Nvo Mans v. Montenegro
Violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression - {general} (Article 10-1 - Freedom to impart information; Freedom to receive information)
Berörda konventionsartiklar
FIRST SECTION
CASE OF NVO MANS v. MONTENEGRO
(Application no. 30130/24)
Art 10 • Freedom to receive and impart information • Refusal of NGO’s request for access to copies of contracts concluded by a public official – a State prosecutor – and her husband held by a notary • Information sought by a well-established NGO, with a public-watchdog role, concerned a matter of public interest and was ready and available • Failure to carry out a proper balancing exercise taking all relevant interests into account • Reasons put forward by domestic authorities, while relevant, not sufficient to show that the refusal was “necessary in a democratic society”
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.
19 November 2026
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of NVO MANS v. Montenegro,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Erik Wennerström , President , Ivana Jelić, Frédéric Krenc, Davor Derenčinović, Alain Chablais, Artūrs Kučs, Anna Adamska-Gallant , judges , and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 30130/24) against Montenegro lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Montenegrin non-governmental organisation, NVO MANS (“the applicant organisation”), on 9 October 2024;
the decision to give notice to the Montenegrin Government (“the Government”) of the complaint concerning free access to information;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 13 October 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1 The present case concerns the applicant organisation’s complaint under Article 10 of the Convention that it was not given free access to information.
THE FACTS
2 The applicant organisation, NVO MANS, is a Montenegrin non-governmental organisation (NGO) registered in 2000 in Podgorica. It was represented before the Court by Mr P. Gluščević, a lawyer practising in Nikšić.
3 The Government were represented by their Agent at the time, Ms. K. Peković.
4 The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.
5 . The applicant organisation is a well-established NGO. Its website specifies that it fights corruption and organised crime affecting Montenegro, and its proclaimed goals are reducing the scope for the operation of organised crime; reducing high-level corruption; increasing the transparency and accountability of institutions; and improving civic oversight of their work (see mans.co.me/en/ [1] ).
6 . On 3 November 2017 the applicant organisation lodged a request with a notary in Berane, seeking copies of all contracts that X and her husband Y had concluded since 2010.
7 . On 10 December 2018, after a remittal, the notary dismissed the applicant organisation’s request, relying on point 6 of the first paragraph of section 14 and point 3 of the first paragraph of section 29 of the Free Access to Information Act (“the FAIA”), and the first and second paragraphs of section 30, the first and second paragraphs of section 74, section 88 and point 7 of the third paragraph of section 112a of the Notary Act (see paragraphs 31 in fine and 35-43 below). The notary held, in particular, that any notarial document and all of its content constituted a professional secret pursuant to the first paragraph of section 30 of the Notary Act, and that giving the requested information to the applicant organisation would amount to a breach of the mandatory provisions ( imperativnih normi ) of the Notary Act. He also found that the relevant provisions clearly set out which persons were authorised to request originals and copies of notarial deeds, and that the applicant organisation was not one of those persons. He concluded that the organisation’s request should be dismissed as unfounded, as it was not authorised to request copies of the documents in question and had not provided evidence indicating that the parties had consented to it lodging the request, nor had it indicated either in its request or during the proceedings that it had a legitimate interest ( opravdanog interesa ) in requesting the information in question.
8 . On an unspecified date the applicant organisation appealed against the notary’s decision, maintaining that access to information had been restricted contrary to the FAIA and the Notary Act. It submitted that the purpose of the FAIA was to ensure access to information of public interest, thereby ensuring public oversight of bodies performing public duties. It referred to sections 5, 7 and 14 of the FAIA and maintained, in particular, that section 7 prioritised the interest in disclosure. The applicant organisation further submitted that section 30 of the Notary Act did not provide that concluded contracts constituted a professional secret (see paragraph 40 below). The applicant organisation maintained that notaries were bound by the FAIA as well, and that the FAIA could not be excluded by reference to the Notary Act. The applicant organisation argued that otherwise, reference to the Notary Act would make the FAIA completely pointless, as it would mean that notaries could restrict access to all information which was sought from them, which would also mean that any request for free access to information would be pointless. In addition, section 17 of the FAIA enumerated cases in which there was an overriding public interest in disclosure, including cases where the information in question contained data which reasonably indicated corruption, non-compliance with regulations, the unlawful use of public funds or abuse of public office (see paragraph 33 below).
9 . The applicant organisation maintained that in the present case it had not been proved that disclosure of the requested information would jeopardise anyone’s interests, and that the relevant balancing exercise ( test štetnosti ) had not been conducted properly. The organisation also submitted that it had not even been established whether there was a public interest in disclosure, and that it had been arbitrarily ( paušalno ) stated that there was no such interest. It argued that that was unacceptable, as the requested information concerned a public official – specifically, a State prosecutor – and her husband, and information concerning public officials could not constitute a professional secret. The applicant organisation submitted that it was irrelevant that it had not indicated that it had a legitimate interest in requesting the information, as that had been common knowledge ( opšte poznat ), given that the information concerned a public official.
10 . The applicant organisation further maintained that as the information in question related to a public official, it was clear that there was an indisputable public interest in knowing about that information, as there was a reasonable suspicion of non-compliance with regulations and abuse of public office. This was further supported by the second paragraph of section 74 of the Notary Act, which provided that other persons could also inspect notarial records if they had a legitimate interest in doing so. The applicant organisation submitted that the Notary Act therefore allowed access to information in circumstances where there was a public interest in disclosure. In the present case, the public interest in disclosure was indisputable and legitimate, and it was clear that there were no legal grounds to restrict access to the information in question, especially since both the FAIA and the Notary Act provided for a legitimate interest being grounds for the disclosure of information.
11 . On 10 April 2019 the Personal Data Protection and Free Access to Information Agency (“the Agency”), as the second-instance body, dismissed the applicant organisation’s appeal. It found that the notary had correctly applied the relevant legislation and, in particular, that the applicant organisation had not demonstrated that it was probable that it had a legitimate interest ( nije ... učinio vjerovatim postojanje opravdanog interesa ). The Agency held that the notary had conducted the relevant balancing exercise and had correctly established that disclosing the information in question would be in breach of the relevant provisions. The Agency also held that there were grounds for restricting access to the information in question and that there was no overriding interest in disclosing that information, as it did not indicate any of the circumstances set out in the first paragraph of section 17 of the FAIA. It concluded that the applicant organisation’s submissions that the first-instance decision was not sufficiently reasoned were unfounded.
12 . On 23 April 2019 the applicant organisation initiated an administrative dispute. It reaffirmed, in substance, most of its arguments from the appeal (see paragraphs 8-9 above) and maintained that even if the information in question could be considered a professional secret under the Notary Act, the public interest in disclosure was more important and could not be denied, as the requested information concerned a public official. It also submitted that the reasoning in the disputed decision was insufficient.
13 . On 18 March 2021 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant organisation’s claim on the grounds that it was indisputable that the organisation was not one of the persons or bodies authorised to request notarial deeds; that it had not provided evidence indicating that the parties had consented to it lodging such a request; and that it had not indicated that it had any legitimate interest in seeking copies of the contracts in question. The court referred to point 6 of the first paragraph of section 14, section 16, section 17 and point 3 of the first paragraph of section 29 of the FAIA, and sections 30, 74 and 88 of the Notary Act (see paragraphs 31 in fine - 33 and 35-42 below).
