ACER Opinion 10-2026 on the derogation request submitted by the Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy, Networks and Environment (ARERA) from the application of the network codes and guidelines

No 10/2026

OPINION

on the derogation request submitted by the Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy, Networks and Environment (ARERA) from the application of the network codes and guidelines, referred to in Article points from the Trans-Mediterranean pipeline and the Greenstream pipeline

30 April 2026

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Executive summary

Pursuant to Article 70(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 (‘Gas Regulation’), ACER is required to provide the European Commission with a reasoned opinion within three months of the date of receipt of a request for a derogation, submitted by a national regulatory authority (‘NRA’) in line with the aforementioned provision, from the implementation of network codes or guidelines, referred to in Article 70(1) of the Gas Regulation, or specific elements of them. On 5 February 2026, the Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy, Networks and Environment (‘ARERA’) submitted to the European Commission and ACER a request for a derogation from the application of specific provisions of Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/459 (‘CAM NC’) regarding the Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points from third countries. The request concerns a derogation, for a period of five years, from the application of Article 8(1) of the abovementioned Regulation. The derogation requested by ARERA specifically relates to the possibility for the Italian transmission system operator to offer the volume of capacity not successfully allocated in the year-ahead auction, or subsequent infra-yearly auctions, via an additional allocation mechanism according to which capacity is allocated to network users based on the order of requests received (‘additional FCFS allocation’). In this case, the network user pays the same amount that it would have paid had it participated in the yearahead auction, i.e., the tariff resulting from the year-ahead auction multiplied by all the days of the gas year, irrespective of when this capacity is purchased. This additional allocation mechanism was introduced in 2021, based on network users’ requests and following a public consultation. All the other provisions of the CAM NC fully apply at these entry points from third countries since 2017. The Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points are connected through long-distance pipelines, crossing third countries (such as Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia) and international waters, to upstream production fields located in third countries, namely Libya and Algeria, respectively. These third countries are characterised by different infrastructure access procedures and different levels of market development compared to those of the Union gas market. Specifically, rules and procedures for the allocation of upstream production access rights in the concerned third countries and the corresponding procedures for accessing these pipelines are not aligned with the year-ahead auction calendar under the CAM NC. Furthermore, no contractual congestion is registered at such entry points, e.g., booking levels are, on average, 60% of the available capacity at the Mazara del Vallo entry point. Furthermore, congestion management procedures are in place to handle potential capacity hoarding.

Conclusion

ACER acknowledges that specific circumstances exist in the third countries concerned, namely Libya, Algeria and Tunisia, which have led ARERA to establish an additional FCFS capacity allocation mechanism at the Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points from third countries. ACER also acknowledges that the additional FCFS allocation mechanism has been introduced by ARERA to overcome the obstacles of selected provisions of the CAM NC in the view of certain contractual conditions.

ACER further acknowledges that the volumes allocated under the additional FCFS mechanism have been marginal until now, i.e., on a weighted average less than 5% of the capacity offered in the gas

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yearly auctions, as a reflection of the specific circumstances existing in the third countries concerned, and that, irrespective of when a network user purchases the additional FCFS capacity, it will pay an amount corresponding to the tariff resulting from the gas yearly auction multiplied by all the days of the gas year. ACER also acknowledges that considerable amounts and shares of capacity are available and that congestion management procedures are implemented. In the absence of specific feedback from market participants, including their expectations, ACER notes that it is not possible to effectively assess the impact on the market deriving from the removal of the additional FCFS allocation.

In Section 4 of this Opinion, ACER has analysed ARERA’s derogation request to assist the European Commission in its decision. In this context, and noting that this aspect may be taken into account in the decision of the European Commission, ACER further notes that, taking into consideration the European Commission’s decision and in light of the design it establishes, it supports ARERA’s decision to carry out a public consultation once the envisaged amendments to the CAM NC enter into force, with the results duly published. This process should focus on the implementation of the revised CAM NC, by comprehensively assessing the appropriateness and necessity of the additional FCFS allocation mechanism and by duly ensuring a timely alignment with the Union gas market.

