Varga v. Romania

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 25801/18 György-Sandor VARGA against Romania

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 6 October 2026 as a Committee composed of:

Faris Vehabović , President , Anja Seibert-Fohr, Sebastian Răduleţu , judges , and Simeon Petrovski, Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 25801/18) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 24 May 2018 by a Romanian national, Mr György-Sandor Varga (“the applicant”), who was born in 1974, lives in Oradea and was represented by Mr A. Stancu, a lawyer practising in Oradea;

the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning Article 3 and Article 6 § 3 (d) to the Romanian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms O.F. Ezer, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1 The case concerns the alleged unfairness of criminal proceedings against the applicant on account of his inability to examine three prosecution witnesses whose pre-trial statements had been used by the trial court to convict him of unlawful deprivation of liberty. It also concerns the material conditions of the applicant’s detention in Oradea and Satu Mare Prisons from 31 October 2017 to 15 May 2018. It raises issues under Article 3 and Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention.

2 . On 25 February 2007 B.M.N. lodged a criminal complaint alleging that he had been abducted the previous night by M.S., the applicant and two other individuals. According to B.M.N., while in the company of V.E., V.R.E., V.B., P.C. and R.Z., he had been taken from a hotel restaurant, forced into a car and driven to another location. He had been released after his kidnappers had received 3,000 euros (EUR), which his mother had provided via H.L.R.

3 The investigating authorities heard evidence from the victim on two occasions.

4 After several unsuccessful attempts to locate the applicant at his place of residence, the Oradea District Court ordered his pre-trial detention in absentia . After the victim had recanted and claimed that the abduction had not taken place, the court replaced the applicant’s pre-trial detention order with an order prohibiting him from leaving the city.

5 On account of attempts by M.S. to intimidate the victim and H.L.R into changing their statements, the Oradea District Court authorised the recording of their telephone conversations.

6 The investigating authorities interviewed all individuals present during the victim’s abduction (see paragraph 2 above), along with the hotel receptionist, S.C.I., and a waitress, N.A. All identified the applicant and the other three individuals suspected of being involved in the abduction from photographic evidence presented by the police. H.L.R. also stated that on the night in question he had been contacted by B.M.N., who had asked him to bring EUR 3,000 to the car where he was being held.

7 On 19 May 2009 the applicant and the other three defendants were indicted for unlawful deprivation of liberty under Article 189 of the Criminal Code.

8 . On the basis of the applicant’s attempt to evade criminal prosecution, on 20 May 2013 he was declared a fugitive and assigned an officially appointed lawyer. On the same day, the court granted a request made by the applicant’s lawyer to have evidence heard from three defence witnesses. H.L.R. and V.E. gave evidence before the first-instance court in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer.

9 By interlocutory judgments of 20 May and 2 December 2013, the criminal proceedings against M.S. and the applicant respectively, were severed from those brought against the other co-defendants, on account of their being in detention in other countries (M.S. in Italy and the applicant in the Netherlands, where he had been serving a sentence for a different offence committed in the Netherlands). The proceedings against the other co-defendants continued, leading to their conviction by the Oradea Court of Appeal.

10 After his transfer to a Romanian prison, M.S. was later separately convicted of the same offence and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. In a confession made in the course of the proceedings against him, he acknowledged his participation in the abduction alongside the applicant.

11 . On an unknown date the applicant was transferred to a Romanian prison. After his transfer, the applicant was tried separately for B.M.N.’s abduction. He was assisted by two lawyers of his choice and did not admit to the offence in his statement before the Oradea District Court (the first-instance court).

12 The applicant asked the first-instance court to hear evidence from all prosecution witnesses and from the co-defendants who had already been convicted. The court heard the two defence witnesses and one of the prosecution witnesses (N.A.).

13 . It further sent summonses to the remaining prosecution witnesses on several occasions. When they failed to appear despite being summoned, the court ordered that they be brought in by the police. The court imposed a fine on H.L.R. for his failure to appear. Subsequently, it heard S.C.I. but noted the absence of V.E., V.B. and H.L.R., who had reportedly left the country on the basis of reports drawn up by the police officers responsible for enforcing the bring-in warrants and whose addresses abroad were unknown.

14 At the final hearing, the court concluded that it was impossible to hear evidence from V.E., V.B. and H.L.R. in person and proceeded to read out the written statements given by them at the investigation stage. The applicant’s lawyers did not insist on having evidence heard from V.E. and V.B. and agreed to have their statements from the investigation stage read out. However, they insisted to have evidence heard from H.L.R. and the victim. The court noted that H.L.R. had made several incriminating statements against the applicant to the investigating authorities and the court, which had led to the conviction of the applicant’s co-defendants, and it proceeded to read out those statements.

15 On 16 March 2017 the first-instance court convicted the applicant of unlawful deprivation of liberty and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment, noting that his version of events was contradicted by all the evidence in the case file.

16 The applicant’s conviction was based on the evidence given at trial by two defence witnesses and prosecution witnesses S.C.I. and N.A.; the statements of prosecution witnesses V.E., V.B. and H.L.R. given during the criminal investigation and the criminal proceedings against the applicant’s co-defendants; and the confession of M.S., who admitted to having committed the offence with the applicant. The court also referred to the victim’s and H.L.R.’s identification of the applicant from photographic evidence and to transcripts of intercepted telephone conversations.

17 By a final judgment of 31 October 2017, the Oradea Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction and reduced his sentence to three years’ imprisonment.

