Kurianski v. Poland
Inadmissible
Berörda konventionsartiklar
FIRST SECTION
Application no. 31761/18 Agnieszka KURIANSKI against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 22 October 2026 as a Committee composed of:
Raffaele Sabato , President , Frédéric Krenc, Anna Adamska-Gallant , judges , and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 31761/18) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 13 June 2018 by a Polish national, Ms Agnieszka Kurianski (“the applicant”), who was born in 1974, lives in Oberhausen and was represented by Ms K. Kruz, a lawyer practising in Katowice;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Polish Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms A. Kozińska-Makowska, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1 The application concerns the dissolution of the applicant’s adoption, following a request from her adoptive parents, some 40 years later.
2 The applicant was adopted in 1978 as a four-year-old child and lived with her adoptive parents, H.B. and B.B., until she reached the age of majority. As a young adult the applicant returned to live with them for a period of ten years following the birth of her daughter. During that time, she often worked abroad for long periods, and her daughter would remain in the care of her grandparents. In 2013, following a disagreement with her adoptive parents, the applicant moved out and stopped all contact.
3 In 2015 H.B. and B.B. applied for the dissolution of the adoption ( rozwiązanie stosunku przysposobienia ) since they no longer had any relationship with the applicant.
4 In December 2015 the Gliwice District Court dismissed their application. The court considered that although there had been a total and irreversible breakdown of family ties, the adoptive parents had been partly responsible for it. It referred to the applicant’s allegation that her adoptive father had attempted to sexually abuse her in 2002.
5 H.B. and B.B. lodged an appeal against that judgment. The public prosecutor, who became involved in the proceedings, sought to uphold the judgment, pointing to the consequences of severing legal ties between the applicant and her adoptive parents, especially since she had a child of her own.
6 On 28 February 2017 the Gliwice Regional Court overturned the impugned judgment and dissolved the applicant’s adoption. The court heard all the parties again and further evidence was collected. The court held that the irretrievable and total breakdown of the family relationship had been clearly established as the applicant had had no contact with her adoptive parents, had remarried and changed her surname to that of her husband, and had an adult daughter. For many years the applicant and her daughter had not maintained any family ties with H.B. and B.B. despite their poor state of health.
The Regional Court exhaustively examined the allegation made by the applicant during the proceedings that her adoptive father had attempted to sexually abuse her when she was 27 years old. It found no evidence whatsoever to support that claim. The court also considered it improbable that someone who had allegedly suffered sexual abuse would leave his or her own child alone with the alleged perpetrator for extended periods of time without any apparent concern for his or her safety, as the applicant did while working abroad for ten years. The court thus found no fault on the part of the adoptive parents. A finding to the contrary would have rendered the application for the dissolution of the adoption inadmissible under domestic law.
The court further considered it necessary to examine the interests of the applicant’s daughter, as she would be affected by the outcome of the proceedings. It noted that the granddaughter had moved out of her grandparents’ household and had not maintained any contact with them since.
The court concluded that it was undisputed between the parties that, as an adult, the applicant had not fulfilled any familial obligations towards her parents, she lived independently of them and had her own family. Given the breakdown of the family relationship, the court decided to dissolve the adoption.
7 The applicant lodged a cassation appeal, pointing out that throughout the proceedings she had consistently expressed a wish to maintain family ties with her parents and had confirmed her emotional attachment to them.
8 On 21 February 2018 the Supreme Court refused to entertain the cassation appeal.
9 The applicant complained in general terms of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention as a result of the dissolution of her adoption.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
10 The Government argued that the application was manifestly ill ‑ founded. Article 125 of the Family Code provides for the dissolution of an adoption for important reasons in the event of a breakdown in the family relationship. In their assessment, the domestic courts did not have to consider the best interests of the child as the applicant was an adult at the material time. The interference pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of third parties – the adoptive parents H.B. and B.B. – and was necessary in a democratic society.
11 The applicant, represented by a lawyer of her choice, did not comment on the Government’s submissions and did not present any arguments pertaining to the admissibility or merits of the case.
12 In the absence of any submissions by the applicant, the Court accepts the Government’s contention that the interference had been in accordance with the law, within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, and had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of the adoptive parents.
13 The Court reiterates that in order to determine whether the impugned measure was “necessary in a democratic society”, it has to consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify it were relevant and sufficient for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 (see Kutzner v. Germany , no. 46544/99, § 65, ECHR 2002-I, and Moser v. Austria , no. 12643/02, § 64, 21 September 2006).
14 In doing so, it is not the Court’s task to substitute itself for the domestic authorities, but rather to review under the Convention the decisions that those authorities have taken in their exercise of their power of appreciation (see K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 154, ECHR 2001-VII).
15 Even assuming that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the need for the annulment of the adoption, the Court must still be satisfied in this particular case that there are circumstances which justify the annulment of the applicant’s adoption some 40 years after the adoption order had been issued (see Zaieţ v. Romania , no. 44958/05, § 45, 24 March 2015).
16 Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court observes that the dissolution of the adoption was sought by the applicant’s adoptive parents, who submitted that their relationship with her had ceased to exist. Both domestic courts found that the breakdown of family relations had persisted for a sufficiently long period to be regarded as permanent and irreversible, and that there had been no contact between the parties. The Regional Court, after having heard the parties again, found no indication that the breakdown of the relationship was attributable to the adoptive parents and dismissed the applicant’s allegations of sexual abuse by her adoptive father as unsubstantiated. It ultimately concluded that, in view of the irrevocable breakdown of family ties, the interests of the adoptive parents warranted the dissolution of the adoption.
17 The Court further notes that throughout the domestic proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer and made written and oral submissions.
18 As a general rule, it is for the domestic courts to assess the evidence before them, including the means to ascertain the relevant facts (see Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], no. 37283/13, § 213, 10 September 2019). The Court is thus satisfied that the procedural approach adopted provided the Regional Court with sufficient material to reach a decision on the dissolution of the applicant’s adoption in the present case and that the applicant had been fully involved in the decision ‑ making process.
19 In the absence of any specific allegation made by the applicant of procedural or other shortcomings on the part of the Regional Court, the Court therefore considers that it adduced relevant and sufficient reasons to justify the decision to dissolve her adoption.
20 The Court notes that it has not received any complaint from the applicant’s adult daughter about the contested measure. Nevertheless, it observes that the Regional Court did examine whether dissolving the adoption would be contrary to her best interests.
21 Having regard to the considerations above and given the applicant’s failure to provide arguments in support of the admissibility or merits of the case and to counter the Government’s submissions, the Court finds that the authorities did not overstep their wide margin of appreciation. Accordingly, their assessment was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued under Article 8 of the Convention.
22 It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 19 November 2026.
Liv Tigerstedt Raffaele Sabato Deputy Registrar President