penalties on the applicant company constituted an interference with its rights guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see Valico S.R.L. v. Italy (dec.), no. 70074/01, 21 March 2006, and Krayeva v. Ukraine , no. 72858/13, § 23, 13 January 2022).
85 The Court reiterates that the first and most important requirement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention is that any interference by a public authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions should be lawful: the second sentence of the first paragraph authorises a deprivation of possessions only “subject to the conditions provided for by law” and the second paragraph recognises that States have the right to control the use of property by enforcing “laws”. Moreover, the rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention (see Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], no. 36480/07, § 94, 11 December 2018).
86 The principle of lawfulness also presupposes a certain quality of the applicable provisions of domestic law. In this regard, it should be pointed out that when speaking of “law”, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 alludes to the very same concept as that to which the Convention refers elsewhere when using that term. It follows that the legal norms upon which the interference is based should be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application. In particular, a norm is “foreseeable” when it affords a measure of protection against arbitrary interferences by the public authorities (ibid., § 95).
87 As stated above in the context of Article 6 of the Convention (see paragraphs 75 to 77), the interpretation of domestic law by the domestic courts had the effect that the executive’s discretion was unfettered by any rule indicating with sufficient clarity the scope and conditions of its exercise, nor was it amenable to any review of proportionality. That interpretation therefore provided no perceptible measure of protection against arbitrariness.
88 These considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that the domestic legal provisions, as in force at the relevant time and as they were interpreted and applied in the applicant company’s case, did not meet the “quality of law” requirements and that the interference was not therefore lawful.
89 There has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION
90 Under Article 46 of the Convention, a judgment in which the Court finds a violation of the Convention or its Protocols imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an end to that violation and redress so far as possible its effects. It also follows from the Convention, and from its Article 1 in particular, that in ratifying it the Contracting States undertook to ensure that their domestic laws would be compatible with it (see, for example, Tsaava and Others v. Georgia [GC], nos. 13186/20 and 4 others, § 463, 11 December 2025).
91 The Court finds it appropriate to give indications under Article 46 on individual measures to be taken in respect of the applicant company and on the general measures which would help prevent breaches of the kind found in the present case from recurring in the future.
92 . As for individual measures, the Court considers that the reopening of the proceedings, if requested, would be the most appropriate way of putting an end to the violations found and of affording redress to the applicant company. The Court observes that the domestic law allows the applicant company to seek such reopening (see paragraph 30 above).
93 As for general measures, the Court observes that the finding of violations in the present case resulted, in large part, from domestic legislation and domestic case-law interpreting it in a way that limited the scope of judicial review of the decisions of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine mainly to the questions of their formal legality and excluded any review of proportionality of the sanctions imposed. In this connection, the Court recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not prescribe a particular mechanism for securing proportionality. The domestic legal framework, viewed as a whole, must nevertheless afford safeguards capable of preventing disproportionate burdens (see Advisory opinion P16-2026-001 , cited above, §§ 86-89). The safeguards adopted must also satisfy the applicable requirements of Article 6 of the Convention (ibid., §§ 86-89). Therefore, the Court considers that the respondent State should ensure, through legislation, case-law or other appropriate means, that judicial review of those decisions is of sufficient scope to satisfy the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
94 Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
95 The applicant company claimed 1,157,024 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, consisting of: (i) the amount of the fine paid – that is, UAH 15,873,000 (UAH 15,903,000 of the initial fine imposed minus UAH 30,000 of the reduced fine); (ii) the penalty imposed for late payment of the fine – that is, UAH 15,903,000; and (iii) the enforcement fee of UAH 3,177,600 and enforcement costs of UAH 1,356 paid to the bailiffs.
96 The Government contested that claim, arguing that it was unjustified and that there was no causal connection between the pecuniary damage claimed and the alleged violations of the Convention. Even if a violation were found, the appropriate remedy would not be the reimbursement of the fine, but rather recourse to a domestic review mechanism which would be capable of addressing the consequences of any procedural deficiency. Under Article 320 of the Code of Commercial Procedure the proceedings could be reopened where an international judicial body found that Ukraine had breached its international obligations in the determination of the case by a court.
97 In view of the nature of the violations found and the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the most appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be the reopening of the proceedings, if requested (see paragraph 92 above).
98 The applicant company did not make any claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage or costs and expenses. There is no call to make any award under those heads.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 November 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Victor Soloveytchik Kateřina Šimáčková Registrar President
[1] Articles 257 and 261 of the Civil Code of Ukraine (2003).