Amiraslan and Others v. Azerbaijan
Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention; Article 5-1-c - Reasonable suspicion); Violation of Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly); Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage; Just satisfaction)
Berörda konventionsartiklar
THIRD SECTION
CASE OF AMIRASLAN AND OTHERS v. AZERBAIJAN
(Applications nos. 18543/23 and 2 others –
see appended list)
Art 5 § 1 • Deprivation of liberty • Unrecorded, unlawful and arbitrary arrests and detentions at a police station for around two hours aimed at interfering with the applicants’ participation in peaceful assemblies and not to prevent an offence • Domestic courts’ failure to address the question of lawfulness • Element of bad faith and arbitrariness
Art 11 • Freedom of peaceful assembly • Unlawful nature of detention impacting on lawfulness of interference • Failure to conduct balancing exercise
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.
17 November 2026
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Amiraslan and Others v. Azerbaijan,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Ioannis Ktistakis , President , Peeter Roosma, Lətif Hüseynov, Úna Ní Raifeartaigh, Mateja Đurović, Canòlic Mingorance Cairat, Vasilka Sancin , judges , and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications (nos. 18543/23, 18790/23 and 31497/23) against the Republic of Azerbaijan lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Azerbaijani nationals, Mr Idris Bayram oglu Amiraslan ( İdris Bayram oğlu Əmiraslan – “the first applicant”), Mr Aziz Iltifat oglu Mamiyev ( Əziz İltifat oğlu Məmiyev – “the second applicant”) and Mr Tofig Rashid oglu Yagublu ( Tofiq Rəşid oğlu Yaqublu – “the third applicant”), on the various dates indicated in the appended table;
the decision to give notice to the Azerbaijani Government (“the Government”) of the applications;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 13 October 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1 The applications concern the applicants’ arrests and detentions by police officers for several hours without any documentation thereof when they were participating in peaceful assemblies.
2 The applicants’ details are provided in the appendix. They were represented by Mr N. Karimli, a lawyer based in Azerbaijan.
3 The Azerbaijani Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Ç. Əsgərov.
4 The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.
5 According to the first and second applicants, at around 12 noon on 15 December 2021, together with several other persons, they gathered at Fountains Square in Baku to hold a peaceful assembly protesting the arrest and detention of a political figure, S.R. According to the third applicant, he participated in a peaceful assembly organised by the opposition party, the Popular Front Party, at around 4 p.m. on 11 November 2022 in front of the administrative building of the Baku City Executive Authority concerning the changes made to the Law on Political Parties. The applicants submitted that the relevant authorities had been informed in advance of both assemblies.
6 Within several minutes of the start of each of the assemblies, police officers arrived at the venue and dispersed them. The police arrested the applicants, put them into police cars and brought them to Sabail district police stations nos. 8 (in the case of the first and second applicants) and 39 (in the case of the third applicant).
7 The applicants were detained at the respective police stations for several hours and, following discussions conducted by the police officers concerning the unlawfulness of the applicants’ assemblies, they were released.
8 . The first and second applicants lodged criminal complaints with the relevant prosecuting authorities on 27 January 2022 and 25 January 2022, respectively. The third applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the prosecuting authorities on 12 November 2022. They complained, inter alia , that they had been ill-treated during their arrests and detentions, that they had been detained unlawfully for two to three hours together with other participants of the assemblies, and that their right to hold a peaceful assembly had been violated.
9 On 25 February 2022 and 10 January 2023, respectively, the prosecuting authorities dismissed the applicants’ complaints as groundless and refused to open a criminal investigation. In their decisions, the prosecuting authorities referred mainly to the statements provided by the police officers who had arrested the applicants. Moreover, in order to examine whether the applicants had been subjected to ill-treatment during their arrests and detentions, the prosecuting authorities had also ordered the forensic examination of the applicants. The first applicant had refused to undergo a forensic examination, without giving any explanations. In the case of the third applicant the forensic expert had concluded that there were no injuries on the applicant’s body. As regards the second applicant, although in the complaint he had lodged with the prosecuting authorities he had claimed that he had been forcefully put into the police car, in the subsequent statement that he had given during the investigation he had stated that he had not been subjected to any ill-treatment on the way to or at the police station.