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1. Background

1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 (‘Gas Regulation’) extends the application of network codes and guidelines, referred to in Article 70(2) of the Gas Regulation (‘network codes and guidelines’), to the entry points from and exit points to third countries, namely countries that are not members of the European Union. The principle embedded in the Regulation at issue is the enhancement of the internal gas market by supporting cross-border trade and efficient operations also at the borders with third countries. Applying network codes and guidelines at these border points helps to avoid market fragmentation and ensures the seamless functioning of the internal market, in particular by guaranteeing consistent rules, non-discriminatory access and efficient cross-border trading conditions, even at the borders of the Union.

2 Article 70(2)(d) of the Gas Regulation lays down that network codes and guidelines shall apply to all interconnection points within the Union and to entry points from and exit points to third countries from 5 August 2026.

3 Furthermore, Article 70(3) thereof states that until 5 February 2026 national regulatory authorities (‘NRAs’) may submit a request to the European Commission and ACER for a derogation from the application of the network codes and guidelines at entry points from and exit points to third countries pursuant to Article 70(2)(d).

4 ACER shall provide a reasoned opinion to the European Commission within three months of the date of receipt of the request for a derogation. In its reasoned opinion ACER provides an assessment on the request submitted by the NRA. The European Commission shall adopt a decision on the request for a derogation, taking into account ACER’s reasoned opinion and after assessing the existence of the conditions listed in Article 70(3)(a), (b) and (c).

5 Notably, whether the NRA has demonstrated that provisions of a network code or guideline cannot be effectively implemented at an entry point from or exit point to a third country; has taken measures to alleviate obstacles to such implementation; and has shown that the derogation is not detrimental to the internal gas market or to the security of supply of the Union or of a Member State. The derogation shall be limited to specific provisions that cannot be effectively implemented and shall be granted by the European Commission for a limited period of time. A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6

6 Furthermore, Recital 95 of the Gas Regulation acknowledges that specific circumstances, including the existence of long-term contractual arrangements or legal difficulties in establishing dispute resolution procedures with transmission system operators or natural gas suppliers established in third countries, may prevent the effective application of network codes in the short term. A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6

2. Procedure

8 On 5 February 2026, ACER received from the Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy, Networks and Environment (‘ARERA’), in written form via electronic post, a request for a derogation from the application of network codes and guidelines at entry and exit points with third countries pursuant to Article 70(3) of the Gas Regulation. Specifically, ACER received ARERA’s Resolution 14/2026/R/Gas issued on 3 February 2026 and ARERA’s accompanying letter.

9 Upon the submission of the derogation request, and after an in-depth analysis thereof, ACER has interacted with ARERA to further clarify elements included in the derogation request. ACER has thus taken due account of the additional information provided by the NRA in its assessment.

10 On 31 March 2026, ACER shared the draft version of the reasoned opinion with the involved NRA for a factual check and to verify the completeness of the information provided.

11 On 30 April 2026, ACER adopted this reasoned opinion and sent it to the European Commission in accordance with Article 70(3) of the Gas Regulation following the prescribed timeline.

3. Summary of Derogation Request

12 The derogation request submitted by ARERA refers to the application of the Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/459 (‘CAM NC’) at the following entry points from third countries: 1) Gela entry point from the Greenstream pipeline. 2) Mazara del Vallo entry point from the Trans-Mediterranean pipeline.

13 ARERA requests to the European Commission a derogation from the capacity allocation provisions set forth in Article 8(1) of the CAM NC. The proposal seeks to allow the Italian transmission system operator (‘TSO’), Snam Rete Gas S.p.A., to offer residual year-ahead capacity, namely the capacity not allocated after the auction referred to in Article 11(4) of the CAM NC, or subsequent infra-yearly auctions, through an additional mechanism in which the network user requests capacity to the TSO at any time after the publication of the auction results. Such capacity is, therefore, allocated based on the order of requests received (‘additional FCFS allocation’). Irrespective of when this allocation happens, the network user pays a price equal to the tariff resulting from the year-ahead auction multiplied by all the days of the relevant gas year.

