AMC & GM to Regulation (EU) 2019/947 — Issue 1, Amendment 3

Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Issue 1, Amendment 3

‘AMC and GM to Regulation (EU) 2019/947— Issue 1, Amendment 3’

This document shows deleted text, new or amended text as follows: — deleted text is struck through; — new or amended text is highlighted in blue; — an ellipsis ‘[…]’ indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged. Annex I to ED Decision 2019/021/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 9 October 2019 is amended as follows:

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

[…] DVR design verification report […] GDOP geometric dilution of precision […] PDOP position dilution of precision

GM1 AMC1 Article 11 Rules for conducting an operational risk assessment

GENERAL

The operational risk assessment required by Article 11 of the UAS Regulation may be conducted using the methodology described in AMC1 Article 11. This methodology is basically the specific operations risk assessment (SORA) developed by JARUS. Other methodologies might be used by the UAS operator as alternative means of compliance. Unmanned free balloons are unmanned aircraft and shall thus comply with Regulation (EU) 2019/947. For this type of aircraft, compliance with Appendix 2 to Regulation (EU) No 923/2012 is considered an acceptable means of compliance with Article 11. […]

AMC1 Article 11 Rules for conducting an operational risk assessment

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS RISK ASSESSMENT (SORA) (SOURCE JARUS SORA V2.0)

[…] 1.5 Roles and responsibilities […] (b) UAS operator — The UAS operator is responsible for the safe operation of the UAS, and hence the safety risk analysis. In accordance with Article 5 of the UAS Regulation, the UAS operator must substantiate the safety of the operation by performing the specific operational and risk assessment, except for the cases defined by the same Article 5. Supporting material for the assessment may be provided by third parties (e.g. the manufacturer of the UAS or equipment, U-space service providers, etc.). The UAS operator obtains an operational authorisation from the competent authority/ANSP. A UAS operator having a LUC cannot be granted the privilege to assess compliance with the design requirements when a UAS with a design verification report (DVR) or a (restricted) type certificate ((R)TC) is required. […] (f) Competent authority — The competent authority that is referred to throughout this AMC is the authority designated by the Member State in accordance with Article 17 of the UAS Regulation to assess the safety case of UAS operations and to issue the operational authorisation in accordance with Article 12 of the UAS Regulation. The competent authority may accept an applicant’s SORA submission in whole or in part. Through the SORA process, the applicant may need to consult with the competent authority to ensure the consistent application or interpretation of individual steps. The competent authority must perform oversight of the UAS operator in accordance with paragraphs (i) and (j) of Article 18 of the UAS Regulation. According to Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (the EASA ‘Basic Regulation’), EASA is the competent authority competent in the European Union to verify compliance of the UAS design and its components with the applicable rules, while the authority that is designated by the Member State is the competent authority to verify compliance with the operational requirements and compliance of the personnel’s competency with those rules. The following elements are related to the UAS design: — OSOs #02 (limited to design criteria), #04, #05, #06, #10, #12, #18, #19 (limited to criterion #3), #20, #23 (limited to criterion #1) and #24; — M1 mitigation (tethered operations): criterion #1 and M2 mitigation for ground risk: (criterion #1); — Verification of the system to contain the UAS within the operational volume to avoid an infringement of the adjacent areas on the ground and/or adjacent airspace, in accordance with step #9 of the SORA process. When according to the SAIL or to the claimed mitigation means, the level of assurance of the above OSOs and/or mitigation means is ‘high’ (i.e. SAIL V and VI), a verification by EASA is required according to If the UAS operation is classified as SAIL V and VI, compliance with the design provisions defined by SORA (i.e. designrelated OSOs, mitigation means linked with the design and containment function) should be demonstrated through a type certificate (TC) issued by EASA according to Annex I (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 as defined in Article 40(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2019/945 . For the other OSOs and mitigation means, the competent authority may verify compliance or may defines which entity third party is able to verify compliance with them as a third party. (1) If the level of robustness of the design-related OSOs and/or mitigation means is ‘lower than ‘high’, the competent authority may still require a verification by EASA of the compliance of the UAS and/or its components with the design-related OSOs and/or mitigation means according to point Article 40(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2019/945. Similarly, also for UAS operators to which the competent authority granted a light UAS operator certificate (LUC), the terms of the approval may require to use a UAS that is verified by EASA when conducting operations for which the level of robustness of the design-related OSOs and/or mitigation means is lower than ‘high’. In those cases, EASA will verify that the achievement of the design integrity level is appropriate to the related SAIL and to the mitigation means, when those means are applicable, and will issue a type certificate (TC) (or a restricted type certificate (RTC)) to the UAS manufacturer, which will cover all design-related OSOs, the design-related mitigation means, and the enhanced containment verification in accordance with Step #9, if that verification is applicable. Alternatively, the competent authority that issues the operational authorisation may accept a declaration by the UAS operator, who is responsible for compliance of the UAS with the design-related OSOs. If the UAS operation is classified as SAIL IV, compliance with the design-related SORA provisions (i.e. designrelated OSOs, mitigation means linked with the design and containment function) should be demonstrated through a DVR issued by EASA. Evidence of compliance with the other OSOs and mitigations (not related to design) will be provided to the competent authority according to the level of robustness of the OSOs, that will assess them as part of the application for the operational authorisation. (2) If the UAS operation is classified as SAIL I, II or III, the competent authority may accept a declaration submitted by the UAS operator for the compliance with all OSOs and mitigations related to design. The competent authority may check the statements of the UAS operator, in particular with regard to the claimed level of integrity and robustness of the UAS for the considered SAIL. (3) Despite the SAIL, when the claimed level of robustness of the mitigation means M2 is high, the competent authority should require the operator to use a UAS with a DVR issued by EASA limited to compliance with those mitigation means . […] 2.3.1 Step #2 – Determination of the intrinsic UAS ground risk class (GRC) […] (k) When evaluating the typical kinetic energy expected for a given operation, the applicant should generally use the airspeed, in particular Vcruise for fixed-wing aircraft and the terminal velocity for other aircraft. Specific designs (e.g. gyrocopters) might need additional considerations. Guidance useful in determining the terminal velocity can be found at https://www.grc.nasa.gov/WWW/K-12/airplane/termv.html https://www1.grc.nasa.gov/beginners-guide-to-aeronautics/termvel/. […] 2.5.2 Step #8 — Identification of the operational safety objectives (OSOs) […]

OSO number (in SAIL line with Annex E) I II III IV V VI

Technical issue with the UAS

OSO#01 Ensure the UAS operator is competent and/or O L M H H H proven OSO#02 UAS manufactured by competent and/or O O L M H H proven entity OSO#03 UAS maintained by competent and/or proven L L M M H H entity OSO#04 UAS developed to authority recognised O O LO L M H design standards OSO#05 UAS is designed considering system safety O O L M H H and reliability OSO#06 C3 link performance is appropriate for the O L L M H H operation OSO#07 Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) to L L M M H H ensure consistency with the ConOps OSO#08 Operational procedures are defined, L M H H H H validated and adhered to OSO#09 Remote crew trained and current and able to L L M M H H control the abnormal situation OSO#10 Safe recovery from a technical issue L L M M H H

Deterioration of external systems supporting UAS operations

OSO#11 Procedures are in-place to handle the L M H H H H deterioration of external systems supporting UAS operations

OSO number (in SAIL line with Annex E) I II III IV V VI

OSO#12 The UAS is designed to manage the L L M M H H deterioration of external systems supporting UAS operations OSO#13 External services supporting UAS operations L L M H H H are adequate for the operation

Human error

OSO#14 Operational procedures are defined, L M H H H H validated and adhered to OSO#15 Remote crew trained and current and able to L L M M H H control the abnormal situation OSO#16 Multi-crew coordination L L M M H H OSO#17 Remote crew is fit to operate L L M M H H OSO#18 Automatic protection of the flight envelope O O L M H H from human error OSO#19 Safe recovery from human error O O L M M H OSO#20 A human factors evaluation has been O L L M M H performed and the human machine interface (HMI) found appropriate for the mission

Adverse operating conditions

OSO#21 Operational procedures are defined, L M H H H H validated and adhered to OSO#22 The remote crew is trained to identify critical L L M M M H environmental conditions and to avoid them OSO#23 Environmental conditions for safe operations L L M M H H are defined, measurable and adhered to OSO#24 UAS is designed and qualified for adverse O O M H H H environmental conditions

[…] 2.5.3 Step #9 – Adjacent area/airspace considerations (a) The objective of this section is to address the risk posed by a loss of control of the operation, resulting in an infringement of the adjacent areas on the ground and/or adjacent airspace. These areas may vary with different flight phases. (b) Safety requirements for ‘basic containment’ are: 1. No probable failure of the UAS or any external system supporting the operation should lead to operation outside the operational volume. Compliance with the requirement above shouldshall be substantiated by a design and installation appraisal and shallshould include at least: — the design and installation features (independence, separation and redundancy); Note: Independence, separation and redundancy are not necessarily required, but they may be useful to substantiate the robustness of the containment system. — any relevant particular risk (e.g. hail, ice, snow, electromagnetic electro-magnetic interference, etc.) associated with the ConOps. The competent authority may accept a declaration for the claimed integrity. The applicant declares that the required level of integrity has been achieved and supporting evidence is available. (c) The enhanced containment, which consists in the following three safety requirements, applies to operations conducted: (1) either where the adjacent areas: (i) contain assemblies of people unless the UAS is already approved for operations over assemblies of people; or (ii) are ARC-d unless the residual ARC of the airspace area intended to be flown within the operational volume is already ARC-d; (2) Or where the operational volume is in a populated area where: (i) M1 mitigation has been applied to lower the GRC; or (ii) operating in a controlled ground area. (d) The enhanced containment consists in the following safety requirements: (a) The UAS is designed to standards that are considered adequate by the competent authority and/or in accordance with a means of compliance that is acceptable to that authority such that: (1) the probability of the UA leaving the operational volume -4 should be less than 10 /FH; and * (2) no single failure of the UAS or any external system supporting the operation should lead to its operation outside the ground risk buffer. Compliance with the requirements above should be substantiated by analysis and/or test data with supporting evidence. (b) Software (SW) and airborne electronic hardware (AEH) whose development error(s) could directly (refer to Note 2) lead to operations outside the ground risk buffer should be developed to an industry standard or methodology that is recognised as being adequate by the competent authorityEASA. For UA with maximum characteristic dimensions not greater than 3 m, operated up to SAIL II operations, the competent authority may accept a declaration from the applicant for the compliance with the MoC to Light-UAS.2511 . For UAS configurations exceeding the applicability of such MoC , the competent authority may decide to still accept declarations based on such MoC with evidence available, or to accept appropriate MoC proposed by the applicant. Otherwise, the competent authority may request the applicant to use a UAS for which EASA has verified the claimed integrity. […]

Annex B to AMC1 to Article 11

INTEGRITY AND ASSURANCE LEVELS FOR THE MITIGATIONS USED TO REDUCE THE INTRINSIC GROUND RISK CLASS (GRC)

[…] B.2 M1 —– Strategic mitigations for ground risk […]

Level of assurance Low Medium High

The applicant declares that the The applicant has supporting evidence to claim The claimed level of integrity is validated by Criterion #1 required level of integrity is that the required level of integrity has been the competent authority of the MS or by an (Definition achieved1. achieved. entity that is designated by the a competent of the This is typically done by means of testing, authoritythird party. ground risk 2 analysis, simulation , inspection, design review buffer) or through operational experience.