10 . The decision dated 25 February 2022 concerning the first and second applicants stated, in particular, the following:
“During the investigation, H.A., an officer of the post-patrol service unit [ post-patrul xidməti ] of the Sabail District Police Department, stated that ... at 7 a.m. on 15 December 2021 during the morning briefing [of the unit] they had been informed that at 12 noon an unlawful march [“ qanunsuz yürüş ”] would take place at Fountains Square and that they were ordered to be deployed to the aforementioned place. Pursuant to the instructions received, they were already stationed in that area at the designated time. ... At approximately noon, several unknown individuals began to shout slogans in that square; accordingly, the officers requested that those persons leave that area as the march was not being held in a manner that was in accordance with the requirements of the [relevant] legislation and that the quarantine regime rules were not being followed. When their requests were ignored, the march participants were put into police cars ... and taken to police stations for further legal procedures. At that time the above‑mentioned individuals [the applicants] and other participants in the march were requested to comply with the COVID-19 quarantine rules when they started chanting slogans loudly [ yüksək səslə şüarlar səsləndirməyə başladıqlarından həmin şəxslərə karantin-rejim qaydalarına əməl etmələri bildirildi ] they protested against those requests and continued their actions; therefore, they put them into a patrol car to be taken to the police station for further action. The participants in the march tried to prevent this by all possible means [ Aksiya iştirakçıları buna hər cür mane olmağa çalışmışdırlar ]. No violence was used against any person by [H.A.] or other police officers during the action.
... From letter no. 066-1727-1222 of the Sabail district police station no. 8 dated 25 February 2022 (enclosed with the investigation material), it appears that [the first and second applicants] were brought [to the police station] on 15 December 2021 at around 12.30 p.m., registered in the registration book of brought persons [ gətirilmiş şəxslərin qeydiyyat kitabı ] under numbers ..., preventive conversations [ profilaktik söhbət ] were conducted with each of them, and they were released at around 2 p.m. on 15 December 2021. Owing to technical malfunctions in the internal and external cameras [of the police station], it was not possible to present the recordings from the cameras.
[D]uring the investigation, it was established that at approximately 12 noon on 15 December 2021, the applicants were detained and taken to Sabail district police station no. 8 for attempting to participate in an unauthorised public assembly ..., in violation of the quarantine regime in force at the time. Preventive conversations were conducted with the applicants in accordance with the relevant regulations. The allegations made by the applicants regarding their having been allegedly beaten by the officers of the Sabail District Police Department were not confirmed during the investigation.
Since the material collected during the investigation did not reveal any evidence confirming the use of violence by the police officers towards [those] who had participated in an unlawful assembly ... and no elements of a criminal offence were identified, a decision refusing the initiation of criminal proceedings must be issued.
It [is] determined that the police officers acted within the scope of their official duties and conducted themselves in a lawful, professional and appropriate manner in preventing the holding of an unauthorised assembly that posed a potential risk to public health and safety under the prevailing pandemic conditions.”
11 . The decision dated 10 January 2023 concerning the third applicant as well as H.G., M.A. and M.T. who had been arrested during the assembly and argued that they had been also detained for approximately two hours by the police, stated, in particular, the following:
“During the investigation, K.A., the officer of the post-patrol service unit of the Sabail District Police Department, stated that ... at 8 a.m. on 11 November 2022 during the morning briefing [of the unit] they were informed they would be deployed to the [administrative building of the] Baku City Executive Authority ... because at 4 p.m. there would be a protest rally [ etiraz mitinqi ] ... They were in front of the Baku City Executive Authority at the specified time, in accordance with the instruction. At that time, [K.A.], along with other police officers serving in the area, approached a group of people who were trying to hold an illegal and unauthorised rally and first explained to them that it would not be possible to hold the rally since they did not have permission to do so. However, since these people ignored [the officers’] legal demands and attempted to hold the rally, some of those people were taken to the relevant [police] stations in a civilised manner [ sivil yolla ], and some were removed from the area where the rally was being held. No police officer showed any violence or unethical behaviour towards the participants in the rally. After preventive conversations [ profilaktik söhbət ] with the participants of the rally who had been taken to the [police] stations in question [the latter] were released.
... Since the material collected during the investigation did not reveal any evidence confirming the use of violence by the police officers towards the plaintiffs who had participated in an unlawful assembly... and no elements of a criminal offence were identified, a decision must be issued refusing to initiate criminal proceedings.
