lagen.nu
no. 80568/17

Trapeza Eurobank Ergasias A.E. v. Greece

Inadmissible

Domstol
European Court of Human Rights
Avgörandedatum
2026-10-06
ECLI
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:1006DEC008056817
Artiklar
14, 14+P1-1, P1-1, 35
Källa
hudoc.echr.coe.int

Berörda konventionsartiklar

THIRD SECTION

Application no. 80568/17 TRAPEZA EUROBANK ERGASIAS A.E. against Greece

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 6 October 2026 as a Committee composed of:

Peeter Roosma , President , Ioannis Ktistakis, Lətif Hüseynov , judges , and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 80568/17) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 14 November 2017 by a Greek bank, Trapeza Eurobank Ergasias A.E. (“the applicant bank”), established in Athens in 1924 and represented by Mr G. Timagenis, a lawyer practising in Piraeus;

the decision to give notice of the complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention to the Greek Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms N. Marioli, President of the State Legal Council, and their Agent’s delegates, Ms I. Kotsoni, Legal Representative, and Mr K. Georgiadis, former Legal Representative at the State Legal Council, who subsequently succeeded Ms Marioli as President, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

the comments submitted by Piraeus Bank S.A., which was granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1 The application concerns an alleged violation of the applicant bank’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, due to its ranking in the creditors’ order in the process of recovering debts from a private person.

2 . On an unknown date in 2003 the applicant bank obtained payment order no. 1509 against its debtor, Mr N.G. On 19 March 2003 the applicant bank, on the basis of that payment order, registered a mortgage prenotation ( προσημείωση υποθήκης ) on two immovable properties owned by N.G., with a view to securing in rem its contractual claims against him. In 2005 another creditor bank in respect of N.G., the Agrotiki Trapeza Ellados bank ( Αγροτική Τράπεζα Ελλάδος – “Agrotiki Trapeza (ATE)”), initiated enforcement proceedings against him in order to enforce its contractual claims amounting to 147,967.75 euros (EUR). ATE had similarly registered a mortgage on one of the immovable properties owned by N.G. on 11 September 2002 in accordance with Article 12 of Law no. 4332/1929 with a view to securing its claims against him.

3 On 28 September 2005 the two immovable properties owned by N.G. were sold at public auction for EUR 70,000 and EUR 1,200 respectively.

4 In the course of the enforcement proceedings, the applicant bank lodged its claims ( αναγγελία απαίτησης ) in the total amount of EUR 88,914.46.

5 The auction proceeds amounted to EUR 66,568.86 (after the deduction of enforcement costs). On 11 June 2010 the auction officer drew up the table of ranking of creditors ( πίνακας κατάταξης δανειστών ) for the distribution of auction proceeds as follows. The Greek State was ranked as a generally preferred creditor and was allocated one-third of the total auction proceeds (in the amount of EUR 22.189,62), in partial satisfaction of its claim. ATE was ranked as the holder of the earliest security right in rem in respect of one of the immovable properties and was allocated two-thirds of the auction proceeds attributable to that property (in the amount of EUR 43.624,79), in partial satisfaction of its claim. The Greek State was ranked as the holder of the earliest security right in rem in respect of the other immovable property and was allocated two-thirds of the auction proceeds attributable to that property (in the amount of EUR 754.45), in partial satisfaction of its claim.

6 As the auction proceeds were insufficient to satisfy all the creditors, the applicant bank was not included in the creditors’ ranking table and received no payment.

7 On 28 June 2010 the applicant bank lodged an objection ( ανακοπή ) against the creditors’ ranking table, asserting that it should have been ranked in ATE’s place. It argued that ATE’s registered mortgage on an immovable property owned by N.G. should have been declared null and void. In particular, the applicant bank alleged that the privilege accorded to ATE under Article 12 of Law no. 4332/1929, which allowed ATE to unilaterally register a mortgage without incurring any costs by merely producing the relevant loan agreements, had been contrary to the Constitution, European competition law and the Convention. It further maintained that that derogation from Article 1266 of the Civil Code, according to which the right to register a mortgage was subject to the debtor making a declaration before a notary public, had placed other creditors banks – to which Article 1266 of the Civil Code applied – at a disadvantage and could not be justified by overriding public-interest considerations.

8 By judgment no. 47/32TM/2012, the Samos Single-Member Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant bank’s objection.

9 Following an appeal lodged by the applicant bank on 2 May 2012, the Aegean Court of Appeal found, by judgment no. 11/2014, that Article 12 of Law no. 4332/1929 was contrary to the Constitution, European competition law and the Convention. It overturned the lower court’s ruling and included the applicant bank in the creditors’ ranking table in place of ATE.

