Paiva De Andrada Reis v. Portugal

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 863/22 Carlos PAIVA DE ANDRADA REIS against Portugal

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 6 October 2026 as a Committee composed of:

Anne Louise Bormann , President , Ana Maria Guerra Martins, Sebastian Răduleţu , judges , and Crina Kaufman, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 863/22) against the Portuguese Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 28 December 2021 by a Portuguese national, Mr Carlos Paiva de Andrada Reis (“the applicant”), who was born in 1947 and lives in Cascais, and was represented by Ms P. Santos, a lawyer practising in Lisbon;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Portuguese Government (“the Government”), represented by Ms A. Garcia Marques, Co ‑ Agent;

the Government’s observations;

the decision not to admit the applicant’s observations and claims for just satisfaction to the case file on account of the fact that they had been submitted out of time, pursuant to Rule 38 § 1 of the Rules of Court;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1 The case concerns an alleged breach of the applicant’s right to be presumed innocent in the context of tax enforcement proceedings brought against him. The applicant relied on Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.

2 On 16 June 2005 the tax authorities initiated enforcement proceedings against the M. company, seeking payment of a total of 451,664.60 euros, plus applicable interest, with respect to withheld personal income tax between 2001 and 2004.

3 As no assets of the M. company had been identified, the tax authorities applied the applicant’s personal subsidiary obligation for the payment of the debt in his capacity as its manager. In January 2010 the applicant objected to the enforcement proceedings before the Lisbon Tax Court.

4 On 23 October 2012 the Lisbon Tax Court delivered a judgment holding the applicant liable for the debt which the M. company owed to the tax authorities.

5 . The applicant appealed against that judgment to the Central Administrative Court of the South (hereinafter “the Administrative Court”). He relied on a judgment, delivered on 16 July 2012 by the Lisbon Criminal Court, which had acquitted him on one charge of embezzlement ( abuso de confiança ) of social security contributions in connection with the M. company on the grounds that it had not been established that he had been the de facto manager of the M. company at the material time.

6 . On 9 June 2021 the Administrative Court upheld the Lisbon Tax Court’s judgment. Notably, it held, on the one hand, that as the applicant had not contested his status as manager in his initial defence pleadings ( petição inicial ), he was estopped from relying on this supervening legal argument. On the other hand, it considered that the tax courts were not bound by the outcome of criminal proceedings given that, inter alia , under domestic law, the authority of the res judicata effect of criminal judgments only extended to civil proceedings.

7 . The Administrative Court’s judgment of 9 June 2021 was sent to the applicant’s lawyer via the electronic notification system on the same date. In his application form, the applicant submitted that he had been notified of the judgment on 14 June 2021 in accordance with Article 248 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He further submitted that the judgment had acquired the force of res judicata on 14 July 2021, that is, after the 30-day time-limit for submitting an appeal for judicial review had expired.

8 Relying on Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, the applicant asserted that by refusing to take into consideration the Lisbon Criminal Court’s acquittal judgment of 16 July 2012 (see paragraph 5 above), the Administrative Court had infringed his right to be presumed innocent.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

9 The Government raised an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They argued that the applicant had failed to raise the claim that he had not been the de facto manager of the M. company before the domestic courts in his objection to the enforcement proceedings, in accordance with the applicable procedural rules (see paragraph 5 above). The applicant failed to submit his observations on the admissibility and merits of the application within the time-limit set by the Court.

10 The Court does not consider it necessary to rule separately on this objection given that the application was, in any case, lodged out of time for the reasons set out below.

11 Although the respondent State has not raised any objection on the basis of non-compliance with the six-month time-limit [1] , this issue, as a public policy rule, calls for consideration by the Court of its own motion (see Sabri Güneş v. Turkey [GC], no. 27396/06, § 29, 29 June 2012).

12 The Court notes that the applicant argued in his application that the six-month deadline started to run from the date on which the judgment had acquired the force of res judicata in accordance with domestic law (see paragraph 7 above). However, the Court reiterates that the time-limit set out in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention starts to run from the date on which an applicant and/or his or her representative has sufficient knowledge of the final domestic decision (see Koç and Tosun v. Turkey (dec.), no. 23852/04, 13 November 2008). While the taking into account of domestic law and practice is an important aspect, it is not decisive in determining the starting point of the six-month period (see Sabri Güneş , cited above, §§ 52 and 55). That period starts to run on the day following the date on which a final decision was pronounced in public, or on which an applicant or his or her representative was informed of it, and expires six calendar months later, regardless of the actual duration of those calendar months (see Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 21425/06, 10 November 2009). Moreover, the date on which the final decision acquired the force of res judicata is irrelevant for this purpose (see Jorge Nina and Others v. Portugal (dec.), no. 35998/97, 3 December 1997).

13 The Court observes that, in the present case, the Administrative Court’s judgment was delivered on 9 June 2021 and electronically notified to the applicant’s lawyer on the same date (see paragraph 6 above). The six ‑ month time-limit, therefore, started to run the following day, that is, on 10 June 2021, and expired at midnight on 9 December 2021. However, the application was lodged on 28 December 2021, that is, after the expiry of the above-mentioned time-limit (see Sabri Güneş , cited above, § 60).

14 It follows that the application was lodged more than six months after the service of the final domestic decision within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 29 October 2026.

Crina Kaufman Anne Louise Bormann Acting Deputy Registrar President

[1] Protocol No. 15 to the Convention has shortened to four months from the final domestic decision the time-limit provided for by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. However, in the present case, the six-month period still applies, given that the final domestic decision was taken prior to 1 February 2022, that is, date of entry into force of the new rule (pursuant to Article 8 § 3 of Protocol No. 15 to the Convention).