Correia Cartageno v. Portugal

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 4656/19 Carlos Alexandre CORREIA CARTAGENO against Portugal

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 6 October 2026 as a Committee composed of:

Anne Louise Bormann , President , Ana Maria Guerra Martins, Sebastian Răduleţu , judges , and Simeon Petrovski, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 4656/19) against the Portuguese Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 11 January 2019 by a Portuguese national, Mr Carlos Alexandre Correia Cartageno (“the applicant”), who was born in 1984, lives in Águas Santas and was represented by Ms V. Costa Ramos, Ms C. Amorim and Ms C. Calçada Soares, lawyers practising in Lisbon;

the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning the alleged unfairness of disciplinary proceedings and breach of the applicant’s right to private and family life to the Portuguese Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agents, Mr R. Matos and Mr M. Aires Magriço, Public Prosecutors, and by Ms H. Martins Leitão, Deputy Attorney General, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1 The case concerns the alleged lack of reasoning in, and proportionality of, the decision to proceed with the applicant’s compulsory retirement as a disciplinary sanction. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a) and Article 8 of the Convention.

2 . The applicant was a member of the National Republican Guard ( Guarda Nacional Republicana – “the GNR”), a militarised security force, at the material time. On 14 March 2008, during a traffic control operation, the applicant and a fellow patrol officer apprehended four individuals for failing to present valid residence permits and other documents. The Brazilian citizens, three men and one woman, were taken to the police station. The woman, V., was then taken by the applicant to an interrogation room for the purposes of drawing up the relevant report. Only reports on the remaining three Brazilian citizens were drawn up and communicated to the immigration authority. No action was taken with regard to V.

3 . These circumstances resulted in the institution of a criminal investigation by the Public Prosecution Office and disciplinary proceedings by the GNR, which were stayed while the criminal investigation was ongoing.

4 The case was sent to trial before the Mafra Criminal Court. During the trial hearing at least one witness alleged that the applicant had omitted to draw up a report in exchange for a sexual favour from V., which he denied.

5 On 30 June 2010 the court convicted the applicant of breach of duty and sentenced him to nine months’ imprisonment, commuted to a fine of 1,890 euros. It did not impose an ancillary penalty of prohibition on performance of duties ( proibição do exercício de funções ) as such a penalty was to be applied only in cases where the sentence exceeded three years’ imprisonment. On 23 March 2011 the Lisbon Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the trial court’s judgment.

6 . On 11 July 2011 the disciplinary proceedings were resumed. On 12 March 2013 the Minister of Home Affairs (“the Minister”), referring to the facts established in the criminal proceedings, found that the applicant had breached his duties of proficiency, impartiality and diligence (Article 11 § 1 (a), Article 13 § 2 (a) and Article 12 § 2 (a) of the GNR’s Disciplinary Regulations), thereby undermining the prestige and reputation of the GNR. It was deemed necessary to show zero tolerance towards any behaviour jeopardising order, discipline and public interest. Taking into account the fact that the applicant’s misconduct had occurred during service, it proceeded with his compulsory retirement – that is, the second most severe sanction available at the material time (Articles 27 (e), 32 and 41 § 2 (c) of the GNR’s Disciplinary Regulations).

7 . On an unspecified date the applicant requested a stay of enforcement of the sanction pending the determination of his appeal against the Minister’s decision. His request was dismissed by the Porto Administrative and Tax Court in a judgment that was subsequently upheld by the Central Administrative Court for the north (“the CACN”). The CACN emphasised the seriousness of the applicant’s misconduct and asserted that, regardless of whether or not he had breached his professional duties in exchange for a sexual favour, his conduct had amounted to an ethically, morally and criminally punishable act, negatively impacting the credibility of the GNR. It further held that the applicant’s actions had raised doubts about his future conduct and that suspending the enforcement of the disciplinary sanction could jeopardise the GNR’s image.

8 . On 31 May 2016 the Porto Administrative and Tax Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Minister’s decision. That judgment was upheld by the CACN. Both courts examined the applicant’s arguments, in particular those concerning the lack of reasoning for, and proportionality of, the sanction. While acknowledging the administrative authorities’ discretionary powers in determining appropriate disciplinary sanctions, they noted, inter alia, that the circumstances of the case had been adequately taken into account and that, in the light of the misconduct at issue and the severity of the facts, it was appropriate to conclude that the employment relationship was no longer viable. The CACN further referred to its previous assessment of the severity of the circumstances (see paragraph 7 above).

9 . On 5 July 2018 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal lodged by the applicant. It held, inter alia , that the Minister’s decision had been clearly reasoned, allowing the applicant to understand why the sanction in question had been imposed. It emphasised the different nature and aims of the disciplinary and the criminal proceedings and noted that the criminal court’s decision not to apply the ancillary penalty (see paragraph 3 above) did not preclude the decision of the disciplinary authority to proceed with the compulsory retirement. It held that the feasibility of the applicant’s continuing employment should be assessed during the disciplinary proceedings, having regard to his functions and conduct, and its impact. With regard to proportionality, it held, inter alia , that the applicant’s behaviour had seriously jeopardised the trust inherent in his relationship with the GNR, in so far as it had impacted the reputation of the institution. The employment relationship was therefore untenable. It added that the applicant’s behaviour had raised doubts about possible misconduct in the future and that his profile was not compatible with his functions. It noted that disregarding very serious misconduct by law ‑ enforcement agents risked spreading impunity within the police force and that doubts vis-à-vis the impartiality and accountability of an officer could undermine the reputation of law enforcement. It added that both aggravating and mitigating circumstances had been taken into account.

