Tuncal v. Türki̇Ye
Inadmissible
Berörda konventionsartiklar
SECOND SECTION
Application no. 17259/26 Arif TUNCAL against Türkiye
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 6 October 2026 as a Committee composed of:
Péter Paczolay , President , Gediminas Sagatys, Stéphane Pisani , judges , and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar ,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 17259/26) against the Republic of Türkiye lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 27 March 2026 by a Turkish national, Mr Arif Tuncal (“the applicant”), who was born in 1982, lives in Ankara and was represented by Ms F.N. Şimşir, a lawyer practising in Sakarya;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1 The case concerns the dismissal of the applicant, a police officer, in the aftermath of the attempted coup d’état of 15 July 2016 and the subsequent judicial review of his dismissal.
2 The declaration of a state of emergency following the coup d’état attempt and the process of enacting emergency legislative decrees are summarised in Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye ([GC], no. 15669/20, §§ 10-17, 26 September 2023) and Pişkin v. Turkey (no. 33399/18, §§ 9-12, 15 December 2020).
3 On 17 August 2016 the applicant was dismissed with a number of other civil servants, by way of the inclusion of his name in the annex to Emergency Decree no. 670, which indicated that he belonged to structures posing a threat to national security or had an affiliation and links with such structures, notably the organisation described by the Turkish authorities as the “Fetullahist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure” ( Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü / Paralel Devlet Yapılanması – “the FETÖ/PDY”).
4 Meanwhile, Emergency Legislative Decree no. 685, adopted on 2 January 2017 and published in the Official Gazette on 23 January 2017, provided for the setting-up of an ad hoc Commission (“the Emergency Commission”) tasked with adjudicating appeals against measures enacted directly by legislative decrees issued in the context of the state of emergency, including the dismissal of civil servants. Decisions of the Emergency Commission were amenable to further appeal before the administrative courts (see Köksal v. Turkey (dec.), no. 70478/16, §§ 16 and 25, 6 June 2017). Accordingly, on 19 February 2019 the applicant challenged his dismissal before the Emergency Commission, which dismissed his application, relying on, among other things, his alleged use of an encrypted messaging application by the name of “ByLock”.
5 On 31 May 2021 the Ankara Administrative Court, ruling on an objection submitted by the applicant, found that he had an affiliation and/or link with the FETÖ/PDY and considered that such a link was incompatible with the duty of loyalty incumbent on civil servants. In doing so, the administrative court relied on the alleged use of ByLock, the personnel file provided by the relevant institution (including the opinion of the applicant’s supervisor), digital material obtained in criminal proceedings from anonymous witnesses indicating that the organisation had assigned the applicant a coded position within its hierarchical structure, and the fact that his name had been mentioned in inspection reports on unlawful phone tapping. On 18 May 2023, having found it unlawful to rely on the opinion of the applicant’s superior to his detriment, the Ankara Regional Administrative Court upheld the dismissal, referring in general terms to the evidence drawn from parallel criminal proceedings against the applicant concerning his alleged membership of a terrorist organisation. The decision of the Regional Administrative Court was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 5 June 2023. He appealed against that decision on 8 July 2023.
6 On 11 July 2023 the Regional Administrative Court, carrying out a preliminary review of the applicant’s appeal before forwarding it to the Supreme Administrative Court, rejected it for failure to comply with the 30 ‑ day time ‑ limit for lodging an appeal, noting that its decision could further be appealed against before the Supreme Administrative Court within seven days.
7 On 29 November 2023 the applicant, represented by a new lawyer, appealed against the decision of the Regional Administrative Court of 18 May 2023, reiterating the arguments regarding the alleged unlawfulness of his dismissal previously raised by him before the administrative courts. On the same day, he also submitted an application for restitution under the relevant provision of the Code of Civil Procedure. In his application, he noted that the decision of 18 May 2023 had been served on his former lawyer, who had missed the deadline and forgotten to inform the applicant. He further noted that his former lawyer had withdrawn from the case on 24 August 2023 and had moved abroad. In that connection, he argued that he had lost all contact with his former lawyer and had only become aware of having missed the deadline much later. He further stated that he had been represented by his new lawyer since 28 November 2023. On 30 April 2024 the Fifth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court rejected his appeal for being lodged out of time. In doing so, the court stated that the Regional Administrative Court’s decision of 11 July 2023 had been served on the applicant’s lawyer electronically on 22 July 2023 and that, although the applicant had been required to submit an appeal by 31 July 2023 at the latest, he had only done so on 30 November 2023.
