Neag v. Romania

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 16926/24 Ioana-Lidia NEAG against Romania

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 6 Octobre 2026 as a Committee composed of:

Ana Maria Guerra Martins , President , Anne Louise Bormann, Sebastian Răduleţu , judges , and Valentin Nicolescu, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 16926/24) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 8 June 2024 by a Romanian national, Ms Ioana-Lidia Neag (“the applicant”), who was born in 1983 and lives in Cluj ‑ Napoca, and was represented by Ms I.-.A. Bonda, a lawyer practising in Cluj-Napoca;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1 The case concerns a change of the place of residence of the applicant’s son (A) from her to his father (X). It raises issues under Article 8 of the Convention.

Factual and procedural background

2 The applicant is the mother of A, who was born in 2011 from her relationship with X.

3 . On 12 December 2019, following their separation, the applicant and X signed a court-approved settlement under which the parents were to exercise joint parental authority in respect of A, A was to reside with the applicant and X was to have contact rights. The agreement was valid until 31 December 2020 and was to be automatically renewed thereafter.

4 . As of March 2020, the applicant and X started having difficulties cooperating in respect of A, with X claiming that the applicant had refused to allow him to see A. It appears that, because of those difficulties, X had to resort to enforcement proceedings concerning his contact rights.

5 . Between April 2020 and January 2021 both the applicant and X initiated several sets of proceedings concerning the exercise of X’s contact rights. As a result, the child protection authority became involved, monitored the situation and issued several reports concerning A’s relationship with each parent. In addition, various psychologists issued expert opinions concerning A’s relationship with his parents and on the issue of parental alienation. On at least two occasions, the domestic courts ordered counselling in respect of A. It appears that at least once the applicant failed to comply with the counselling order, for which she was fined.

6 . On 7 February 2022 X brought proceedings before the Cluj-Napoca District Court (“the District Court”), seeking, among other things, that A reside with him. He alleged that the applicant had alienated A from him and had subjected the child to emotional abuse. The applicant brought separate proceedings relating to her parental rights over A, which were joined to X’s proceedings.

7 . Both before and during the proceedings in question, various psychological reports were drawn up, which concluded that the applicant had engaged in parental alienation. The reports also noted the minor child’s unexplained refusal to see X and his negative attitude towards the latter and concluded that the conflict between the parents constituted a significant source of stress for A, with serious long-term consequences for his development. One of the reports (no. 58 of 1 July 2021) was later annulled and a sanction was imposed on the psychologist who had drafted it.

8 . On 8 September 2022 A gave a statement in court in the presence of a psychologist. He stated that during 2020 and 2021 his relationship with his father had been “precarious”, as A had refused contact. A was unable to identify the reasons why he had refused to meet his father during that period. He stated that in 2022 things had improved and that he had seen his father frequently. He also stated that he did not visit his father at the latter’s home, the main reason being his unfavourable relationship with his father’s wife. He further stated that he wished to have a relationship with both parents, that he preferred to live with his mother and that he wanted to meet his father alone, as before, but not at the latter’s home.

9 . On 30 June 2023 the District Court granted X’s application (see paragraph 6 above) and ordered that A should live with his father. By the same decision, the parents were awarded joint parental authority, and the applicant was granted contact rights in respect of A. In reaching that decision, the District Court noted that the applicant had failed to observe X’s contact rights from March 2020 (see paragraph 3 above) and that, as a result, enforcement proceedings had had to be initiated, and that, despite being obliged to undergo counselling, she had refused to do so and had been subsequently fined.

10 . The District Court noted that the evidence in the case, including the psychological assessments and counselling report (see paragraphs 5 and 7 above) pointed to the same conclusion that A was being alienated from his father by the applicant. The District Court further noted, as indicated in a monitoring report drawn up by the child protection authority (see paragraph 5 above), that A believed that only his mother loved him and that his father was a bad person because he had chosen to rebuild his life. According to the expert evidence, such thoughts could only have originated from external influences and represented “borrowed scenarios” that A had internalised as his own. The District Court further noted that the applicant had not made any effort to help A maintain a genuine emotional relationship with X. In fact, she had constantly sought to replace any expert who had reached an unfavourable conclusion regarding the reasons why the child refused to see his father. Accordingly, in view of the evidence before it, the only solution in A’s best interests was for him to reside with his father.

11 The applicant lodged an appeal before the Cluj-Napoca County Court (“the County Court”).

12 On 30 April 2024 the County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision for generally the same reasons. In addition, the County Court noted that the applicant’s failure to respect the father’s contact schedule had been aimed at distancing A from his father and at using him as a means of seeking revenge on the father, even if the applicant herself had not realised this.