1 When simulation is used, the validity of the Supporting evidence may or Comments targeted environment used in the simulation N/A

may not be available. needs to be justified.

The applicant declares that the The density data used for the claim of risk Same as medium; however, the density data

M1 — Strategic

required level of integrity has reduction is an average density map for the used for the claim of risk reduction is a nearmitigations for 3 been achieved . date/time of the operation from a static real time density map from a dynamic

ground risk

sourcing (e.g. census data for night time ops). sourcing (e.g. cellular user data) and Criterion #2 In addition, for localised operations (e.g. intra- applicable for the date/time of the (Evaluation city delivery or infrastructure inspection), the operation. of people at applicant submits the proposed route/area of risk) operation to the applicable authority (e.g. city

police, office of civil protection, infrastructure

owner, etc.) to verify the claim of a reduced

number of people at risk.

Supporting evidence may or Comments N/A N/A may not be available

Table B.3 — Level of assurance assessment criteria for ground risk of non-tethered M1 mitigations […] Level of assurance

Low Medium High

Does not meet the ‘medium’ The applicant has supporting evidence The claimed level of integrity is validated by

level criteria (including the specifications of the tether EASA the competent authority of the MS or

material) to claim that the required level of by an entity that is designated by the

integrity is achieved. competent authority. Criterion #1 (a) This is typically achieved through testing or (Technical operational experience. design) (b) Tests can be based on simulations;

however, the validity of the target

environment used in the simulation needs

to be justified.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

(a) Procedures are validated against standards

M1 — considered adequate by the competent

Tethered authority of the MS and/or in accordance (a) Procedures do not require operation with the a means of compliance acceptable Same as medium. In addition: validation against either a 1 to that authority . (a) Flight tests performed to validate the standard or a means of (b) The Aadequacy of the procedures is proven procedures cover the complete flight compliance considered through: envelope or are proven to be conservative. Criterion #2 adequate by the (1) dedicated flight tests; or (b) The procedures, flight tests and (Procedures) competent authority of the (2) simulation, provided that the simulations are validated by the MS. representativeness of the simulation competent authority of the MS or by an (b) The adequacy of the means is proven to be valid for the entity that is designated by the a procedures and checklists intended purpose with positive results; competent authoritythird party. is declared. or

(3) any other means acceptable to the

competent authority of the MS.

robustness) is considered an acceptable means

of compliance.

Table B.5 — Level of assurance assessment criteria for ground risk tethered M1 mitigations B.3 M2 — Effects of ground impact are reduced

[…]

LEVEL of ASSURANCE Level of assurance

Low/None Medium High

The applicant declares that The applicant has supporting evidence to claim The claimed level of integrity is validated by the required level of that the required level of integrity is achieved. This EASA against a standard considered adequate

Criterion integrity has been is typically done by means of testing, analysis, by EASA and/or in accordance with means of 1 3 #1 achieved . simulation , inspection, design review or through compliance acceptable to EASA (when

(Technical operational experience. applicable). design) The applicant may declare compliance with MoC to The competent authority should request the Light-UAS.2512 providing the supporting evidence applicant to use a UAS for which EASA has defined in it. verified the claimed integrity through a DVR. M2 — Effects 2

The use of industry standards is encouraged when

of UA impact

developing mitigations used to reduce the effect of

dynamics are

ground impact. reduced (e.g. 3

1 When simulation is used, the validity of the

parachute) Supporting evidence may

Comments targeted environment used in the simulation needs

or may not be available. to be justified.

https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/documentlibrary/product-certification-consultations/meanscompliance-mitigation-means-m2-ref-amc

(a) Procedures do not Same as medium. In addition: Criterion (a) Procedures are validated against standards require validation (a) Flight tests performed to validate the #2 considered adequate by the competent against either a standard procedures cover the complete flight (Procedure authority of the MS and/or in accordance with or a means of envelope or are proven to be conservative. s, if the means of compliance acceptable to that compliance considered 1 (b) The procedures, flight tests and simulations applicable) authority . adequate by the are validated by the competent authority of

competent authority of (b) The adequacy of the procedures is proven the MS or by an entity that is designated by the MS. through: the a competent authoritythird party. (b) The adequacy of the (1) dedicated flight tests; or procedures and (2) simulation, provided that the checklists is declared. representativeness of the simulation means is proven to be valid for the intended purpose with positive results; or (3) any other means acceptable to the competent authority of the MS. N/A AMC2 UAS.SPEC.030(3)(e) (Operational

procedures for medium and high levels of Comments N/A N/A robustness) is considered an acceptable means of

compliance. (a) Training syllabus is validated by the competent authority of the MS or by an Criterion entity that is designated by the a competent (a) Training syllabus is available. #3 authoritythird party. Training is self-declared (Training, (b) The UAS operator provides competency-based, (with evidence available) (b) Remote crew competencies are verified by if theoretical and practical training. the competent authority of the MS or by an applicable) entity that is designated by the a competent authoritythird party.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

Table B.7 -— Level of assurance assessment criteria for M2 mitigations B.4 M3 — An ERP is in place, UAS operator validated and effective […]

Level of assurance Low/None Medium High

(a) Same as medium. In addition: (a) The ERP and the effectiveness of the plan with respect to limiting the number of (a) Procedures do not require people at risk are validated by the a validation against either a competent third party authority of the MS or (a) The ERP is developed to standards considered standard or a means of by an entity that is designated by the adequate by the competent authority of the compliance considered MS and/or in accordance with means of competent authority. adequate by the 1 (b) The applicant has coordinated and agreed Criterion #1 compliance acceptable to that authority . competent authority of the the ERP with all third parties identified in the (Procedures) MS. (b) The ERP is validated through a representative plan. tabletop exercise consistent with the ERP (c) The representativeness of the tabletop (b) The adequacy of the M3 — training syllabus. exercise is validated by the a competent procedures and checklists An ERP is third party authority of the MS or by an is declared. in place, entity that is designated by the competent UAS authority.

operator validated

and

high level of robustness) is considered an

effective

Comments N/A acceptable means of compliance. N/A The tabletop exercise may or may not involve

all third parties that are identified in the ERP.

Same as medium. In addition, the competencies (a) An ERP training syllabus is available. of the relevant staff are verified by the a (b) A record of the ERP training completed by the Criterion #2 Does not meet the ‘medium’ competent third party authority of the MS or by relevant staff is established and kept up to (Training) level criterion an entity that is designated by the competent date. authority.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

Table B.9 — Level of assurance assessment criteria for M3 mitigations

Annex C to AMC1 to Article 11

STRATEGIC MITIGATION — COLLISION RISK ASSESSMENT

[…] C.3.3 SORA flight rules assumptions Today, UAS flight operations under the ‘specific’ category cannot fully comply with the IFR and VFR rules as written. Although IFR infrastructures and mitigations are designed for manned aircraft operations (e.g. minimal safe altitudes, equipage requirements, operational restrictions, etc.), it may be possible for a UAS to comply with the IFR requirements. UAS operating at very low levels (e.g. 400 operational volume’s ceiling below 150m (~500 ft) AGLand below) may technically comply with the IFR requirements rules, but the IFR infrastructure was not designed with that airspace in mind; therefore, mitigations for this airspace would be derived, and would be highly impractical and inefficient. When operating BVLOS, a UAS cannot comply with VFR . […] C.6.2 Lowering the initial ARC using operational restrictions (optional) […]

Operational environment, AEC and ARC

Initial generalised Operations in: Corresponding AEC Initial ARC density rating

Airport/heliport environment

OPS in an airport/heliport environment in 5 AEC 1 ARC-d class B, C or D airspace OPS in an airport/heliport environment in 3 AEC 6 ARC-c class E airspace or in class F or G

Operations above 150 m(~4500 ft) AGL but below flight level 600

OPS > 150 m (~4500 ft) AGL but < FL 600 in 5 AEC 2 ARC-d a Mode-S Veil or transponder mandatory zone (TMZ) OPS > 150 m (~4500 ft) AGL but < FL 600 in 5 AEC 3 ARC-d controlled airspace OPS > 150 m (~4500 ft) AGL but < FL 600 in 3 AEC 4 ARC-c uncontrolled airspace over an urban area OPS > 150 m (~4500 ft) AGL but < FL 600 in 2 AEC 5 ARC-c uncontrolled airspace over a rural area

Operations below 150 m(~4500 ft) AGL

OPS < 150 m (~4500 ft) AGL in a Mode-S 3 AEC 7 ARC-c Veil or TMZ

Operational environment, AEC and ARC

Initial generalised Operations in: Corresponding AEC Initial ARC density rating

OPS < 150 m (~4500 ft)) AGL in controlled 3 AEC 8 ARC-c airspace OPS < 150 m (~4500 ft) AGL in uncontrolled 2 AEC 9 ARC-c airspace over an urban area OPS < 150 m (~4500 ft) AGL in uncontrolled 1 AEC 10 ARC-b airspace over a rural area

Operations above flight level 600

OPS > FL 600 1 AEC 11 ARC-b Operations in atypical or segregated airspace OPS in atypical/segregated airspace 1 AEC 12 ARC-a