It was determined that the police officers had acted within the scope of their official duties and conducted themselves in a lawful, professional, and appropriate manner while preventing the holding of an unauthorised assembly.”
12 . On 16 November 2022 the first and second applicants lodged a complaint with the Sabail District Court against the above-mentioned decision of 25 February 2022, repeating the same allegations they had raised before the prosecuting authority (see paragraph 8 above) and asking the court to acknowledge violations of their rights under Articles 3, 5, 11, 13 and 14 of the Convention. On 3 May 2023 the third applicant also lodged a complaint with the Sabail District Court against the decision of 10 January 2023, repeating the same allegations he had raised before the prosecuting authority (see paragraph 8 above) and asking the court to quash the decision of the prosecuting authority, to oblige the prosecuting authority to investigate his complaints, and to acknowledge the violations of his rights under Articles 3, 5, 11, 13 and 14 of the Convention. They alleged that the prosecuting authority had failed to conduct an effective investigation, had relied solely on the statements of the police officers, and had failed to question other witnesses and to address other pieces of evidence (such as photos and camera recordings). By judgments of 24 November 2022 and 16 May 2023, respectively, the Sabail District Court dismissed the applicants’ complaints. Following appeals by the applicants, those judgments were upheld by the Baku Court of Appeal on 1 December 2022 and 26 May 2023, respectively. The courts held that the decisions of the prosecuting authorities had been lawful and properly substantiated. While the domestic courts found that the applicants had not been ill-treated by the police during the arrests and detentions, they did not expressly address the applicants’ complaints concerning the alleged violation of their right to liberty and freedom of peaceful assembly.
13 Article 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan provides:
“I. Everyone has the right to liberty.
II. The right to liberty may be restricted only through arrest, detention or imprisonment under the procedure prescribed by law.”
14 . Article 49 of the Constitution provides:
“I. Everyone has the right to freely assemble together with others.
II. Everyone has the right, upon notifying the relevant State bodies in advance – [and] provided that he or she does not violate public order or public morals – to assemble peacefully with others, without arms, and to hold rallies, meetings, demonstrations, street marches and pickets.”
15 Article 86 of the CAO provided:
“Article 86. Measures to secure administrative-offence proceedings
86.1. An authorised official may use the following measures in order to prevent administrative offences, to establish the identity of a person, to ensure the correct and timely examination of [administrative-offence] cases, and to ensure the implementation of decisions in administrative-offence cases:
86.1.1. administrative escorting [ gətirilmə ],
86.1.2. administrative arrest [ inzibati qaydada tutma ”] ...”
16 Article 88 of the CAO provided as follows:
“Article 88. Administrative arrest
88.1. Administrative arrest – that is, the short-term restriction of the liberty of a person – can be carried out by the following authorised bodies (or officials) in order to ensure the correct and timely consideration of a case concerning an administrative offence or the execution of a decision in an administrative-offence case, in the cases specified in this Article:
88.1.1. Officials of the relevant executive authority – in cases concerning ... the violation of the procedure for organising and holding meetings, rallies, demonstrations, street marches and pickets, ...”
17 . Article 90 of the CAO provided as follows:
“Article 90. Administrative-arrest report
90.1. When a person is subjected to administrative arrest, a report shall be drawn up on this matter, and the following shall be indicated therein:
90.1.1. the date and place of the report;
90.1.2. the position, surname, first name and patronymic of the person who drew up the report;
90.1.3. information about the identity of the arrested person;
90.1.4. the time and reasons for the arrest.
90.2. The report shall be signed by the official who drew it up and the arrested person. If the arrested person refuses to sign the report, this shall be noted in the report. ... A copy of the report shall be given to the arrested person.”
18 . Article 513 of the CAO provided as follows:
“Article 513. Breach of the rules for organising and holding assemblies
513.1. A breach of the rules established by the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on freedom of assembly for organising and holding assemblies, rallies, demonstrations, street marches and pickets by the organiser of the assembly – individuals shall be fined in the amount of one thousand five hundred to three thousand manats, or (depending on the circumstances of the case – taking into account the identity of the offender) shall be subjected to between 200 and 240 hours of community service or administrative detention for a period of up to two months, ...
513.2. Participation in an assembly, rally, demonstration, street march or picket that has not been organised in accordance with the procedure established by the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on freedom of assembly shall [incur a fine of between] 300 and 600 manats, or (depending on the circumstances of the case, and taking into account the identity of the offender) shall be [punished by] between 160 to 200 hundred hours of community service or administrative detention for a period of up to two months.