14 . On 20 April 2021 the applicant organisation lodged a request for judicial review and maintained that its request should have been allowed on the basis of point 1 of the first paragraph of section 14 of the FAIA, which provided that access to information could be restricted in order to protect privacy, except when information related to public officials and the performance of their duties, their income, their property and conflicts of interest. The applicant organisation submitted that the decisive fact in the present case was that the requested information concerned X – a public official and, more specifically, a State prosecutor – and her husband; it argued that such information was not protected in the manner interpreted by the courts, and that the legislation itself provided for an overriding public interest in the disclosure of such information. The applicant organisation also submitted that in accordance with the Prevention of Corruption Act, public officials and their spouses had a duty to report their income and property to the Prevention of Corruption Agency. It submitted that in the present case, the public interest in disclosing the requested information was obvious, given the purpose of provisions relating to the property of public officials and free access to information. It also argued that the application of section 30 of the Notary Act depended on other pieces of legislation. More specifically, that section provided for an exception to information being kept secret, when the legislation indicated otherwise, and the second paragraph of section 74 provided that other persons could inspect notarial records if they had a legitimate interest in doing so. The applicant organisation maintained that the Notary Act therefore allowed access to information when there was a public interest in disclosing such information. It submitted that such an interest existed in the present case, as the requested information concerned a public official (specifically, a State prosecutor), and that public officials constituted a special category as regards information concerning their property, in order to prevent corruption and protect the overriding public interest in disclosure. The applicant organisation further submitted that the FAIA explicitly provided that information relating to the property of public officials was public. It argued that the Administrative Court had not examined whether the balancing exercise had been conducted, or, if it had been carried out, had not examined it. It also referred to decisions U.br.158/18 of 3 July 2019, U.br. 6254/18 of 25 December 2019 and U.br.8739/18 of 12 March 2020 of the Administrative Court, and decision Uvp.br.514/19 of 6 June 2019 of the Supreme Court (see paragraphs 51-53 below).
15 . On 23 November 2021 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant organisation’s request for judicial review, referring to the same provisions as the Administrative Court (see paragraph 13 in fine above). It found, in substance, that the applicant organisation was not a person authorised to request notarial deeds, and that it had not provided evidence indicating that the parties had consented to it lodging such a request. The court found that the balancing exercise had been conducted and it had therefore been established that disclosing notarial deeds would amount to a breach of the Notary Act, which would be harmful ( izazvalo štetne posledice ) to the work of notaries; that risk outweighed the public interest in disclosure. The court found that the disputed decision had examined all the relevant arguments and had given clear and valid reasons for all conclusions, and that the applicant organisation’s submission that the disputed decision lacked reasoning was unfounded.
16 . On an unspecified date the applicant organisation lodged a constitutional appeal against the decisions of the Administrative Court and the Supreme Court. The organisation did not provide the Court with a copy of that appeal, but the Constitutional Court’s decision indicates that the organisation submitted that access to the requested information had been unlawfully restricted; that information about the income and property of public officials and their spouses could not be protected from disclosure; and that the relevant balancing exercise had not established in any way that access to the requested information could jeopardise anybody’s interests.
17 On 22 December 2023 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant organisation’s constitutional appeal. The judgment was served on the applicant on 12 June 2024. It found, under Article 6, that the proceedings had been fair and that the disputed decisions were not arbitrary, but properly reasoned.
18 . As regards Article 10, the Constitutional Court referred to Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary ([GC] (no. 18030/11, 8 November 2016) and the criteria established by that case. The court held that the applicant organisation in the present case was also an NGO which could have the role of a public watchdog, and that the key question was whether refusing its request for information had amounted to an interference with its rights under Article 10.
19 The court noted that the applicant organisation had not specified why it had requested the information in question, nor had it argued that by requesting that information, it had wanted to contribute in some way to a debate of public interest or impart that information to interested members of the public. Nor had the organisation argued that the lack of disclosure had made it impossible ( onemogućilo ) for it to participate in a public debate on a question of public interest and thereby perform its role as a public watchdog.
20 As regards the second criterion, the nature of the disputed information, the Constitutional Court noted that the requested information was secret ( predstavljaju tajne podatke ) and that the applicant organisation was not authorised to access notarial information, nor had it obtained the parties’ consent to do so. The court referred to section 14 of the FAIA and sections 30 and 74 of the Notary Act.
21 As regards the third criterion, whether the person who had requested information had done so in order to perform its role as a public watchdog, the court found that the applicant organisation had not alleged that the requested information concerned a specific activity relating to a question of public interest, and that therefore its role within the meaning of the criterion established in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság could not be examined.
22 The Constitutional Court considered that it could not be concluded that the requested information was necessary for some of the applicant organisation’s activities as an NGO which would contribute to a debate of obvious public interest. Taking all those factors into account, the Constitutional Court concluded that the refusal by the relevant domestic body and the courts to allow access to the information in question had not “caused harm” ( nijesu ... naškodili ) to the applicant organisation’s right of free access to information, due to which there had been no interference with the applicant organisation’s right under Article 10 of the Convention.
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
I. Relevant domestic law
A. The Constitution of Montenegro ( Ustav Crne Gore , published in Official Gazette of Montenegro – OGM – nos. 001/07 and 038/13)
23 Article 51 provides that everyone has the right of access to information held by State bodies and organisations exercising public authority. The right of access to information may be restricted if it is in the interest of protecting life; public health; morality and privacy; the conduct of criminal proceedings; the security and defence of Montenegro; or foreign, monetary and economic policy.
B. The Free Access to Information Act ( Zakon o slobodnom pristupu informacijama ; published in OGM nos. 044/12 and 030/17)
24 . The first paragraph of section 1 of the FAIA provides that the right to access information and to re-use information in the possession of public authorities shall be exercised in accordance with the manner and procedure prescribed by this Act.
25 . Section 3 of the FAIA provides that any national or foreign natural person or legal entity has the right to access information without being obliged to state the reasons for the request or explain the interest in requesting the information.
26 . Section 5 provides that access to information ensures that the public knows about information held by the authorities ( u posjedu organa vlasti ), so that the public may exercise democratic control over the authorities and exercise human rights and freedoms.
27 . Section 7 provides that access to information is in the public interest and may be restricted only for the purpose of protecting the interests specified in this Act.
28 Section 9 provides that the “authorities” are a State body (legislative, executive, judicial, or administrative body), a local self-government body, a local administration body, an institution, a commercial company or another legal entity whose founder, co-founder or majority owner is the state or a local self-government unit; a legal entity whose activities are financed predominantly from public revenues; as well as a natural person, entrepreneur or a legal entity that exercises public authority or manages a public fund.
29 . Section 10 provides that information is a document or part of a document in written, printed, video, audio, electronic or other form, including copies thereof, regardless of its content, source (author), time of creation or classification system. Access to information includes the right to request and receive information, regardless of the purpose of that request and the data contained in that information.
30 . Section 13 provides that a public authority must allow a natural person or a legal entity requesting access to information to access the information or part of that information which is in its possession, except in the cases provided for by this Act.
31 . Point 1 of the first paragraph of section 14 provides that a public authority may restrict access to information or part of that information in order to protect privacy, in accordance with the law governing the protection of personal data, with the exception of data relating to public officials in connection with the performance of their duties, as well as information concerning their income, property and conflicts of interest, including those of their relatives, as regulated by the law governing the prevention of conflicts of interest. Point 6 of the first paragraph of section 14 provides that a public authority may restrict access to information or part of that information if the information is a professional or tax secret under the law.