14 ARERA requests a derogation for a period of five years.

15 ARERA bases the derogation request on the following grounds: • The entry points of Gela and Mazara del Vallo are connected to long-distance pipelines linked to gas production fields located in Libya and Algeria, respectively. These pipelines play a key role in ensuring security of gas supply to Italy and the European Union. In the exchanges held with ACER following the submission of the derogation request, ARERA has highlighted the role of the current geopolitical and unstable situation regarding LNG markets, and the key role of Algerian gas imports to Italy, which have replaced the imports of gas of Russian origin since the energy market crisis of 2022, to become Italy’s primary source of gas supply. A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6 • Gas markets in Algeria and Libya are neither liberalised nor competitive to the same extent as the Union gas market and do not follow the access regime on which the CAM NC allocation rules are based. • The requirement to sign long-term contracts with the third-country producers affects capacity allocation needs of network users at the Italian entry side at the two points. Furthermore, the authorisations required to access such pipelines, outside Italy, are granted by the third countries’ authorities and the access conditions to the pipelines as well as the services provided by such pipeline operators are not market-based. • ARERA highlights that the CAM NC has been fully applied at the Italian side of these entry points from third countries since 2017. In 2021, some network users reported concerns regarding coordinating the timetable of CAM auctions with the signature of gas contracts on the supply side. Thus, and following a public consultation, ARERA introduced the allocation of residual year-ahead capacity through an allocation mechanism based on the order of the request received to ensure the effective application of CAM NC and to address the abovementioned obstacles at these entry points. These residual provisions hence are currently in force. • ARERA expects that extending the application of the measure after 6 August 2026 will ensure a higher level of use of the existing infrastructure and reduce costs for consumers, while it will also contribute to the security of gas supply, in line with the objectives of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 . • ARERA states that the removal of such additional allocation mechanism, which has been in place since 2021, could negatively affect the economic viability of supply arrangements and the security of gas supply in Italy and the European Union, as network users would need to procure intra-year capacity products at higher tariffs than the tariffs applying to the annual products. ARERA states that the continuation of the implementation of the additional capacity mechanism increases security of supply and does not contradict market efficiency. • Furthermore, ARERA states that a marginal volume of capacity has been booked via such additional mechanism since its implementation in 2021 and does not impact demand patterns negatively.

4. ACER assessment

4.1. Application of CAM NC at Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points from third countries

16 In 2017, ARERA implemented all CAM NC provisions at such entry points from third countries even if it was not prescribed by the CAM NC at that time. In fact, the implementation of the provisions of the network codes and guidelines at the entry points from third countries has been established in the Gas Regulation, published in July 2024, effective as of 5 August 2026.

17 In 2021, ARERA approved an additional allocation procedure with reference to the year-ahead capacity product, or for parts of this yearly product, according to which the TSO makes available for purchase the volume of capacity not successfully allocated in the year-ahead auction, or of subsequent infra-yearly auctions, based on the order of requests received (‘additional FCFS allocation’). In this case, the network user pays the same amount that it would have paid had it A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6 participated in the year-ahead auction, i.e., the tariff resulting from the year-ahead auction multiplied by all the days of the gas year, irrespective of when this capacity is purchased.

18 The additional FCFS allocation only applies at the Gela entry and at the Mazara del Vallo entry points from third countries.

19 In practice, year-ahead capacity at the Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points from third countries is offered on the PRISMA platform, in the auction held once per year, i.e. on the first Monday of July, in line with the CAM NC provisions. In addition, in case of volumes of capacity not allocated in the abovementioned year-ahead auction (or in the subsequent infra-annual auctions) on PRISMA and in case a market participant requests such volumes, they can be offered by the TSO via additional FCFS allocation after July via its capacity booking platform ‘Portale Capacità’. Such additional FCFS allocation could be potentially carried out also after the start of the gas year, for a duration corresponding to the residual part of it, whereas the network users still pay the tariff for the entire gas year, i.e., resulting from the yearly auction multiplied by all the days of the gas year, irrespective of when this allocation happens. Network users may request capacity only for the gas year that is about to start, or—once the gas year has already commenced—for the ongoing gas year.