Note: If the actions listed in Articles 513.1 and 513.2 of this Code contain elements of a crime, such actions shall give rise to criminal liability, in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”
19 . Under Article 5 of the Law, advance written notification was required in order to agree upon the place and time of an assembly and upon the route of a march, with the purpose of enabling the relevant local executive authority to take all necessary measures. Such notification had to be given in writing five days before the holding of the demonstration in question.
20 Other provisions of the Law provide the relevant local executive authority with broad powers to issue relevant orders so as to prohibit (Article 8 §§ IV and V) or stop (Article 8 § VI) a public assembly in specific circumstances; to restrict or change the place, route and/or time of a public assembly (Article 9 §§ II and VII); and to designate specific areas for public assemblies (Article 9 § VI).
21 . At the material time Article 14 of the Law provided as follows:
“Article 14. Powers of the police authorities with regard to the holding of an assembly
“I. ... the police authorities have the following powers with regard to the holding of an assembly: ...
2) When necessary, to stop an assembly which has not been notified [to the authorities] beforehand, save for [spontaneous] assemblies ...;
...
4) To apprehend and remove from the place where an event is being held persons who came carrying ... weapons, as well as rocks, pieces of wood and glass, or clubs that may pose a threat to people’s life and safety or damage property, [as well as] ... explosives, ... flammables, ... radioactive materials;
...
II. The police authorities have the following powers with regard to prohibitions provided in paragraphs I-III of Article 8 of this Law and ..., as well as the execution of orders specified under Article 8 paragraphs V and VI of this Law:
...
2) To order the organisers and participants of an assembly to use all available opportunities to stop the assembly and to disperse;
3) To warn organisers and participants that physical force or exceptional measures will be used against them if the order to stop the assembly and to disperse is not complied with;
4) To use physical force or exceptional measures in order to stop an assembly and disperse participants, in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Azerbaijan;
5) To apprehend persons not complying with the order to stop an assembly and disperse...”
22 . Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (adopted on 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171) provides as follows:
“The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
23 . General Comment No. 37 (2020) of the Human Rights Committee (17 September 2020, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/37), contains, inter alia , the following recommendations:
“70. Having to apply for permission from the authorities undercuts the idea that peaceful assembly is a basic right. Notification systems requiring that those who intend to organize a peaceful assembly must inform the authorities in advance and provide certain salient details are permissible to the extent necessary to assist the authorities in facilitating the smooth conduct of peaceful assemblies and protecting the rights of others. At the same time, this requirement must not be misused to stifle peaceful assemblies and, as in the case of other interferences with the right, must be justifiable on the grounds listed in article 21. The enforcement of notification requirements must not become an end in itself. Notification procedures should be transparent, not unduly bureaucratic, their demands on organizers must be proportionate to the potential public impact of the assembly concerned, and they should be free of charge.
71 A failure to notify the authorities of an upcoming assembly, where required, does not render the act of participation in the assembly unlawful, and must not in itself be used as a basis for dispersing the assembly or arresting the participants or organizers, or for imposing undue sanctions, such as charging the participants or organizers with criminal offences. Where administrative sanctions are imposed on organizers for failure to notify, this must be justified by the authorities. Lack of notification does not absolve the authorities from the obligation, within their abilities, to facilitate the assembly and to protect the participants.
72 Any notification requirements for pre-planned assemblies must be provided for in domestic law. The minimum period of advance notification might vary according to the context and level of facilitation required, but it should not be excessively long. If restrictions are imposed following a notification, they should be communicated early enough to allow time for access to the courts or other mechanisms to challenge them. Any notification regime should exclude assemblies for which the impact of a gathering on others can reasonably be expected to be minimal, for example because of its nature, location or limited size or duration. Notification must not be required for spontaneous assemblies for which there is not enough time to provide notice.
73 Where authorization regimes persist in domestic law, they must in practice function as a system of notification, with authorization being granted as a matter of course, in the absence of compelling reasons to do otherwise. Notification regimes, for their part, must not in practice function as authorization systems.”
THE LAW
24 Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.
25 . The applicants complained that the police had deprived them of their liberty in breach of Article 5 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so...”
26 The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.
27 . The applicants maintained their complaints, submitting that they had been deprived of their liberty for two to three hours, and that the police had not acted in line with the relevant domestic legislation and had not provided any record or documentation concerning their arrests and detentions.
