lagen.nu
no. 47735/20

Olteanu and Others v. Romania

Inadmissible

Domstol
European Court of Human Rights
Avgörandedatum
2026-10-06
ECLI
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:1006DEC004773520
Artiklar
13, 14, P1-1, 35
Källa
hudoc.echr.coe.int

Berörda konventionsartiklar

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 47735/20 Călin-Ovidiu OLTEANU against Romania and 2 other applications (see appended list)

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 10 March 2026 and 6 October 2026 as a Chamber composed of:

Lado Chanturia , President , Lorraine Schembri Orland, Faris Vehabović, Anja Seibert-Fohr, Anne Louise Bormann, Sebastian Răduleţu, András Jakab , judges , and Hasan Bakırcı, Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above applications lodged on the various dates indicated in the appended table,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1 The present case mainly concerns a question under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention as to whether the State may be held liable for costs and expenses incurred in criminal proceedings by individuals who are ultimately exonerated (by an acquittal or by the discontinuance of such proceedings).

THE FACTS

2 The applicants’ details and the names of their representatives are listed in the appendix.

3 The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms O.-F. Ezer, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4 The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

5 In a criminal case involving a number of suspects, the applicant was charged on 23 October 2015 with complicity in abuse of office. It was alleged that in his capacity as a lawyer, he had requested that certain immovable property be registered in the Land Registry for the benefit of a private party, even though he had not provided or produced any title to that property.

6 On 15 June 2017 several third parties were indicted and sent before the domestic criminal courts. The charges against the applicant were dropped ( clasare ), as the prosecutor found that no criminal act had been committed ( fapta nu existǎ , Article 16 § 1 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, see paragraph 25 below).

7 Consequently, on 7 February 2018 the applicant brought a civil action, claiming 6,200 Romanian lei (RON) from the prosecutor’s office and the State in respect of the representation fees he had incurred in the criminal proceedings initiated against him. He relied on Article 276 §§ 5 and 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 26 below).

8 On 2 November 2018 the Iași District Court dismissed the applicant’s action against the prosecutor’s office on the basis that the defendant lacked legal standing. The court considered that the State was liable for such claims and it consequently allowed the action against it, finding that on the basis of Article 504 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the State was financially liable for any judicial error and that this concept covered the applicant’s situation.

9 On 29 October 2019 the Iași County Court upheld that judgment, finding that Article 276 § 6 and Article 538 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure were relevant to the applicant’s circumstances, as the State had been procedurally at fault in his case.

10 . On 28 May 2020 the Iași Court of Appeal allowed an objection raised by the State in an appeal which it had lodged, finding that the State did not have legal standing as regards requests formulated on the basis of provisions such as those relied on by the applicant. Both Article 276 § 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 453 of the Code of Civil Procedure did refer to obligations relating to costs and expenses which were incumbent on the parties to a trial; however, the State was not listed as a “party to criminal proceedings” and therefore could not be liable for the costs and expenses of those proceedings.

11 On 30 October 2006 the applicant, a journalist in Cluj, was charged with blackmail and association with a criminal group. She was indicted on 19 January 2007, together with eight co ‑ accused.

12 As it had been alleged that the Cluj County Court lacked impartiality, on 6 March 2007 the High Court of Cassation and Justice decided that the criminal case against the applicant would be transferred to Brǎila, another jurisdiction located some 500 km away.

13 In a final judgment of 20 December 2017, the Galaţi Court of Appeal upheld a judgment of the first-instance court dated 15 April 2016 acquitting the applicant on the basis of the first sentence of Article 16 § 1 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the relevant act was not provided for by criminal law, see paragraph 25 below).

14 On 19 June 2018 the applicant brought a civil action against the State, seeking RON 79,752.69 in compensation for the pecuniary damage (representation, transport and accommodation costs) sustained during the criminal proceedings against her, which had lasted 11 years and involved 117 hearings. She relied on the provisions of tort law, essentially arguing that it was the State that had initiated the criminal proceedings against her which had made her incur all the costs claimed in respect of pecuniary damage. She also claimed EUR 450,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

15 On 10 December 2018 the Bihor County Court dismissed her claims in part, considering that the indictment per se could not be regarded as an unlawful action within the meaning of tort liability. Similarly, the notion of guilt was not relevant to the circumstances of the applicant’s case, in so far as a prosecutor could not be bound to indict only those in respect of whom a conviction was certain.