32 . The first paragraph of section 16 provides that access to information is restricted if disclosure of information would significantly jeopardise the interest referred to in section 14 of this Act, that is, if there is a possibility that the disclosure of information would cause adverse consequences for an interest that is more important than the public interest in disclosure, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure prescribed by section 17 of this Act.
33 . Section 17, in so far as relevant, provides that an overriding public interest in disclosing information or part of that information exists when the requested information contains data that reasonably ( osnovano ) indicate, inter alia
(1) corruption, non-compliance with regulations, the unlawful use of public funds, or abuse of power in the performance of a public function;
(2) a suspicion that a criminal offence has been committed, or the existence of reasons for contesting a court decision.
The public authority must grant access to information referred to in section 14 of this Act, or part of that information, when there is an overriding public interest in disclosing such information.
34 . Section 24 provides that if access to part of a piece of information is restricted in accordance with section 14 of this Act, the public authority in question must provide access to the information by providing the person who requested it with a copy of that information, after deleting the part of the information to which access is restricted. In such a case, the part of the information to which access is restricted must be marked as “deleted” and information on the extent of the deletion (line, paragraph and page numbers) will be provided.
35 . Point 3 of the first paragraph of section 29 provides that a public authority must refuse a request for access to information if, inter alia , there is a reason under section 14 of this Act for restricting access to the requested information.
C. The Notary Act ( Zakon o notarima ; published in Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro – OG RM – no. 068/05 and OGM nos. 049/08, 055/16 and 084/18)
36 . Sections 2, 4, 5 and 7 provide that notaries perform notarial activities as a public service and that a notarial deed is a public document.
37 Sections 10, 10a, 11, 14 and 123 provide that the Ministry of Justice determines the number of notarial offices and the locations of their seats; adopts regulations governing the work of notaries; determines the working hours of notaries; publishes and conducts competitions for the appointment of notaries; and prescribes the procedure for conducting disciplinary proceedings and determining the disciplinary liability of notaries.
38 Sections 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 25, 115, 116, 117, 130 and 135 provide, inter alia , that the Minister of Justice (“the Minister”) appoints notaries; that notaries take an oath before the Minister; that the Minister renders a decision on the termination of notarial duties, on dismissing the notary from office, on the temporary suspension of the notary; appoints the Disciplinary Prosecutor and his or her Deputy, at whose request disciplinary proceedings are initiated in respect of notaries; appoints members of the first-instance and the second-instance disciplinary commissions in charge of conducting disciplinary proceedings in respect of notaries; establishes an examination commission before which a notarial examination is taken; issues and signs a certificate of that a notary passed the notarial examination.
39 . Section 17, insofar as relevant, provides that a notary has a seal, the text of which is inscribed in accordance with the law governing the seals of state authorities (State Seal and the Seals of State Authorities of Montenegro Act).
40 . The first paragraph of section 30 provides that a notary is obliged to keep information that he or she has learned in the course of his or her duties secret, unless the law, the parties concerned or a legal transaction indicates otherwise. The second paragraph provides that a notary is obliged to provide the information referred to in the first paragraph of this section to a court or other State authority before which proceedings are being conducted, in accordance with the law. The third paragraph provides that the duty of secrecy also applies to persons who are employed by a notary.
41 . Section 74 provides that parties have the right to inspect notarial records. Other persons may inspect notarial records only if they have a legitimate ( opravdani ) interest in doing so or written consent of a party.
42 . Section 88 provides that a notary is obliged to issue a copy of a notarial deed to a party and his or her heir, the Chamber of Notaries, the Ministry of Justice, a court or another State authority, at their request and at their expense.
43 . Section 112a sets out disciplinary breaches of notarial duties. In particular, point 7 of the third paragraph of that section provides that a serious breach of notarial duties occurs if a notary discloses confidential information from a notarial deed that he or she has obtained in the course of his or her notarial activities.
D. Criminal Code of Montenegro ( Krivični zakonik Crne Gore , published in OG RM nos. 070/03, 013/04 and 047/06, and in OGM nos. 040/08, 025/10, 073/10, 032/11, 064/11, 040/13, 056/13, 014/15, 042/15, 058/15, 044/17, 049/18, 003/20, 026/21, 144/21, 145/21, 110/23, 123/24, 121/25, 117/26 and 137/26)
44 Article 171 of the Criminal Code provides for a criminal offence of unauthorised disclosure of a secret. In particular, the first paragraph of this Article provides that a lawyer, physician, or any other person who, without authorisation, discloses a secret that he or she learned in the course of performing his or her profession shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. The second paragraph provides that a person who discloses a secret in the public interest or in the interest of another person, where such interest outweighs the interest in maintaining secrecy, shall not be punished for the offence referred to in the first paragraph of this Article.
E. The Prevention of Corruption Act ( Zakon o sprječavanju korupcije ; published in OGM nos. 053/14 and 042/17)
45 . Section 23 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which was in force at the relevant time, provided that within 30 days of being appointed or leaving office, a public official had to file a report with the Prevention of Corruption Agency about his or her income and property and his or her spouse’s income and property on the day of his or her appointment or departure from office. Such a report was filed once a year, except when there were changes relating to an increase in assets exceeding 5,000 euros (EUR), which needed to be reported within 30 days. A public official also had to file a report once a year for two years after leaving office.
46 Section 24 provided that an income and property report contained, in particular, information about: ownership rights over immovable property and lease rights relating to immovable property which were effective for a period exceeding one year, in Montenegro and abroad; ownership rights over movable property whose value exceeded EUR 5,000 or which had to be registered with the competent authorities (motor vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and so on); ownership rights over immovable and movable property belonging to a company, institution or other legal entity owned or founded by a public official; deposits in banks and other financial organisations, in Montenegro and abroad; stocks and shares in a legal entity and other securities; cash amounting to more than EUR 5,000; rights based on copyright, patents and similar rights, and intellectual and industrial property; debts and credits; the source and amount of income from scientific, teaching, cultural, artistic and sports activities; and membership of the governing and supervisory bodies of public companies, public institutions or other legal entities co-owned by the State ( sa učešćem kapitala čiji je vlasnik država ), municipalities, and scientific, educational, cultural, artistic, humanitarian, sports or similar associations.
47 The first paragraph of section 26 provided that data from such a report were kept in the Register of Income and Property of Public Officials (“the Register”), which was part of the Prevention of Corruption Agency’s unified information system.
48 The first paragraph of section 27, in so far as relevant, provided that data from the Register would be published on the Prevention of Corruption Agency’s website.
49 Section 30 provided that the Prevention of Corruption Agency verified data from a report by comparing those data with data on the assets and income of public officials which had been collected by public authorities and legal entities. Public authorities and legal entities had to submit the required data and information within the time-limit and in the manner determined by the Prevention of Corruption Agency, that is, they would provide access to the required documentation in accordance with the law. If, during the verification procedure, the Prevention of Corruption Agency determined that the assets and incomes of a public official and related persons were higher than their real incomes, at the request of the Prevention of Corruption Agency, the public official had to submit detailed data about how he or she had acquired the property and income within 30 days. The verification procedure was not open to the public.