20 Under the auction calendar established by the CAM NC, the auction for yearly capacity is held once a year on the first Monday of July. Auctions for quarterly capacity products take place four times per year: specifically, on the first Mondays of August, November, February, and May. During the quarterly auction held in August, all four quarters of the upcoming gas year are offered. Should additional FCFS year-ahead capacity be allocated after the August auction, such a procedure would deviate from the principle set forth in CAM NC Article 8(3), which establishes a logical order in which capacity products covering longer durations are offered before those with the next shortest duration for the same period (‘cascading’ principle). Consequently, if volumes were booked via the additional FCFS allocation beforehand, the TSO would offer lower volumes in the November quarterly auction, where the remaining three quarters are sold. ACER acknowledges that, as enough capacity has been available since 2021 for the auctions compared to the capacity booked, this has until now not represented an obstacle to book all other intrayearly products.

21 Therefore, ACER observes that such additional FCFS allocation, for which the derogation is sought, and the corresponding product, would deviate from the CAM NC provisions established in Article 8(1), according to which capacity shall only be allocated via auctions; Article 8(3) , establishing the abovementioned ‘cascading’ principle; and Article 9, which establishes the type of standard capacity products.

22 The CAM NC provides network users with the possibility to purchase capacity covering all the 12 months from October to September of the following year, or part of this period, not only in the annual year-ahead auction held in July, but also in the following quarterly and monthly auctions. For example, a quarterly auction is held on the first Monday of August (offering all four quarters of the following gas year), a monthly auction is held on the third Monday of September (offering the month of October), a monthly auction is held on the third Monday of October (offering the month of November), a quarterly auction is held on the first Monday of November (offering the remaining three quarters of the gas year), and a monthly auction is held on the third Monday of November (offering the month of December).

23 According to the Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/460 (‘TAR NC’), multipliers apply to the price of shorter-term products, i.e. from quarterly to within-day durations. The same multipliers A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6 apply at all interconnection points of the Italian transportation network, and are set at 1.2 for quarterly products, 1.3 for monthly products, 1.5 for daily products, and 1.5 for within-day products for 2026 . This means that quarterly capacity products can be purchased at 20% higher tariffs than yearly products, and monthly capacity products can be purchased at 30% higher than yearly products.

24 Furthermore, the tariffs applying at Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points in 2026 are higher than the tariffs applying at the entry side of the other Italian interconnection points, i.e. from 110% to 250% higher, as a natural consequence of the reference price methodology applied by ARERA. In fact, such entry points from third countries are in the southern part of the Sicily island, which is in the south of Italy.

25 The Gela and Mazara entry points are connected via long-distance pipelines to upstream production fields located, respectively, in Libya and Algeria. The gas originating from the Algerian production fields is transported for more than 2700 km to Mazara del Vallo, first in a pipeline located in Algeria, then in a pipeline located in Tunisia, and eventually via the Trans- Mediterranean pipeline, which is an under-sea pipeline located between Tunis in Tunisia and Mazara del Vallo in Italy.

26 The gas originating from the Libyan production fields is transported first in a pipeline located in Libya and then via the Greenstream pipeline, which is an undersea pipeline located between west Libya and Gela. In such third countries, infrastructure access provisions are not aligned with those of the Union gas market and the market itself is not aligned with the level of the Union gas market.

27 ARERA states that the contractual arrangements to access upstream production capacity in Libya and Algeria, and the transportation capacity’s access conditions in Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia, depend on the conditions and procedures established by the third countries’ authorities, and are therefore not under the control of market participants, nor aligned with the CAM NC provisions.

28 ACER acknowledges that, in the absence of market competition, a reasonable market participant would purchase transportation capacity only if it has secured production and transportation capacity access rights from third-country authorities. Otherwise, such market participant would face a potentially high economic loss deriving from the difficulty to successfully re-sell such transportation capacity.