Table C.1 —– Initial air risk category class assessment […] Example 1: A UAS operator is intendsing to operate in an airport/heliport environment, in class C airspace, which corresponds to AEC 1. […] Example 2: A UAS operator is intendsing to operate in an airport/heliport environment, in class G airspace, with a corresponding level of AEC 6. […] Example 3: A UAS operator is intendsing to operate below 150 m (~4500 ft) AGL, in a class G (uncontrolled) airspace, over an urbanised area, with a corresponding level of AEC 9. […] C.6.3 Lowering the initial ARC by common structures and rules (optional) Today, aviation airspace rules and structures mitigate the risk of collision. As the airspace risk increases, more structures and rules are implemented to reduce the risk. In general, the higher the aircraft density, the higher the collision risk, and the more structures and rules are required to reduce the collision risk. In general, manned aircraft do not use very low level (VLL) airspace, as it is below the minimum safe height to perform an emergency procedure, ‘unless at such a height as will permit, in the event of an emergency arising, a landing to be made without undue hazard to persons or property on the surface’ (Ref. point SERA.3105 of the SERA Regulation). Subject to permission from the competent authority, special flights may be granted permission to use this airspace. Every aircraft will cross VLL airspace in an airport environment for take-off and landing. With the advent of UAS operations, VLL airspace is expected to soon become more crowded, requiring more common structures and rules to lower the collision risk. It is anticipated that U-space services will provide these risk mitigation measures. This will require mandatory participation by all aircraft in that airspace, similar to how the current flight rules apply to all manned aircraft operating in a particular airspace today. The SORA does not allow the initial ARC to be lowered through strategic mitigation by common structures and rules for all operations in AEC 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 11. . Outside the scope of the SORA, a UAS operator may appeal to the competent authority to lower the ARC by strategic mitigation by using common structures. The determination of acceptability falls under the normal airspace rules, regulations and safety requirements for ATM/ANS providers. Similarly, the SORA does not allow for lowering the initial ARC through strategic mitigation by using common structures and rules for all operations in AEC 10 . The maximum amount of ARC reduction through strategic mitigation by using common structures and rules is by one ARC level. The SORA does allow for lowering the initial ARC through strategic mitigation by structures and rules for all operations below 150 m (~4500 ft) AGL within VLL airspace (AECs 7, 8, 9 and 10). […]

Annex E to AMC1 to Article 11

INTEGRITY AND ASSURANCE LEVELS FOR THE OPERATIONAL SAFETY OBJECTIVES (OSOs)

[…] E.2 OSOs related to technical issues with the UAS […]

Level of assurance TECHNICAL ISSUE WITH THE UAS Low Medium High

The applicant holds an organisational

operating certificate (e.g LUC) or has a OSO #01 Prior to the first operation, athe recognised flight test organisation. Ensure that competent authority of the MS or an The elements delineated in the level of In addition, the competent authority of the UAS Criteria entity that is designated by the competent integrity are addressed in the ConOps. the MS or an entity that is designated operator is authoritythird party performs an audit of by thea competent authoritythird competent the organisation. party recurrently verifies the UAS and/or proven operator’s competencies.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

OSO #02 — UAS designed and produced by a competent and/or proven entity

Level of integrity TECHNICAL ISSUE WITH THE UAS Low Medium High

OSO #02 As a minimum, design documentation Same as low. UAS manufactured covers: In addition, design documentation also The design organisation complies with designed and Criteria for (a) the specification of the materials; covers: Subpart J of Annex I (Part 21) to produced by a design and (a) the configuration control; and Regulation (EU) No 748/2012. competent and/or (b) the suitability and durability of the (b) identification and traceability. proven entity materials used.

Same as low. In addition,

As a minimum, manufacturingproduction procedures also

manufacturingproduction procedures cover:

cover: (a) the configuration control; The manufacturerproduction (a) the specification of materials; (b) the verification of incoming products, organisation complies with the Criteria for (b) the suitability and durability of parts, materials, and equipment; organisational requirements that are production materials used; and (c) identification and traceability; defined in Subpart F or G of Annex I (c) the processes necessary to allow for (d) in-process and final inspections & (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) repeatability in manufacturing, and testing; No 748/2012. conformity within acceptable (e) the control and calibration of tools;

tolerances. (f) handling and storage; and

(g) the control of non-conforming items.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

Level of assurance TECHNICAL ISSUE WITH THE UAS Low Medium High

Same as medium. Same as low. In addition, evidence is The specifications, suitability and In addition, the competent authority available that the UAS has been designed durability of the materials are declared should request the applicant to in accordance with design procedures. Criteria for against a standard recognised by the operate a UAS designed by an The competent authority should request design competent authority and/or in organisation approved by EASA the applicant to use a UAS for which accordance with means of compliance according to Subpart J of Annex I EASA has verified the claimed integrity acceptable to the competent authority. (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) OSO #02 through a DVR. No 748/2012. UAS manufactured The declared manufacturing designed and Same as medium. In addition:, the production procedures are developed produced by a competent authority of the MS or an to a standard that is considered Same as low. In addition, evidence is competent and/or entity that is designated by the adequate by the competent authority available that the UAS has been proven entity competent authority EASA validates Criteria for that issues the operational manufacturedproduced in conformance compliance with the production production authorisation and/or in accordance with/to its design. organisational requirements that are with a means of compliance The competent authority may request defined in Subpart F or G of Annex I acceptable to that authority. The EASA to validate the claimed integrity. (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) competent authority may request No 748/2012. EASA to validate the claimed integrity.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

OSO #03 — UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity […]

Level of assurance TECHNICAL ISSUE WITH THE UAS Low Medium High

Same as low. In addition:

(a) The maintenance programme is

developed in accordance with

standards considered adequate by (a) The maintenance instructions are the competent authority of the MS documented. Same as medium. In addition, the and/or in accordance with a means (b) The maintenance conducted on the maintenance programme and the of compliance acceptable to that UAS is recorded in a maintenance maintenance procedures manual are Criterion #1 1/2 authority. log system . validated by the competent (Procedure) In addition, if the UAS has a DVR or a (c) A list of the maintenance staff authority of the MS or by an entity (R)TC, the maintenance programme authorised to carry out that is designated by the a includes the scheduled maintenance maintenance is established and competent authoritythird party. OSO #03 requirements developed as part of kept up to date. UAS the design.

maintained by (b) A list of the maintenance staff with

a competent maintenance release authorisation is

and/or proven established and kept up to date.

entity (e.g. The Oobjective is to record all the

industry maintenance performed on the aircraft,

standards) and why it is performed (rectification of

defects or malfunctions, modifications,

Comments scheduled maintenance, etc.). N/A N/A The maintenance log may be requested for inspection/audit by the approving authority or an authorised

representative.

Same as low. In addition: Same as medium. In addition: A record of all the relevant (a) The initial training syllabus and (a) A programme for the recurrent Criterion #2 qualifications, experience and/or training standard, including training of staff holding a (Training) training completed by the maintenance theoretical/practical elements, maintenance release staff is established and kept up to date. duration, etc., is defined and is authorisation is established; and

commensurate with the (b) This programme is validated by authorisation held by the the competent authority of the maintenance staff. MS or by an entity that is (b) For staff that hold a maintenance designated by thea competent release authorisation, the initial authoritythird party. training is specific to that particular UAS model/family. (c) All maintenance staff have undergone initial training.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

OSO #04 — UAS developed to authority recognised design standards […]

Level of assurance TECHNICAL ISSUE WITH THE UAS Low Medium High

Consider the criteria defined in Section 9 The competent authority should request The competent authority should The competent authority should request the the applicant to use a UAS for which EASA request the applicant to use a UAS for applicant to use a UAS for which EASA has has issued a type certificate or restricted which EASA has issued a type Criteria OSO #04 verified the claimed integrity through a type certificate in accordance with Annex I certificate or restricted type certificate UAS developed to DVR. (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 in accordance with Annex I (Part 21) to authority Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 recognised design If the operation is classified as SAIL V, standards EASA validates the claimed integrity. In all The competent authority may request EASA Comments other cases, the competent authority may N/A to validate the claimed integrity. N/A request EASA to validate the claimed integrity. . N/A

OSO #05 — UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability […]

Level of assurance TECHNICAL ISSUE WITH THE UAS Low Medium High

OSO #05 A functional hazard assessment and a The competent authority Same as low. In addition: UAS is design and installation appraisal that should request the applicant Criteria (a) Safety analyses are conducted in line with designed shows that hazards are minimised, are to use a UAS for which EASA standards considered adequate by the competent considering available. has issued a type certificate or

Level of assurance TECHNICAL ISSUE WITH THE UAS Low Medium High

system safety The competent authority may request authority and/or in accordance with a means of restricted type certificate in and reliability EASA to validate the claimed integrity. compliance acceptable to that authority. accordance with Annex I (b) A strategy for the detection of single (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) failures of concern includes pre-flight checks. No 748/2012 Same as The competent authority may request request EASA medium. In addition, safety to validate the claimed integrity. should request the analyses and development applicant to use a UAS for which EASA has validated assurance activities are the claimed integrity through a DVR. validated by EASA.

The severity of failure conditions (no safety effect, minor, major, hazardous and Comments catastrophic) should be determined N/A N/A according to the definitions provided in

JARUS AMC RPAS.1309 Issue 2.

OSO #06 — C3 link characteristics (e.g. performance, spectrum use) are appropriate for the operation […]

Level of assurance TECHNICAL ISSUE WITH THE UAS Low Medium High

Demonstration of the C3 link performance is in accordance with standards considered The competent authority should adequate by the competent authority request the applicant to use a UAS OSO #06 The applicant declares that the required and/or in accordance with means of for which EASA has issued a type C3 link level of integrity has been achieved. compliance acceptable to that authority. certificate or restricted type characteristics (e.g. Consider the assurance criteria defined in Criteria The competent authority may request EASA certificate in accordance with performance, Section 9 (low level of assurance). to validate the claimed integrity. Annex I (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) spectrum use) are The competent authority may request EASA The competent authority should request the No 748/2012 Same as medium. In appropriate for the to validate the claimed integrity. applicant to use a UAS for which EASA has addition, evidence is validated by operation verified the claimed integrity through a EASA. DVR.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

OSO #07 — Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) to ensure consistency with the ConOps […]

Level of assurance TECHNICAL ISSUE WITH THE UAS Low Medium High

Same as medium. In addition, the

product inspection is procedures are Product inspection is documented and Same as low. In addition, the product Criterion #1 validated by the competent accounts for the manufacturer’s inspection is documented using OSO #07 (Procedures) authority of the MS or by an entity recommendations, if available. checklists. Inspection of that is designated by thea competent

the UAS authoritythird party.