50 . The Prevention of Corruption Act entered into force on 30 June 2017 and replaced the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest Act ( Zakon o sprječavanju sukoba interesa ; published in OGM nos. 001/09, 041/11, 047/11 and 052/14). Sections 19, 20, 20a and the first paragraph of section 21 of the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest Act corresponded, in substance, to sections 23, 24, 30 and the first paragraph of section 26 of the Prevention of Corruption Act respectively (a report had to be submitted to the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest Commission). The second paragraph of section 21 provided that information from the reports was available to the public.
II. Relevant domestic practice
51 . As submitted by the applicant organisation in the domestic proceedings (see paragraph 14 in fine above) and not disputed by the Government, in judgment U.br.158/18 of 3 July 2019 the Administrative Court found that it was undisputed that a claimant had requested access to information relating to Z, the husband of W, the head of the High State Prosecutor’s Office in Podgorica. The court further found that the arguments put forward by the relevant administrative bodies in finding that the conditions for allowing access to information had not been met were incomprehensible, bearing in mind point 1 of the first paragraph of section 14 of the FAIA. That provision also included information that was not subject to access restrictions, and the request in question had clearly indicated that it concerned the property and income of a public official’s relative.
52 In judgment U.br.6254/18 of 25 December 2019, which also concerned a request for access to information, the Administrative Court found that the relevant first-instance body had prevented it from examining the lawfulness of the disputed decision because it had not provided it with the evidence on which the facts were based or the evidence referred to by the first-instance body. Such evidence was important for deciding that dispute, including the balancing exercise, which was why the court allowed the claim and quashed the disputed decision. Judgment U.br.8739/18 of 12 March 2020 had a similar conclusion.
53 . In ruling Uvp.br. 514/19 of 6 June 2019, which was adopted in favour of the present applicant, who had requested access to information on public officials, the Supreme Court found procedural violations that had had an impact on the lawfulness of the challenged decision, bearing in mind the relevant law and the content of the case files. The case file clearly indicated that at the time the request for access to information had been submitted, the person in relation to whom access to information had been requested had been a public official; that the Administrative Court had not examined the relevant provisions; and that the particular case had concerned a public official and the performance of his duties. The Supreme Court therefore quashed the judgment of the Administrative Court which had dismissed a request by the applicant for the annulment of a decision issued by the Agency.
III. Relevant international materials
54 The Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents (CETS No. 205), also known as the Tromsø Convention , entered into force on 1 December 2020. Montenegro is one of its 17 Parties. Article 3 of that Convention sets out possible limitations to access to official documents. In particular, the first paragraph of Article 3, sub-paragraph f, provides that each Party may limit the right of access to official documents, and that limitations shall be set down precisely in law, be necessary in a democratic society and be proportionate to the aim of protecting, inter alia , privacy and other legitimate private interests. The second paragraph of the same Article provides that access to information contained in an official document may be refused if its disclosure would or would be likely to harm any of the interests mentioned in the first paragraph, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.
55 Paragraph 28 of the explanatory report to the Tromsø Convention provides that official documents can contain information of a personal or private nature which is protected, for example criminal records or medical files. It also reiterates that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees the right of respect to private and family life, and that these interests may take precedence over the interest in making the information in the document in question available.
56 The Council of Europe Access Info Group (AIG) is one of the two bodies of the Tromsø Convention monitoring system. In July 2024 the AIG published a Baseline Evaluation Report on the implementation of the Tromsø Convention in respect of Montenegro. Paragraph 15 of the report noted, inter alia , that the interests provided for in point 1 of the first paragraph of section 14 of the FAIA corresponded to the legitimate aims provided for in Article 3 § 1 (f) of that Convention. The report also noted that section 16 of the FAIA mirrored to a large extent the harm test required under Article 3 § 2 of the Convention and that section 17 of the FAIA was in line with Article 3 § 2 of the Convention (see paragraphs 16 and 19 of the report).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
57 The applicant organisation complained under Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention that it had been denied access to information and that the reasons given in domestic judgments in that regard had been neither relevant nor sufficient.
58 The Court considers that the application is to be examined under Article 10 only, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2 The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
A. Admissibility
1 Four-month time-limit
59 The Government contended that the application had been submitted outside of the four-month time-limit, as the applicant organisation had received the Constitutional Court’s decision on 12 June 2024, and the Court had received its application on 17 October 2024.
60 The applicant organisation contested the Government’s submission and submitted that it had posted the application on 9 October 2024.
61 The Court reiterates that the date of lodging the application is the date of the postmark when the applicant dispatched a duly completed application form to the Court (Rule 47 § 6 (a) of the Rules of Court; see also Brežec v. Croatia , no. 7177/10, § 29, 18 July 2013; Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania [GC], no. 35343/05, §§ 115-17, ECHR 2015; and J.L. v. Italy , no. 5671/16, §§ 73-74, 27 May 2021).
62 The Court notes that although the application was indeed received on 17 October 2024, the date on the postmark recording when the application was sent is 9 October 2024, that is, the application was sent within the four-month period after the Constitutional Court’s decision had been served on the applicant organisation on 12 June 2024. The Government’s objection in this regard must therefore be dismissed.
2 Compatibility ratione materiae
(a) The parties’ submissions
(i) The Government
63 The Government submitted that the applicant organisation had not proved either before the domestic bodies or before the Court that the requested information was necessary for its activities. It had not clarified the purpose of its request, nor had it substantiated ( argumentovao ) that by requesting access to the information in question, it had wanted to contribute to a debate of public interest. Nor had the organisation argued that the lack of disclosure had made it impossible for it to participate in a debate of public interest and thereby perform its role as a public watchdog, which distinguished the present case from Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary ([GC], no. 18030/11, 8 November 2016), Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary (no. 37374/05, 14 April 2009), and Zöldi v. Hungary (no. 49049/18, 4 April 2024). The Government maintained that there had therefore been no interference with the applicant organisation’s right to freedom of expression, and that the application was incompatible ratione materiae .
64 In particular, the Government referred to the criteria established in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság (cited above, §§ 71, 117 and 156-170) and to the reasoning provided by the notary and the Agency in their decisions (see paragraphs 7 and 11 above). They maintained that the applicant organisation had not specified in its request for access to information why it needed the information in question, and in the proceedings before the domestic courts it had made only general submissions about there being a public interest in the requested information being disclosed because it related to property belonging to a public official ( nosilac javne funkcije ) and her spouse. However, it had not submitted any arguments or evidence in support of the allegations that the public interest in disclosure was indisputable because there was a reasonable suspicion of non-compliance with regulations and abuse of office (see paragraphs 8 and 10 above). The Government submitted that general and abstract submissions as to why information should be disclosed were not sufficient to trigger Article 10, and that the purpose of such requests should be substantiated.
65 The Government further maintained that the relevant legislation at the time had obliged public officials and their spouses to file reports on their property and income. Those reports were available to the public and were verified by the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest Commission and the Prevention of Corruption Agency (see paragraph 50 above), and if any discrepancies were established, proceedings could be initiated to determine whether the relevant provisions had been breached. All of this ensured that the public had the necessary information to exercise democratic control.
