M.Ö. v. the Netherlands
Inadmissible
Berörda konventionsartiklar
FOURTH SECTION
Application no. 45036/18 M.Ö. against the Netherlands
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 13 October 2026 as a Chamber composed of:
Lado Chanturia , President , Lorraine Schembri Orland, Faris Vehabović, Ana Maria Guerra Martins, Sebastian Răduleţu, András Jakab, Corinna Wissels , judges , and Hasan Bakırcı, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 14 September 2018,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated in private on 8 September and 13 October 2026, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1 The applicant, Mr M.Ö., is a Dutch national, who was born in 1999 and lives in Arnhem. The President granted the applicant’s request for his identity not to be disclosed to the public (Rule 47 § 4). He was initially represented before the Court by Mr R.I. Kool and subsequently by Mr H.M.W. Daamen, both lawyers practising in Maastricht.
2 The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms B. Koopman, and their Deputy Agent at the time, Ms K. Adhin, both of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3 The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.
A. Shooting incident
4 On the evening of 31 May 2017, Senior Police Officers V. and D. saw a stolen car being driven on the motorway. The officers followed the vehicle unobtrusively, with the aim of bringing it to a halt as soon as it slowed down. Officers V. and D. knew from professional experience that stolen cars of this type – a BMW M3 – tended to be used in high-impact crimes, and that drivers of such stolen vehicles regularly disregarded stop signs, because their more powerful engines enabled them to get away in the event of a pursuit.
5 Initially, the officers’ unmarked police car kept the stolen car in constant view. When it suddenly accelerated well above the speed limit, it got away and was soon out of sight. When Officers V. and D. saw the car again, the driver – the applicant – was manoeuvring in a manner which the officers perceived as an attempt to shake them off.
6 When the stolen car later came to a halt, Officer V. stopped the police car about half a metre behind it and applied the parking brake. Wearing his police badge and a safety vest with the word “Police” clearly visible on it, Officer D. got out and opened the front passenger door of the stolen car. He identified himself as a police officer and ordered the applicant to stop, in order to prevent him from driving off.
7 Immediately after being addressed by Officer D., the applicant put the car, whose engine was still running, in reverse. Both officers heard the car’s engine revving loudly. Officer D. felt the car starting to reverse and the opened passenger door pulling him along, which threw him off balance and caused him to fall backwards. He managed to jump away and avoid being dragged under the door. The applicant then reversed hard into the front of the police car. At that very instant Officer V. was getting out of the police car and still had his leg in the door opening, causing him to jump back into his car.
8 . Officer D. and (after getting out of the police car) Officer V. then each drew their service weapon, and each fired four shots at the stolen car as it was taking off at high speed.
9 The applicant continued his way in the stolen car, again well in excess of the speed limit. He was finally arrested after driving the stolen car into a ditch. Inside the car the police found gas canisters, a wired detonator, a balaclava, a stopwatch, head lamps and a crowbar.
10 At the time of the shooting incident, Officers V. and D. were trained and certified to carry and use their firearm.
B. Criminal investigation into the use of firearms by Officers V. and D.
11 . Officers V. and D. reported the shooting incident to the Police Inspector, who submitted the appropriate form to report the use of force on 1 June 2017. It was noted on the form that the police officers had fired towards the bottom of the applicant’s vehicle, out of fear for each other’s safety when the vehicle had reversed into the police car and because the applicant had been trying to evade arrest.
12 . A criminal investigation into the shooting incident was instituted on the instructions of the public prosecutor of the National Public Prosecutor’s Office ( Landelijk Parket ) in Rotterdam. Once it became clear that there had been no personal injury, the investigation was transferred from the National Criminal Investigations Department ( rijksrecherche ) to the Security, Integrity and Complaints ( Veiligheid, Integriteit en Klachten – “VIK”) Division of the Central Unit of the National Police.
13 . The investigation report of the VIK Division of 28 June 2017 included the following official records: findings by and interviews of Officers V. and D. (see paragraphs 14-15 below), a trajectory reconstruction carried out by forensic investigators (see paragraph 16 below), and questioning of the applicant within the context of a criminal investigation against him (see paragraph 24 below). The report also included the form on the use of force by Officers V. and D. (see paragraph 11 above).
14 . In the official record of findings drawn up jointly by Officers V. and D. on 1 June 2017, they stated that they had fired at the applicant’s vehicle because they had lost sight of each other and feared for each other’s safety when the vehicle had reversed into the police car.