13 . After examining at length the expert evidence in the case, the County Court concluded that it all indicated that A was being alienated from his father by his mother and that that conclusion stood even if one of the reports had had to be disregarded (see paragraph 7 above). The County Court also dismissed the applicant’s criticism that the minor child’s opinion had not been taken into account, given that it had been assessed within the context of all evidence gathered in the case and, above all, in the context of parental alienation. The County Court did not question the applicant’s affectionate feelings towards her son but concluded that she needed to learn to place the child’s best interests above her own needs. In view of its findings above, the County Court noted that although A had lived with his mother for 12 years, the change of residence was considered necessary also because the mother was emotionally affected and the child sensed and absorbed her emotions, which put him at risk of being destabilised.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

14 . Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained that her right to a fair hearing had been breached on account of the domestic courts’ failure to provide reasoned decisions for A’s change of residence. She contended that the first-instance court had ignored A’s stated wish to live with her.

15 Given the nature and substance of the applicant’s complaint, it falls to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 126, 20 March 2018).

16 The relevant principles under Article 8 of the Convention concerning custody disputes, including the hearing of children in such proceedings, were summarised in, among other cases, X and Others v. Slovenia (no. 27746/22, §§ 144 ‑ 52, 19 December 2024). Of those principles, the Court deems it necessary to highlight that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation when deciding on custody and that it is not the Court’s role to substitute itself for the domestic authorities, but rather to review their decisions in the light of the Convention ( see, in addition to X and Others , cited above, Diamante and Pelliccioni v. San Marino , no. 32250/08, §§ 175-76, 27 September 2011).

17 At the outset, the Court finds it essential to highlight that, apart from the change in A’s residence, the applicant’s parental rights in respect of A were maintained unchanged, including her contact rights and parental authority (see paragraph 9 above; see also, mutatis mutandis , Leonov v. Russia , no. 77180/11, § 70, 10 April 2018).

18 In the present case, the Court notes that the domestic courts concluded, on the basis of extensive evidence, including several psychological assessments and reports drawn up by the child protection authority, that the applicant had alienated A from his father and that it was in the child’s best interests to live with his father. It further notes that the domestic courts’ conclusion that the applicant had alienated A from his father was not based on any single piece of evidence, but was corroborated across several independent sources: repeated psychological assessments conducted by different experts over an extended period, the child protection authority’s reports (see paragraphs 10 and 13 above; contrast, for illustrative purposes, Niță v. Romania [Committee], no. 1240/21, § 25, 16 April 2024) and the pattern of the applicant’s conduct in the enforcement and counselling proceedings (see paragraphs 4 and 5 above). In view of this convergence, and given that the national authorities are in principle better placed than an international judge to evaluate the evidence before them, it is not the Court’s task to take their place in establishing and assessing the facts and deciding what is in the best interests of the child in the present case (see Leonov , cited above, § 72 ). Having regard to the facts above, the Court also finds that the reasons advanced by both domestic courts were sufficient and relevant (see Buchs v. Switzerland , no. 9929/12, § 49, 27 May 2014, and, mutatis mutandis J.N. v. Poland , no. 10390/15, §§ 146-65, 10 November 2022 ; contrast Babayeva v. Azerbaijan , no. 57724/11, §§ 37 and 43 ‑ 52, 30 January 2020) and that it therefore has no grounds to question their findings.

19 As concerns the alleged failure of the domestic courts to give due weight to A’s opinion about where he should live (see paragraphs 8 and 14 above), the Court notes that, as explained by the County Court, the domestic courts considered A’s views in the context of the whole body of evidence before them, and in particular, the evidence of parental alienation (see paragraph 13 above). The Court further notes that although the domestic courts did not specifically and explicitly state what weight they had attached to A’s view, it is clear from the underlying reasoning that, given the competing evidence of parental alienation, it decided that it would be in A’s best interests to live with his father. In this connection, the Court reiterates that the right of a child to express his or her own views should not be interpreted as effectively giving an unconditional veto power to children without any other factors being considered and an examination being carried out to determine their best interests (see Zelikha Magomadova v. Russia , no. 58724/14, § 115, 8 October 2019).

20 Lastly, the Court notes that the decision-making process leading to the adoption of the impugned court decisions was fair and afforded due respect to the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention (see, notably, Buchs , cited above, § 53). In that regard, the impugned court decisions were reached following adversarial proceedings, throughout which the applicant, represented by counsel, had the opportunity to present her case and to adduce evidence.

21 That being so, the Court reiterates that the authorities have a wide margin in such matters and finds that the present application does not disclose any appearance of violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

22 It follows that this complaint must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

23 The applicant also raised other complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

24 The Court considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints either do not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.

It follows that the remaining complaints must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 29 October 2026.

Valentin Nicolescu Ana Maria Guerra Martins Acting Deputy Registrar President