10 . Ruling on an appeal on points of law lodged by ATE on 3 November 2014, the Court of Cassation found, by judgment no. 817/2017, that the privilege accorded to ATE was justified on public-interest grounds and quashed the appellate court’s ruling. In particular, the Court of Cassation noted that ATE, in accordance with its founding Law no. 4332/1929 had been established as a primary financial institution with a mission to facilitate access to credit for agricultural development and to improve the conditions for the organisation and coordination of agricultural activities and associated transactions. It further held that Article 12 of Law no. 4332/1929 continued to apply and was not contrary to the Constitution, even following the bank’s transformation into a société anonyme in 1990 (Law no. 1914/1990). Despite the change of its statute, the transformation did not change the special preferential legal status of ATE – which continued to constitute the primary institution for supporting agricultural credit – in accordance with the provisions set out in Law no. 1914/1990. The Court of Cassation referred to judgments nos. 24-25/2006, 360/2010, 20/2011, 526/2014 and 29/2016 in which it had made a similar finding on the constitutionality of Article 12 of Law no. 4332/1929.

11 Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, the applicant bank complained that the privilege accorded to ATE under Article 12 of Law no. 4332/1929, which enabled it to unilaterally register a mortgage on an immovable property owned by N.G., had resulted in the applicant bank’s claims remaining unsatisfied. Accordingly, its right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions had been violated.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

12 The Court notes at the outset that the case at hand concerns complaints raised in the context of enforcement proceedings brought against a private debtor. In this connection, where the case concerns the ordinary economic relations between private parties, the positive obligations of the State are limited to organising a system for the enforcement of judgments that is effective both in law and in practice and ensuring that the procedures enshrined in the legislation for the enforcement of final judgments are complied with without undue delay (see Fuklev v. Ukraine , no. 71186/01, § 91, 7 June 2005).

13 The Court accepts that, in the present case, the failure to satisfy the applicant bank’s secured claim in the course of the enforcement proceedings against N.G. could amount to an interference with its property rights and should be examined in the light of the general principle laid down in the first rule of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (compare Acar and Others v. Türkiye (dec.), nos. 26878/07 and 32446/07, § 33, 12 December 2017).

14 The Court observes, however, that Article 12 of Law no. 4332/1929 governs how ATE may secure its claims in rem , irrespective of whether enforcement proceedings are subsequently instituted against the debtor. The order in which creditors are satisfied in enforcement proceedings is, by contrast, governed by the principle of priority in time (Article 1300 of the Civil Code). It follows that the privilege accorded to ATE, consisting in the unilateral registration of a mortgage, does not, in itself, predetermine the extent to which other creditors may recover their claims in the context of subsequent enforcement proceedings.

15 In that respect, the Court notes that the applicant bank did not contend that the privilege accorded to ATE under Article 12 of Law no. 4332/1929 had, in any way, impaired its ability to register a mortgage prenotation in due time. In particular, the applicant bank did not claim, let alone demonstrate, that it had been prevented from following the prescribed procedure for creditors without a privilege, which requires a declaration from the debtor before a notary public, nor that it had encountered any substantial delay in doing so. The applicant bank obtained payment order no. 1509/2003 and registered a mortgage prenotation on immovable property owned by its debtor within less than two months – that is, on 19 March 2003. By that time, however, ATE had already registered a mortgage on the same property on 11 September 2002 – that is, approximately six months earlier. In any event, the Court observes that the applicant bank did not obtain a payment order against the debtor until, at the earliest, January 2003 (see paragraph 2 above), by which time ATE had already registered a mortgage in its favour.

16 The Court concludes, therefore, that in the present case there is no causal link between the privilege accorded to ATE under Article 12 of Law no. 4332/1929 in securing its claims, and the interference with the applicant bank’s property rights in the course of the subsequent enforcement proceedings brought against N.G.

17 In view of the above-mentioned considerations, the Court further finds that Article 14 of the Convention is not applicable in the present case. The interference with the applicant bank’s property rights resulted from the application of the principle of the priority in time (Article 1300 of the Civil Code), which does not draw any distinction between creditor banks. That provision merely establishes that secured creditors are ranked according to the chronological order in which their respective mortgages were registered. Accordingly, the applicant bank was not subjected to any difference in treatment on the basis of grounds falling within the ambit of Article 14 of the Convention.

18 Furthermore, in relation to the applicant bank’s allegation that ATE’s mortgage should have been declared null and void, the Court notes that an applicant can allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention only in so far as the impugned decisions relate to “possessions” within the meaning of that provision. “Possessions” can be either “existing possessions” or assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining the effective enjoyment of a property right. No legitimate expectation can be said to arise where there is a dispute as to the correct interpretation and application of domestic law and the applicant’s submissions are subsequently rejected by the domestic courts (see, among many authorities, Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 39794/98, § 69, ECHR 2002‑VII, and Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, §§ 50-52, ECHR 2004‑IX).

19 By way of contrast, the hope of a creditor to have the domestic courts set aside a provision laying down a special procedure to register a mortgage which had been established in favour of another creditor cannot be considered a “possession”. The applicant bank unsuccessfully challenged the applicable provision in favour of another creditor and its arguments that maintaining this favourable provision was contrary to the Constitution were dismissed by the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 10 above). The applicant bank cannot, for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, therefore be deemed to have had “existing possessions” or a claim amounting to a “legitimate expectation” in the sense of the Court’s case-law (compare, in a different context, Bank Saderat Iran v. Greece [Committee], no. 31687/15, §§ 13-14, 22 July 2025).

20 In view of the above-mentioned considerations, the Court considers that, in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.

21 It follows that the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 5 November 2026.

Olga Chernishova Peeter Roosma Deputy Registrar President