28 . The Government submitted that the applicants had not been arrested or detained and that they had therefore not been deprived of their liberty. They maintained that the applicants had been participating in unlawful demonstrations, which was an administrative offence under Article 513 of the CAO (see paragraph 18 above). Referring to subparagraph (c) of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the Government argued that since the demonstrations in question had been unlawful, it followed that the police officers had prevented an administrative offence; moreover, the police officers had escorted the applicants to the police stations for only a very short period of time and had released them following the above-mentioned preventive conversations.
29 The Court reiterates that in proclaiming the “right to liberty” paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Convention contemplates the physical liberty of the person. Accordingly, it is not concerned with mere restrictions on liberty of movement, which are governed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, with regard to persons lawfully within the territory of that State. In order to determine whether someone has been “deprived of his liberty” within the meaning of Article 5, the starting-point must be his or her specific situation, and account must be taken of a whole range of factors – such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question. The difference between deprivation and restriction of liberty is one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance (see Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], no. 47287/15, §§ 211 ‑ 212, 21 November 2019, and Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], nos. 61411/15 and 3 others, §§ 133 ‑ 134, 21 November 2019).
30 The characterisation or lack of characterisation given by a State to a factual situation cannot decisively affect the Court’s conclusion as to the existence of a deprivation of liberty (see Creangă v. Romania [GC], no. 29226/03, § 92, 23 February 2012).
31 The Court has previously held that the taking of individuals to a police station and their presence there amounted to a “deprivation of liberty” (see, for example, Osypenko v. Ukraine , no. 4634/04, § 49, 9 November 2010; Belousov v. Ukraine , no. 4494/07, § 83, 7 November 2013; Khalikova v. Azerbaijan , no. 42883/11, § 102, 22 October 2015; Dzabarov and Others v. Bulgaria , nos. 6095/11, 74091/11 and 75583/11, § 66, 31 March 2016; and Tsvetkova and Others v. Russia , nos. 54381/08 and 5 others, § 107, 10 April 2018, with further references).
32 In a number of cases, presence at the police station for periods such as 45 minutes (see Shimovolos v. Russia , no. 30194/09, §§ 48-50, 21 June 2011), two hours (see Duğan v. Türkiye , no. 84543/17, §§ 35-37, 7 February 2023) or 3 hours and 30 minutes (see Emin Huseynov v. Azerbaijan , no. 59135/09, §§ 82-83, 7 May 2015) was found to constitute “deprivation of liberty”.
33 Additionally, the Court has emphasised on several occasions that where the “lawfulness” of detention is at issue – including the question of whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been followed – the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof. Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient: Article 5 § 1 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness ( see S., V. and A. v. Denmark [GC], nos. 35553/12 and 2 others, § 74, 22 October 2018, with further references). What is at stake here is not only the “right to liberty” but also the “right to security of person” (see, among other authorities, Khalikova , cited above , § 99, and Wassink v. the Netherlands , 27 September 1990, § 24, Series A no. 185 ‑ A). It is a fundamental principle that no detention that is arbitrary can be compatible with Article 5 § 1, and the notion of “arbitrariness” in Article 5 § 1 extends beyond a lack of conformity with national law, so that a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still arbitrary and thus contrary to the Convention (see Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229/03, § 67, ECHR 2008).
34 . The Court must first examine whether in the instant case the applicants were deprived of their liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
35 In that respect the Court firstly notes the contradiction between the Government’s argument that the applicants had not been deprived of their liberty and their submission that the applicants had been taken to the police station and been kept there for some time (see paragraph 28 above). It is undisputed that the applicants were taken to the police station by police officers and that they were not free to leave the premises without authorisation. The Court thus considers that there was an element of coercion that was indicative of a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (see Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom , no. 4158/05, § 57, ECHR 2010 (extracts), with further reference, and Khalikova , cited above , § 102).
36 . As to the exact length of time for which the applicants were deprived of their liberty, the Court observes that while the applicants maintained that they had been held under arrest by the police for two to three hours and had not been authorised to leave the police station, the Government argued that they had been kept at the police station for a very short period of time.
