Kessie-Adjei v. the United Kingdom
Inadmissible
Berörda konventionsartiklar
SECOND SECTION
Application no. 16257/24 Jason KESSIE-ADJEI against the United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 6 October 2026 as a Committee composed of:
Jovan Ilievski , President , Gediminas Sagatys, Hugh Mercer , judges , and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar ,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 16257/24) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 31 May 2024 by a British national, Mr Jason Kessie ‑ Adjei, who was born in 1995 and lives in Chatham (“the applicant”) and was represented by Mr S. Genen (Scott-Moncrieff & Associates Ltd), a lawyer practising in London;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1 The case concerns the applicant’s recall to prison one year after the decision to revoke his licence had been made.
2 In February 2018 the applicant was convicted of possessing a bladed article in a public place and sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment. The conviction activated a previous suspended sentence and the applicant’s total sentence was accordingly 30 months’ imprisonment. He was released on licence on 3 April 2019 and a supervising probation officer, H, was allocated to him.
3 . On 12 November 2019 the applicant was arrested and charged with having a bladed article in a public place. His probation officer learned of the new charge on 17 December 2019 and met with the applicant on 31 December 2019. H informed the applicant that no decision had yet been made on whether he would be recalled to prison as a result of the new charge.
4 . On 10 January 2020 H was told to begin the recall process. He did so, and on the same day the Secretary of State revoked the applicant’s licence and ordered his recall. H was informed that the revocation order had been sent to the police with a request that the applicant be arrested. The applicant was not informed of the recall decision.
5 . On 9 March 2020 the applicant was sentenced for the November 2019 offence (see paragraph 3 above). He received a suspended sentence with an unpaid work requirement. The same supervising probation officer was allocated to him and regular contact took place between the applicant and H in the following months. H did not inform the applicant of the revocation of his licence. H later gave evidence that he had considered the applicant to be a potential flight risk. At some point in the weeks leading up to what would have been, had it not been revoked, the termination of the applicant’s licence on 2 July 2020, H commented to the applicant that it was good news that his licence was coming to an end. At the end of September 2020, contact between the applicant and H stopped.
6 On 15 January 2021 the applicant was arrested by the police pursuant to the revocation of his licence on 10 January 2020 (see paragraph 4 above) and returned to prison.
7 . Because the applicant had not surrendered when his licence was revoked, he was deemed to have been unlawfully at large since 10 January 2020. According to domestic law, any time spent unlawfully at large was left out of account in calculating the outstanding sentence to be served, unless the Secretary of State directed otherwise. The applicant had 174 days remaining on his sentence, which would therefore have resulted in a release date of 7 July 2021. However, he requested the Secretary of State to exercise his discretionary power not to leave out of account the days when he had been unlawfully at large. The Secretary of State concluded that there were exceptional circumstances, pursuant to the guidance contained in Prison Service Instruction (PSI) 3/2015, which justified 58 days of the time spent unlawfully at large counting towards the sentence. Those circumstances were that the applicant had not been informed of the revocation and recall so that he had in that sense been unknowingly unlawfully at large. That gave a release date of 10 May 2021.
8 . Separately, the applicant made representations to the Parole Board in relation to his recall. On 4 March 2021 the Parole Board decided that it was no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the applicant should be detained and directed his release. The applicant was released on 8 March 2021, 52 days after his arrest.
9 . In subsequent judicial review proceedings, the Court of Appeal noted that the applicant had at no time made it difficult for the authorities to find him: he was being monitored on bail for the 2019 offence and remained at the same address throughout. The court further noted that there was no explanation of why it had taken the police just over a year to arrest him. There was no apparent justification for this delay. Moreover, the applicant’s probation officer had known that his licence had been revoked and that he was still at large. Whatever his reason for not telling the applicant about the revocation, there was “no explanation for his failure to chase up the issue of recall with his superiors and/or the police”. Finally, the court referred to Mr H.’s comment to the applicant shortly before 2 July 2020 (see paragraph 5 above), observing that this had led the applicant to believe that the 2018 sentence would come to an end in July 2020. The court considered, however, that there had been no bad faith on the part of H. The question was “whether this catalogue of administrative incompetence” engaged Article 5 of the Convention. The court found that the applicant’s detention for having breached his licence conditions was both lawful and entirely foreseeable. The applicant’s detention had not been caused by the administrative incompetence which had led to his recall to prison approximately 12 months after he should have been recalled by reference to the revocation notice, but had resulted from the 2018 sentence and his clear breach of the licence conditions. Since there was no statutory requirement for a person on licence to be told of a licence revocation prior to his/her return to prison, the failure to inform the applicant of the recall did not affect the foreseeability of the detention. The passage of time between the revocation of the licence and the applicant’s arrest fell “far short” of what would be required to break the link between the sentence and the post-recall detention. Detention was not arbitrary and did not breach Article 5 of the Convention. No Article 5 rights could arise in relation PSI 3/2015, but in any event the reference to exceptional or very exceptional circumstances in that document was sufficient to allow a prisoner to understand the basis on which the policy would be applied.
