ACER Opinion 07-2026 on the derogation request submitted by the Lithuanian National Energy Regulatory Council (NERC) from the application of the network codes and guidelines

No 07/2026

OPINION

on the derogation request submitted by the Lithuanian National Energy Regulatory Council (NERC) from the application of the network codes Regulation (EU) 2024/1789, at the entry points from and the exit points to Belarus and Russia

30 April 2026

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Executive summary

Pursuant to Article 70(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 (‘Gas Regulation’), ACER is required to provide the European Commission with a reasoned opinion within three months of the date of receipt of a request for a derogation, submitted by a national regulatory authority (‘NRA’) in line with the aforementioned provision, from the implementation of network codes or guidelines, referred to in Article 70(1) of the Gas Regulation, or specific elements of them. On 5 February 2026, the Lithuanian National Energy Regulatory Council (‘NERC’) submitted to the European Commission and to ACER a derogation request asking for a derogation from the application of all the network codes and guidelines with reference to the Kotlovka entry point from the Republic of the Republic of Belarus and to the Šakiai exit point to the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation, for an indefinite period of time. A bilateral agreement between the Lithuanian transmission system operator, i.e. Amber Grid, and PAO Gazprom is valid until 31 December 2030, it was concluded following the expiry of the previous agreement in December 2025. This agreement regulates the transportation service offered by Amber Grid between the Kotlovka entry point from the Republic of Belarus and the Šakiai exit point to deliver gas to the Kaliningrad region. Such network points are used exclusively for the supply of gas to the Kaliningrad region and, therefore, operate in a unidirectional manner.

Conclusion

NERC’s derogation request concerns the application of all network codes and guidelines at the Kotlovka entry point from the Republic of Belarus and the Šakiai exit point to the Russian Federation’s region of Kaliningrad, for an unlimited time and without conditions.

ACER acknowledges the existence of an exceptional situation in Lithuania, in which the TSO is required to enforce the prohibition to supply gas to Lithuania from countries that, according to the National Security Strategy, pose a threat to the national security and safeguarding of national security interests of the Republic of Lithuania and to ensure that gas of Russian origin reaches exclusively the Kaliningrad region under the framework established by the abovementioned bilateral agreement.

ACER notes that Directive 2024/1788 (‘Gas Directive’) and the Gas Regulation aim at creating a fully operational Union internal market for natural gas. In the case under consideration, the gas flowing from the Russian Federation to Kaliningrad is not destined to the internal market itself, as it is transported through the infrastructure in Lithuania via the Kotlovka entry point and the Šakiai exit point.

The regulatory framework established by NERC correctly reflects the specific circumstances affecting such points.

Given the abovementioned exceptional situation in Lithuania, and given that the Kotlovka entry and Šakiai exit points are not standalone elements of an integrated infrastructure such as the Lithuanian natural gas network, specific regulatory arrangements are required for these points. In these specific circumstances, and for as long as the bilateral agreement remains in force and unless new conditions arise, the application of a set of minimum provisions of the network codes is considered sufficient to safeguard the integrity of the Union internal gas market, ensure equal treatment of network users, and

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avoid cross‑subsidisation. ACER refers to the provisions identified in paragraph (35) of section 4.2 of this Opinion. ACER is of the opinion that NERC has already implemented most of these provisions, including the key requirement that the Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/460 (‘TAR NC’) provisions applicable at the other points of the Lithuanian network also apply at these points.

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1. Background

1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 (‘Gas Regulation’) extends the application of network codes and guidelines, referred to in Article 70(2) of the Gas Regulation (‘network codes and guidelines’), to the entry points from and exit points to third countries, namely countries that are not members of the European Union. The principle embedded in the Regulation at issue is the enhancement of the internal gas market by supporting cross-border trade and efficient operations also at the borders with third countries. Applying network codes and guidelines at these border points helps to avoid market fragmentation and ensures the seamless functioning of the internal market, in particular by guaranteeing consistent rules, non-discriminatory access and efficient cross-border trading conditions, even at the borders of the Union.