(product Comments N/A N/A N/A

inspection) to AThe competent authority of the MS (a) A training syllabus including a ensure or an entity that is designated by the The remote crew is trained to perform product inspection procedure is consistency competent authoritythird party: Criterion #2 the product inspection, and that available. with the (a) validates the training syllabus; (Training) training is self-declared (with evidence (b) The UAS operator provides ConOps and available). competency-based, theoretical and (b) verifies the remote crew practical training. competencies.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

E.3 OSOs related to operational procedures

Level of integrity OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES Low Medium High

(a) Operational procedures appropriate for the proposed operation are defined and, as a minimum, cover the following elements: (1) Flight planning; (2) Pre- and post-flight inspections; (3) Procedures to evaluate the environmental conditions before and during the mission (i.e. real-time evaluation); (4) Procedures to cope with unexpected adverse operating conditions (e.g. when ice is encountered during an operation Criterion #1 (Procedure not approved for icing conditions); definition) (5) Normal procedures; (6) Contingency procedures (to cope with abnormal situations); (7) Emergency procedures (to cope with emergency situations); (8) Occurrence-reporting procedures; and Note: normal, contingency and emergency procedures are compiled in an OM. (b) The limitations of the external systems supporting the UAS operation are defined in an OM. Operational procedures cover the deterioration3 of the UAS itself and any external system supporting the UAS operation. OSO #08, To properly address the deterioration of external systems required for the operation, it is recommended to: OSO #11, (a) identify these ‘external systems’; OSO #14 and (b) identify the modes of deterioration of the ‘external systems’ (e.g. complete loss of GNSS, GDOP/PDOP, latency issues, OSO #21 etc.) which would lead to a loss of control of the operation; (c) describe the means to detect these modes of deterioration of the external systems ; and (d) describe the procedure(s) used when deterioration is detected (e.g. activation of the emergency recovery capability, switch to manual control, etc.). In the scope of this assessment, external systems supporting the UAS operation are defined as systems that are not already Comments part of the UAS but are used to: (a) launch/take-offtake off the UA;

(b) make pre-flight checks; or

(c) keep the UA within its operational volume (e.g. GNSS, satellite systems, air traffic management, U-Sspace). External systems activated/used after a loss of control of the operation are excluded from this definition. To properly address the deterioration of external systems required for the operation, it is recommended to: (a) identify these ‘external systems’; (b) identify the modes of deterioration of the ‘external systems’ (e.g. complete loss of GNSS, drift of the GNSS, latency issues, etc.) which would lead to a loss of control of the operation; (c) describe the means to detect these modes of deterioration of the external systems/facilities; and

Level of integrity OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES Low Medium High

(d) describe the procedure(s) used when deterioration is detected (e.g. activation of the emergency recovery capability, switch to manual control, etc.). Operational procedures are complex and may potentially jeopardise the Contingency/emergency procedures Criterion #2 crew’s ability to respond by increasing require manual control by the remote 2 Operational procedures are simple. (Procedure complexity) raising the remote crew’s workload pilot when the UAS is usually and/or their interactions with other automatically controlled. entities (e.g. ATM, etc.).

This is still under discussion since It should be considered that not all UAS have a mode where the pilot could

Comments N/A directly control the surfaces; moreover, N/A

some people claim it may requires significant skill not to make things

worse. At a minimum, operational procedures provide: Criterion #3 (a) a clear distribution and assignment Same as medium. In addition, the Operational procedures take human 3 (Consideration of of tasks, and remote crew receives crew resource error into consideration. 4 Potential Human Error) (b) an internal checklist to ensure staff management (CRM) training. are adequately performing their assigned tasks.

In the context of the SORA, the term ‘remote crew’ refers to any person

involved in the mission.

CRM training focuses on the Comments N/A N/A effective use of all the remote crew to ensure safe and efficient operation, reducing error, avoiding

stress and increasing efficiency.

Level of assurance OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES Low Medium High

(a) Normal, contingency, and emergency

procedures are documented and

part of the operations manual (OM).

(a)(b) Operational procedures are

validated against standards Same as medium. In addition:

considered adequate by the (a) Flight tests performed to validate (a) Operational procedures do not competent authority of the MS the procedures and checklists require validation against either a and/or in accordance with the means cover the complete flight standard or a means of compliance of compliance acceptable to that envelope or are proven to be that is considered adequate by the 1 OSO #08, authority . conservative. Criteria competent authority of the MS. OSO #11, (b)(c) The Aadequacy of the (b) The procedures, checklists, flight (b) The adequacy of the operational OSO #14 and procedures is proven through: tests and simulations are procedures is declared, except for OSO #21 (1) dedicated flight tests; or validated by the competent emergency procedures, which are (2) simulation, provided that the authority of the MS or by an tested. representativeness of the entity that is designated by thea

simulation means is proven valid competent authoritythird party.

for the intended purpose with

positive results.; or

(3) any other means acceptable to

the competent authority.

Comments N/A

levels of robustness) is considered an acceptable means of compliance.

E.4 OSOs related to remote crew training […]

Level of assurance REMOTE CREW COMPETENCIES Low Medium High

The competent authority of the MS

or an entity that is designated by (a) Training syllabus is available and kept theA competent authoritythird up to date. OSO #09, Training is self-declared (with evidence party: Criteria (b) The UAS operator provides OSO #15 and available). (a) validates the training syllabus; competency-based, theoretical and OSO #22 and practical training. (b) verifies the remote crew

competencies.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

E.5 OSOs related to safe design […]

Level of assurance Low Medium High

Same as low. In addition, the level of A design and installation appraisal is available. In The competent authority should integrity claimed is substantiated by particular, this appraisal shows that: request the applicant to use a UAS analysis and/or test data with supporting (a) the design and installation features for which EASA has issued a type evidence. (independence, separation and redundancy) satisfy certificate or restricted type For If the operation is classified as SAIL OSO #10 Criteria the low integrity criterion; and certificate in accordance with IV,Tthe competent authority may should & OSO #12 (b) particular risks relevant to the ConOps Annex I (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) request the applicant to use a UAS for (e.g. hail, ice, snow, electromagnetic interference, No 748/2012 Same as medium. In which EASA has verified the claimed etc.) do not violate the independence claims, if addition, EASA validates the level of integrity through a DVR. EASA to validate any. integrity claimed. the claimed integrity.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

E.6 OSOs related to the deterioration of external systems supporting UAS operations For the purpose of the SORA and this specific OSO, the term ‘external services supporting UAS operations’ encompasses any service providers necessary for the safety of the flight, such as communication service providers (CSPs) and U-space service providers . […]

DETERIORATION OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS Level of assurance SUPPORTING UAS OPERATIONS BEYOND THE CONTROL OF THE UAS Low Medium High

The applicant has supporting evidence that the required level of performance for any externally provided service Same as medium. In addition: required for the safety of the flight can (a) the evidence of the performance OSO #13 be achieved for the full duration of the The applicant declares that the of an externally provided service External mission. requested level of performance for any is achieved through services This may take the form of a service-level externally provided service necessary demonstrations; and supporting UAS Criteria agreement (SLA) or any official for the safety of the flight is achieved (b) the competent authority of the operations are commitment that prevails between a (without evidence being necessarily MS or an entity that is designated adequate for service provider and the applicant on the available). by thea competent authoritythird the operation relevant aspects of the service (including party validates the claimed level quality, availability, and responsibilities). of integrity. The applicant has a means to monitor externally provided services which affect flight-critical systems and take

appropriate actions if real-time performance could lead to the loss of control of the operation.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

E.7 OSOs related to Hhuman Eerror […]

Level of assurance HUMAN ERROR Low Medium High

(a) Procedures are validated against standards considered adequate by the competent authority of the MS and/or in accordance with the means Same as medium. In addition: of compliance acceptable to that (a) flight tests performed to validate (a) Procedures doare not require 1 authority . the procedures cover the validatedion against either a (b) TheAadequacy of the procedures is complete flight envelope or are standard or a means of compliance Criterion #1 proven through: proven to be conservative; and considered adequate by the (Procedures) (1) dedicated flight tests; or (b) the procedures, flight tests and competent authority of the MS. (2) simulation, provided that the simulations are validated by the (b) The adequacy of the procedures representativeness of the competent authority of the MS or and checklists is declared. OSO #16 Multi- simulation means is proven valid an entity designated by thea crew for the intended purpose with competent authoritythird party. coordination positive results.; or (3) any other means acceptable to the competent authority.

compliance. (a) Training syllabus is available. The competent authority of the MS Criterion #2 Training is self-declared (with evidence (b) The UAS operator provides or an entity that is designated by (Training) available). competency-based, theoretical and theA competent authoritythird party: practical training.

Level of assurance HUMAN ERROR Low Medium High

(a) validates the training syllabus;

and

(b) verifies the remote crew

competencies.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

The applicant has supporting evidence The competent authority should

that the required level of integrity is request the applicant to operate a Criterion #3 Consider the criteria defined in Section achieved. This is typically done by UAS designed by an organisation (Communication 1 9 N/A testing, analysis, simulation , approved by EASA according to devices) inspection, design review or through Subpart J of Annex I (Part 21) to

operational experience. Regulation (EU) No 748/2012.

When simulation is performed, the validity of the targeted environment that Comments N/A N/A is used in the simulation needs to be

justified.

OSO #17 — Remote crew is fit to operate […]

Level of assurance HUMAN ERROR Low Medium High

Same as Mmedium. In addition: Same as Llow. In addition: — Medical standards considered — Remote crew duty, flight duty and The policy to define how the remote adequate by the competent the resting times policy are crew declares themselves fit to operate authority and/or the means of documented. OSO #17 (before an operation) is documented. compliance acceptable to that — Remote crew duty cycles are logged Remote crew is Criteria The remote crew fit-to-operate authority are established and the and cover at a minimum: fit to operate declaration of fit to operate (before an competent authority of the MS or — when the remote crew member’s operation) is based on a policy defined an entity that is designated by duty day commences, by the applicant. thea competent authoritythird — when the remote crew members party verifies that the remote are free from duties, and crew is medically fit.

— resting times within the duty — The competent authority of the

cycle. MS or an entity that is designated

— There is evidence that the remote by theA competent authoritythird

crew is fit to operate the UAS. party validates the duty/flight

duty times.

— If an FRMS is used, it is validated

and monitored by the competent

authority of the MS or an entity

that is designated by thea

competent authoritythird party.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

OSO #18 — Automatic protection of the flight envelope from human errors […]

Level of assurance HUMAN ERROR Low Medium High

The competent authority The automatic protection of the flight envelope has should request the applicant to The automatic protection of the flight been developed to standards considered adequate use a UAS for which EASA has OSO #18 envelope has been developed in-house or out by the competent authority and/or in accordance issued a type certificate or Automatic of the box (e.g. using commercial off-the-shelf with a means of compliance acceptable to that restricted type certificate in protection of Criteria elements), without following specific authority. accordance with Annex I the flight standards. The competent authority may should request the (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) envelope from The competent authority may request EASA applicant to use a UAS for which EASA has verified No 748/2012 Same as Medium. human errors to validate the claimed integrity. the claimed integrity through a DVR EASA to validate In addition, evidence is the claimed integrity. validated by EASA.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

OSO #19 — Safe recovery from human errors […] Level of assurance

HUMAN ERROR Low Medium High

−(a) Procedures and checklists are

validated against standards considered adequate by the

competent authority of the MS Same as Mmedium. In addition: and/or in accordance with the −(a) Flight tests performed to −(a) Procedures and checklists means of compliance acceptable to 1 validate the procedures and doare not require validatedion that authority . checklists cover the complete against either a standard or a −(b) TheAadequacy of the flight envelope or are proven to Criterion #1 means of compliance considered procedures and checklists is proven be conservative. (Procedures and adequate by the competent through: −(b) The procedures, checklists, checklists) authority of the MS. −(1) dedicated flight tests; or flight tests and simulations are −(b) The adequacy of the −(2) simulation, provided that the validated by the competent OSO #19 procedures and checklists is representativeness of the authority of the MS or an entity Safe recovery declared. simulation means is proven valid that is designated by thea from Hhuman for the intended purpose with competent authoritythird party. Eerror positive results.; or −(3) any other means acceptable to

the competent authority of the

MS.