15 . When Officers V. and D. were interviewed separately by investigators of the VIK Division, on 8 and 9 June 2017 respectively, each stated that they had fired shots to avert danger to themselves and to immobilise the stolen vehicle for the purpose of making an arrest. Officer V. stated that he had aimed his four shots at the front left side and front left tyre of the applicant’s vehicle, and Officer D. stated that he had aimed his four shots at its underside, rear and tyres.
16 . According to the formal record with the results of the trajectory reconstruction, the stolen car had been damaged by bullet impacts and ricochets in the following places:
– perforation damage to the rear bumper;
– perforation damage to the left-hand rear wheel arch;
– perforation damage to the bodywork on the left-hand side;
– perforation damage to the bodywork of the left-hand front door;
– perforation damage to the left-hand front door;
– instances of ricochet damage to the left-hand rear wheel arch;
– three instances of damage to, or near, the left-hand front door (one instance of perforation damage, two instances of ricochet damage);
– three instances of damage to the left-hand front door jamb (one instance of perforation damage, two instances of ricochet damage);
– ricochet damage to the inside of the windscreen, directly in front of the steering wheel.
17 . On 4 September 2017 the public prosecutor of the National Public Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant of his decision not to prosecute Officers V. and D. The decision was based on the investigation report of the VIK Division of 28 June 2017 (see paragraph 13 above). The prosecutor considered that by reversing hard into the police vehicle, the applicant had committed a sudden and unlawful assault against the officers, and that the officers’ conduct had satisfied the criteria of self-defence under Article 41 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 33 below).
C. Applicant’s complaint under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
18 . On 30 November 2017 the applicant submitted a written complaint to the Court of Appeal ( gerechtshof ) of The Hague under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraphs 36-37 below) against the public prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute Officers V. and D. for attempted manslaughter or attempted serious assault.
19 . Relying on Article 2 of the Convention, he submitted that no thorough investigation had been carried out, that the circumstances had not justified or excused the use of a firearm, and that the officers had contravened section 7 of the Police Act 2012 (see paragraph 30 below). The applicant claimed that the decision not to prosecute the officers had sent the “wrong signal to society” and that prosecution would be the only way to remove his “sense of injustice”.
D. Decision of the Court of Appeal
20 . In its decision of 15 March 2018, the Court of Appeal noted at the outset that the police were authorised – and, in some cases, even obliged – to use force if this was necessary in the lawful execution of their duties. Turning to the applicant’s case, the court held that the use of firearms by Officers V. and D. could not be justified or excused and had thus been unlawful:
“[Officers V. and D.] claimed to have shot at (the car of) the [applicant] in self ‑ defence and not for the purpose of making an arrest. The court notes that in the form for reporting any use of force [see paragraph 11 above] ... the officers stated, as the first reason for shooting, that the [applicant] had been trying to evade arrest ... and, as the second reason, that the [applicant] had been trying to drive into them ... On the same form, one of the [officers] also stated that the vehicle which the [applicant] was driving had been hit on the side and windows. Elsewhere [on the form], [the officers] stated that they had aimed at the lower side of the car. They also later stated that they had fired in self-defence, as the [applicant] had been driving away from them. The court considers that the explanation and justification for the use of the weapon has not been substantiated.
Similarly, the defence that one of the [officers], at the time when the [applicant] moved forward and drove away again, did not have his colleague in sight and that he feared for his [colleague’s] safety is insufficient to substantiate the argument that on those grounds, it was still a matter of self-defence while the [applicant] was driving away.
In view of the foregoing, the court is of the opinion that it cannot be established that there was a situation of self-defence [see paragraph 33 below] (including one reasonably perceived as such by the officers) at the time they fired. There was no suggestion of a sudden and unlawful assault on one’s own or another person’s body, or on honour or property, against which it was necessary to defend (with the use of firearms), nor could the [officers] reasonably have believed this. It is true that for a moment the [applicant] drove his car forcefully backwards in their direction and against the [officers’] police car, but the [officers] both fired shots when the [applicant] subsequently, of his own volition, was driving forward away from them ... In the court’s opinion, the defendants also cannot legitimately claim that they used excusable violence going beyond the needs of self-defence [see paragraph 34 below] ... because police officers ought to be expected to act professionally and not to be led by emotion as soon as the danger has passed.