2 Article 70(2)(d) of the Gas Regulation lays down that EU network codes and guidelines, adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 of the same provision, shall apply to all points within the Union and to entry points from and exit points to third countries from 5 August 2026.

3 Furthermore, Article 70(3) thereof states that until 5 February 2026 national regulatory authorities (‘NRAs’) may submit a request to the European Commission and ACER for a derogation from the application of the network codes and guidelines at entry points from and exit points to third countries pursuant to Article 70(2)(d).

4 ACER shall provide a reasoned opinion to the European Commission within three months of the date of receipt of the request for a derogation. In its reasoned opinion ACER provides an assessment on the request submitted by the NRA. The European Commission shall adopt a decision on the request for a derogation, taking into account ACER’s reasoned opinion and after assessing the existence of the conditions listed in Article 70(3)(a), (b) and (c).

5 Notably, whether the NRA has demonstrated that provisions of a network code or guideline cannot be effectively implemented at an entry point from or exit point to a third country; has taken measures to alleviate obstacles to such implementation; and has shown that the derogation is not detrimental to the internal gas market or to the security of supply of the Union or of a Member State. The derogation shall be limited to specific provisions that cannot be effectively implemented and shall be granted by the European Commission for a limited period of time. A C E R O P I N I O N N O 0 7 / 2 0 2 6

6 Furthermore, Recital 95 of the Gas Regulation acknowledges that specific circumstances, including the existence of long-term contractual arrangements or legal difficulties in establishing dispute resolution procedures with transmission system operators or natural gas suppliers established in third countries, may prevent the effective application of network codes in the short term. A C E R O P I N I O N N O 0 7 / 2 0 2 6

2. Procedure

8 On 5 February 2026, ACER received from the National Energy Regulatory Council (‘NERC’) in written form via electronic post a request for a derogation from the application of network codes and guidelines pursuant to Article 70(3) of the Gas Regulation.

9 Upon the submission of the derogation request, and after an in-depth analysis thereof, ACER has interacted with NERC to further clarify elements included in the Derogation request. ACER has thus taken due account of the additional information provided by the NRA in its assessment.

10 On 1 April 2026, ACER shared the draft version of the reasoned opinion with NERC for a factual check and to verify the completeness of the information provided.

11 On 30 April 2026, ACER adopted this reasoned opinion and sent it to the European Commission in accordance with Article 70(3) of the Gas Regulation following the prescribed timeline.

3. Summary of Derogation Request

12 NERC’s derogation request concerns the application of all network codes and guidelines at the Kotlovka entry point from the Republic of Belarus and the Šakiai exit point to the Russian Federation’s region of Kaliningrad neighbouring Lithuania and Poland, for an unlimited time and without conditions.

13 NERC’s derogation request is based on the geopolitical situation in the region since 2022. Specifically, under Lithuanian law, only suppliers not posing a threat to the national security of Lithuania are provided access rights to the Lithuanian national gas infrastructure. NERC further states that the Lithuanian law does not prohibit the transit of gas of Russian origin from the Republic of Belarus to the Kaliningrad region, as this service would not violate the national security interests of Lithuania.

14 NERC further highlights the alignment of the provisions included in paragraph (13) above with the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2026/216 , which establishes a gradual phase-out of the import of gas of Russian origin in the Union by 2027.

15 NERC informs that a bilateral agreement between the Lithuanian transmission system operator (‘TSO’), i.e. Amber Grid, and PAO Gazprom is in place and valid until 31 December 2030 as it was concluded following the expiry of the previous agreement in December 2025. This bilateral agreement regulates the transportation service offered by Amber Grid between the Kotlovka entry point and the Šakiai exit point to deliver gas to the Kaliningrad region. NERC specifies that such points are used exclusively for the supply of gas transit to the Kaliningrad region and, therefore, operate in a unidirectional manner. Pursuant to national legislation, no other network users are allowed to access or use these points.