(Operational procedures for medium Comments N/A and high levels of robustness) is N/A considered an acceptable means of

compliance.

Criterion #2 Consider the criteria defined for the level of assurance of the generic remote crew training OSO (i.e. OSO #09, OSO #15 and

(Training) OSO #22) corresponding to the SAIL of the operation.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

Level of assurance

HUMAN ERROR Low Medium High

The applicant has supporting evidence that the required level of integrity is achieved. That evidence is provided through testing, analysis, simulation , inspection, design review or operational experience. If the operation is classified as SAIL IV, The competent authority should EASA validates the claimed integrity. In request the applicant to use a UAS The applicant declares that the all other cases, the competent authority for which EASA has issued a type required level of integrity has been Criterion #3 1 may should request the applicant to use certificate or restricted type achieved . (UAS design) a UAS for which EASA has verified the certificate in accordance with The competent authority may request claimed integrity through a DVR EASA to Annex I (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) EASA to validate the claimed integrity. validate the claimed integrity. No 748/2012. EASA validates the If the operation is classified as SAIL V claimed level of integrity. the competent authority should request the applicant to use a UAS for which EASA has issued a type certificate or restricted type certificate in accordance with Annex I (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) No 748/2012.

When simulation is performed, the

Supporting evidence may or may not validity of the targeted environment

Comments N/A be available. that is used in the simulation needs to

be justified.

OSO #20 — A Hhuman Ffactors evaluation has been performed and the HMI has been found appropriate for the mission […]

LEVEL of ASSURANCE HUMAN ERROR Low Medium High

The applicant conducts a human factors Same as Low but the HMI evaluation is Same as Medium. In addition, EASA evaluation of the UAS to determine 1 based on demonstrations or simulations. witnesses the HMI evaluation of the UAS OSO #20 whether the HMI is appropriate for the If the operation is classified as SAIL V, and the competent authority of the MS or A Human Factors mission. The HMI evaluation is based on Criteria EASA witnesses the HMI evaluation of the an entity that is designated by thea evaluation has inspection or analyses. UAS. In all other cases, The competent competent authoritythird party witnesses been performed The competent authority may request authority may should request EASA to the HMI evaluation of the possible and the HMI has EASA to witness the HMI evaluation of the witness the HMI evaluation of the UAS. electronic means used by the AVO. been found UAS.

appropriate for When simulation is performed, the

the mission validity of the targeted environment that

Comments N/A N/A is used in the simulation needs to be

justified.

E.8 OSOs related to Aadverse Ooperating Cconditions OSO #23 — Environmental conditions for safe operations are defined, measurable and adhered to […]

Level of assurance ADVERSE OPERATING CONDITIONS Low Medium High

The applicant has supporting evidence OSO #23 The competent authority should that the required level of integrity is Environmental Consider the criteria defined in request the applicant to use a UAS achieved. This is typically done by conditions for Section 9. for which EASA has issued a type Criterion #1 testing, analysis, simulation, safe operations The applicant declares that the certificate or restricted type (Definition) inspection, design review or through defined, required level of integrity has been certificate in accordance with operational experience. measurable and achieved. Annex I (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) If the operation is classified as SAIL IV, adhered to No 748/2012 the competent authority should

request the applicant to use a UAS for which EASA has issued a DVR.

Comments N/A

−(a) Procedures are validated against standards considered adequate by the competent authority of the MS and/or in accordance with the means of Same as Mmedium. In addition: compliance acceptable to that −(a) Flight tests performed to −(a) Procedures do not require 1 authority . validate the procedures cover validation against either a standard −(b) The Aadequacy of the the complete flight envelope or or a means of compliance procedures and checklists is provedn are proven to be conservative. Criterion #2 considered adequate by the through: −(b) The procedures, flight (Procedures) competent authority of the MS. −(1) Ddedicated flight tests; or tests and simulations are −(b) The adequacy of the −(2) Ssimulation, provided that the validated by the competent procedures and checklists is representativeness of the authority of the MS or an entity declared. simulation means is proven valid that is designated by thea for the intended purpose with competent authoritythird party. positive results.; or −(3) any other means acceptable to the competent authority of the MS.

compliance. The competent authority of the MS or an entity that is designated by − Training syllabus is available. theA competent authoritythird Criterion #3 Training is self-declared (with evidence − The UAS operator provides party: (Training) available). competency-based, theoretical and − Vvalidates the training practical training. syllabus.; and − Vverifies the remote crew competencies.

Comments N/A N/A N/A

OSO #24 — UAS is designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) […]

Level of assurance ADVERSE OPERATING CONDITIONS N/A Medium High

If the operation is classified as SAIL IV, the competent authority should request the applicant to use a UAS for Consider the criteria defined in Section 9 which EASA has issued a DVR. The applicant has supporting evidence that the If the operation is classified SAIL V or required level of integrity has been achieved. OSO #24 VI, the competent authority should Criteria N/A This is typically done by testing, analysis, UAS is designed and 2 request the applicant to use a UAS for simulation , inspection, design review or qualified for adverse which EASA has issued a type through operational experience. environmental certificate or restricted type conditions certificate in accordance with Annex I (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) No 748/2012.

When simulation is performed, the validity of

Comments N/A the targeted environment that is used in the N/A

simulation needs to be justified.N/A

E.9 Assurance level criteria for technical OSO

LEVEL of ASSURANCE Low Medium High

The applicant declares that the required The applicant has supporting evidence that the required EASA validates the claimed level of integrity has been achieved . level of integrity is achieved. This is typically done by level of integrity. TECHNICAL testing, analysis, simulation , inspection, design review Criteria OSO or through operational experience. The competent authority may request EASA to validate the claimed integrity.

1 When simulation is performed, the validity of the Supporting evidence may or may not be

Comments targeted environment that is used in the simulation N/A available. needs to be justified.

AMC2 Article 11 Rules for conducting an operational risk assessment

PREDEFINED RISK ASSESSMENT PDRA-G01 Version 1.23

EDITION January September 20232 […]

PDRA characterisation and conditions

Topic Method of Condition Integrity Proof proof Containment 6.13 To ensure a safe recovery from a technical issue that involves the UAS or an external system that supports the operation, the UAS operator should comply with the following basic containment provisions ensure that: 6.13.1 no probable failure of the UAS or of any Please describe how this condition is ‘n/a since enhanced containment external system that supports the operation met applies.’ Declaration would lead to operation outside the or supported operational volume; and ‘I declare compliance.’ by A design and installation appraisal 6.13.2 it is reasonably expected that a fatality will Please describe how this condition is data is available and it covers at least: not occur due to any probable failure of the met — the design and installation UAS or of any external system that supports features (independence, the operation.

PDRA characterisation and conditions

Topic Method of Condition Integrity Proof proof 6.14 The vertical extension of the operational volume Please describe how this condition is separation, and redundancy); should be 150 m above the surface (or any other met and reference altitude defined by the Member State). — the particular risks (e.g. hail, ice, snow, electromagnetic

Note: The term ‘probable’ should be understood in its

interference, etc.) relevant to

qualitative interpretation, i.e. ‘anticipated to occur one

the type of operation.’

or more times during the entire system/operational life

of an item’.

6.15 The following enhanced containment additional conditions should apply if the adjacent area includes an assembly of people or if the adjacent airspace is classified as ARC-d (in accordance with the SORA):

6.15.1 The UAS should be designed to standards that Please include a reference to the ‘N/A since the basic containment are considered adequate by the competent relevant chapter/section of the OM or applies’ authority and/or in accordance with a means indicate ‘n/a’. or of compliance that is acceptable to that ‘I declare compliance with MoC competent authority such that: Light-UAS.2511.’ 6.15.1.1. the probability of the UA leaving the Please include a reference to the Analysis and/or test data with Declaration operational volume should be less than relevant chapter/section of the OM or supporting evidence is available.’ supported –4 10 /FH; and indicate ‘n/a’. or by ‘The UAS has a DVR 6.15.1.2 no single failure of the UAS or of any Please include a reference to the data demonstrating compliance with external system that supports the relevant chapter/section of the OM or operation should lead to operation indicate ‘n/a’. the enhanced containment outside the ground risk buffer. requirements.’

Note: The term ‘failure’ should be understood as an

occurrence that affects the operation of a component,

part, or element in such a way that it can no longer function as intended. Errors may cause failures but are not considered to be failures. Some structural or mechanical failures may be excluded from this criterion if

PDRA characterisation and conditions

Topic Method of Condition Integrity Proof proof

it can be shown that these mechanical parts were

designed according to aviation industry best practices. 6.15.2 SW and AEH whose development error(s) Please include a reference to the could directly lead to operations outside the relevant chapter/section of the OM or ground risk buffer should be developed indicate ‘n/a’. according to an industry standard or methodology that is recognised as adequate by the competent authorityEASA.

Note 1: The proposed additional safety conditions cover

both the integrity and the assurance levels.

Note 2: The proposed additional safety conditions do not imply a systematic need to develop the SW and AEH according to an industry standard or methodology that is recognised as adequate by the competent authority. For instance, if the UA design includes an independent engine shutdown function that systematically prevents the UA from exiting the ground risk buffer due to single failures or an SW/AEH error of the flight controls from occurring, the intent of the conditions of point 6.15.1

above could be considered met.

AMC3 Article 11 Rules for conducting an operational risk assessment

PREDEFINED RISK ASSESSMENT PDRA-G02 Version 1.12

EDITION January September 20232 […]

Remote pilot 5.3 The remote pilot has the authority to cancel or Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ delay any or all flight operations under the relevant chapter/section of the OM. following conditions: 5.3.1 when the safety of persons is jeopardised; Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ relevant chapter/section of the OM. 5.3.2 when property on the ground is jeopardised; Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ relevant chapter/section of the OM. 5.3.3 when other airspace users are in jeopardy; Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ relevant chapter/section of the OM. 5.3.4 when there is a violation of the terms of the Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ operational authorisation. relevant chapter/section of the OM. 5.4 The remote pilot should: 5.4.1 not perform any duties under the influence of Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ psychoactive substances or alcohol, or when relevant chapter/section of the OM. Selfthey are unfit to perform their tasks due to declaration injury, fatigue, medication, sickness or other causes; 5.4.2 be familiar with the manufacturer’s Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ instructions provided by the manufacturer of relevant chapter/section of the OM. the UAS; 5.4.3 ensure that the UA remains clear of clouds; Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ relevant chapter/section of the OM. 5.4.4 perform unaided visual scan of the airspace as Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ required to avoid any potential collision relevant chapter/section of the OM. hazard; 5.4.35 obtain updated information relevant to the Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ intended operation about any geographical relevant chapter/section of the OM. zones defined in accordance with Article 15 of the UAS Regulation; and 5.4.46 ensure that the UAS is in a safe condition to Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ complete the intended flight safely and, if relevant chapter/section of the OM. applicable, check whether the direct remote identification is active and up to date.