66 The Government submitted that the applicant organisation had not indicated, either before the domestic bodies and courts or before the Court, why it needed the requested information in addition to the information about the property and income of public officials and their spouses which was publicly available and was checked. Nor had it indicated that any of the circumstances specified in section 17 of the FAIA reasonably indicated that there was an overriding public interest in disclosing the requested information, especially since the information in question constituted a professional secret to which access was restricted pursuant to point 6 of the first paragraph of section 14 and the first paragraph of section 16 of the FAIA unless there was an overriding interest in disclosure.
67 . The Government maintained that the relevant statutory provisions and the relevant case-law of the Court could not be ignored. In particular, the purpose of a request for information had to be explained, especially when the relevant legislation provided for access to such information being restricted and when information about the property and income of public officials was publicly available and was subject to checks. The Government submitted that it was not sufficient for the applicant organisation to explain why it was requesting such information for the first time before the Court, and that it had had to do so before domestic bodies in the first place and indicate what its role was and why access to the information was instrumental for the exercise of its right to freedom of expression.
68 . The Government further submitted that access to the information in question had not been refused on the basis of point 1 of the first paragraph of section 14 of the FAIA, in order to protect the privacy of a public official, but on the basis of point 6 of the first paragraph of section 14 and the first paragraph of section 16, because the information in question constituted a professional secret and because it had been established on the basis of the available data that there was no overriding public interest in disclosure.
69 The Government submitted that the FAIA did not provide for the form or content of the relevant balancing exercise, or an obligation to send a copy of the results of such an exercise to a person seeking free access to information. However, it was clear from the domestic decisions that the balancing exercise had been conducted in accordance with the first paragraph of section 16 of the FAIA, and that the domestic bodies and courts had carefully examined the matter and had given clear reasons which could not be considered arbitrary.
(ii) The applicant organisation
70 The applicant organisation submitted that the reasoning of the domestic courts had been insufficient, as they had limited themselves to stating that the applicant organisation had not proved that there was an overriding interest in the information in question being disclosed or that its interest in the information was legitimate, thereby imposing an unjustified and disproportionate burden on it. The applicant organisation submitted that the courts had entirely ignored both the fact that the requested information related to a public official – a State prosecutor – and her husband, and the applicant organisation’s arguments in that regard even though at every stage it had maintained that the requested information concerned a public official and her spouse. The applicant organisation further maintained that the domestic courts had ignored point 1 of the first paragraph of section 14 of the FAIA, the first paragraph of section 23 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and section 30 of the Notary Act (see paragraphs 31, 45 and 36 above), which indicated that the necessary balancing exercise had not been properly conducted. It referred to the first paragraph of section 16 of the FAIA (see paragraph 32 above) and maintained that the balancing exercise required detailed analysis of the need to restrict access to information and the need to ensure transparency and respect for the right of free access to information.
71 . The applicant organisation also submitted that public officials were a special category of persons when it came to information relating to their property, and this related to the prevention of corruption and the overriding public interest; legal certainty and the Prevention of Corruption Act required that information on the assets ( imovnom statusu ) of public officials’ spouses be transparent. The applicant organisation submitted that there had been a legitimate and obvious public interest in disclosing the information in question, also in compliance with the second paragraph of section 74 of the Notary Act (see paragraph 41 above), and that the notary in question should have allowed access to at least part of the requested information pursuant to section 24 of the FAIA (see paragraph 34 above). It also maintained that requiring it to prove the purpose of its request was contrary to section 3 of the FAIA (see paragraph 25 above) and unlawfully restricted its rights. In addition, the applicant organisation submitted that the notary had not disputed that the information was ready and available. It submitted that the dealings of public officials and their spouses with notaries, at least those which related to property, reflected the lawfulness of their work, their credibility and their tax obligations, especially in view of the fact that in the present case, the persons in respect of whom information had been requested were a prosecutor and her husband.
72 . The applicant organisation maintained that its role in Montenegrin society was widely known and included monitoring the work of political figures, public officials and the authorities, and the finances of public officials and their relatives. It reiterated its achievements in uncovering numerous instances of unlawful conduct by public officials. The organisation maintained that the Government’s attempt to treat its request outside the context of Montenegrin society, distanced from the role that the organisation had had in Montenegrin society for decades, and to present the courts and the authorities as people who were outside of events in society and unfamiliar with the applicant organisation’s working methods, was an inappropriate strategy aimed at circumventing the right of free access to information.
73 . The applicant organisation disputed that the information on the property and income of public officials and their spouses which was publicly available and allegedly subject to checks was sufficient to ensure transparency. It submitted that that mechanism was not reliable or sufficient, as there was a practice of manipulating the information contained in the required reports ( postoji praksa manipulacija u dostavljanju izveštaja ). In addition, neither the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest Commission nor the Prevention of Corruption Agency (see paragraph 50 above) had initiated any serious proceedings or lodged a criminal complaint on the basis of the alleged checks which they had performed. The applicant organisation submitted that that Prevention of Corruption Agency’s work was instead symbolic and focused on property of low value.
(b) The Court’s assessment
(i) Relevant general principles
74 . The relevant principles to be applied in assessing whether the denial of access to information constitutes an interference with freedom of expression have been set out in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság (cited above, §§ 149-70). In particular, Article 10 does not confer on the individual a right of access to information held by a public authority, nor oblige the Government to impart such information to an individual. Nevertheless, such a right or obligation may arise, firstly, where disclosure of the information has been imposed by a judicial order which has gained legal force (which is not an issue in the present case) and, secondly, in circumstances where access to the information is instrumental for the individual’s exercise of his or her right to freedom of expression, in particular “the freedom to receive and impart information”, and where its denial constitutes an interference with that right (ibid., § 156). Whether and to what extent the denial of access to information constitutes an interference with an applicant’s freedom ‑ of ‑ expression rights must be assessed in each individual case and in the light of its particular circumstances (ibid., § 157). In order to determine whether Article 10 can be said to apply to a public authority’s refusal to disclose information, the situation must be assessed in the light of the following criteria: (a) the purpose of the information request; (b) the nature of the information sought; (c) the particular role of the seeker of the information in “receiving and imparting” it to the public; and (d) whether the information was ready and available (ibid., §§ 158 ‑ 70).
(ii) Application of the above principles to the present case
(α) Whether the information was ready and available
75 Starting with the last of the above-mentioned criteria (see Centre for Democracy and the Rule of Law v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 75865/11, § 50, 3 March 2020), the Court notes that it is not in dispute that the information the applicant organisation sought was ready and available.
(β) The particular role of the seeker of the information in “receiving and imparting” it to the public
76 . In assessing whether the respondent State interfered with the applicant organisation’s Article 10 rights by denying it access to certain documents, the Court has attached particular weight to the applicant’s role as a journalist, social watchdog or NGO whose activities related to matters of public interest (see Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland , no. 10103/20, § 54, 21 March 2024, and the authorities cited therein). The Court has accepted that when an NGO draws attention to matters of public interest, it is exercising a public watchdog role of similar importance to that of the press and may be characterised as a social “watchdog” warranting similar protection under the Convention to that afforded to the press (ibid., § 55; see, also, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság , cited above, § 166). It has recognised that civil society makes an important contribution to the discussion of public affairs (ibid.).