16 According to NERC, if the provisions of Article 70(2) of the Gas Regulation were applied at such points, they would potentially make it mandatory for the TSO to ensure an allocation of transportation capacity at the Kotlovka entry point from Belarus for all the market participants, potentially allowing Russian gas to enter the Republic of Lithuania and, therefore, the Union gas internal market.

17 In its derogation request, NERC further highlights that the regulatory and market framework in the Russian Federation and in Belarus differs significantly from the EU framework, including the A C E R O P I N I O N N O 0 7 / 2 0 2 6 absence of an entry-exit system, limited transparency and cooperation, and the lack of an independent regulatory authority aligned with EU rules.

4. ACER’s assessment

4.1. Application of network codes and guidelines at the Kotlovka entry point from the Republic of Belarus and the Šakiai exit point to the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation

18 NERC's derogation request pertains to all network codes and guidelines.

19 In this Section, ACER analyses the current framework on capacity allocation, balancing, congestion management, interoperability, and tariffs applying at the Kotlovka entry point from the Republic of Belarus and the Šakiai exit point to the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation. Capacity allocation

20 Based on the information provided by NERC, transportation capacity products are based on the provisions of the standard products established in Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/459 (‘CAM NC’), namely yearly, quarterly, monthly, and daily products and are offered as both firm and interruptible products. However, due to the application of standards in the Russian Federation and in the Republic of Belarus differing from the EU regulatory framework, NERC informs that full alignment with the requirements of CAM NC is not possible under the bilateral agreement. Balancing

21 ACER understands that most provisions of Commission Regulation (EU) 312/2014 (‘BAL NC’) apply at the Kotlovka entry point from the Republic of Belarus and the Šakiai exit point to the Kaliningrad region.

22 To ensure that the same volumes injected into the Lithuanian network at the Kotlovka entry point from the Republic of Belarus are withdrawn at the Šakiai exit point to the Kaliningrad region, two restrictions apply. First, the entry nominations and physical flows at the Kotlovka entry point must always be equal to exit nominations and physical flows at the Šakiai exit point. Second, in the event of discrepancies between the gas nominated and the gas physically injected or withdrawn, the gas volume allocated at Šakiai is the same as the volume registered by the metering station, whereas the gas volume allocated at Kotlovka results from the difference between the gas allocated at Šakiai exit point and the gas allocated at Kiemenai interconnection point with Latvia. Congestion management

23 Based on the information provided by NERC, none of the provisions established in Annex I, paragraph 2.2. of the Gas Regulation, i.e. regarding congestion management procedures in the event of contractual congestion, apply. ACER notes that is unlikely that measures to manage contractual congestions would be needed under the current specific circumstances. A C E R O P I N I O N N O 0 7 / 2 0 2 6 Interoperability

24 Articles 16 of Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/703 (‘INT NC’) establish that TSOs shall publish on their website for each point, with a frequency of at least once per hour during the gas day, the Wobbe-index and the gross calorific value for gas directly entering their networks. At the the Kotlovka entry point and the Šakiai exit point such information is not published. No metering station is installed in the Lithuanian gas network to measure such data at the Kotlovka point. Tariffs

25 Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/460 (‘TAR NC’) is implemented at both the Kotlovka entry point and at the Šakiai exit point. Under the current regulatory period, i.e. until December 2028, NERC applies a postage stamp tariff methodology for the whole Lithuanian system. While the application of TAR NC Chapter III, which regulates the calculation of reserve prices for non-yearly standard capacity products, multipliers for non-yearly products, seasonal factors, and discounts for interruptible products, was not mandatory in the case of points with third countries before 5 August 2026, NERC calculated the tariffs for non-yearly and interruptible products following the same methodology established for the other entry and exit points, and applies multipliers and seasonal factors for these points in the same way as they apply for the rest of the system.