The Bihor County Court awarded the applicant EUR 3,200 in compensation for the non-pecuniary damage caused to her by the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings.

16 The applicant appealed, arguing that as the Code of Criminal Procedure did not explicitly provide for a right to claim the reimbursement of costs and expenses from the State, she had been compelled to rely on civil provisions to justify her reimbursement claims. On 21 May 2019 the Oradea Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s findings in full, holding that even if a public prosecutor acted on behalf of the State in criminal proceedings, and the State could therefore have legal standing ( are calitate procesualǎ pasivǎ ) in such trials, an acquittal could not be regarded as proof that the prosecutor had acted unlawfully in carrying out an investigation and indicting somebody.

17 . A further appeal by the applicant was dismissed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 5 March 2020. The court found that an acquittal alone did not necessarily mean that the prosecutor had been at fault in initiating the related criminal proceedings; in addition, the indictment per se could not be regarded as an unlawful action. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, only the injured party and/or the civil party could be held liable for costs and expenses, in certain circumstances – for example, in the event of an acquittal. At the same time, the applicant had decided to rely on the provisions of tort law – arguing that there was strict liability ( rǎspundere obiectivǎ ) on the part of the State in the event of an acquittal – and not on the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provided for specific conditions for the reimbursement of costs in criminal proceedings.

18 At some point in 2014-2015 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant, who was accused of taking bribes and inciting others to take bribes.

19 A final judgment of 28 November 2019 upheld a judgment given by the Timișoara Court of Appeal which had acquitted the applicant. The High Court of Cassation and Justice confirmed the lower court’s finding that the act had not been committed by the applicant ( fapta nu existǎ – Article 16 § 1 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, see paragraph 25 below).

20 On 2 June 2020 the applicant brought a civil action against the State, seeking RON 15,076.80 – the amount paid in respect of costs and expenses in the criminal proceedings – in addition to interest on that amount. He argued that the State had inevitably been at fault in initiating criminal proceedings which had ended in an acquittal because no criminal act had been committed. He relied on Article 276 §§ 5 and 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 453 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and tort law principles.

21 On 8 October 2020 the Beiuș Court of First Instance allowed the claims in part, finding that the State did have legal standing in actions such as the one brought by the applicant, as it could be held liable when its representatives initiated civil or criminal proceedings against a third party who ultimately won the case. The legal basis of such actions was the procedural fault of the State ( culpa procesualǎ ), which existed even in the absence of any bad faith on its part.

22 . On 30 March 2021 the Bihor County Court allowed an appeal by the State and dismissed the applicant’s claims. It considered that while Article 276 § 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure established the right of an accused to claim judicial costs from the State, such claims were to be examined in accordance with the principles of civil law, in particular tort law. Generally, a fault on the part of the State in initiating criminal proceedings against an individual could not be presumed if that individual was acquitted, as the existence of an unlawful action and a specific fault in initiating those criminal proceedings were matters to be proved by the claimant on a case ‑ by ‑ case basis. In the applicant’s case, there was no indication that there had been any such fault or unlawful action.

23 On 30 March 2022 the Oradea Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s findings by a majority. It considered that the State was bound to initiate criminal proceedings in every situation when there was an indication that a crime had been committed, on the basis of the principle of ex officio prosecution ( principiul oficialitǎţii ); the initiation of proceedings in such a situation, and all subsequent investigative acts, were lawful actions by default, unless proved otherwise. An acquittal per se did not imply the existence of a judicial error which would trigger the State’s liability to provide compensation.

The dissenting judge considered that no one could be absolved of responsibility for a procedural fault unless this was expressly set out in the law, which was not the case in the applicant’s situation.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE

24 Criminal proceedings in Romania are regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure (the current version of which has been in force since 2014) and are based on the principles of legality and ex officio prosecution. Essentially, prosecution is mandatory when there is a reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence subject to mandatory prosecution has been committed.