37 The Court notes that the Government were unable to produce any record of the applicants’ arrests indicating the exact time of the commencement of their deprivation of liberty – despite the clear requirements of domestic law in this respect (see paragraph 17 above). According to the decision of the prosecuting authorities, in the case of the first and the second applicants, it had been confirmed that the applicants had been arrested at around 12 noon, brought to the police station at 12.30 p.m., and kept at the station until 2 p.m. (see paragraph 10 above); in other words, the first and second applicants had been deprived of their liberty for around two hours. In the case of the third applicant the exact length of time for which he had been detained had not been recorded. It appears from the third applicant’s complaint to the prosecuting authority that he stated that he had been detained for approximately two hours (see paragraph 8 above). According to the decision of the prosecuting authority, other participants in the assembly (namely, H.G., M.A. and M.T.) likewise indicated during their questioning that they had been detained for the same period of time (see paragraph 11 above). In his subsequent complaints before the domestic courts, the third applicant consistently reiterated this account (see paragraph 12 above). However, the domestic authorities failed to take account of, or to address, his version of events. Nor did they seek to establish the precise duration of the detention, despite the third applicant’s allegations and the corroborating statements of other individuals who had been arrested and detained in the same manner and for the same length of time. In their observations, the Government likewise failed to specify the exact duration of the detention, merely asserting that the applicants had been held “for a very short period of time” (see paragraph 34 above). Accordingly, in view of the Government’s inability to provide convincing and relevant evidence in support of their version of events, and having regard to the consistent and plausible nature of the third applicant’s submissions, the Court accepts the latter’s version of events (see paragraph 25 above) (see, mutatis mutandis , Khalikova , cited above, §§ 108–9).
38 The absence of an arrest record must in itself be considered to constitute a most serious failing, as it has been the Court’s constant view that unrecorded detention of an individual amounts to a complete negation of the fundamentally important guarantees contained in Article 5 of the Convention and discloses a most grave violation of that provision. The absence of a record of such matters as the date, time and location of detention, the name of the detainee, the reasons for the detention and the name of the person effecting it must be seen as incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness and with the very purpose of Article 5 of the Convention (see Derrek and Others v. Russia , no. 31712/21, § 40, 29 April 2025, and Čamans and Timofejeva v. Latvia , no. 42906/12, § 129, 28 April 2016).
39 According to a letter enclosed with the investigation material in the case of the first and second applicants – and referred to in the prosecuting authority’s decision of 25 February 2022 (though not included in the case file) – entries were made in the police station’s registration log (see paragraph 10 above). However, these entries cannot be considered sufficient to document the applicants’ detention, for several reasons. Firstly, domestic law required that an arrest report be drawn up (see paragraph 17 above). Secondly, the police station registration log itself cannot be considered reliable – in particular, because, while some records had been made in the case of the first and second applicants, no such records had been made in the case of the third applicant (see paragraphs 10-11 above) (compare, mutatis mutandis , Bogay and Others v. Ukraine , no. 38283/18, § 56, 3 April 2025).
40 . The Court must next ascertain whether depriving the applicants of their liberty complied with the requirements of Article 5 § 1 and was free from arbitrariness. The Court finds that the applicants’ deprivation of liberty did not fall under sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (d), (e) and (f) of paragraph 1 of Article 5. The Government referred to sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, submitting that the police had prevented the administrative offence of a breach of the rules for organising and holding assemblies while arresting and detaining the applicants (see paragraph 28 above).
41 In this regard, the Court reiterates that Article 5 § 1 (c) is concerned with detention for the purpose of bringing the person concerned before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so. As regards the second limb of this provision, the Court has acknowledged that it provides a distinct ground for detention, independent of the existence of “a reasonable suspicion of his having committed an offence”. It thus applies to preventive detention outside criminal proceedings (see S., V. and A. v. Denmark , cited above, §§ 114-16). Even within the context of this limb of Article 5 § 1 (c), however, the Court has held that the provision does not permit a policy of general prevention directed against individuals who are perceived by the authorities as being dangerous or having the propensity to commit unlawful acts. This ground of detention does no more than afford the Contracting States a means of preventing a concrete and specific offence as regards, in particular, the place and time of its commission and its victim(s). In order for a detention to be justified under the second limb of Article 5 § 1 (c), the authorities must show convincingly that the person concerned would in all likelihood have been involved in the concrete and specific offence, had its commission not been prevented by the detention (ibid., §§ 89 and 91).