PDRA characterisation and conditions

Topic Method of Condition Integrity Proof proof Containment 6.9 To ensure a safe recovery from a technical issue that involves the UAS or an external system that supports the operation, the UAS operator should comply with the following basic containment provisions ensure that: 6.9.1 no probable failure of the UAS or of any Please describe how this condition is ‘n/a since enhanced containment external system that supports the operation met applies.’ would lead to operation outside the or operational volume; and ‘I declare compliance.’ ‘A design and installation 6.9.2 it is reasonably expected that a fatality will Please describe how this condition is appraisal is available and it covers not occur due to any probable failure of the met at least: Declaration UAS or of any external system that supports — the design and installation supported the operation. features (independence, by separation, and redundancy); data and — the particular risks (e.g. hail, ice, snow, electromagnetic interference, etc.) relevant to the type of operation.’ 6.10 The following enhanced containment additional conditions should apply if the adjacent area includes an assembly of people or if the adjacent airspace is classified as ARC-d (in accordance with the SORA): 6.10.1 The UAS should be designed to standards that Please include a reference to the ‘n/a since basic containment are considered adequate by the competent relevant chapter/section of the OM or applies’, authority and/or in accordance with a means indicate ‘n/a’. or

PDRA characterisation and conditions

Topic Method of Condition Integrity Proof proof of compliance that is acceptable to that ‘I declare compliance with MoC competent authority such that: Light-UAS.2511.’ Analysis and/or test data with supporting evidence is available.’ or 6.10.1.1. the probability of the UA leaving the Please include a reference to the ‘The UAS has a DVR operational volume should be less than relevant chapter/section of the OM or –4 demonstrating compliance with 10 /FH; and indicate ‘n/a’. the enhanced containment 6.101.1.2 no single failure of the UAS or of any Please include a reference to the requirements.’ external system that supports the relevant chapter/section of the OM or operation should lead to operation indicate ‘n/a’. outside the ground risk buffer. Declaration

Note: The term ‘failure’ should be understood as an

supported occurrence that affects the operation of a component, by

part, or element in such a way that it can no longer

data

function as intended. Errors may cause failures but are not considered to be failures. Some structural or mechanical failures may be excluded from this criterion if it can be shown that these mechanical parts were

designed according to aviation industry best practices. 6.10.2 SW and AEH whose development error(s) Please include a reference to the could directly lead to operations outside the relevant chapter/section of the OM, ground risk buffer should be developed otherwise indicate ‘n/a’. according to an industry standard or methodology that is recognised as adequate by the competent authorityEASA.

Note 1: The proposed additional safety conditions cover

both the integrity and the assurance levels.

Note 2: The proposed additional safety conditions do not imply a systematic need to develop the SW and AEH according to an industry standard or methodology that is recognised as adequate by the competent authority. For instance, if the UA design

PDRA characterisation and conditions

Topic Method of Condition Integrity Proof proof

includes an independent engine shutdown function that systematically prevents the UA from exiting the ground risk buffer due to single failures or an SW/AEH error of the flight controls from occurring, the intent of the conditions of point 6.10.1 above could be considered met

AMC4 Article 11 Rules for conducting an operational risk assessment

PREDEFINED RISK ASSESSMENT PDRA-S01 Version 1.12

EDITION January September 20223

(a) Scope This PDRA addresses the same type of operations that are covered by the standard scenario STS-01 (Appendix 1 to the Annex to the UAS Regulation); however, it provides the UAS operator with the flexibility to use UASs that do not need to be marked as class C5. This PDRA addresses UAS operations that are conducted: (1) with UA with maximum characteristic dimensions (e.g. wingspan, rotor diameter/area or maximum distance between the rotors tips in the case of a multirotor) of up to 3 m and MTOM of up to 25 kg; (2) in VLOS of the remote pilot; (3) over a controlled ground area that might be located in a populated area; (4) below 150 m above ground level (AGL) (except when close to obstacles); and (5) in controlled or uncontrolled airspace, provided that there is a low probability of encountering manned aircraft . (b) PDRA characterisation and conditions The characterisation and conditions for this PDRA are summarised in Table PDRA-S01.1 below:

PDRA characterisation and conditions

Topic Assurance level Condition Demonstration of integrity Demonstration of assurance 1. Operational characterisation (scope and limitations) Level of human 1.1 No autonomous operations: the remote pilot Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ intervention should have the ability to maintain control of relevant chapter/section of the OM. the UA, except in case of a loss of the command-and control (C2) link. 1.2 The remote pilot should operate only one UA Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ Self-declaration at a time. relevant chapter/section of the OM. 1.3 The remote pilot should not operate the UA Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ from a moving vehicle. relevant chapter/section of the OM. 1.4 The remote pilot should not hand the control Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ of the UA over to another command unit. relevant chapter/section of the OM. UA range limit 1.5 VLOS distance from the remote pilot at all Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ Self-declaration times. relevant chapter/section of the OM. Overflown areas 1.6 UAS operations should be conducted over a Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ controlled ground area. relevant chapter/section of the OM. 1.7 For the operation of a tethered UA, the area Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ Self-declaration should have a radius equal to the tether relevant chapter/section of the OM. length plus 5 m, and should be centred on the point of the surface of the Earth where the tether is fixed. UA limitations 1.8 The UA should have an MTOM of less than Please include a reference to the 25 kg, including payload. relevant chapter/section of the OM. ‘I declare compliance.’ 1.89 The UA should have a maximum Self-declaration characteristic dimension (e.g. wingspan, rotor diameter/area or maximum distance between rotors’ tips in the case of a multirotor) of less than 3 m. Flight height 1.910 The remote pilot should maintain the UA Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ limit within 120 m (unless making use of the relevant chapter/section of the OM. option defined in point 1.12) from the closest point of the surface of the Earth. The

PDRA characterisation and conditions

Topic Assurance level Condition Demonstration of integrity Demonstration of assurance measurement of the distances should be adapted according to the geographical characteristics of the terrain, such as plains, hills, and mountains. 1.101 When flying a UA within a horizontal distance Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ of 50 m from an artificial obstacle that is relevant chapter/section of the OM. taller than 105 m, the maximum height of the UAS operation may be increased up to Self-declaration 15 m above the height of the obstacle, at the request of the entity responsible for the obstacle. 1.112 When UAS operators intend to operate at a Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ height above 120 m, up to 150 m, they relevant chapter/section of the OM. should define a risk buffer according to point 3.8 below. Airspace 1.123 The UA should be operated: 1.123.1 in uncontrolled airspace, unless different Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ limitations are provided for by the Member relevant chapter/section of the OM. States for their UAS geographical zones in areas where the probability of encountering manned aircraft is not low; or 1.123.2 in controlled airspace after coordination Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ Self-declaration and flight authorisation in accordance with relevant chapter/section of the OM. the published procedures for the area of operation, to ensure that the probability of encountering manned aircraft is low.

Note: Airspace with an air risk that is classified as not higher than ARC-b can be considered having a

low probability of encountering manned aircraft. Visibility 1.134 The flight visibility should allow the remote Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ Self-declaration pilot to conduct the entire flight in VLOS. relevant chapter/section of the OM. Others 1.145 The UA should not be used to carry Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ dangerous goods, except for dropping items relevant chapter/section of the OM. Self-declaration in connection with agricultural, horticultural

PDRA characterisation and conditions

Topic Assurance level Condition Demonstration of integrity Demonstration of assurance or forestry activities where the carriage of such items does not contravene any other applicable regulations. Note: The operator shall comply with applicable national or international regulations on the use of plant protection products, chemicals, dangerous substances, and preparations as appropriate. This includes Directive 2009/128/EC establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides, if applicable.

2. Operational risk classification (according to the classification defined in AMC1 Article 11 of the UAS Regulation)

Final GRC 3 Final ARC ARC-b SAIL II 3. Operational mitigations

Operational and 3.1 The UAS operator should define the Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ adjacent volume operational volume, ground risk buffer and relevant chapter/section of the OM. (see Figure 2 adjacent volume for the intended operation, of AMC1 including: Article 11) 3.1.1 the flight geography; and Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ relevant chapter/section of the OM. 3.1.2 the contingency volume, with its external Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ limit(s) at least 10 m beyond the limit(s) relevant chapter/section of the OM. of the flight geography if the operation is conducted with untethered UA. Self-declaration 3.2 To determine the operational volume, the Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ UAS operator should consider the position- relevant chapter/section of the OM. keeping capabilities of the UAS in 4D space (latitude, longitude, height, and time). 3.3 In particular, the accuracy of the navigation Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ solution, the flight technical error of the UAS, relevant chapter/section of the OM. as well as the flight path definition error (e.g. map error) and latencies should be

PDRA characterisation and conditions

Topic Assurance level Condition Demonstration of integrity Demonstration of assurance considered and addressed when determining the operational volume.

3.4 The size of adjacent volume should be Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ defined. relevant chapter/section of the OM.

3.5 The remote pilot should apply emergency Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ procedures as soon as there is an indication relevant chapter/section of the OM. that the UA may exceed the limits of the operational volume, as per point 5.3.98(d) below. 3.6 No persons should be overflown when Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ spraying liquids or dropping substances. relevant chapter/section of the OM. Infrastructure or facilities can be overflown on request of the entity responsible for the infrastructure or facility. Ground risk 3.75 The UAS operator should establish a ground Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ risk buffer to protect third parties on the relevant chapter/section of the OM. ground outside the operational volume.