4.2. ACER considerations

26 ACER acknowledges the existence of an exceptional situation in Lithuania, in which the TSO is required to enforce the prohibition to supply gas to Lithuania from countries that, according to the National Security Strategy, pose a threat to the national security and safeguarding of national security interests of the Republic and that gas originating from the Russian Federation reaches the Kaliningrad region by entering the Kotlovka point from the Republic of Belarus and exiting the Šakiai point to the Kaliningrad region within the framework of the bilateral agreement signed between Amber Grid and PAO Gazprom.

27 This bilateral agreement is valid until 31 December 2030, as it was concluded following the expiry of the previous agreement in December 2025.

28 NERC derogation request is submitted for an unlimited time and without conditions.

29 ACER acknowledges the role and the need for NERC to guarantee that the gas system is kept safe and secure.

30 ACER notes that the Gas Directive and the Gas Regulation aim at creating a fully operational Union internal market for natural gas. In the case under consideration, the gas flowing from the Republic of Belarus to Kaliningrad is not destined to the internal market itself, as it is transported through the infrastructure in Lithuania via the Kotlovka entry point and the Šakiai exit point. However, such two points are not standalone elements of an integrated infrastructure such as the Lithuanian natural gas network. In fact, the infrastructure elements connecting Kotlovka entry point with the Šakiai exit point are not physically separated from the rest of the Lithuanian network and are not exclusively serving the purposes of transporting gas from the Republic of Belarus to Kaliningrad, i.e. there is no dedicated pipeline connecting them.

31 In the case under consideration, common infrastructure elements are used to provide both transmission services for transporting gas through the system between third countries and services for transporting gas to end-users within the Union, making it difficult to establish a clear A C E R O P I N I O N N O 0 7 / 2 0 2 6 separation at asset level. Lacking such a clear separation of assets and costs, any exclusion of network costs would have to rely on assumptions and modelling, The modelling may not reduce the risk of cross-subsidisation and decreased cost-reflectivity, both ultimately affecting the internal market for natural gas. This would pose a risk of cross-subsidisation and decreased costreflectivity, due to the non-application of the TAR NC provisions.

32 ACER notes that NERC has implemented TAR NC provisions at such points in the same way as they are implemented at the other points of the Lithuanian network. This ensures the fulfilment of the objective of cost-reflectiveness and the avoidance of cross-subsidisation among network users of the Union internal gas market.

33 In this regard, ACER notes the importance of ensuring that the duration of the products allocated at these points is the same as the duration of the standard products of CAM NC, in order to support the maximisation of the use of the gas network and to ensure equal treatment of network users through the application of the provisions on network tariffs, multipliers, and seasonal factors established in the TAR NC. NERC has confirmed that this provision is implemented at the Kotlovka entry point and the Šakiai exit point.

34 Furthermore, CAM NC Article 32 establishes that interruptible capacity products should be offered only if firm capacity products of the same duration are unavailable and only prior to the offering of the subsequent product of shorter duration; the offer of interruptible capacity shall not be detrimental to the amount of firm capacity on offer; TSOs shall not set aside capacity that can be offered as firm capacity in order to offer it as interruptible capacity. Interruptible capacity is generally priced at a discount compared to firm capacity, as established in the TAR NC, and PAO Gazprom is the only entity allowed to book capacity. Therefore, ACER notes the importance of the implementation of CAM NC Article 32 provisions. NERC has confirmed that these provisions are implemented at the Kotlovka entry point and the Šakiai exit point.