10 The applicant’s subsequent appeal lodged with the Constitutional Court was rejected.

11 . Relying on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a) of the Convention, the applicant asserted that the proceedings had been unfair, as the outcome was neither proportionate, nor sufficiently reasoned.

12 Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, he claimed that the disciplinary penalty imposed on him had amounted to a breach of his right to private and family life, in particular because it had resulted in a significant loss of household income and had caused depression. He stated that he had been forced to move away from his previous place of residence to pursue a professional activity, which meant living far from his wife and child. This had eventually led to the breakdown of his marriage. He argued that the penalty had carried significant stigma, causing others to question his professional and moral suitability for certain jobs and resulting in the loss of professional opportunities. He also argued that, in so far as the penalty had not been proportionate, it had also been unforeseeable.

13 The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018), finds that the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 of the Convention (see paragraph 11 above) fall to be examined from the standpoint of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention only.

14 It notes that the disciplinary proceedings at issue, while triggered by a criminal conviction, are administrative in nature. As such, the criminal limb of Article 6 is not applicable to the present case (see, among other authorities, R.S. v. Germany (dec.), no. 19600/15, § 33, 28 March 2017, and Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, §§ 121-28, 6 November 2018). On the other hand, as the applicant’s right to practise his profession was at stake in the present case, the disciplinary proceedings brought against him by the Minister fall within the civil limb of Article 6 of the Convention (see Denisov v. Ukraine [GC] (no. 76639/11, §§ 44 and 51 ‑ 52, 25 September 2018, and the references therein).

15 . As regards the alleged unfairness of the disciplinary proceedings, the Court refers to the general principles of the Court’s case-law which have been summarised in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá (cited above, §§ 185-86, with further references).

16 . In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was able to appeal against the Minister’s decision to the CACN and the Supreme Administrative Court, which examined his arguments, in particular those concerning the lack of reasoning in the disciplinary decision and the lack of proportionality of the sanction, giving relevant and sufficient reasons for their decisions (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above, and, mutatis mutandis , Dahan v. France , no. 32314/14, §§ 60-66, 3 November 2022 ). Furthermore, the Court does not discern any sign of arbitrariness or manifest unreasonableness in their approach.

17 It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

18 The Government contested the applicability of Article 8 of the Convention to the present case.

19 The principles on the basis of which to assess whether employment ‑ related disputes fall within the scope of “private life” under Article 8 are summarised by the Court in Denisov (cited above, §§ 101, 104 ‑ 05, 108 and 109, and the references therein).

20 In the present case, the Court observes that the disciplinary proceedings resulted in a severe sanction that had an adverse impact on the applicant’s professional and private life. Moreover, the decision was based on an assessment that called his moral and ethical values into question, which could have a negative impact on his reputation. The Court finds, therefore, that Article 8 is applicable (see, among other authorities, Denisov , cited above, §§ 115-17).

21 For the same reasons, the Court also considers that there was an interference with the applicant’s right under Article 8. Such an interference was lawful and pursued a legitimate aim, notably that of protecting public trust in, and the proper functioning of, law enforcement. It therefore remains to be assessed whether it was necessary in a democratic society.

22 The Court notes that the applicant’s unlawful conduct, which led to his criminal conviction and later to a disciplinary sanction being imposed, is largely undisputed. The disciplinary proceedings concerned a criminal act committed in the course of his professional activity (see paragraphs 2-6 above). As a member of the police force, the applicant ought to have been aware of his professional duties and of the regulations and ethical standards applicable to him, together with the impact of his actions on public trust in the authorities.

23 The Court further observes that the domestic courts conducted an individualised assessment of the facts and their impact on the applicant’s employment in law enforcement, and of the application of the law, taking all the relevant circumstances into consideration and weighing the interests at issue in the balance in a manner that cannot be considered arbitrary or unreasonable (see, mutatis mutandis , Xhoxhaj v. Albania , no. 15227/19, §§ 402-14, 9 February 2021). As noted above, the applicant was afforded sufficient procedural safeguards and there is nothing to suggest that the proceedings were otherwise unfair (see paragraph 16 above).

24 The Court notes, moreover, that the applicant does not appear to have raised his complaints regarding the impact of the sanction on his private and family life in the main proceedings, only doing so in the context of the request for a stay of enforcement of the sanction. On that occasion, the court assessed the applicant’s claims, weighing them against the public interests involved in a manner that does not appear arbitrary or unreasonable (see paragraph 7 above).

25 In the light of the above, the Court holds that the domestic authorities acted within their margin of appreciation and that the sanction imposed on the applicant was proportionate.

26 It follows that this complaint is also manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 29 October 2026.

Simeon Petrovski Anne Louise Bormann Deputy Registrar President