3.86 For the operation of untethered UA, the Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ ground risk buffer should cover a distance relevant chapter/section of the OM. beyond the external limit(s) of the contingency area. That distance should be at least as defined below: Max Minimum distance for ground height risk buffer AGL with MTOM with MTOM Self-declaration of up to 10 kg greater than 10 kg 10 m 5 m 10 m 30 m 10 m 20 m

PDRA characterisation and conditions

Topic Assurance level Condition Demonstration of integrity Demonstration of assurance 60 m 15 m 30 m 90 m 20 m 45 m 120 m 25 m 60 m 150 m 30 m 75 m 3.97 For the operation of tethered UA, the ground Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ risk buffer is considered in point 1.7 above. relevant chapter/section of the OM. Air risk 3.108 If the UAS operation is performed above 120 m and up to 150 m, the UAS operator should: Declaration 3.108.1 establish an air risk buffer to Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance and that protect third parties in the air outside the relevant chapter/section of the OM, supporting evidence is included in the supported by operational volume; and otherwise indicate ‘n/a’. OM.’ data Justification supporting the reduction of the air risk buffer is documented in […] or ‘n/a’. 3.108.2 if the air risk buffer is part of Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance and that controlled airspace, coordinate the relevant chapter/section of the OM, supporting evidence is included in the operation with the respective ANSP; otherwise indicate ‘n/a’. OM.’ ‘or n/a’ 3.108.3 develop appropriate procedures Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance and that to not jeopardise other airspace users. relevant chapter/section of the OM. supporting evidence is included in the Please describe how the remote pilots OM.’ ‘or n/a’

and, if employed, the AOs are able to assess the height of the UA compared to other airspace users , otherwise

indicate ‘n/a’.

PDRA characterisation and conditions

Topic Assurance level Condition Demonstration of integrity Demonstration of assurance 3.119 The operational volume should be outside Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ any geographical zone corresponding to a relevant chapter/section of the OM. flight restriction zone of a protected aerodrome or of any other type, as defined Self-declaration by the responsible authority, unless the UAS operator has been granted appropriate permission. 3.120 Prior to the flight, the UAS operator should Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ assess the proximity of the planned relevant chapter/section of the OM. operation to manned aircraft activity. 3.13 The UAS operator should establish a de- Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ confliction scheme that allows the remote relevant chapter/section of the OM pilot to take efficient decisions in case of incoming traffic. Observers 3.14 Airspace observers (AOs): n/a UA observers: refer to point 5.3.98(b) below.

4. UAS operator and UAS operations conditions UAS operator 4.1 The UAS operator should: and UAS 4.1.1 develop an operations manual (OM) (for Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance and that operations the template, refer to met. supporting evidence is included in the AMC1 UAS.SPEC.030(3)(e) and to the OM.’ complementary information in GM1 UAS.SPEC.030(3)(e)); 4.1.2 define, and include in the OM, the Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance and that procedure to determine the operational met. supporting evidence is included in the volume and ground risk buffer for the OM.’ intended operation, as per points 3.1 to 3.6 above, and the adjacent volumeinclude them in the OM; 4.1.3 develop procedures to ensure that the Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance and that operation is conducted safely and that relevant chapter/section of the OM. supporting evidence is included in the security requirements applicable to the OM.’ Declaration the area of operations are complied with supported by during the intended operation; data 4.1.4 develop measures to protect the UAS Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance and that against unlawful interference and relevant chapter/section of the OM. supporting evidence is included in unauthorised access; the OM.’ 4.1.5 develop procedures to ensure that all Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance and that operations comply with Regulation relevant chapter/section of the OM. supporting evidence is included in (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of the OM.’ natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. In particular, the UAS operator should carry out a data protection impact assessment, when this is required by the data protection national authority of the Member State with regard to the application of Article 35 of that Regulation;

4.1.6 develop guidelines for its remote pilots to Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance and that plan UAS operations in a manner that relevant chapter/section of the OM. supporting evidence is included in minimises nuisance, including noise and the OM.’ other emissions-related nuisance, to people and animals; 4.1.7 ensure the adequacy of the contingency Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance and that and emergency procedures and prove it met evidence is available to the through any of the following: competent authority for review.’ (a) dedicated flight tests; or (b) simulations, provided that the representativeness of the simulation means is proven valid for the intended purpose with positive results; or (c) any other means acceptable to the competent authority; 4.1.8 develop an effective emergency response Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance and that plan (ERP) that is suitable for the met evidence is available to the intended operation (see competent authority for review.’ GM1 UAS.SPEC.030(3)(e)); 4.1.9 upload updated information into the geo- Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance and that awareness function, if such system is met supporting evidence is included in the installed on the UAS, when required by OM.’ the UAS geographical zone for the intended location of the operation; 4.1.10 ensure that before starting the operation, Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance and that the controlled ground area is in place, met supporting evidence is included in the effective, and compliant with the OM.’ minimum distance that is defined in points 3.1 and 3.5 above and, when required, coordination with the appropriate authorities has been established; 4.1.11 ensure that before starting the operation, all persons that are present in the controlled ground area:

(a) have been informed of the risks of the Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance and that operation; met supporting evidence is included in the OM.’ (b) have been briefed on or trained in, as Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance and that appropriate, the safety precautions met supporting evidence is included in the and measures that the UAS operator OM.’ has established for their protection; and (c) have explicitly agreed to participate in Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance and that the operation; and met supporting evidence is included in the OM.’ 4.1.12 designate for each flight a remote pilot Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance and that with adequate competency and other relevant chapter/section of the OM. supporting evidence is included in the personnel in charge of duties essential to OM.’ the UAS operation if needed; 4.1.13 in case the operation takes place in a Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance and that controlled airspace, as part of the relevant chapter/section of the OM. supporting evidence is included in the procedures that are contained in the OM OM.’ (point 4.1.1 above), include the description of the following: (a) the method and means of communication with the authority or entity responsible for the management of the airspace during the entire period of operation; (b) the member(s) of personnel in charge of duties essential to the UA operation, who are responsible for establishing that communication; 4.1.134 ensure that the UAS operation Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance and that effectively uses and supports the efficient relevant chapter/section of the OM. supporting evidence is included in the use of the radio spectrum in order to OM.’ avoid harmful interference; 4.1.145 keep for a minimum of 3 years and Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance and that maintain up to date a record of the relevant chapter/section of the OM. recordkeeping data is available to the information on UAS operations, including competent authority.’

any unusual technical or operational occurrences and other data as required by the declaration or by the operational authorisation. UAS 4.2 The UAS operator should: maintenance Self-declaration 4.2.1 ensure that the UAS maintenance Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ instructions that are defined by the UAS relevant chapter/section of the OM. operator are included in the OM and cover at least the UAS manufacturer’s instructions and requirements when applicable; and 4.2.2 ensure that the maintenance staff follow Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ the UAS maintenance instructions when relevant chapter/section of the OM. performing maintenance; 4.2.3 keep for a minimum of 3 years and Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ maintain up to date a record of the relevant chapter/section of the OM. maintenance activities conducted on the UAS; 4.2.4 establish and maintain up to date a list of Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ the maintenance staff employed by the relevant chapter/section of the OM. operator to carry out maintenance activities; 4.2.5 comply with point UAS.SPEC.100, if the Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ or ‘n/a’ UAS uses certified equipment. relevant chapter/section of the OM or n/a. External services 4.35 The UAS operator should ensure that the Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance.’ level of performance for any externally met. provided service that is necessary for the safety of the flight is adequate for the intended operation. The UAS operator should declare that this level of performance Self-declaration is adequately achieved. 4.46 The UAS operator should define and allocate the roles and responsibilities between the UAS operator and the external service provider(s), if applicable.

5. Conditions for the personnel in charge of duties essential to the UAS operation General 5.1 The UAS operator should keep and maintain Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance.’ up to date a record of all the relevant met. Record-keeping data is available for qualifications and training courses inspection at the request of the completed by the remote pilot and the other competent authority. personnel in charge of duties essential to the UAS operation and by the maintenance staff for at least 3 years after those persons have ceased to be employed by the organisation or have changed position within the organisation. 5.2 The remote pilot should have the authority to cancel or delay any or all flight operations under the following conditions: 5.2.1 the safety of persons is jeopardised; or Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ relevant chapter/section of the OM. 5.2.2 property on the ground is jeopardised; or Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ relevant chapter/section of the OM. 5.2.3 other airspace users are in jeopardy; or Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ relevant chapter/section of the OM. 5.2.4 there is a violation of the terms of the Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ operational authorisation. relevant chapter/section of the OM. Remote pilot 5.3 The remote pilot should: 5.3.1 not perform any duties under the Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ influence of psychoactive substances or relevant chapter/section of the OM. alcohol, or when they are unfit to perform Self-declaration their tasks due to injury, fatigue, medication, sickness or other causes; 5.3.2 be familiar with the manufacturer’s Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ instructions provided by the relevant chapter/section of the OM. manufacturer of the UAS; 5.3.3 ensure that the UA remains clear of Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ clouds; relevant chapter/section of the OM. 5.3.4 hold a certificate of remote pilot Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance.’ or ‘n/a’ theoretical knowledge, in accordance met. with Attachment A to Chapter I of

Appendix 1 to the Annex to the UAS Regulation, which is issued by the competent authority or by an entity that is designated by the competent authority of a Member State; 5.3.5 hold an accreditation of completion of a Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance.’ or ‘n/a’ practical-skills training course for this met. PDRA, in accordance with Attachment A to Chapter I of Appendix 1 to the Annex to the UAS Regulation, which is issued by: (a) an entity that has declared compliance with the requirements of Appendix 3 to the Annex to the UAS Regulation and is recognised by the competent authority of a Member State; or (b) a UAS operator that has been authorised by the competent authority of the Member State of registration to operate according to this PDRA (or declared to the same competent authority, compliance with STS-01) and with the requirements of Appendix 3 to the Annex to the UAS Regulation. 5.3.6 If operations are conducted at a height between 120 and 150 m, the remote pilot should undergo additional theoretical knowledge training in the following topics: (a) raising awareness about the air risk Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance and that the and about the existence of other met. training syllabus is available for airspace users; inspection at the request of the competent authority.’ (b) checking height determination/ Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance and that the limitation devices; and met. training syllabus is available for

inspection at the request of the competent authority.’ (c) using applicable procedures in case a Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance and that the manned aircraft is detected. met. training syllabus is available for inspection at the request of the competent authority.’ 5.3.7 As an alternative to holding a certificate Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance and that the of remote pilot theoretical knowledge, met. training syllabus is available for according to point 5.3.4, and to holding inspection at the request of the an accreditation of completion of a competent authority.’ practical-skills training course according or to point 5.3.54, the operator may ‘n/a’. propose a dedicated training syllabus to the competent authority; 5.3.87 Before starting the UAS operation, the remote pilot should: (a) verify that the means to terminate the Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance.’ UA flight and the remote met. identification system are operational; (b) obtain updated information relevant Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance. to the intended operation about any relevant chapter/section of the OM. geographical zones defined in accordance with Article 15 of the UAS Regulation; and (c) ensure that the UAS is in a safe Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance. condition to complete the intended relevant chapter/section of the OM. flight safely and, if applicable, check whether the direct remote identification is active and up to date. 5.3.98 During the flight:

(a) keep the UA in VLOS and maintain Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance.’ thorough visual scan of the airspace met. that surrounds the UA to avoid any risk of collision with manned aircraft; the remote pilot should discontinue

the flight if the operation poses a risk to other aircraft, people, animals, environment or property; (b) for the purpose of point (a) above, be Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance.’ possibly being assisted by a UA met. observer ; clear and effective communication should be established between the remote pilot and the UA observer; (c) use the contingency procedures that Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance.’ are defined by the UAS operator for met. abnormal situations, including situations where the remote pilot has an indication that the UA may exceed the limits of the flight geography; and (d) use the emergency procedures that Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance.’ are defined by the UAS operator for met. emergencies, including triggering the means to terminate the flight when the remote pilot has an indication that the UA may exceed the limits of the operational volume; the means to terminate the flight should be triggered at least 10 m before the UA reaches the limits of the operational volume; (e) keep the UA at a ground speed of less Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance.’ than 5 m/s in case of untethered UA; met. (f) activate the direct remote Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ identification system . relevant chapter/section of the OM.