25 . Article 16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets out the circumstances which preclude the initiation of criminal proceedings and the prosecution of criminal acts. It reads, in its relevant parts, as follows:

Article 16

“(1) Criminal proceedings may not be instituted or, if instituted, may not be continued if:

(a) the [relevant] facts do not exist;

(b) the [relevant] act is not provided for by criminal law or was not committed with the [type of] culpability required by law;

(c) there is no evidence that the person has committed the offence;

(d) there is a justifiable or excusable reason for the commission of the offence; ...”

26 . In relation to defence costs, the Code of Criminal Procedure essentially provides that if criminal proceedings end in an acquittal, the accused may claim costs and expenses from the injured party and/or the civil party, in so far as they have caused those costs to be incurred. However, in all other cases, the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that such matters will be examined on the basis of the principles of civil law, without giving any further details as to the steps to be taken by the person claiming costs or by the courts:

Article 276 – Payment of the litigation costs incurred by the parties

“...

(5) In the event of an acquittal, the injured party or the civil party shall be obliged to pay the accused and, where applicable, the party liable in civil law, the legal costs incurred by them, to the extent that such costs were caused by the injured party or civil party.

(6) In all other cases, the court shall determine reimbursement obligations in accordance with civil law principles ...”

27 Article 504 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure provided for the right to compensation for wrongful conviction or unlawful detention:

Article 504 – Compensation for wrongful conviction or unlawful detention

“(1) Anyone who has been convicted by a final decision ... is entitled to compensation from the State for any loss or damage sustained where, after a retrial, a final judgment holds that he [or she] did not commit the offence in question or that no offence was committed ...

(2) Anyone against whom a preventive measure has been taken, and in whose favour a decision to discontinue proceedings has been issued or an acquittal has been entered for the reasons listed in the preceding paragraph, also has a right to compensation for the damage sustained ...”

28 Articles 538 and 539 of the current Code of Criminal Procedure contain provisions which are similar to Article 504 of the former Code. Article 539 of the current Code of Criminal Procedure was amended following a decision taken by the Constitutional Court on 3 March 2021 which found that previous provisions of the Code were unconstitutional in so far as the right to compensation was strictly contingent upon deprivation of liberty being unlawful (see also paragraph 35 below). The current version of Article 539 reads as follows:

Article 539 - Right to compensation for damage in the event of unlawful or unjust deprivation of liberty

“(1) A person against whom a preventive measure involving deprivation of liberty was ordered during criminal proceedings is also entitled to compensation for damage if

(a) the measure was found to be unlawful;

(b) the case was discontinued in relation to the offence triggering the measure, or the defendant was acquitted under Article 16 § 1 (a)-(d), except where such a decision was made as a result of the decriminalisation of the act committed.

(2) The circumstances referred to in paragraph (1) shall be established by the public prosecutor’s order revoking the detention measure or dismissing the case, by the final ruling of the judge for rights and freedoms, of the preliminary chamber judge or of the court revoking the preventive measure involving deprivation of liberty or finding that it has ceased to have effect by law, or, where applicable, by the final judgment of acquittal.”

29 The relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on litigation costs read as follows:

Article 453 – Awarding litigation costs

“(1) At the request of the winning party, the losing party shall be bound to pay to the [former] the costs of the litigation ...”

30 The relevant provisions concerning tort actions are described in Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania ([GC], no. 41720/13, §§ 68 ‑ 70, 25 June 2019).

In particular, the former Romanian Civil Code, which was in force until 1 October 2011, provided that any person who was responsible for causing damage to another would be liable to make reparation for this regardless of whether the damage was caused through his or her own actions, omissions or negligence (Articles 998 and 999). The new Romanian Civil Code, in force since 1 October 2011, provides that a person with discernment is liable for all damage caused by his or her actions or omissions, and is bound to make full reparation (Article 1349).

31 . The Constitutional Court was asked to examine the constitutionality of Article 453 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in particular the hypothesis that costs could be claimed separately in a further action without infringing principles such as stability, legal certainty and the foreseeability of proceedings.

32 . In so far as relevant to the present case, the Constitutional Court noted that the basis on which legal costs had to be borne relied on procedural fault in the proceedings and the obligation to fully compensate the successful party. Good faith on the part of the losing party did not trigger any exemption from the payment of costs.