In view of the above, the case-law, and the strict application of the law and of the Standing Orders [see paragraph 31 below], the court finds that there was no lawful use of firearms by [the officers] in this case.”
21 . The Court of Appeal went on to consider that it was not in the general interest to prosecute the officers:
“However, as the use of firearms did not result in death or injury, but only damage to the vehicle, the court considers – taking into account all the facts and circumstances – that it is not in the general interest [ niet opportuun ] to order the prosecution of [the officers]. In doing so, the court takes particular account of the (driving) behaviour of the [applicant] himself, who, as the driver of a stolen car and after being stopped by the police, reversed vigorously and at high speed, pulling one of the [officers] along for some distance and, in the process, crashing into the police car in which the other [officer] was sitting. The court considers it highly unlikely and implausible that this happened ‘by accident’, quite apart from the fact that this does not alter the threatening and dangerous nature of the [applicant’s] manoeuvre.”
22 . Accordingly, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint. No appeal lay against that decision.
E. Applicant’s conviction
23 A separate criminal investigation was carried out into offences that might have been committed by the applicant.
24 . When questioned on 1 June 2017, the applicant stated that he was not used to driving a vehicle with an automatic gearbox, that he had reversed into the police car by accident, and that Officer D.’s orders had caused him to panic and drive off.
25 . On 3 April 2018 the North Netherlands Regional Court ( rechtbank ) convicted the applicant of attempted serious assault, intentionally and unlawfully causing damage to a police vehicle, knowingly handling stolen goods, and complicity in acts involving the preparation of deliberate arson or causing an explosion. The court sentenced the applicant to 360 days in juvenile detention, of which 174 days were suspended pending a probation period of two years. The applicant was ordered to pay 500 euros (EUR) to each police officer in compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
26 Neither the applicant nor the prosecution appealed against that conviction.
F. Relevant developments after the lodging of the application
27 . In a letter of 26 November 2018, the applicant informed the Court that he had not pursued tort ( onrechtmatige daad ) proceedings against Officers V. and D. because he wanted them to be prosecuted, which was not possible in civil proceedings.
28 In a letter of 14 February 2023, following the submission of the parties’ observations, the Government informed the Court that it was possible for the applicant to submit a civil liability claim to the police for the damage caused by Officers V. and D. If the claim were to be denied, it was possible for him to pursue tort proceedings before the civil court. By way of example, the Government referred to the decision of a civil chamber of the Amsterdam Regional Court of 1 February 2023 (see paragraph 38 below) in which compensation was awarded to a victim of police violence, even though the victim’s request for prosecution had been dismissed in proceedings under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
29 . In a letter of the same date, the applicant informed the Court that he had not (or not yet) submitted a claim for compensation to the police, and such compensation had not been offered to him. He explained that the redress for the alleged violation of Article 2 of the Convention would have to consist of the prosecution of (or disciplinary action against) the police officers, as well as financial compensation. Joining criminal proceedings as an injured party would have offered him a “low-threshold and low-risk mechanism” to receive compensation, whereas civil proceedings against the State would have involved significant court fees and the risk that he would be ordered to pay the legal costs of the other party.
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
30 . At the relevant time, section 7 of the Police Act 2012 ( Politiewet 2012 ) provided as follows:
“1. A police officer ... shall be authorised to use force ... in the lawful exercise of his duties when it is justified by the purpose thereby intended to be served, taking into account also the dangers involved in such use of force, and when that purpose cannot otherwise be served. The use of force shall be preceded, if possible, by a warning.
...
7 The exercise of the powers referred to in [subsection 1] must be reasonable and moderate and in proportion to the objective [ in verhouding tot het beoogde doel redelijk en gematigd ].
...”
31 . Rules on the implementation of section 7 of the Police Act 2012 are laid down in the Standing Orders for the police, the Royal Military Constabulary and other officers invested with investigative powers ( Ambtsinstructie voor de politie, de Koninklijke Marechaussee en andere opsporingsambtenaren – “the Standing Orders”), which, at the relevant time, provided as follows:
Section 7
“1. The use of a firearm ... shall be permitted only:
(a) ...
(b) to arrest a person who is trying to evade, or has evaded, being arrested, being brought before the competent legal authority or being subjected to another lawful form of deprivation of liberty [ aanhouding, voorgeleiding of andere rechtmatige vrijheidsbeneming ] and who is suspected or has been convicted of committing a crime
1 o . for which the law prescribes a term of imprisonment of four years or more, and
2 o . which constitutes a serious infringement of physical integrity or privacy, or
3 o . whose consequences pose or may pose a threat to society.