77 The Court notes that the applicant organisation is a well ‑ established NGO which investigates corruption and organised crime (see paragraph 5 above), and that its professional stance and outreach to the broader public have not been called into question either at domestic level or before the Court ( ibid., § 178; see, also, Centre for Democracy and the Rule of Law (dec.), cited above, § 51; compare also Yuriy Chumak v. Ukraine , no. 23897/10, § 29, 18 March 2021). The Court also observes that the Constitutional Court acknowledged that the applicant organisation could have the role of a public watchdog (see paragraph 18 above), which was not disputed by the Government. The Court sees no reason to doubt that the copies of the contracts requested by the applicant organisation could have contained information of the kind which the applicant organisation imparted to the public and which the public had a right to receive (compare Magyar Helsinki Bizottság , cited above, § 178).
78 The extent to which the applicant organisation explained the link between the exercise of its watchdog function and the information it sought relates to the question of the “purpose of the information request”, and will be examined below (see Centre for Democracy and the Rule of Law (dec.), cited above, § 51).
(γ) The purpose of the information request
79 . The Court is not called upon to examine whether, as a matter of principle, documents of the type requested by the applicant organisation could or should have been disclosed. Rather, it should establish if, at any stage of the proceedings, the applicant organisation showed that the purpose of its information request was to enable it to effectively exercise its freedom of expression, and that access to the information requested was instrumental for the exercise of the right conferred by Article 10 § 1 (ibid., § 54).
80 . The Court reiterates that it is not sufficient that an applicant make an abstract point to the effect that certain information should be made accessible as a matter of the general principle of transparency (ibid.). In another case, the Court found that an applicant association’s statement that the information sought was of public interest had been too general and found that the applicant association had failed to clarify why, despite some information having been made available, the information sought could be of interest to society as a whole (see Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association v. Georgia (dec.), no. 2703/12, §§ 30-33, 19 January 2021). The Court relied on similar considerations in Studio Monitori and Others v. Georgia (nos. 44920/09 and 8942/10, §§ 40-42, 30 January 2020); Mikiashvili and Others v. Georgia ((dec.), nos. 18865/11 and 51865/11, § 53, 19 January 2021); and Namazli v. Azerbaijan ((dec.), no. 28203/10, §§ 36-37 and 39, 7 June 2022).
81 . The Court also reiterates that for this criterion to be satisfied, it would not be sufficient for an applicant to explain that purpose for the first time in the proceedings before the Court. While it is noted that the relevant domestic legislation does not require that the reasons for requesting information be stated, the Court reiterates that stating the reasons for requesting the information is one of the Court’s criteria in order to determine whether Article 10 can be said to apply to a public authority’s refusal to disclose information or not (see paragraph 74 above). A statement of purpose is therefore an inevitable precondition for applying the test of lawfulness and balancing the confidentiality of information against an overriding public interest in its disclosure. It is therefore in the first place before the relevant domestic authorities that the seeker of information must sufficiently explain the exact purpose of the request by specifying, inter alia , how his or her particular role in receiving and imparting information to the public is compatible with the nature of the information sought and why access to it is instrumental for the exercise of his or her right to freedom of expression (see Mikiashvili and Others , cited above, § 50, with further references).
82 . The Court firstly notes in this regard that the applicant organisation’s role was undeniably compatible with the scope of the right to solicit access to State ‑ held information (see paragraph 76 above; compare also Magyar Helsinki Bizottság , cited above, § 175 in limine ). The Court accepts that the notaries also fell under the notion of “public authorities” in view of the relevant legal provisions (see paragraphs 26 and 36-39 above), and given that the domestic bodies, the courts and the Government did not dispute it.
83 . The Court further observes that although the applicant organisation initially failed to specify the purpose of its request (see paragraph 6 above), it remedied its initial omission in the subsequent judicial proceedings. In particular, the organisation did not only make general submissions about the requested information being of obvious public interest, but also specified that the requested information concerned a particular State prosecutor and her husband and related to the performance of duties and their income, property and conflicts of interest; that there was a reasonable suspicion of non-compliance with regulations and abuse of office; and that the public interest in disclosing the requested information was the prevention of corruption (see paragraphs 8-10, 12 and 14 above; compare also Mikiashvili and Others , cited above, § 51, and Centre for Democracy and the Rule of Law v. Ukraine , no. 10090/16, § 97, 26 March 2020, where the applicants in both cases remedied their initial omissions to give reasons for their requests in the subsequent judicial proceedings). The Court considers that in the present case the applicant organisation’s submissions were sufficiently specific and that it thus remedied its initial omission and specified why the requested information could be of interest to society as a whole (see paragraph 80 above).
(δ) The nature of the information sought
84 . As regards the nature of the information sought, the Court reiterates that the information to which access is sought must satisfy a public-interest test which, according to its general definition, exists where disclosure provides transparency on the manner of conduct of public affairs and on matters of interest for society as a whole, and thereby allows participation in public governance by the general public. What might constitute a subject of public interest will depend on the circumstances of each case (see, for instance, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság , §§ 161-62, and Mikiashvili and Others , § 52, both cited above).
85 The Court notes that the information sought concerned contracts concluded by a State prosecutor and her husband during a certain period which the applicant organisation submitted related to their income and property and reflected the lawfulness of their work (see paragraphs 8, 10, 14, 16 and 71 in fine above). The Court also notes that, contrary to the Government’s submission (see paragraph 67 above), the applicant organisation explained why it needed the requested information in addition to the information that was already available (see paragraph 73 above). In particular, the organisation maintained that the information on the property and income of public officials and their spouses which was publicly available was not sufficient to ensure transparency; that that mechanism was not reliable and sufficient; that neither the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest Commission nor the Prevention of Corruption Agency had initiated any serious proceedings or lodged a criminal complaint on the basis of the alleged checks that they had performed; and that their work was instead symbolic and focused on property of low value (ibid.). Those submissions were not rebutted by the Government. The Court is therefore satisfied that the information in question concerned a matter of interest to society as a whole (see paragraph 84 above).
(ε) Conclusion
86 . Having regard to the above considerations, the Court is satisfied that the applicant organisation wished to exercise its right to impart information on a matter of public interest and sought access to information to that end under Article 10 of the Convention (see Yuriy Chumak , cited above, § 33, and Saure v. Germany (no. 2) , no. 6091/16, § 39, 28 March 2023). It follows that the Government’s objection as to compatibility ratione materiae with Article 10 of the Convention must be dismissed.
(iii) The Court’s conclusion
87 The Court notes that the application is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1 The parties’ submissions
88 The applicant organisation reaffirmed its complaint and disputed that the refusal of its request had pursued a legitimate aim or had been necessary in a democratic society.
89 The Government submitted that the interference had been lawful, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been necessary in a democratic society. In particular, they maintained that the interference had been in accordance with point 6 of the first paragraph of section 14 and the first paragraph of section 16 of the FAIA, in conjunction with the first paragraph of section 30 of the Notary Act (see paragraphs 31 in fine , 32 and 36 above). It had also pursued the legitimate aim of preventing the disclosure of information obtained in confidence. Furthermore, it had been necessary in a democratic society, given that the requested information had constituted a professional secret to which access could be restricted, as provided for by law, and that it had been established that the disclosure of such information would amount to a breach of mandatory provisions and that there was no overriding public interest in disclosure. The Government concluded by submitting that there had been no violation of Article 10.
2 The Court’s assessment
90 In view of its finding that the applicant organisation’s information request was compatible ratione materiae with Article 10 of the Convention (see paragraph 86 above), the Court considers that by denying the organisation access to the requested information, the domestic authorities interfered with its rights under Article 10 § 1 of the Convention.