18 The applicant began serving his sentence at Oradea Prison on 31 October 2017. On 12 April 2018 he was transferred to Satu Mare Prison, where he remained until his conditional release on 15 May 2018.

19 . The applicant had benefitted from the domestic remedy examined in Dîrjan and Ștefan v. Romania ((dec.), nos. 14224/15 and 50977/15, 15 April 2020), by having sixty-six days deducted from his sentence.

20 The applicant alleged a violation of Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention on account of the failure of the domestic courts to hear the prosecution witnesses whose written pre-trial statements they had admitted as evidence. Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, he complained about the conditions of his post-conviction detention in both Oradea and Satu Mare Prisons.

21 The general principles concerning the examination of absent witnesses and the use by the courts of the evidence given by those witnesses, based on a three-step test, have been summarised in Schatschaschwili v. Germany ([GC], no. 9154/10 , §§ 100-31, ECHR 2015) and Al ‑ Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06 , §§ 118 ‑ 47, ECHR 2011). The Court notes, in particular, that the use as evidence of statements obtained at the stage of a police inquiry and judicial investigation is not in itself inconsistent with Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d), provided that the rights of the defence have been respected (see Schatschaschwili , cited above, § 105).

22 At the outset, the Court notes that the applicant was aware that an indictment had been issued against him and that a criminal trial had begun (contrast Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 101, ECHR 2006-II). After being indicted, the applicant left for the Netherlands. Following unsuccessful attempts to enforce the preventive measures taken against him (that is, the initial pre-trial detention order and subsequent obligation not to leave the city), he was declared a fugitive, and an international arrest warrant was issued against him (see paragraph 8 above). In such circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant had significantly contributed to creating a situation that prevented him from appearing before the courts conducting the criminal proceedings.

23 At the first trial hearings during the initial set of criminal proceedings against all the defendants, the applicant was represented by an officially appointed lawyer, who conducted his defence and called several witnesses (see paragraph 8 above). His lawyer was also able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses H.L.R. and V.E. Subsequently, the Oradea District Court severed the proceedings from those brought against his co-defendants on finding out about the applicant’s detention by the Dutch authorities.

24 In the subsequent set of criminal proceedings solely against the applicant, the first-instance court heard two defence witnesses and two prosecution witnesses (N.A. and N.S.I) in the presence of the applicant and his lawyers. However, it was unable to hear evidence from three of the prosecution witnesses, namely V.E., V.B. and H.L.R.

25 The domestic courts made multiple efforts to secure their attendance. The first-instance court’s repeated attempts to summon the witnesses were unsuccessful and it eventually sought police assistance to compel their appearance. The authorities established that the prosecution witnesses had left the country and were living abroad at an unknown address (see paragraph 13 above).

26 The district court also consulted the applicant’s two lawyers, who insisted on having evidence heard from H.L.R. and the victim, but not from V.E. and V.B. (see paragraphs 13 and 14 above).

27 As to the weight of the evidence of the absent witnesses, the Court does not consider that it had a sole or decisive role in the applicant’s conviction. The Court observes that the applicant’s guilt was established on the basis of a large body of evidence, including the applicant’s statements, testimony from several witnesses and from co-defendant M.S., transcripts of tapped telephone conversations, and the applicant’s identification by the victim and H.L.R. from photographic evidence (see paragraph 16 above). However, as it cannot be ruled out that the written statements of the absent prosecution witnesses at the investigation stage carried a certain weight, and given the need under Article 6 to assess the fairness of the proceedings taken as a whole, the Court must still determine whether there were sufficient factors counterbalancing any disadvantages that admitting that evidence might have entailed for the defence (see Seton v. the United Kingdom , no. 55287/10, §§ 59 and 64, 31 March 2016).

28 In this respect the Court observes that, having regard to the actual weight of the three witnesses’ statements, the applicant’s ability to provide his own account of the facts and to highlight any eventual inconsistencies in the absent witnesses’ statements (see paragraph 11 above) could have mitigated potential difficulties faced by the defence (see, mutatis mutandis , Aigner v. Austria , no. 28328/03, § 43, 10 May 2012).

29 The Court also observes that in the initial set of proceedings the applicant was represented by a court-appointed lawyer, who had the opportunity to cross-examine H.L.R. and V.E. Moreover, in the subsequent proceedings, the applicant was at all times assisted by lawyers of his own choosing, who conducted his defence in an effective manner.

30 Another significant safeguard was the availability at the trial of corroborative evidence supporting the absent witnesses’ untested statements. In the present case, the domestic courts’ judgments show that they referred to a broad range of evidence. The reasoning of those judgments indicates that the absent witnesses’ statements were used to support other evidence but did not play a decisive role in the applicant’s conviction.

31 Thus, given the domestic courts’ rigorous assessment of all the evidence, which showed no sign of arbitrariness, the Court finds that the absence of three of the prosecution witnesses at the trial and the use of the statements given by them at the investigation stage do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the applicant’s Article 6 rights.

32 Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, particularly the applicant’s conduct and his attempts to evade criminal prosecution, the Court finds the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 3 (d) to be manifestly ill ‑ founded. Accordingly, this complaint should be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

B. Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention

33 The Court upholds the Government’s objection concerning the applicant’s loss of victim status noting that the applicant was afforded adequate redress for the specific period of detention mentioned in his application on the basis of Law no. 169/2017 amending and completing Law no. 254/2013 on the execution of sentences (see paragraph 19 above).

Accordingly, it finds that this complaint is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 29 October 2026.

Simeon Petrovski Faris Vehabović Deputy Registrar President