(c) ...”
Section 10a
“1. Immediately before discharging a firearm ... an officer must issue a warning in ... some ... unmistakable manner that a shot will be fired unless the order that has been given is obeyed forthwith. This warning, which can, if necessary, be replaced by a warning shot, may be omitted only if circumstances do not allow it to be given.
2 A warning shot must be given in such a way as to avoid, as far as possible, endangering persons or property.”
32 . The Explanatory Note ( Nota van Toelichting ) to the decree of 16 July 2001 which amended the Standing Orders (Official Bulletin ( Staatsblad ), 2001, no. 387, at pp. 6-7) provides as follows:
“[S]hooting at moving cars is strongly discouraged [ ernstig ontraden ]. The reason for this is the small chance of successfully immobilising the vehicle and the relatively high risk that the individuals present may be hit by projectiles straying through the vehicle. It was decided not to introduce an outright ban, because in some situations shooting at moving cars cannot be entirely ruled out.”
B. The Criminal Code
33 . Article 41 § 1 of the Criminal Code ( Wetboek van strafrecht ) governs the right to self-defence ( noodweer ) and provides that anyone who commits an act which is necessary in order to defend his or her own or someone else’s physical integrity ( lijf ), sexual integrity ( eerbaarheid ) or property against immediate unlawful assault shall not be liable for punishment in respect of that act.
34 . Article 41 § 2 of the Criminal Code provides that anyone who uses excusable violence in excess of self-defence ( noodweerexces ) shall not be liable for punishment in respect of that act.
C. Proceedings under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
35 . According to section 124 of the Judiciary Organisation Act ( Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie ) the Public Prosecution Service has exclusive responsibility for upholding the legal order through criminal law and for carrying out other tasks which are assigned to it by law. In accordance with its discretionary powers ( opportuniteitsbeginsel ), the Public Prosecution Service may, on grounds of general interest, decide, in line with the general policy rules defined by the Board of Procurators General, not to institute, or to discontinue, a prosecution (Article 167 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
36 . A decision not to institute, or to discontinue, a prosecution is subject to review by the Court of Appeal in the event of a complaint under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
37 . In its relevant part, the Code of Criminal Procedure ( Wetboek van strafvordering ) provided as follows at the relevant time:
Article 12
“1. If the perpetrator of a punishable act is not prosecuted [or] if the prosecution is not pursued to a conclusion ... then anyone with a direct interest may lodge a written complaint with the [relevant] court of appeal within whose area of jurisdiction the decision has been taken not to prosecute [or] not to pursue the prosecution to a conclusion ... ”
Article 12i
“1. If the complaint falls within the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction, if the [action brought by the complainant] can be admitted [ de klager ontvankelijk is ], and if the Court of Appeal finds that a prosecution ought to have been brought or pursued to a conclusion, the Court of Appeal shall order the prosecution to be brought or pursued in respect of the fact to which the complaint relates ....
2 The Court of Appeal may also refuse to give such an order on grounds relating to the general interest [ algemeen belang ].
3 ...
4 In all other cases the Court of Appeal shall ... dismiss the complaint.”
D. Domestic case-law
38 . On 1 February 2023 a civil chamber of the Amsterdam Regional Court gave a decision (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2023:478) in tort proceedings, ordering the police to pay compensation to a victim of force used by a police officer. Earlier, in separate proceedings decided on 30 November 2021, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal had dismissed the victim’s complaint under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the decision not to prosecute the officer concerned.
E. Relevant Council of Europe instruments
39 . Recommendation Rec(2000)19 on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system, adopted by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers on 6 October 2000 at the 724 th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, provides:
“34. Interested parties of recognised or identifiable status, in particular victims, should be able to challenge decisions of public prosecutors not to prosecute; such a challenge may be made, where appropriate after an hierarchical review, either by way of judicial review, or by authorising parties to engage private prosecution.”
COMPLAINTS
40 The applicant complained that Officers V. and D. had endangered his life in a manner which was not justified, and that the proceedings under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 18-22 above) had constituted insufficient redress for the alleged violation of Article 2 of the Convention, which provides in its relevant part:
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law ...