In that context, where one party had been successful and had his or her right recognised by a final judgment, and one party had lost a case, the risk of the outcome had to be borne by the party who, by his or her conduct, regardless of whether he or she had acted in bad faith, had determined that the winning party would bear the costs of the proceedings. It had been pointed out that in all cases in which legal costs were claimed in a separate action, the basis of the action was tort law.

33 The Constitutional Court was asked to examine whether the provisions of Article 276 of the Code of Criminal Procedure infringed the constitutional provisions relating to the right of private property and the provisions of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in two ways: by having the title “Payment of litigation costs incurred by the parties”; and by failing to regulate the obligation to reimburse legal costs in the event of discontinuance ( clasare ) under Article 16 § 1 (a)-(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

34 Article 276 § 6 referred to all other situations not expressly regulated in Article 276 §§ 1-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely those in which persons who were not parties to criminal proceedings could bring certain financial claims related to those proceedings; it provided that a court would determine the obligation to reimburse legal expenses in accordance with civil law. That legal mechanism was not such as to deprive persons entitled to the reimbursement of legal costs of the opportunity to enforce their respective rights, but provided for a legal mechanism to establish those rights which was different from the one provided for by the rules of criminal procedure – a mechanism which entailed the application of civil law. That legal solution was the legislature’s choice, justified by the fact that the persons concerned were not parties to the criminal proceedings in question; such a choice was in accordance with the legislature’s constitutional power and within the margin of appreciation afforded by that framework.

35 . Decision no. 136 of 3 March 2021 was issued in the context of a constitutionality review of the provisions of Article 539 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It set out that when a person had been deprived of his or her liberty pending criminal proceedings which had ultimately ended in an acquittal, that person was entitled to compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage only if the measure depriving him or her of his or her liberty had been declared unlawful by a judge or a prosecutor.

36 The Constitutional Court held that whenever an action by the State became unjust or unfair to a citizen, even if it was lawful, it had to be followed by an appropriate legal remedy aiming to restore “the state of justice” ( starea de dreptate ) for both the individual concerned and society in general. Hence, making the right to compensation strictly contingent upon deprivation of liberty being unlawful was likely to limit the scope of the constitutional provisions protecting individual freedom and the right to financial compensation from the State for damage caused by judicial errors (Article 23 § 1, and the first sentence of Article 52 § 3, of the Constitution). Therefore, an acquittal or discontinuance of criminal proceedings called for the same remedial mechanism, regardless of whether the measure depriving the person of his or her liberty had been unlawful, since in either situation the same constitutional value – the inviolability of individual freedom – had been breached.

Preliminary rulings to resolve new legal issues

37 In 2017 a request for a preliminary ruling to resolve (new) legal issues ( hotărâre prealabilă pentru dezlegarea unor chestiuni de drept ) was lodged with the High Court of Cassation and Justice (“the High Court”). The question to be assessed was whether an accused who had been acquitted because an act had not been committed ( fapta nu existǎ ) could seek the reimbursement of costs and expenses incurred in the relevant criminal proceedings, relying on Article 276 § 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read in conjunction with Article 453 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

38 . The High Court noted that the issue in question had rarely been dealt with in the national case-law, and that the outcomes in relevant cases did not appear to converge clearly and sufficiently in the same direction. Various domestic courts had indicated their viewpoints on the matter, and diverse approaches had also been identified in the relevant academic legal literature.

39 . Essentially, one approach supported the idea that the State should be liable to reimburse costs and expenses incurred by an accused who was acquitted, if no fault on the part of the injured party and/or the civil party was identified in determining such expenses. Such liability was based on the State’s failure to legislate for a specific solution in such circumstances – a failure which had a direct causal link to the damage caused. In addition, as the law entitled the State to recover the costs and expenses it incurred in criminal proceedings, the principle of equality of treatment required that a party who was ultimately acquitted because the relevant act had not been committed also be entitled to recover the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings.

40 . Other courts considered that Article 453 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be relied on to award costs and expenses in criminal proceedings, in so far as its provisions concerned only civil proceedings. Also, that legal instrument applied only to “parties to proceedings”, and the State could not be considered a party to criminal proceedings initiated against an individual.

Such liability was based on the idea of “procedural fault” ( culpǎ procesualǎ ), which was attributed to any party who lost a case.

41 . Other courts considered that save for judicial errors, the State could not be required to compensate the accused by, inter alia , reimbursing costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings.