35 ACER acknowledges that the Kotlovka entry point and the Šakiai exit point are operational solely due to the bilateral agreement between Amber Grid and PAO Gazprom and that the gas flowing at these points is not destined to the Union gas market. Therefore, ACER is of the opinion that, until the validity of the bilateral agreement, and unless new conditions appear, there are minimum provisions to be implemented by NERC at the Kotlovka entry point and the Šakiai exit point, aimed at reflecting the specific circumstances in place at such points, in order to fulfil the objectives of non-discrimination among network users, cost-reflectivity, cost-predictability, avoidance of cross-subsidisation across network users, and equal treatment in the Union internal market for natural gas, which include: • The offer of capacity product with the same duration as the duration of the standard capacity products of CAM NC Article 9, following the provisions on interruptible capacity established in CAM NC Chapter VI, specifically those established in CAM NC Article 32. NERC has confirmed that these provisions are implemented at the Kotlovka entry point and the Šakiai exit point. • The implementation of all the provisions of the TAR NC that apply at all the other points of the Amber Grid network and the alignment of the bilateral agreement of Amber Grid – PAO Gazprom with the TAR NC provisions. In these specific circumstances, the full implementation of the TAR NC will guarantee harmonised transmission tariff structures, a reasonable level of cost reflectivity and predictability, and non-discrimination among network users. NERC has fully implemented these provisions. • The implementation of all provisions of the BAL NC at the Kotlovka entry point and at the Šakiai exit point that apply at the other points to the maximum extent possible considering the additional provisions correctly established by NERC to ensure that the gas of Russian origin does not enter the Lithuanian market, listed in section 4.1. above, and any provision guaranteeing the full separation of the imbalance volumes at these points from the imbalance volumes, imbalance charges, and neutrality fees applying to the other network users. NERC has confirmed that these provisions are implemented at Kotlovka and Šakiai. A C E R O P I N I O N N O 0 7 / 2 0 2 6 • The implementation of INT NC Articles 16 to ensure transparency for all network users and the well-functioning of the EU internal energy market.

36 As regards the period after 2030, when the bilateral agreement expires, and unless new conditions appear, ACER is of the opinion that all the provisions of the network codes and guidelines, except for those requiring mutual implementation with the adjacent TSO , shall apply at the Kotlovka entry point and the Šakiai exit point for the reasoned provided in section (4.1) and in this section (4.2).

5. Conclusions

37 NERC’s derogation request concerns the application of all network codes and guidelines at the Kotlovka entry point from the Republic of Belarus and the Šakiai exit point to the Russian Federation’s region of Kaliningrad, for an unlimited time and without conditions.

38 ACER acknowledges the existence of an exceptional situation in Lithuania, in which the TSO is required to enforce the prohibition to supply gas to Lithuania from countries that, according to the National Security Strategy, pose a threat to the national security and safeguarding of national security interests of the Republic of Lithuania and to ensure that gas of Russian origin reaches exclusively the Kaliningrad region under the framework established by the abovementioned bilateral agreement.

39 ACER notes that the Gas Directive and the Gas Regulation aim at creating a fully operational Union internal market for natural gas. In the case under consideration, the gas flowing from the Russian Federation to Kaliningrad is not destined to the internal market itself, as it is transported through the infrastructure in Lithuania via the Kotlovka entry point and the Šakiai exit point.

40 The regulatory framework established by NERC correctly reflects the specific circumstances affecting such points.

41 Given the above-mentioned exceptional situation in Lithuania and given that the Kotlovka entry and Šakiai exit points are not standalone elements of an integrated infrastructure such as the Lithuanian natural gas network, specific regulatory arrangements are required for these points. In these specific circumstances, and for as long as the bilateral agreement remains in force and unless new conditions arise, the application of a set of minimum provisions of the network codes is considered sufficient to safeguard the integrity of the Union internal gas market, ensure equal treatment of network users, and avoid cross‑subsidisation. ACER refers to the provisions identified in paragraph (35) of section 4.2 above.

42 ACER is of the opinion that NERC has already implemented most of these provisions, including the key requirement that the TAR NC provisions applicable at the other points of the Lithuanian network also apply at these points. This Opinion is addressed to the European Commission. A C E R O P I N I O N N O 0 7 / 2 0 2 6 Done at Ljubljana, on 30 April 2026. — SIGNED — V. ZULEGER, ACER Director ad interim