8 On 4 November 2024 the applicant lodged an application with the Constitutional Court. Relying on Articles 6, 8, 7, 9, 14, 15 and 18 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, he mainly complained that his dismissal from the civil service had constituted an unlawful interference with his private life and that the subsequent judicial review of his dismissal had lacked adequate procedural safeguards. He further complained that the domestic courts had lacked independence and impartiality. On 24 December 2025 the Constitutional Court declared the complaints under Article 6 of the Convention regarding access to a court inadmissible for being manifestly ill-founded and those under the same Article regarding the length of the proceedings inadmissible for failure to lodge a claim in that regard with the Compensation Commission. The applicant’s remaining complaints relating to his dismissal were examined from the standpoint of Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and were dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
9 The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 and Article 8 of the Convention that his dismissal from the civil service, which entailed a lifelong ban, had been unforeseeable and disproportionate and that the subsequent judicial proceedings had not complied with the guarantees of a fair trial. The applicant further claimed that he had not been tried by independent and impartial tribunals, that the disclosure of his name in the annex of Emergency Decree no. 670 had breached his right to reputation and that his dismissal had also violated Articles 7, 9, 13, 14 and 18 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
10 The applicant complained that the Emergency Commission and the administrative courts which had reviewed his dismissal, including the Supreme Administrative Court, had not met the requirements of independence and impartiality under Article 6 of the Convention. He argued, in particular, that the administrative courts had not been independent and impartial, alleging that the principle of the irremovability of judges had been eroded by legislative and factual developments, especially in the aftermath of the coup attempt, and that the Council of Judges and Prosecutors likewise had lacked independence and impartiality in view of structural changes and the manner in which its members had been appointed.
11 The Court considers it difficult to dissociate the question of impartiality from that of independence on the basis of the arguments advanced by the applicant and will accordingly consider both issues together ( see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, §§ 150 and 152, 6 November 2018).
12 The general principles concerning the right to an independent and impartial tribunal are summarised in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá (cited above, §§ 144-50), Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland ([GC], no. 26374/18, §§ 234, 1 December 2020) and Miracle Europe Kft v. Hungary (no. 57774/13, §§ 53-56, 12 January 2016).
13 Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes at the outset that the applicant raised a complaint regarding the impartiality and independence of the Emergency Commission and the administrative courts before the Constitutional Court; however, the Constitutional Court neither examined this complaint separately nor declared it inadmissible on specific grounds. That being so, the Court nevertheless notes that in so far as the applicant complained of a lack of independence and impartiality on the part of the Emergency Commission and the first-instance administrative court, by failing to lodge his appeal within the prescribed time-limit he did not afford the Supreme Administrative Court the opportunity to examine those complaints on the merits. However, the Court does not consider it necessary to determine whether this aspect of the complaint satisfies the exhaustion requirement under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, as it is, in any event, inadmissible for the reasons set out below. The same consideration applies to the applicant’s complaint concerning the Supreme Administrative Court, on the assumption that it is not inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
14 Accordingly, the Court notes that the first limb of the applicant’s complaint concerning the independence and impartiality of the Emergency Commission was formulated in abstract and general terms without raising any specific complaint. The applicant did not give reasons as to why the Commission could not be considered independent and impartial and merely submitted that his dismissal “had been reviewed by the Emergency Commission, which was neither independent nor impartial”. In the absence of any specific complaint, the Court considers that the applicant did not sufficiently substantiate his claim.
15 The Court next notes that the second limb of the complaint – namely, the independence and impartiality of the administrative courts, including the Supreme Administrative Court – rests on very generalised claims, without any concrete circumstance specific to the applicant’s case being identified. The applicant did not substantiate his allegation by reference to any document or information capable of supporting his claim and therefore failed to lay the basis for a prima facie complaint.
16 In any event, the Court reiterates that it is not called upon to make general findings on the Turkish judicial system in the abstract, or to rule on the permissible limits of relations and interaction between the various State powers, but to determine, on the facts of the specific case before it, whether the requirements of the right to a fair trial have been met (see Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, §§ 363-64, 26 September 2023, and further references therein, and compare and contrast Kavala v. Türkiye (no. 2) [GC], no. 2170/24, §§ 207-11, 25 August 2026, concerning criminal proceedings, where the Court, in the particular circumstances of that case, found that the proceedings against the applicant had fallen short, inter alia , of the requirements of independence and impartiality under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention). In that connection, the Court points out that the applicant did not raise any specific allegations, either during the domestic proceedings or before the Court, relating to the judges who had participated in the examination of his dismissal and producing specific consequences in his individual trial. This part of the applicant’s complaints thus amounts to criticism of the judiciary in general, rather than of any specific court or judge involved in his case. The Court’s task is not to undertake a general and theoretical assessment of the structure of the judiciary, but to determine whether, and if so to what extent, the independence and impartiality of the courts which decided the applicant’s case may have been affected (see, mutatis mutandis , Baş v. Turkey , no. 66448/17, §§ 275 ‑ 77, 3 March 2020). Such general and abstract statements cannot be considered sufficient to call into question the independence of the entire judicial system and to conclude that the judiciary acted on the instructions of the executive (compare also Kavala , cited above, § 273).
17 In view of the foregoing considerations, and having regard to the absence of a prima facie claim concerning the alleged lack of independence and impartiality on the part of the Emergency Commission and the administrative courts involved in the applicant’s case, this complaint remains wholly unsubstantiated and must therefore be rejected as manifestly ill ‑ founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
18 The applicant further complained that the judges of the Constitutional Court who had decided on his individual application had lacked the appearance of independence and impartiality on account of the controversial process by which they had been appointed, their political connections, and statements that they had made in the past.