42 . Lastly, some courts considered that tort law principles could be relevant in assessing such claims.

43 On 11 July 2018 the High Court rejected the request as inadmissible, noting that the issue in question had not been the subject of recent legislation, as the relevant provisions had remained unchanged since the adoption of the former Code of Criminal Procedure in 1968.

44 In 2022 the High Court was asked whether an acquittal was, in itself, sufficient for compensation to be granted to a person who had been deprived of his or her liberty and subsequently acquitted, and whether, in that context, the “unjust/unlawful nature of the measures involving deprivation of liberty” and the “lack of a basis for the criminal charge” constituted independent criteria that broadened the scope of Article 539 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and entitled the person to compensation.

45 In response to the second part of the question, which is of more relevance to the present case, on 16 January 2023 the High Court stated:

“The solutions of discontinuance ( clasare ) or acquittal [in] one of the situations provided for in Article 16 § 1 (a)-(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure prove the lack of a basis for or the unfairness of a criminal charge, and have the effect of establishing the unjustness or unfairness of the measures involving deprivation of liberty which were lawfully taken against the person concerned in the course of the criminal proceedings. Therefore, the concepts of unjust or unfair measures involving deprivation of liberty and the lack of a basis for a criminal charge constitute independent criteria triggering the right to compensation.”

COMPLAINTS

46 The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the State was not held liable to reimburse the costs and expenses they had incurred in the criminal proceedings initiated against them and in which they had ultimately been exonerated (by an acquittal or by the discontinuance of such proceedings).

47 The applicant in application no. 29610/22 relied on Article 13 of the Convention to complain that the domestic law did not provide an effective remedy for his claims.

48 The applicants in applications nos. 55917/20 and 29610/22 complained under Article 14 of the Convention that they could not recover costs and expenses from the State, whereas similar claims would have been admissible against a private party to the proceedings (an injured and/or civil party).

THE LAW

49 Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single decision.

50 The applicants complained that they were unable to recover the costs and expenses incurred in the criminal proceedings against them which had resulted in their exoneration. They alleged that there had been a breach of their property rights protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

51 . The Government argued that the judicial practice related to the issue in the present case was not settled, underlining that there was no legal provision obliging the State to reimburse defence costs in all circumstances where there was an acquittal or discontinuance of criminal proceedings. Indeed, the law did not provide for the State being automatically liable whenever there was no final conviction in a case. The State was liable only for judicial errors or miscarriages of justice, and an acquittal did not necessarily involve such errors.

52 The Government maintained that the applicants had no legitimate expectation of obtaining the reimbursement of their defence costs. Their potential entitlement to compensation would have to be assessed on the basis of tort law principles and in the light of clear elements of irregular or unlawful conduct (such as judicial error) on the part of the authorities.

53 The applicants in applications nos. 47735/20 and 55917/20 submitted that even though there was no distinct legal provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning the recovery of defence or legal costs from the State specifically, Article 276 § 6 nonetheless covered that situation by referring the matter to the rules of civil procedure on the reimbursement of legal costs. In accordance with those rules, the winning party was not required to prove that all tort liability conditions had been met in order to recover legal costs from the losing party, as winning the case was sufficient. The same concept was supported by the relevant jurisprudence, including the Constitutional Court’s decisions, which had consistently held that the obligation to pay court expenses was based on the idea of procedural fault and fully compensating the winning party (the applicants cited decisions nos. 367 of 20 March 2008 and 463 of 28 June 2016, see paragraphs 31-32 above).

54 The applicants’ legitimate expectation that their legal costs would be reimbursed also relied on the case-law of the domestic courts, which considered that the State had to take responsibility for the loss of criminal proceedings brought – albeit not in bad faith – against a person, by covering the legal costs incurred by that person in the event that he or she was ultimately acquitted, as that was the only equitable solution (the applicants cited a 2021 decision of the High Court, a 2018 decision of the Bucharest County Court and a 2022 decision of the Mureș County Court). Indeed, the courts considered that denying such a person the right to recover the legal costs that he or she had incurred in exercising his or her rights of defence in a criminal trial which had ended in an acquittal, where those costs could not be requested from another party to the proceedings, would amount to rendering the legal rule in Article 276 § 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ineffective, in circumstances where the rule was specifically intended to regulate that type of situation. Similar reasoning had been put forward by the Constitutional Court in decision no. 136/2021 (see paragraph 35 above).