42 In the present case, the authorities had failed to provide any documentation concerning the applicants’ detentions which in itself is a sign that the authorities were not able to show convincingly that the applicants had been involved in any concrete and specific offence with its precise details. As there were no proper records of the applicants’ detentions, no reasons for it were stated either at the time of the detentions. While in the case of the first and the second applicants, the police officers also stated orally, at a later stage, that the applicants’ actions had also been in breach of the quarantine rules (see paragraph 10 above), this alleged offence had not been documented either.
43 . The Court also notes that in response to the applicants’ complaints concerning, inter alia , the unlawfulness of their detentions, in their decisions the domestic courts did not touch upon that issue at all (see paragraph 12 above). They thus failed to address whether the detentions in question were in accordance with the domestic law.
44 Furthermore, having regard to the above, it can be discerned from the circumstances of the case that the intent of the authorities was not to prevent an offence, but rather to interfere with the assemblies in question (see below paragraphs 52-55). In this connection, the Court reiterates the analysis and conclusions made in Huseynli and Others v. Azerbaijan (nos. 67360/11 and 2 others, 11 February 2016), and Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 60259/11, 15 October 2015), which are, in its view, also relevant within the context of the present case. In particular, in those judgments the Court noted that the measures applied by the authorities – namely, arrests related to their participation or planned participation in demonstrations, followed by several days of imprisonment – had implied an element of bad faith and arbitrariness (see the above-cited cases of Huseynli and Others , § 147, and Gafgaz Mammadov , § 108). A similar element of bad faith and arbitrariness is apparent in the present case.
45 . The Court cannot therefore accept the Government’s submission that the applicants’ arrests and detentions fall under the second limb of sub‑paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. Thus no grounds have been made out which could bring the applicants’ arrests and detentions within any of the sub-categories of Article 5 § 1.
46 Consequently, the Court concludes that the applicants’ deprivation of liberty was unlawful and arbitrary.
47 . There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
48 The applicants complained that the dispersal of the demonstrations by the police and their arrests and detentions had been in breach of their right to freedom of assembly, as provided by Article 11 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2 No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.”
49 The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.
50 The applicants submitted that they had given the authorities official advance notice of the demonstrations, that they and the other demonstrators had behaved peacefully, and that through the dispersal of the assemblies and their arrests and detentions, the authorities had interfered with their right to freedom of assembly. The interference had not been lawful, had not pursued a legitimate aim and had not been “necessary in a democratic society”.
51 . The Government maintained the arguments that they had advanced in respect of the complaint under Article 5 of the Convention, submitting that the demonstrations had been unlawful (as they had been unauthorised), that the police officers had prevented the commission of an administrative offence, and had escorted the applicants to the police station for a very short period of time (releasing them following the above-mentioned preventive conversations – see paragraph 28 above).
52 . The Court reiterates that the right to freedom of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and, like the right to freedom of expression, is one of the foundations of such a society. Thus, it should not be interpreted restrictively (see Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], no. 37553/05, § 91, ECHR 2015, and Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], nos. 29580/12 and 4 others, § 98, 15 November 2018).
53 An interference with the right to freedom of assembly does not need to amount to an outright ban (legal or de facto ), but can consist of various other measures taken by the authorities. The term “restrictions” in Article 11 § 2 must be interpreted as including both measures taken before or during a gathering and those (such as punitive measures) taken afterwards. For instance, a prior ban can have a chilling effect on those who may intend to participate in a rally and thus amount to an interference – even if the rally subsequently proceeds without hindrance on the part of the authorities. A refusal to allow an individual to travel for the purpose of attending a meeting amounts to an interference. So too do measures taken by the authorities during a rally (such as the dispersal of the rally or the arrest of participants) and penalties imposed for having taken part in a rally (see Kudrevičius and Others , cited above, § 100).
54 In the present case it has not been disputed between the parties that the demonstrations in issue were dispersed by the police, and that the applicants who participated in the demonstrations were arrested and taken to the police stations.
55 . The Court concludes that there has been interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of peaceful assembly on account of both the dispersal of the demonstrations and the applicants’ arrests and detentions.
56 The Court reiterates that an interference will constitute a breach of Article 11 unless it is “prescribed by law”, pursues one or more legitimate aims under paragraph 2, and is “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of those aims (see Djavit An v. Turkey , no. 20652/92, § 63, ECHR 2003-III; Balçık and Others v. Turkey , no. 25/02 , § 44, 29 November 2007; and Sergey Kuznetsov v. Russia , no. 10877/04 , § 37, 23 October 2008).