19 The Court first notes that the applicant’s complaint regarding the process for appointing judges to the Constitutional Court relies on abstract claims, as he did not state how, in his view, the appointment process had failed to comply with the guarantees enshrined in the Convention (compare also Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson , cited above, § 207). Nor did he otherwise demonstrate a bias or provide evidence capable of giving rise to objectively justified fears on his part. In this connection, the Court notes that, although the applicant referred in his application to the judges’ alleged political connections and biased statements, he failed to provide any information about the judges in question or their conduct. Nor did he attribute any specific act or statement to them individually. In particular, the applicant did not substantiate his claims by demonstrating any political affiliations held by the judges, or by submitting the content of the allegedly biased statements. In addition, he did not submit a single press article, social media post or any other written material in support of his claim that the judges had made prejudicial statements capable of rebutting the presumption of impartiality. Nor did he demonstrate that there was a legitimate reason to fear that the judges had been biased (see Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, §§ 94-96, ECHR 2009). The Court therefore considers that the applicant failed to put forward specific arguments or information capable of casting doubt on the independence or impartiality of the Constitutional Court. He therefore failed to lay the basis for a prima facie complaint.
20 In view of the foregoing considerations, and having regard to the absence of a prima facie claim concerning the alleged lack of independence and impartiality on the part of the judges and courts involved in the applicant’s case, this complaint remains wholly unsubstantiated and must therefore be rejected as manifestly ill ‑ founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
21 Relying on Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14 and 18 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicant complained of the unlawful and disproportionate nature of his dismissal, a breach of his right to respect for his reputation and of the inadequacy of the subsequent judicial proceedings.
22 The general principles concerning exhaustion of domestic remedies are summarised in Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 21881/20, §§ 138-45, 27 November 2023) and Vučković and Others v. Serbia ((preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69-77, 25 March 2014). In particular, the Court may only deal with an application after all domestic remedies have been exhausted. The purpose of Article 35 is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity to prevent or put right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to it (see, for example, Mifsud v. France (dec.) [GC], no. 57220/00, § 15, ECHR 2002‑VIII).
23 In this connection, the Court reiterates that the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies requires that the complaints intended to be made subsequently in Strasbourg should have been made to the appropriate domestic body, at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law. Applicants must comply with the applicable rules and procedures of domestic law, failing which their application is likely to fall foul of the condition laid down in Article 35 (see Vučković and Others , cited above, §§ 72 and 80, with further references).
24 Turning to the present case, the Court observes that during the dismissal proceedings, the applicant’s appeals were rejected as he had failed to comply with the 30 ‑ day time-limit for lodging an appeal against the Regional Administrative Court’s decision with the Supreme Administrative Court, as well as with the seven ‑ day time-limit for lodging an objection to the dismissal of an appeal on procedural grounds. Those decisions do not appear arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable, and the applicant did not argue otherwise. Nor did he argue that the administrative courts were ineffective and that, on that basis, he could apply directly to the Constitutional Court. In this connection, the Court reiterates that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of procedural rules, such as time-limits for filing documents or for lodging appeals, and that the rules governing the formal steps to be taken and the time ‑ limits to be complied with are aimed at ensuring a proper administration of justice and compliance, in particular, with the principle of legal certainty (see, mutatis mutandis , Naït-Liman v. Switzerland [GC], no. 51357/07, §§ 114-16, 15 March 2018, and Cañete de Goñi v. Spain , no. 55782/00, § 36, ECHR 2002-VIII). Litigants must be entitled to expect those rules to be applied (see, mutatis mutandis , Cañete de Goñi , cited above, § 36).
25 As regards the applicant’s argument that he missed the time-limit for appealing against the Regional Administrative Court’s decision owing to his former lawyer’s negligence, the Court reiterates that it follows from the independence of the legal profession from the State (see Staroszczyk v. Poland , no. 59519/00, § 133, 22 March 2007) that the conduct of the proceedings is essentially a matter between the applicant and his or her counsel, whether counsel is appointed under a legal aid scheme or is privately financed. In that connection, the Court considers that any conduct on the part of the applicant’s private counsel resulting in a lack of access to a court cannot incur the State’s liability under the Convention (see Tuziński v. Poland (dec.), no. 40140/98, 30 March 1999, and, mutatis mutandis , Maass v. Germany (dec.), no. 71598/01, 15 September 2005, with further references).
26 Accordingly, the Court sees no reason to depart from the finding of the Constitutional Court that the applicant failed to exhaust the domestic remedies in relation to his complaints regarding his dismissal from the civil service, a breach of his right to respect for his reputation and the alleged unfairness of the judicial review proceedings. In particular, having regard to the circumstances of the case as a whole, the Court does not find that there were any special circumstances absolving the applicant from the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies in accordance with the applicable rules and procedure of domestic law (compare Vučković and Others , cited above, § 77).
27 It follows that these complaints must be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 5 November 2026.
Dorothee von Arnim Péter Paczolay Deputy Registrar President