55 The applicant in application no. 55917/20 also indicated that her co ‑ accused in the proceedings initiated against her, who had also been acquitted, had had their claims for the reimbursement of their legal costs allowed in 2023 by the Cluj Court of Appeal and the High Court. It followed that the applicants’ expectation of having their legal costs reimbursed was well founded and entirely legitimate.

56 The relevant general principles are set out in Béláné Nagy v. Hungary ([GC], no. 53080/13, §§ 74-77, 13 December 2016):

“74. Although Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 applies only to a person’s existing possessions and does not create a right to acquire property (see Stummer v. Austria [GC], no. 37452/02, § 82, ECHR 2011), in certain circumstances a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining an asset may also enjoy the protection of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, among many authorities, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, § 65, ECHR 2007-I).

75 A legitimate expectation must be of a nature more concrete than a mere hope and be based on a legal provision or a legal act such as a judicial decision. The hope that a long ‑ extinguished property right may be revived cannot be regarded as a “possession”; nor can a conditional claim which has lapsed as a result of a failure to fulfil the condition (see Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 39794/98, §§ 69 and 73, ECHR 2002-VII). Further, no “legitimate expectation” can be said to arise where there is a dispute as to the correct interpretation and application of domestic law and the applicant’s submissions are subsequently rejected by the national courts (see Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 50, ECHR 2004-IX). At the same time, a proprietary interest recognised under domestic law – even if revocable in certain circumstances – may constitute a “possession” for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Beyeler, cited above, § 105).

76 In cases concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the issue that needs to be examined is normally whether the circumstances of the case, considered as a whole, conferred on the applicant title to a substantive interest protected by that provision (see Iatridis , cited above, § 54; Beyeler , cited above, § 100; and Parrillo , cited above, § 211). In applications concerning claims other than those relating to existing possessions, the idea behind this requirement has also been formulated in various other ways throughout the Court’s case-law. By way of example, in a number of cases the Court examined, respectively, whether the applicants had “a claim which was sufficiently established to be enforceable” (see Gratzinger and Gratzingerova , cited above, § 74); whether they demonstrated the existence of “an assertable right under domestic law to a welfare benefit” (see Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, § 51, ECHR 2005-X); or whether the persons concerned satisfied the “legal conditions laid down in domestic law for the grant of any particular form of benefits” (see Richardson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 26252/08, § 17, 10 April 2012).

77 In Kopecký , the Grand Chamber recapitulated the Court’s case-law on the notion of “legitimate expectation”. Following an analysis of different lines of cases concerning legitimate expectations, the Court concluded that its case-law did not contemplate the existence of a “genuine dispute” or an “arguable claim” as a criterion for determining whether there was a “legitimate expectation” protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It took the view that “where the proprietary interest is in the nature of a claim it may be regarded as an “asset” only where it has a sufficient basis in national law, for example where there is settled case-law of the domestic courts confirming it” (see Kopecký , cited above, § 52).”

57 In the present case, the Court considers that the pertinent legal provision for the purposes of its assessment is Article 276 § 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That provision states that, in the event of an acquittal, the reimbursement of legal expenses shall be determined by the courts in accordance with civil law principles, in all situations where an injured party or civil party has not caused those expenses to be incurred.

58 The Court notes that, at the relevant time, the domestic courts gave varying and even conflicting interpretations of that specific provision (see also paragraphs 38-42 above), as set out below.

59 In the applicants’ cases, the domestic courts indicated that the State could not be held liable, whether due to the lack of legal standing or subjective liability, for the costs of a party who had been prosecuted in criminal proceedings that ended in an acquittal.

60 In particular, one court held that the State was not listed as a “party to criminal proceedings” and therefore could not be held liable for the costs and expenses of those proceedings (paragraph 10 above). Other courts found that an acquittal did not necessarily imply that a prosecutor had acted unlawfully in initiating the related criminal proceedings, since the initiation of such proceedings and all subsequent investigative acts were lawful actions by default, unless proven otherwise (paragraphs 17 and 22 above). In the absence of any judicial error, the State was not liable to reimburse defence costs.

