Martins Vara v. Portugal

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 3862/26 Armando António MARTINS VARA against Portugal

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 6 October 2026 as a Committee composed of:

Anne Louise Bormann , President , Ana Maria Guerra Martins, Sebastian Răduleţu , judges , and Simeon Petrovski, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 3862/26) against the Portuguese Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 22 January 2026 by a Portuguese national, Mr Armando António Martins Vara (“the applicant”), who was born in 1954 and is currently detained in Évora Prison, and was represented by Mr T. Rodrigues Bastos, a lawyer practising in Porto;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1 The applicant is a well-known businessman and politician in Portugal. The case concerns a final judgment of July 2025 by which a pardon which had been granted to the applicant regarding the remainder of a prison sentence imposed on him was annulled. The applicant raised complaints under Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention.

2 By a judgment of the Aveiro Central Criminal Court, the applicant was convicted on three counts of trading in influence and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. On 16 January 2019 he started serving his sentence.

3 The applicant was released on 11 October 2021, following a pardon of the remainder of his sentence, granted in accordance with section 2(7) of Law no. 9/2020 of 10 April 2020.

4 On 1 July 2024 the Lisbon Central Criminal Court annulled the pardon. In this connection, it took the view that, in the light of section 2 of Law no. 9/2020, the pardon could not be granted in so far as the applicant had in the meantime been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in connection with charges of money laundering, which had to be aggregated to the sentence imposed on him for trading in influence, in accordance with Article 78 § 1 of the Portuguese Criminal Code.

5 On 16 September 2024 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court for judicial review in respect of the judgment of the Lisbon Central Criminal Court, arguing that that court’s normative interpretation of Articles 78 § 1 and 80 § 1 of the Portuguese Criminal Code in conjunction with section 2(6)(i) of Law no. 9/2020 had been unconstitutional. He argued that such interpretation violated the principles of legal certainty, irrevocability of decisions and separation of powers. On 21 February 2025 the Supreme Court fully dismissed the appeal.

6 On 5 March 2025 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal before the Constitutional Court, reiterating the questions raised before the Supreme Court. By a judgment of 24 June 2025, the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the impugned interpretation was not unconstitutional.

7 On 16 September 2025 the Constitutional Court dismissed a plea of nullity lodged by the applicant.

8 On 17 September 2025 the Constitutional Court’s judgment was sent to the applicant’s representative via registered mail.

9 . The Constitutional Court’s judgment was served on the applicant on 18 September 2025.

10 In his application lodged with the Court on 22 January 2026, the applicant complained under Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention that the Portuguese State had acted in breach of the law in revoking a final and binding decision to grant him a pardon, thereby violating the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations. As a result, his legitimate expectation that he would not be imprisoned again to serve the remainder of the sentence had been breached.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

11 The Court reiterates that the four-month period established in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention runs from the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies (see Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], no. 36480/07, § 65, 11 December 2018). It starts running from the date on which the applicant and/or his or her representative has sufficient knowledge of the final domestic decision, provided that this date is, in principle, the date on which the decision was served (see Koç and Tosun v. Turkey (dec.), no. 23852/04, § 6, 13 November 2008). The four-month period runs from the date on which the applicant’s lawyer became aware of the decision completing the exhaustion of domestic remedies, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant only became aware of the decision later (see Çelik v. Turkey (dec.), no. 52991/99, 23 September 2004). This is an autonomous rule that must be construed and applied to the facts of each individual case, so as to ensure the effective exercise of the right to individual petition (see Sabri Güneş v. Turkey [GC], no. 27396/06, § 55, 29 June 2012 ).

12 The four-month rule marks out the temporal limit of the supervision exercised by the Court and signals, both to individuals and State authorities, the period beyond which such supervision is no longer possible (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 138, 20 March 2018).

13 While taking account of domestic law and practice is, admittedly, an important aspect, it is not decisive in determining the starting point of the four-month period (see Sabri Güneş , cited above, § 52).

14 In the present case, the applicant submitted that the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 16 September 2025 should have been considered to have been served on him on the third day following its dispatch by registered mail, that is, on 20 September 2025, in accordance with Article 248 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Moreover, he argued that, since 20 September 2025 had been a Saturday, the notification had to be deemed, in accordance with the same Article of the Code of Civil Procedure, to have been made on the next working day, that is, on 22 September 2025. He therefore asserted that his application form, which had been duly completed and sent by registered post on 22 January 2026, should be considered to have been submitted within the four-month time-limit specified in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.

15 The Court notes that the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 16 September 2025 was received by the applicant’s representative via registered mail on 18 September 2025 (see paragraph 9 above). This fact is indicated by the postal reference concerning the dispatch of the Constitutional Court’s judgment.

16 Since the judgment was accessible to the applicant as of that date, the Court is therefore satisfied that the applicant had all the elements necessary to lodge the application with the Court as of 18 September 2025, and that this is the date which is relevant from the aspect of the four-month rule, regardless of the arrangement laid down by Article 248 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see Sabri Güneş , cited above, § 49).

17 For the calculation of the four-month time-limit, it is the Court’s well ‑ established case‑law that time starts to run on the day following the date on which the final decision has been pronounced in public, or on which the applicant or his/her representative was informed of it, and expires four calendar months later, regardless of the actual duration of those calendar months (see Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 21425/06, 10 November 2009). The fact that the last day of the four-month period falls on a Saturday, a Sunday or an official holiday and that in such situation, under the domestic law, time-limits are extended to the following working day, does not affect the determination of the dies ad quem (see Sabri Güneş , cited above, §§ 43 and 61).

18 In the present case, the four-month period established in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention therefore started to run on 19 September 2025 and expired at midnight on 18 January 2025. The application was lodged on 22 January 2026, that is, after the expiry of the above-mentioned time-limit (ibid., § 60).

19 It follows that the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 29 October 2026.

Simeon Petrovski Anne Louise Bormann Deputy Registrar President