2 Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest ... ”
THE LAW
Admissibility
1 The applicability of Article 2 of the Convention
(a) The parties’ submissions
41 The Government submitted that Article 2 of the Convention was inapplicable as the degree of force used by Officers V. and D. had not endangered the applicant’s life and there had been no evidence of other exceptional circumstances calling for the application of this provision. The applicant had suffered no injury, the trained officers had aimed at the spots that would give the best chance of immobilising the vehicle, they had not intended to hit the applicant, and they had stopped firing when they realised that they could no longer achieve their goal or only at an unacceptably high risk to the applicant’s life. The circumstances, degree of force and risks to the life of the driver as evidenced by the extent and location of the damage to the car, were thus to be distinguished from those in Makaratzis v. Greece ([GC], no. 50385/99, ECHR 2004-XI) and Haász and Szabó v. Hungary (nos. 11327/14 and 11613/14, 13 October 2015) in which the Court had found that Article 2 of the Convention was applicable.
42 Relying on, inter alia , Makaratzis and Haász and Szabó (both cited above), the applicant submitted that Officers V. and D. had used force and put his life at risk such as to render Article 2 of the Convention applicable. The findings of the forensic investigation showed that a bullet had narrowly missed his head (see paragraph 16 above) and the danger inherent in firing at moving vehicles was recognised in the Explanatory Note which amended the Standing Orders (see paragraph 32 above).
(b) The Court’s assessment
43 The Court reiterates that Article 2 of the Convention may exceptionally come into play even if a person whose right to life was allegedly breached did not die as a result of the impugned conduct. The principles developed in the Court’s case-law demonstrate that Article 2 is applicable if the injuries suffered by the person in question were seriously life-threatening or if the activity or conduct at issue was dangerous by its very nature and put a person’s life at real and imminent risk (see Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], no. 41720/13, § 140, 25 June 2019; Makaratzis , cited above, § 51; Karagiannopoulos v. Greece , no. 27850/03, § 38, 21 June 2007; Soare and Others v. Romania , no. 24329/02, § 108, 22 February 2011; Kitanovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , no. 15191/12, §§ 52-53, 22 January 2015; and Haász and Szabó, cited above, §§ 43-44).
44 Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the inherent danger of shooting at moving vehicles is recognised by the Explanatory Note which amended the Standing Orders (see paragraph 32 above). The Court further notes that Officers V. and D. each fired four bullets in the direction of the car driven by the applicant (see paragraphs 8 and 15 above) and that the car was damaged by six bullet impacts and several ricochets, including ricochet damage to the inside of the windscreen, directly in front of the steering wheel (see paragraph 16 above).
45 In the light of the above, the Court considers that at least one bullet only narrowly missed the applicant. Accordingly, the use of force by Officers V. and D. was life-threatening by its very nature. Irrespective of whether or not they actually intended to hit or kill him, their use of force put the applicant’s life at real and imminent risk of death, even though, in the event, he was not injured (see also Haász and Szabó , §§ 46-48, and, mutatis mutandis , Makaratzis , §§ 54-55, both cited above).
46 The above considerations are sufficient for the Court to dismiss the Government’s objection of incompatibility ratione materiae and to conclude that the applicant’s complaint falls within the scope of Article 2 of the Convention.
2 Loss of victim status
(a) The parties’ submissions
(i) The Government
47 . The Government submitted, in the alternative, that the Court of Appeal’s decision (see paragraphs 20-22 above) had amounted in substance to an acknowledgment of a violation of the applicant’s right to life laid down in Article 2 of the Convention.
48 Emphasising that Article 2 does not entail a right to have third parties prosecuted and that national courts are granted substantial deference in the choice of appropriate sanctions, the Government argued further that the applicant’s complaints about the lawfulness of the use of firearms by Officers V. and D. had been carefully scrutinised by the Court of Appeal in accordance with domestic law and the requirements under the Convention. The appellate court had considered the evidence, the relevant circumstances, and the applicant’s reckless driving and lack of personal injuries, before coming to the reasonable conclusion that it would not be in the general interest to prosecute the officers for their unlawful use of force (see paragraph 21 above). Accordingly, the Government submitted that compliance with the substantive requirements of Article 2 of the Convention had been assessed even without the prosecution of Officers V. and D.
49 The Government also asserted that disciplinary proceedings against Officers V. and D. would be reasonable only if there was a basis for a finding of dereliction of duty, which had not been the case here.