10 On 27 February 2024 permission to appeal was refused by the Supreme Court.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
11 The applicant argued that there had been a breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention because his detention in January 2021, on account of maladministration, had not been foreseeable and because the law relating to credit for time while unlawfully at large was insufficiently precise.
12 . The Court underlines that the applicant was sentenced to a fixed prison term by a court in 2018 as the punishment for his offence. Upon his recall in January 2021, his detention was again governed by the fixed term imposed by that court conforming with the objectives of that sentence and thus within the scope of Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention (see Brown v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 968/04, 26 October 2004). The applicant’s detention did not result from maladministration but from the foreseeable operation of the law and his breach of licence conditions. Only the timing of his detention was affected by the mismanagement of the recall process in his case.
13 Despite the delay, there can be no doubt that there was a sufficient causal connection between the conviction and the deprivation of liberty at issue (see for the relevant principles James, Wells and Lee v. the United Kingdom , nos. 25119/09 and 2 others, § 189, 18 September 2012). Recall was lawfully ordered while the applicant was still on licence because he had breached his licence conditions through further offending which paralleled his index offence. It is true that, with the passage of time, the link between the initial conviction and a later deprivation of liberty gradually becomes less strong (ibid.). However, even if an argument might be made that an excessive delay in executing a recall decision might eventually break the causal connection, these circumstances are not made out here.
14 . The applicant relied on H’s comment to him shortly before his licence was due to expire in July 2020 (see paragraph 5 above). He argued that while H was not deliberately dishonest, there was nonetheless a lack of truthfulness which rendered his detention in January 2021 unforeseeable. H’s comment was no doubt ill-advised given that he was aware that the applicant’s licence had been revoked (see paragraph 4 above). However, the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention, which includes its foreseeability, is to be determined on the basis of the legal provisions in place at the time ( Del Río Prada v. Spain [GC], no. 42750/09, §§ 125 and 130, ECHR 2013). The Court has already explained that the law was clear (see paragraph 12 above). Furthermore, H’s ill-advised comment did not amount to bad faith or deception within the meaning of the Court’s case-law on arbitrariness (see James, Wells and Lee , cited above, § 192 and the findings of the Court of Appeal at paragraph 9 above), and does not support a violation of Article 5 § 1 on that basis.
15 The applicant further argued that his detention was rendered unforeseeable because of the maladministration by the authorities, notably the failure to notify him of the revocation of his licence and to arrest him in a timely matter. It is a matter of regret that the applicant was not informed of the recall decision nor arrested in the days following it. His whereabouts were at all times known to the authorities and from March 2020 he was once again in regular contact with his probation officer. No explanation has been given for the significant delay in arresting the applicant, but H’s evidence was that he was concerned that the applicant would abscond were he to be informed of the recall decision (see paragraph 5 above). Whatever the cause for these administrative shortcomings, their consequence was that the applicant believed that his licence had expired in July 2020 (see paragraph 9 above). His arrest in January 2021 came as a genuine surprise to him. But foreseeability in this context concerns the law, and not the detention itself (see paragraph 14 above). In the applicant’s case, both the law governing recall and the licence itself made plain that breach of licence conditions rendered the applicant liable to recall to prison. In these circumstances, as the Court of Appeal found (see paragraph 9 above), his recall was entirely foreseeable.
16 The law was equally clear that unless the Secretary of State directed otherwise, time spent unlawfully at large would not count towards the outstanding sentence. Guidance was available in the form of PSI 3/2015, which explained that exceptional or very exceptional circumstances were required for the Secretary of State to exercise discretion to count days spent unlawfully at large in calculating the remainder of the sentence. However, PSI 3/2015 did not provide the authority for the applicant’s detention: the basis for detention came from the 2018 sentence itself (see paragraph 12 above). It follows that the foreseeability of the applicant’s detention did not depend on the scope of the Secretary of State’s power to exercise, exceptionally, discretion to reduce the remaining sentence to be served. In any event, as the Court of Appeal explained, the reference to exceptional or very exceptional circumstances was sufficient to enable the applicant to understand the basis on which discretion would be, and in his case was, exercised (see paragraph 9 above).
17 Although the glaring mismanagement of the applicant’s recall and arrest was unfortunate, it did not itself affect the lawfulness of the detention or break the causal connection between his sentence and his detention for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. The Court further observes that the mismanagement which occurred in this case resulted in the exceptional exercise by the Secretary of State of discretion to reduce the time remaining on his sentence (see paragraph 7 above). The applicant was, moreover, able to make a swift application to the Parole Board requesting release, and his release was ordered after only 52 days in detention out of a possible 174 days that he could lawfully have been required to serve (see paragraph 8 above).
18 Accordingly, the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 5 November 2026.
Dorothee von Arnim Jovan Ilievski Deputy Registrar President