91 Such an interference will only be justified under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention if it was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more legitimate aims set out in that provision, and was “necessary in a democratic society” (see Yuriy Chumak , § 40, and Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska , § 68, both cited above).
(a) The lawfulness of interference
92 The Court notes that the impugned refusal to grant access to the information sought was based on point 6 of the first paragraph of section 14, sections 16-17, and point 3 of the first paragraph of section 29 of the FAIA, and sections 30, 74, 88 and 112a of the Notary Act (see paragraphs 31-43 above). It can therefore be considered lawful.
(b) The legitimate aim
93 The Court accepts that the interference pursued one of the legitimate aims provided for under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, namely “preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence” (compare Saure v. Germany (no. 2) , no. 6091/16, § 54, 28 March 2023).
(c) Whether the restriction was “necessary in a democratic society”
94 The question remains whether the restriction on the applicant organisation’s right of access to information was “necessary in a democratic society”. According to the Court’s well-established principles in this regard, any restriction on freedom of expression “must be established convincingly” and must correspond to a “pressing social need” (see, among other authorities, Zöldi , cited above, § 47, and the authorities cited therein). Moreover, it is the Court that is empowered to rule on the compatibility of any restriction with Article 10 of the Convention. When exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, “what the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it was ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are ‘relevant and sufficient’ ... In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 ...” (ibid.).
95 Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant organisation requested access to copies of all contracts concluded by a public official, X, and her husband Y between 2010 and 3 November 2017 (see paragraph 6 above). It further notes that the domestic bodies refused the request on the grounds that the requested information constituted a professional secret; that the applicant organisation was not a person who could request such copies; that it had not provided evidence indicating that the parties concerned had agreed that it could inspect the copies; and that it had not indicated that it had any legitimate interest in requesting those documents (see paragraphs 7, 11, 13 and 15 above).
96 The Court, however, takes note of the fact that the relevant legislation also provides that there is an overriding public interest in disclosing information that is otherwise restricted under section 14 of the FAIA where the requested information contains data that reasonably indicate, inter alia , corruption, non-compliance with regulations, the unlawful use of public funds or abuse of public office (see paragraphs 32-33 above). Even though the applicant organisation raised that argument before the domestic bodies, the Court observes that there is no evidence that any of those bodies actually consulted any of the copies which had been requested in order to verify the relevant allegations before refusing the organisation’s request (contrast Šeks v. Croatia , no. 39325/20, § 68, 3 February 2022, where the Court made findings in the context of national security). The relevant domestic legislation also provides that other persons who are not parties to a legal transaction concluded before a notary can also inspect the records in question if they have a legitimate interest in doing so (see paragraph 41 above). The Court notes in this regard that the domestic bodies merely stated that the applicant organisation had not indicated that it had any legitimate interest in the requested information, without addressing the organisation’s well-known role in Montenegrin society and its commitment to investigating corruption (see paragraph 5 above) or the fact that the requested information concerned a specific public official and her husband and their income and property; the domestic bodies therefore failed to properly establish whether the applicant organisation had a legitimate interest in the requested information or not. They also failed to take into consideration the law governing the protection of personal data (see paragraph 30 above). The Constitutional Court, having found that there had been no interference with the applicant organisation’s rights under Article 10 of the Convention, did not examine whether the domestic bodies had conducted a proportionality analysis. While it may well be that, after examining these additional elements, the domestic courts would still have found that there was no prevailing public interest in disclosing all or at least some of the requested information, the Court concludes that in the present case they failed to carry out a proper balancing exercise taking all relevant interests into account.
97 In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that while the reasons put forward by the domestic authorities were relevant, they were not sufficient to show that the refusal to disclose all or part of the requested information was “necessary in a democratic society”.
98 There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
99 Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
100 The applicant organisation made no claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award any sum on that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 November 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Ilse Freiwirth Erik Wennerström Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judge Adamska-Gallant is annexed to this judgment.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ADAMSKA-GALLANT
1 With the utmost respect for my colleagues in the majority, I am unable to agree that the application was admissible or that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. In my opinion, Article 10 was not applicable in the circumstances of the present case and the application should therefore have been declared inadmissible as incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. Nevertheless, since the majority have found that there was an interference with the applicant organisation’s Article 10 rights, I would add that, in my view, that interference was prescribed by law, pursued the legitimate aims of preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence and protecting the rights of others, and was necessary in a democratic society. I respectfully submit that the judgment gives insufficient weight to these considerations. It also misses an opportunity to address an important question: whether, and under what conditions, the duty of notarial confidentiality may yield to a request under Article 10 for access to information concerning a public official. Nor does it explain how the interests of private individuals who are parties to notarial deeds, or whose data appear in them, should weigh in that balance.
2 As the judgment emphasises (see paragraph 74), Article 10 does not confer on individuals a right of access to information held by a public authority. Nor does it oblige the Government to impart such information. Such a right or obligation may arise in certain circumstances, however, notably where access to the information is instrumental to the individual’s exercise of the right to freedom of expression, in particular the freedom to receive and impart information, and where its denial constitutes an interference with that right (see Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], no. 18030/11, § 156, 8 November 2016). In the present case, I am not persuaded by the majority’s assessment, in the light of the criteria developed in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság (cited above), that such a right arose. While I acknowledge the applicant organisation’s role as a social “watchdog”, I am not convinced that the purpose of the request and the nature of the information sought were such as to render access to that information instrumental to the exercise of its freedom of expression.
3 Turning first to the purpose of the request, it is true that the applicant organisation was a recognised non-governmental organisation (NGO) whose aims included combating corruption and organised crime, enhancing institutional transparency and accountability, and fostering civic oversight of governmental activities. It had requested from a notary copies of all contracts entered into by X, a State prosecutor, and her husband since 2010. In my view, the applicant organisation did not explain in any concrete way what it had intended to do with the contracts – whether for publication, reporting or campaigning purposes – and thus failed to show how access to these documents would have contributed to public debate. Rather, the submissions made by the applicant organisation at various stages of the proceedings, both before the national authorities and before the Court, indicated that it considered that, by reason of X’s public office, no information of this kind was protected, whether it concerned X herself or her spouse, who was a private individual. The applicant organisation further argued that the relevant legislation itself established an overriding public interest in the disclosure of such information where it contained data reasonably indicating corruption, non-compliance with regulations, the unlawful use of public funds or abuse of public office (see paragraphs 8-10, 12, 14 and 16 of the judgment). However, the applicant organisation did not point to any element suggesting that the contracts in question might have contained such data, relying instead on the statutory exception, as though it applied automatically to any information concerning a public official. The application thus appeared to rest on the premise that any information relating to a public official and his or her spouse should be accessible to the public in the interests of transparency, accountability and the fight against corruption.
4 Furthermore, even if the applicant had been granted access to all the contracts entered into between X and her spouse, those documents alone would not have allowed it to draw reliable conclusions about X’s performance of her duties as a State prosecutor, or about her income, assets or potential conflicts of interest. Private-law contracts have too indirect a link to the exercise of public office to serve the stated anti-corruption purpose. Any reasonable suspicion of non-compliance with the applicable regulations, or of abuse of office, would in any event have to be verified in formal proceedings, including a criminal investigation, which falls outside the role of a public watchdog. Moreover, prosecutors in the respondent State are required to file asset declarations, which are publicly available and extend to the income and assets of their spouses (see paragraphs 45-50 of the judgment). The existence of such an official and targeted transparency mechanism, which already covered X’s spouse, meant that blanket access to notarial records could not be regarded as instrumental to the applicant organisation’s exercise of its freedom of expression.