57 As regards the requirement of lawfulness, the Court notes that in the present case the demonstrations in question were dispersed because they had not been “authorised” by the authorities. The Court also notes that the Government invoked Article 513 of the CAO as the legal basis for the applicants’ arrests and detentions (see paragraphs 18 and 28 above). The Court observes, however, that Article 49 of the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned public assembly (see paragraph 14 above). On the other hand, the Court also notes that the Law on Freedom of Assembly provided the relevant local executive authority (in the present case, the Baku City Executive Authority) and the police with broad powers to prohibit or stop a public assembly (see paragraphs 19-21 above) (see Gafgaz Mammadov , cited above, § 55).
58 In this regard, the Court also reiterates that while rules governing public assemblies – such as the system of prior notification – are essential for the smooth conduct of public events (since they allow the authorities to minimise disruption to traffic and to take other safety measures), their enforcement cannot become an end in itself. In particular, where irregular demonstrators do not engage in acts of violence, the Court has required that the public authorities show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings if the freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention is not to be deprived of all substance (see Malofeyeva v. Russia , no. 36673/04, §§ 136-37, 30 May 2013, and Kasparov and Others v. Russia , no. 21613/07 , § 91, 3 October 2013; see also paragraphs 22-23 above for the ICCPR and General Comment No. 37, points 70-73).
59 Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the authorities failed to provide any records to show that the applicants had indeed been arrested and detained for the administrative offence in question. Given such circumstances the Court has doubts about the credibility of the formal ground invoked by the authorities for the applicants’ arrests and detentions (see, mutatis mutandis , Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan , cited above, §§ 54-56).
60 In view of its above findings under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see paragraphs 34-47 above), the Court cannot accept that the interference with the applicants’ right under Article 11 was “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention.
61 In any event, even assuming that the police’s actions had a legal basis and that they consequently pursued the legitimate aim of prevention of crime as argued by the Government (see paragraph 51 above), the Court cannot overlook the fact that the authorities dispersed the demonstrations shortly after they began, despite the fact that they had been intended to be peaceful and had been conducted in a peaceful manner. There was no evidence that the applicants committed any reprehensible offence during the demonstrations. This also calls into question the Government’s assertion about the necessity of the dispersals and the applicants’ arrests and detentions.
62 Furthermore, the domestic courts’ decisions did not address the complaints raised by the applicants concerning the violation of their right to freedom of peaceful assembly, thereby repeating the same failing already identified with regard to the complaint relating to the right to liberty (see paragraph 43 above). The Court further notes the lack of any acknowledgment that participation in an “unauthorised” peaceful demonstration was by itself protected by Article 11 of the Convention, and the authorities did not balance this right with any competing interests (see, mutatis mutandis , Gafgaz Mammadov , cited above, §§ 61-65).
63 . There has accordingly been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention.
64 Lastly, the applicants complained that – in breach of Article 13 of the Convention – no effective remedy had been available to them in respect of their complaints under Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention. Having regard to the submissions of the parties and the Court’s findings under Articles 5 § 1 and 11 of the Convention (see paragraphs 25-63 above), the Court considers that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of these complaints (compare Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08 , § 156, ECHR 2014).
65 Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
66 The applicants claimed 3,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
67 The Government contested those claims as being excessive and unsubstantiated.
68 The Court, ruling on an equitable basis, awards each applicant EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
69 The applicants also claimed EUR 500 each for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court.
70 The Government considered that the claims were excessive and asked the Court to adopt a strict approach to the applicants’ claims.
71 According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award each applicant EUR 500 in respect of all the costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 November 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Milan Blaško Ioannis Ktistakis Registrar President
APPENDIX
List of cases:
No.
Application no.
Case name
Lodged on
Applicant Year of Birth Place of Residence
Represented by
1.
18543/23
Amiraslan v. Azerbaijan
31/03/2023
Idris
Bayram oglu AMIRASLAN 1986 Baku
Nemat
Aga oglu
KARIMLI
Baku
2.
18790/23
Mamiyev v. Azerbaijan
31/03/2023
Aziz
Iltifat oglu MAMIYEV 1993 Salyan
3.
31497/23
18/07/2023
Tofig
Rashid oglu YAGUBLU 1961 Baku