29 ACER acknowledges the presence of different infrastructure access procedures and different levels of market development between such third countries and the Union gas market. Therefore, ACER notes that these contractual and factual circumstances in place in the concerned third countries are likely to negatively impact the effective implementation of CAM NC Article 8(1), Article 8(3), and Article 9 at the Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points from third countries.

30 ACER has limited information on the abovementioned specific conditions, as information related to the infrastructure access in the third countries (i.e., Libya, Tunisia, Algeria) and to the supply contracts with upstream producers in Libya and Algeria is not publicly available.

31 ACER notes that these entry points from third countries have not registered contractual congestion until now. ARERA informs that the capacity booked at the Mazara del Vallo point is circa 60% of the available capacity, leaving the remaining 40% as usually not booked. This element, combined with the ongoing application of procedures for contractual congestions in line with Annex I, paragraph 2.2. of the Gas Regulation at both points and combined with the need for the additional FCFS network user to pay all the annual gas year price irrespective of when A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6 this capacity is booked, reduces the risk that the additional FCFS allocation contributes to a situation of capacity hoarding.

32 ACER acknowledges the marginal utilisation of such additional FCFS allocation methodology since 2021. Based on the data provided by ARERA, since the implementation of the additional FCFS allocation methodology, which was approved in July 2021 with effects from October 2021, such additional FCFS capacity was not purchased every year. On a volume-weighted average basis, this additional FCFS booked capacity accounted for less than 5% of the capacity offered in the year-ahead auctions and was only allocated at the Mazara del Vallo entry point. This likely confirms the specific situation of low market liquidity in the third countries and the difficulty of accessing upstream fields and the required long-distance infrastructure in those third countries by the timings established in CAM NC for the year-ahead auction. However, in the absence of specific feedback from market participants, including their expectations, ACER notes that it is not possible to effectively assess the impact on the market deriving from the removal of the additional FCFS allocation and that a public consultation would be required to carry out such assessment.

33 Based on the auction data published on PRISMA, ACER observes that this additional FCFS allocation mechanism has not precluded the application of Articles 8(6) and 8(7) of the CAM NC, which mandate the reservation of a minimum share of technical capacity for quarterly products and for capacity offered no earlier than five years before delivery.

34 ACER notes that the results of such additional allocation mechanism are communicated to the successful applicant, rather than made public after the closure of the additional FCFS allocation mechanism. Such provision is not in line with the principle of transparency established in the CAM NC, considering that the CAM NC requires the publication of the results of capacity allocation procedures after their conclusion.

4.2. ACER considerations

35 ACER observes that the additional FCFS allocation, for which the derogation is sought, and the corresponding product, would deviate from the CAM NC provisions established in Article 8(1), according to which capacity shall only be allocated via auctions; Article 8(3), establishing the abovementioned ‘cascading’ principle; and Article 9, which establishes the type of standard capacity products.

36 Article 70(3)(a) of the Gas Regulation refers to the need for an NRA to demonstrate that it is not possible to effectively implement a network code or guideline, or part of those acts.

37 The Gas Regulation does not provide a definition of effective implementation of network codes or guidelines, or part of them, however Recital 95 refers to the existence of specific circumstances, including the existence of long-term contractual arrangements or legal difficulties in establishing dispute resolution procedures with the TSO or natural gas suppliers established in third countries, which may prevent the effective application of network codes in the short term.

38 ACER acknowledges that the contractual circumstances applying at the entry points connected to production fields via long-distance pipelines would mostly follow the volume pattern dictated by these production fields.

39 ACER acknowledges the existence of specific contractual circumstances at such entry points from third countries, which are imposed by the conditions established by the third countries’ authorities to access production rights and transportation capacity rights. A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6

40 ACER is of the opinion that the abovementioned specific circumstances hinder the implementation of CAM NC Article 8(1), Article 8(3), and Article 9.

41 ACER cannot access the contractual arrangements and procedures in place in the third countries. Therefore, ACER cannot objectively assess the magnitude of the actual or foreseen negative impact of such specific circumstances on the effective implementation of CAM NC Article 8(1), and Article 8(3).