50 Referring to the Regional Court’s judgment of 3 April 2018 (see paragraph 25 above), in which the applicant had been ordered to pay EUR 500 to each officer in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, the Government contended that the incident, its aftermath (including the criminal investigation and the subsequent proceedings under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and media exposure had been very traumatic for both officers and had had a profound impact on them. Shortly after the incident, a “learning circle” had been created – consisting of the officers involved, their supervisors and a trainer – and “evaluation interviews” had been held, all with the aim of reflecting on the incident and practising the safe use of firearms.
51 . In view of the above, the Government submitted that there had been no manifest disproportion between the actions of officers V. and D. and their consequences, and that the applicant had received appropriate and sufficient redress for the acknowledged violation of Article 2 of the Convention.
(ii) The applicant
52 The applicant submitted that the Court of Appeal’s finding that the police officers’ use of force had been unlawful amounted to an acknowledgment of a breach of the substantive limb of Article 2 of the Convention.
53 He also submitted that the officers in question had not been held accountable and that the Government had failed to undo the detrimental consequences which the incident had had on him. The applicant had not been afforded appropriate and sufficient redress for that violation, because neither criminal proceedings (which he could have joined as a civil injured party to claim compensation) nor disciplinary proceedings had been instituted against the officers. It was the applicant who had been convicted and ordered to pay compensation to the police officers (see paragraph 25 above), rather than the other way around.
54 The applicant asserted further that the impact which the incident had allegedly had on the officers was unsubstantiated and, in any case, irrelevant to the question of whether he had been afforded appropriate and sufficient redress. The “evaluation interviews” could not make up for a shooting that had nearly cost his life.
(b) The Court’s assessment
55 The Government submitted that the Court of Appeal’s decision in the proceedings under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure constituted appropriate and sufficient redress for the acknowledged violation of Article 2 of the Convention (see paragraphs 47-51 above). The Court considers that, in doing so, the Government may be understood to have claimed that the applicant has lost his status as a victim for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention and that his complaint is thus incompatible ratione personae .
(i) General principles
56 According to the Court’s settled case-law, a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him or her of his or her status as a “victim” unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and subsequently afforded appropriate and sufficient redress for the breach of the Convention (see, for the main principles, Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 178-213, ECHR 2006-V, and, for a summary of those principles, Nikolova and Velichkova v. Bulgaria , no. 7888/03, § 49, 20 December 2007).
57 The Court has generally considered this to be dependent on all the circumstances of the case, with particular regard to the nature of the right alleged to have been breached (see Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 116, ECHR 2010), the reasons given for the decision (see M.A. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 35242/04, ECHR 2005-VIII) and the persistence of the unfavourable consequences for the person concerned after that decision (see Freimanis and Līdums v. Latvia , nos. 73443/01 and 74860/01, § 68, 9 February 2006).
58 It is therefore for the Court to verify, ex post facto , whether the domestic authorities afforded appropriate and sufficient redress, having regard to the just satisfaction as provided for under Article 41 of the Convention (see Mučibabić v. Serbia , no. 34661/07, § 117, 12 July 2016, with further references).
(ii) Application of the above principles to the present case
(α) The acknowledgment of a violation
59 The Court observes that the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the use of force by Officers V. and D. had been unlawful, considering that both had shot at the applicant while he was driving away to evade arrest (see paragraph 20 above). Taking also account of the Government’s submission on this point (see paragraph 47 above), the national authorities can be considered to have recognised thereby, at least in substance, that Officers V. and D. had used force in breach of Article 2 of the Convention. This makes it unnecessary to determine whether the officers’ use of force was justified under Article 2 § 2 of the Convention. The Court’s examination of the applicant’s complaint will therefore be limited to ascertaining whether or not the national authorities afforded appropriate and sufficient redress for the violation (see also Hasan Köse v. Turkey , no. 15014/11, § 33, 18 December 2018, and Kasap and Others v. Turkey , no. 8656/10, § 56, 14 January 2014).
(β) The characteristics of the redress
60 . The Court reiterates that in cases of conduct by State agents in breach of Article 2, the Court has repeatedly found that two measures are necessary to provide sufficient redress. Firstly, the State authorities must have conducted a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see, for example, Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391/99, §§ 324-25, ECHR 2007-II; Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, § 165, ECHR 2011; and Koomen v. the Netherlands , no. 298/15, §§ 108-12, 15 April 2025). Secondly, an award of compensation to the applicant is required where appropriate or, at least, the possibility of seeking and obtaining compensation for the damage which the applicant sustained as a result of the conduct which was allegedly in breach of Article 2 (see, for example, Nikolova and Velichkova , cited above, §§ 55-56, 20 December 2007; see, mutatis mutandis , Gäfgen , cited above, §§ 116-18, concerning a breach of Article 3 of the Convention).