5 As to the nature of the information sought, I am likewise not persuaded that it was of public interest. In previous cases, the Court has found that the denial of access to information constituted an interference with the applicants’ right to receive and impart information where the information sought had comprised, inter alia , “factual information concerning the use of electronic surveillance measures” (see Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia , no. 48135/06, § 24, 25 June 2013); information about a constitutional complaint “on a matter of public importance” (see Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary , no. 37374/05, §§ 37-38, 14 April 2009); “original documentary sources for legitimate historical research” (see Kenedi v. Hungary , no. 31475/05, § 43, 26 May 2009); decisions of real-property transaction commissions (see Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria , no. 39534/07, § 42, 28 November 2013); the names of public defenders and the number of their appointments, sought for the purposes of a survey (see Magyar Helsinki Bizottság , cited above, § 180); and the list of meetings held by the President and Vice-President of the Constitutional Court (see Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland , no. 10103/20, § 62, 21 March 2024). By contrast, the private contracts of X and her spouse did not, in my view, concern a matter of public interest within the meaning of the Court’s case-law, notwithstanding X’s position as a State prosecutor. It is difficult to see how such information could have affected the public to such an extent that it might legitimately have taken an interest in it (see Magyar Helsinki Bizottság , cited above, § 162), particularly since the contracts concerned the private financial affairs of X and her husband, a private individual, rather than the exercise of her prosecutorial functions.
6 In the light of the specific circumstances of the case, I therefore do not see how access to the information sought was instrumental to the exercise of the applicant organisation’s right to freedom of expression (see Magyar Helsinki Bizottság , cited above, § 156). It did not explain how access to the contracts entered into between X and her spouse would have contributed to a debate of public interest. Two of the criteria established in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság , which must be satisfied cumulatively (see Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska , cited above, § 49), were thus not met. For these reasons, I voted to declare the complaint inadmissible.
7 That being said, since the majority have declared the application admissible and found that there was an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, I will now explain why I consider that interference to have been justified under Article 10 § 2. In my view, it was prescribed by law, namely by section 30 of the Notary Act (see paragraph 40 of the judgment); it pursued the legitimate aims of preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence and protecting the rights of others; and it was necessary in a democratic society, being proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.
8 The right of access to public information is intended to ensure transparency in the work of public authorities, enable public oversight, develop civil society and encourage participatory democracy, allowing citizens to contribute meaningfully to the decision-making processes that affect them. In the respondent State, this matter is governed by the Free Access to Information Act (“the FAIA”), which guarantees the right to access and reuse information held by public authorities (see paragraphs 24-34 of the judgment). Access to notarial documents, however, is specifically regulated by the Notary Act (see paragraphs 40-42 of the judgment), which, as lex specialis , prevails over the FAIA.
9 The notary’s main role is to provide legal certainty to contracts entered into between private persons (both natural and legal). A notary’s day-to-day activities therefore primarily consist in recording private legal transactions, authenticating declarations and certifying signatures and copies. Documents issued by a notary, such as deeds, are “public documents” (see paragraph 36 of the judgment), but this does not mean that they are accessible to the public. Rather, they are documents issued or authenticated by a State authority or another person exercising public powers (in this case, a notary) which have enhanced evidential value in legal matters. Such documents are presumed to be authentic and to accurately reflect the recorded facts, unless proven otherwise.
10 The general rule governing notarial practice is that, when carrying out their duties, notaries are obliged to keep confidential any information they have learned in the course of their work, unless the law, the parties involved or a legal transaction indicates otherwise. According to the Notary Act, such information may be disclosed to a court or other State authority conducting proceedings, in accordance with the law (see paragraph 40 of the judgment).
11 Notarial secrecy bears certain similarities to attorney-client privilege in that both aim to protect confidence in the profession and the privacy of clients. In both cases, the professional is entrusted with confidential information about individuals and legal entities and is under a duty not to disclose it. Both notaries and lawyers practise professions of public trust, where a breach of confidentiality may result in disciplinary, civil and, in certain circumstances, criminal liability. The two are nevertheless distinct in their rationale and function. An attorney acts as his or her client’s representative and is bound by a duty of loyalty to advance that client’s interests. By contrast, a notary does not represent any party but acts as an impartial public official entrusted with ensuring legal certainty and the authenticity of legal transactions. Accordingly, attorney-client privilege primarily protects the confidential relationship between lawyer and client, whereas notarial secrecy is intended to preserve confidence in the notarial profession and the official character of notarial deeds.
12 Notaries, like lawyers, may thus be regarded as playing a vital role in ensuring legal certainty and the proper administration of justice (compare André and Another v. France , no. 18603/03, § 42, 24 July 2008, and Altay v. Turkey (no. 2) , no. 11236/09, § 56, 9 April 2019), which calls for a strict framework governing any measures affecting their relations with clients. In the respondent State, that framework is provided by the Notary Act, which specifies when, to whom and under what conditions copies of notarial deeds may be issued and notarial records inspected (see paragraphs 40-42 of the judgment).
13 As regards the protection of the rights of others, the applicant organisation’s request concerned not only X but also her husband, a private individual holding no public office, along with any third person mentioned in, or otherwise connected with, the notarial contracts entered into between the spouses since 2010. Information concerning a person’s financial affairs and legal transactions falls within the scope of private life, as protected by Article 8 of the Convention (see, for example, M.N. and Others v. San Marino , no. 28005/12, § 51, 7 July 2015, and G.S.B. v. Switzerland , no. 28601/11, § 51, 22 December 2015). These persons had no connection with X’s prosecutorial functions and the information concerning them had been provided to the notary in reliance on the latter’s statutory duty of confidentiality. In my view, their interests, and those of X’s husband in particular, should have carried considerable weight in the Court’s balancing exercise. By leaving these interests out of their assessment, the majority have missed an opportunity to clarify whether, and under what conditions, notarial confidentiality may yield to a request for access to information under Article 10 concerning a public official.
14 In my view, the solution adopted in the Notary Act, which permits information obtained by a notary to be disclosed to a court or other State authority conducting proceedings in accordance with the law, is proportionate to the aims of preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence and protecting the rights of others, in particular third parties to contracts, while also serving legal certainty and the public interest. It must also be borne in mind that, as noted in paragraph 4 above, judges and prosecutors in the respondent State are required to file annual declarations of their own and their spouses’ income and assets, which are entered in the Register of Income and Assets of Public Officials and published on the website of the Prevention of Corruption Agency.
15 Finally, I am not persuaded by the majority’s reasons for departing from the conclusions of the national courts at every level, including the Constitutional Court, which assessed the circumstances of the case in the light of the criteria established in the Court’s case-law (see paragraphs 13, 15 and 18-22 of the judgment). In my view, the national courts carefully balanced the competing interests in conformity with those criteria, and there were no strong reasons for the Court to substitute its view for theirs (see Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, § 107, ECHR 2012; Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, § 88, 7 February 2012; and Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], no. 17224/11, § 77, 27 June 2017).
16 Accordingly, even assuming that Article 10 was applicable, I consider that there has been no violation of that provision.
[1] Last time accessed on 9 September 2026.