42 ACER notes the low risk of capacity hoarding deriving from the implementation of the additional FCFS allocation due to three main elements, specifically the availability of considerable amounts and shares of capacity, the implementation of congestion management procedures, and the price established for the additional FCFS allocation capacity, which is equal to the price of the auction applied to every day of the gas year, irrespective of when the additional FCFS capacity is booked.

43 ACER also notes that tariffs applying at the Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points are higher compared to those applying at the entry side of the other interconnection points in the Italian gas transportation network (e.g., Passo Gries, Tarvisio, etc), i.e. from 110% to 240% higher, and that the application of the relevant multipliers would increase the tariffs by at least 20% in case of quarterly products, and by at least 30% in case of monthly products .

44 ACER notes that some of the proposed amendments to the CAM NC, if confirmed in the current comitology process, could be beneficial for network users at such entry points from third countries, as, for example, the TSO could offer the yearly capacity volumes, not allocated on the first Monday of July, in subsequent auctions to be held later during July. ACER supports ARERA’s decision of carrying out a public consultation, once the new provisions of the amended CAM NC enter into force, to assess the new allocation opportunities provided by the revised Code, with a view to comprehensively assessing the appropriateness and necessity of removing the additional FCFS allocation mechanism, and with the publication of the consultation results.

45 ACER is of the opinion that the continuation of the measure would not be detrimental to the security of supply in Italy or to that of other European Member States. The gas of Algerian origin, which accounts for almost 50% of Italian demand, is a key source of gas for the Italian and the European customers and has replaced the gas of Russian origin since the energy crisis of 2022, becoming the primary source of gas imports to Italy since then and supporting the Italian and European security of supply with significant volumes. ACER acknowledges that the volumes allocated under the additional FCFS mechanism have so far been marginal and are intended to complement the CAM NC auctions, reflecting the specific circumstances existing in the third countries concerned, as well as the availability of considerable amounts and shares of capacity not booked at these entry points from third countries. ACER is of the opinion that it cannot objectively assess the market impact deriving from the removal of this additional FCFS allocation measure in the absence of specific feedback from market participants, including their expectations. A C E R O P I N I O N N O 1 0 / 2 0 2 6

5. Conclusions

46 ACER acknowledges that specific circumstances exist in the third countries concerned, namely Libya, Algeria and Tunisia, which have led ARERA to establish an additional FCFS capacity allocation mechanism at the Gela and Mazara del Vallo entry points from third countries. ACER also acknowledges that the additional FCFS allocation mechanism has been introduced by ARERA to overcome the obstacles of selected provisions of the CAM NC in the view of certain contractual conditions.

47 ACER further acknowledges that the volumes allocated under the additional FCFS mechanism have been marginal until now, i.e., on a weighted average less than 5% of the capacity offered in the gas yearly auctions, as a reflection of the specific circumstances existing in the third countries concerned, and that, irrespective of when a network user purchases the additional FCFS capacity, it will pay an amount corresponding to the tariff resulting from the gas yearly auction multiplied by all the days of the gas year. ACER also acknowledges that considerable amounts and shares of capacity are available and that congestion management procedures are implemented. In the absence of specific feedback from market participants, including their expectations, ACER notes that it is not possible to effectively assess the impact on the market deriving from the removal of the additional FCFS allocation.

48 In Section 4 of this Opinion, ACER has analysed ARERA’s derogation request to assist the European Commission in its decision. In this context, and noting that this aspect may be taken into account in the decision of the European Commission, ACER further notes that, taking into consideration the European Commission’s decision and in light of the design it establishes, it supports ARERA’s decision to carry out a public consultation once the envisaged amendments to the CAM NC enter into force, with the results duly published. This process should focus on the implementation of the revised CAM NC, by comprehensively assessing the appropriateness and necessity of the additional FCFS allocation mechanism and by duly ensuring a timely alignment with the Union gas market. This Opinion is addressed to the European Commission. Done at Ljubljana, on 30 April 2026. — SIGNED — V. ZULEGER, ACER Director ad interim