61 . Before embarking on an analysis of the subsequent investigation and the proceedings under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court considers it necessary to reiterate the principles which govern the authorities’ duty to conduct an effective investigation in cases such as the present one (see further Nikolova and Velichkova , cited above, § 57, where these general principles are set out in more detail):
(a) Article 2 imposes a duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal‑law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by law‑enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions.
(b) The effective investigation required under Article 2 serves to maintain public confidence in the authorities’ maintenance of the rule of law, to prevent any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts, to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and to ensure accountability in cases involving State agents or bodies.
(c) While there is no absolute obligation for all prosecutions to result in conviction or in a particular sentence, the national courts should not under any circumstances be prepared to allow life-endangering offences to go unpunished. This is essential for maintaining public confidence and ensuring adherence to the rule of law and for preventing any appearance of tolerance of or collusion in unlawful acts.
62 Accordingly, the Court will now turn to an examination of the effectiveness of the criminal investigation against Officers V. and D. and the subsequent proceedings under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraphs 11-17 and 20-22 above) in the light of the above-mentioned general principles (see paragraphs 60-61 above). The Court’s task here consists in reviewing whether and to what extent the national authorities may be deemed to have submitted the case to the careful scrutiny required by Article 2, so that the deterrent effect of the judicial system in place and the significance of the role it is required to play in preventing violations of the right to life are not undermined (see Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, § 96, ECHR 2004-XII, and Mileusnić and Mileusnić-Espenheim v. Croatia , no. 66953/09, § 66, 19 February 2015; see also, mutatis mutandis , Okkalı v. Turkey , no. 52067/99, § 66, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts), as regards Article 3 of the Convention).
63 On the basis of the material before it, the Court discerns no grounds to conclude that the respondent State has failed to carry out a prompt and adequate investigation into the shooting incident of 31 May 2017. In particular, the Court notes that the Police Inspector submitted the appropriate form to report the use of force on 1 June 2017 (see paragraph 11 above). On the same day, Officers V. and D. jointly drew up an official record in which they described their role in the shooting incident (see paragraph 14 above). Next, on 8 and 9 June 2017 respectively, Officers V. and D. were interviewed by investigators of the VIK Division of the Central Unit of the National Police which had been charged ex officio with the investigation into the officers’ shooting (see paragraphs 12 and 15 above). In addition, forensic investigators carried out a trajectory reconstruction to establish where exactly the shots fired by the officers had damaged the applicant’s vehicle (see paragraph 16 above). The above findings were all included in the VIK Division’s investigation report of 28 June 2017 (see paragraph 13 above), together with the official record of the statements given by the applicant on 1 June 2017, when he was questioned within the context of the criminal investigation against himself (see paragraph 24 above).
64 The Court further notes that the public prosecutor’s discretionary decision not to prosecute Officers V. and D. (see paragraph 17 above) was subject to judicial review, which is a reassuring safeguard of accountability and transparency (see Armani Da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 5878/08, § 278, 30 March 2016; see also, in this connection, the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation Rec(2000)19, quoted in paragraph 39 above). As the Court has held before, the principle of discretionary prosecution leaves States considerable room for manoeuvre in deciding whether or not to institute proceedings against someone thought to have committed an offence (see Pentikäinen v. Finland [GC], no. 11882/10, § 110, ECHR 2015; see also, mutatis mutandis , Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], no. 69698/01, § 159, ECHR 2007-V). The Court reiterates further that proceedings before the Court of Appeal under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may constitute part of the mechanism for the respondent State to discharge its procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to conduct an effective investigation (see M ulder-van Schalkwijk v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 26814/09, 7 June 2011; Mustafić-Mujić and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 49037/15, 30 August 2016; and Koomen , cited above, § 124).
65 In response to the applicant’s complaint, the Court of Appeal examined not only the lawfulness of the conduct of the police officers (see paragraph 20 above) but also considerations of general interest (see paragraph 21 above). In particular, in the exercise of its own discretionary judicial powers (see Article 12i § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, quoted in paragraph 37 above) the appellate court concluded that although the use of force by Officers V. and D. had been unlawful, their prosecution would not have been in the general interest given the lack of any injuries sustained by the applicant and his reprehensible conduct in attempting to evade a lawful arrest.