61 . These approaches have been observed not only in the examples of domestic practice made available to the Court, but also in the reasoning of the High Court, which referred to certain prominent cases concerning whether the State could be held liable for the costs of proceedings. These cases ranged from accepting liability based on the principle of procedural fault and/or the theory of strict liability when a case was “lost”, to limiting liability to judicial errors only, or denying State liability altogether on the grounds that the State was not a party to criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 31-42 above).

62 The Court notes that, at the material time, the judicial practice concerning the matter in question was unsettled, as evidenced by the applicants’ cases and the above-mentioned examples (see paragraph 61 above).

63 . Therefore, the applicants’ claims cannot be considered to have had, at the material time, a sufficient basis in domestic case ‑ law entitling them to have a “legitimate expectation” of reimbursement for the costs and expenses incurred in the criminal proceedings initiated against them ex officio by the State (see, mutatis mutandis , Albu and Others v. Romania , nos. 34796/09 and 63 others, § 47, 10 May 2012, and Petrescu and Others v. Romania , (dec.), nos. 31390/18 and 9 others, § 71, 7 March 2023; see also Çiftçiler Joint Stock Company and Others v. Turkey, (dec.), nos. 62323/09 and 64965/09, §§ 42, 83-89, 24 November 2020, and Kalkan v. Türkiye (dec.), no. 28775/23, §§ 26-35, 9 December 2025).

64 . It follows that the applicants did not have a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and their related complaint is therefore inadmissible as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

65 The applicant in application no. 29610/22 relied on Article 13 of the Convention to complain that the domestic law did not provide an effective remedy for his claims. That Convention Article reads as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

66 The Court notes that Article 13 requires that a remedy be available in domestic law only in respect of grievances which can be regarded as “arguable” in terms of the Convention (see Nada v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10593/08, § 208, ECHR 2012).

67 The Court has found that the applicants’ complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention is inadmissible. It accordingly finds that that claim cannot be said to be “arguable” within the meaning of the Convention case-law (see, mutatis mutandis , S.C. I.F.N. Comautosport Leasing S.A. v. Romania (dec.), no. 44093/10, § 19, 17 April 2018).

68 It follows that also this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

69 Lastly, the applicants in applications nos. 55917/20 and 29610/22 claimed that they had been discriminated against on account of the fact that they had been unable to recover costs and expenses from the State, whereas similar claims would have been admissible against a private party to the proceedings (an injured and/or civil party). They relied on Article 14 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

70 The Government argued that there was an essential difference between the two scenarios compared by the applicants, because while an injured and/or civil party had a choice about whether or not to initiate criminal proceedings, the State did not, as it was obliged to carry out a criminal investigation whenever there was a suspicion that a criminal act had been committed. That difference justified the fact that the State, unlike an injured and/or civil party, could not be held liable for court expenses.

71 The applicants disagreed. They considered that the only relevant element in the present case was establishing who was the winning party and who was the losing party, as the latter was obliged to reimburse all justified court expenses, even when there had been no bad faith or abuse on the part of that person either at the outset or during the proceedings. Furthermore, the difference referred to was not only unjustified, but also lacked any legal basis in the national legislation.

72 The Court has already held that the legislation relied on by the applicants could not be regarded as generating a proprietary interest falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraphs 63-64 above). Accordingly, since the facts of the present case did not fall within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, Article 14 cannot be considered to be applicable (contrast Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, § 56, ECHR 2005 ‑ X; and Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 42184/05, § 64, ECHR 2010). This complaint is therefore incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Decides to join the applications;

Declares the applications inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 5 November 2026.

Hasan Bakırcı Lado Chanturia Registrar President

APPENDIX

List of cases:

No.

Application no.

Lodged on

Applicant Year of Birth Place of Residence Nationality

Represented by

1.

47735/20

15/10/2020

Călin-Ovidiu OLTEANU 1979 Iași Romanian

Radu Liviu CHIRIŢĂ

2.

55917/20

27/11/2020

Anca Elena VODĂ 1976 Nojord Romanian

Radu Liviu CHIRIŢĂ

3.

29610/22

31/05/2022

Raul-Ovidiu-Raj ROTAR 1971 Sârbești Romanian

Simona Ioana PAŞCU