66 . The Court considers that a conclusion that prosecution of an unlawful act is not in the general interest is not, of itself, sufficient to raise an issue under Article 2 of the Convention. In this connection, the Court reiterates that there is no right to obtain a prosecution or conviction or indeed a particular sentence, and the fact that an investigation ends without concrete results is not indicative of any failings as such (see, among many authorities, Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458/02, § 306, ECHR 2011).
67 On the one hand, it is not the Court’s task to verify whether the Court of Appeal’s decision correctly applied domestic criminal law (see paragraphs 33-34 above) or general policy rules and the exercise of discretionary powers (see paragraph 35 above); what is in issue in the present proceedings is not the individual criminal‑law liability of the officers, but the international‑law responsibility of the State (see Öneryıldız , cited above, § 116, and Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 147, ECHR 2005-VII). On the other hand, the Court is mindful that it must exercise a certain power of review and intervene in cases of manifest disproportion between the offence committed and the sanction imposed (see Hasan Köse , cited above, § 36, with further references, and Armani Da Silva , cited above, § 285). Were it to be otherwise, the States’ duty to carry out an effective investigation would lose much of its meaning, and the right enshrined by Article 2, despite its fundamental importance, would be ineffective in practice (see Nikolova and Velichkova , cited above, § 62).
68 In the particular circumstances of the case, the Court does not discern any grounds to disagree with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that it would not be in the general interest to prosecute the officers in question, given the lack of any injuries sustained by the applicant and his reprehensible conduct in attempting to evade a lawful arrest. Accordingly, in view of the reasonable conclusion adopted by the Court of Appeal when reviewing the actions of Officers V. and D. as well as the decision of the prosecutor, it cannot be said that there was manifest disproportion between the gravity of their use of force and their non-prosecution. More generally, it cannot be said that the deterrent effect of the judicial system and the significance of the role it is required to play in preventing violations of the right to life was undermined. The fact that the applicant persistently called for the officers’ prosecution and conviction (see paragraphs 18-19, 27 and 29 above) does not warrant the Court to take a different stance in this respect. In this connection it should be reiterated, once again, that there is no right to obtain a prosecution or conviction or indeed a particular sentence (see paragraph 66 above).
69 Turning to the issue of compensation (see paragraph 60 above), the Court notes that the Court of Appeal established all relevant facts and found that the officers’ use of force was unlawful (see paragraph 20 above). It was open to the applicant to rely on these findings of fact and law to claim compensation from the police in separate civil proceedings (compare the parties’ submissions on this point, as reflected in paragraphs 27 ‑ 29 above). Based on the contents of the case file, the Court considers that this possibility existed in the Netherlands at the relevant time, irrespective of whether or not the officers in question were prosecuted and convicted (see, for instance, the Amsterdam Regional Court’s decision of 1 February 2023, cited in paragraph 38 above). Such civil proceedings are wholly independent of any criminal investigation, and the prospect of success of a claim for compensation does not depend on the proper conduct of criminal investigations or prosecutions (see also Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom , no. 24746/94, §§ 112 and 162, 4 May 2001, and contrast Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom , no. 46477/99, §§ 99-101, ECHR 2002-II). In this connection the Court also notes that the applicant did not convincingly demonstrate that the compensatory mechanism was unavailable or practically ineffective at the relevant time.
70 The applicant thus had the possibility to turn to the domestic civil courts to claim compensation for the acknowledged breach of the substantive limb of Article 2 of the Convention, rather than relying exclusively on the proceedings under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and subsequently turning to the Court to seek confirmation of the already recognised unlawfulness of the conduct complained of (see also Hugh Jordan , cited above, § 162, and contrast X. v. Switzerland , no. 16744/14, §§ 49-55, 26 January 2017). The fact that the applicant has not made use of this possibility cannot put into question that a clearly established and realistic avenue to claim compensation in civil proceedings was available to him at the relevant time.
(γ) Conclusion
71 Having found that the applicant received appropriate and sufficient redress for the acknowledged violation of the substantive limb of Article 2 of the Convention, the Court upholds the Government’s objection of incompatibility ratione personae and concludes that the applicant can no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 5 November 2026.
Hasan Bakırcı Lado Chanturia Registrar President