6. Technical conditions

UAS 6.1 The UAS operator should use a UAS marked ‘I declare that the UAS is marked as class C5 and complies with the with a class C5 identification label.’ requirements of that class, as defined in or ‘n/a’ Part 16 of the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/945. 6.2 As an alternative to point 6.1, the UAS Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance.’ or ‘n/a’ operator may use a UAS that complies with met. the requirements of Part 16 of the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/945, except that the UAS does not need to: Self- • bear a class C3 UAS or a class C5 UAS declaration identification label; • have an MTOM of less than 25 kg; • be exclusively powered by electricity, if the UAS operator ensures that the environmental impact that is caused by the use of non-electric UAS is minimised; • include an information notice that is published by EASA and provides the applicable limitations and obligations, as required by the UAS Regulation; and • include the manufacturer’s instructions for the UAS, if it is privately built; however, information on its operation and maintenance, as well as on the training of the remote pilot, should be included in the OM.

Note 1: The UAS can comply with point (9) of Part 4 of the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/945 by using an add-on that complies with Part 6 of the Annex to that Regulation.

Note 2: If the UA does not bear a physical serial number that is compliant with standard ANSI/CTA 2063-A ‘Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers’ and/or does not have an integrated system of direct remote identification, it can comply with point (9) of Part 4 of the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/945 by using an add-on that complies with Part 6 of the Annex to that Regulation. 6.3 In addition, if: Please describe how this condition is ‘Basic containment applies and I • the adjacent area does not include a met. declare that a design and installation populated area or an assembly of appraisal is available and it covers at people; and least: • the adjacent airspace is classified as — the design and installation ARC-a or ARC-b, features (independence point 5 of Part 16 of the Annex to Regulation separation, and redundancy); and (EU) 2019/945 may be replaced with the — the particular risks (e.g. hail, ice, following basic containment conditions: snow, electromagnetic • no probable failure of the UAS or interference, etc.) relevant to the of any external system that type of operation.’ supports the operation would or lead to operation outside the ‘Enhanced containment applies and I operational volume; and declare compliance with MoC Light- • it is reasonably expected that a UAS.2511. fatality will not occur due to any Analysis and/or test data with probable failure of the UAS or of supporting evidence is available.’ any external system that or supports the operation. ‘The UAS has a DVR demonstrating compliance with the enhanced containment requirements.’ 6.2.1 bear a class C3 UAS or a class C5 UAS identification label; 6.2.2 be exclusively powered by electricity, if the UAS operator ensures that the

environmental impact that is caused by the use of non-electric UAS is minimised; 6.2.3 include a notice that is published by EASA and provides the applicable limitations and obligations, as required by the UAS Regulation; and 6.2.4 include the manufacturer’s instructions for the UAS if it is privately built; however, information on its operation and maintenance, as well as on the training of the remote pilot, should be included in the OM.

Note 1: The UAS can comply with point (9) of Part 4 of the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/945 by using an add-on that complies with Part 6 of the Annex to

that Regulation.

Note 2: If the UA does not bear a physical serial number that is compliant with standard ANSI/CTA-2063-A ‘Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers’ and/or does not have an integrated system of direct remote identification, it can comply with point (9) of Part 4 of the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/945 by using an add-on that complies

with Part 6 of the Annex to that Regulation.

Note 3: If the UAS is privately built, there may be no

identification on the UA of its MTOM. In that case,

the UAS operator should ensure that the MTOM of the UA, in the configuration of the UA before take-

off, does not exceed 25 kg. 6.4 If designed to spray, the UA should:

6.4.1 be designed to avoid an accidental release of any substance;

6.4.2 have means for the remote pilot to immediately stop the spraying of liquids or dropping of substances in case of an emergency.

Table PDRA-S01.1 — Main limitations and conditions for PDRA-S01

AMC6 Article 11 Rules for conducting an operational risk assessment

PREDEFINED RISK ASSESSMENT PDRA-G03 Version 1.01

EDITION January September 20232 […]

Air risk Self-declaration 3.9 The UAS operation should be conducted: Please include a reference to the relevant ‘I declare compliance.’ 3.9.1 in ‘atypical airspace’ which, for the chapter/section of the OM. purpose of this PDRA, is one of the following: 3.9.1.1 in reserved or segregated airspace; the claim for ARC-a is met if a reserved or segregated airspace is established and approved for the purpose of conducting UAS operations under this PDRA, with the operational volume and air risk buffer, if applicable, being entirely contained in that reserved or segregated airspace; 3.9.1.2 at a height of the flight geography of less than 30 m; 3.9.1.3 when operating in the proximity of natural or artificial

obstacles (e.g. trees, buildings, towers, cranes, fences, power lines, etc.) whose height is below 20 m, keeping the UA within the following distances: (i) 30 m horizontal distance; (ii) 1530 m vertical distance from the top of the overflown obstacle; 3.9.1.4 when operating in the proximity of natural or artificial obstacles (e.g. trees, buildings, towers, cranes, fences, power lines, etc.) whose height is above 20 m, keeping the UA within the following distances: (i) 1530m horizontal distance; (ii) 15 m vertical distance from the top of the overflown obstacle;

[…]

Remote pilot 5.3 The remote pilot has the authority to cancel or delay any or all flight operations under the following conditions:

5.3.1 the safety of persons is jeopardised; Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ relevant chapter/section of the OM. 5.3.2 property on the ground is jeopardised; Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ relevant chapter/section of the OM. 5.3.3 other airspace users are in jeopardy; Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ relevant chapter/section of the OM. 5.3.4 there is a violation of the terms of the Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ operational authorisation. relevant chapter/section of the OM. 5.4 The remote pilot should: 5.4.1 not perform any duties under the influence Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ of psychoactive substances or alcohol, or relevant chapter/section of the OM.

Self-declaration

when they are unfit to perform their tasks due to injury, fatigue, medication, sickness or other causes; 5.4.2 be familiar with the manufacturer’s Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ instructions provided by the manufacturer relevant chapter/section of the OM. of the UAS; 5.4.3 ensure that the UA remains clear of clouds; Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ relevant chapter/section of the OM. 5.4.4 perform unaided visual scan of the airspace Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ as required to avoid any potential collision relevant chapter/section of the OM. hazard; 5.4.35 obtain updated information relevant to the Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ intended operation about any geographical relevant chapter/section of the OM. zones defined in accordance with Article 15 of the UAS Regulation; and 5.4.46 ensure that the UAS is in a safe condition to Please include a reference to the ‘I declare compliance.’ complete the intended flight safely and, if relevant chapter/section of the OM. applicable, check whether the direct remote identification is active and up to date.

[…]

PDRA characterisation and conditions

Topic Method of Condition Integrity Proof proof Containment 6.12 To ensure a safe recovery from a technical issue that involves the UAS or an external system that supports the operation, the UAS operator should comply with the following basic containment provisions ensure that: 6.12.1 no probable failure of the UAS or of any Please describe how this condition is ‘n/a since enhanced containment external system that supports the operation met applies.’ Declaration would lead to operation outside the or supported operational volume; and ‘I declare compliance.’ by ‘A design and installation 6.12.2 it is reasonably expected that a fatality will Please describe how this condition is data appraisal is available and it covers not occur due to any probable failure of the met at least: UAS or of any external system that supports — the design and installation the operation. features (independence,

Note: The term ‘probable’ should be understood in its

separation, and redundancy);

qualitative interpretation, i.e. ‘anticipated to

and

occur one or more times during the entire

— the particular risks (e.g. hail, system/operational life of an item’. ice, snow, electromagnetic interference, etc.) relevant to the type of operation.’ 6.13 The following enhanced containment additional conditions should apply if the adjacent area includes an assembly of people or if the adjacent airspace is classified as ARC-d (in accordance with the SORA):

PDRA characterisation and conditions

Topic Method of Condition Integrity Proof proof 6.13.1 The UAS should be designed to standards that Please include a reference to the ‘N/A since the basic containment are considered adequate by the competent relevant chapter/section of the OM or applies’ authority and/or in accordance with a means indicate ‘n/a’. or of compliance that is acceptable to that ‘I declare compliance with MoC competent authority such that: Light-UAS.2511.’ 6.13.1.1. the probability of the UA leaving the Please include a reference to the Analysis and/or test data with operational volume should be less than relevant chapter/section of the OM or supporting evidence is available.’ –4 10 /FH; and indicate ‘n/a’. or 6.13.1.2 no single failure of the UAS or of any Please include a reference to the ‘The UAS has a DVR external system that supports the relevant chapter/section of the OM or demonstrating compliance with operation should lead to operation indicate ‘n/a’. Light-UAS.2511.’ Declaration outside the ground risk buffer. supported Note: The term ‘failure’ should be understood as an by occurrence that affects the operation of a component, data part, or element in such a way that it can no longer

function as intended. Errors may cause failures but are not considered to be failures. Some structural or mechanical failures may be excluded from this criterion if it can be shown that these mechanical parts were

designed according to aviation industry best practices. 6.13.2 SW and AEH whose development error(s) Please include a reference to the could directly lead to operations outside the relevant chapter/section of the OM or ground risk buffer should be developed indicate ‘n/a’ according to an industry standard or methodology that is recognised as adequate by the competent authorityEASA.

Note 1: The proposed additional safety conditions cover

both the integrity and the assurance levels.

Note 2: The proposed additional safety conditions do not imply a systematic need to develop the SW and AEH according to an industry standard or methodology that is recognised as adequate by the competent authority. For instance, if the UA

PDRA characterisation and conditions

Topic Method of Condition Integrity Proof proof

design includes an independent engine shutdown function that systematically prevents the UA from exiting the ground risk buffer due to single failures or an SW/AEH error of the flight controls from occurring, the intent of the conditions of

point 6.13.1 above could be considered met.

Note 3: For this PDRA, having adjacent airspace classified as ARC-c like a hospital heliport in uncontrolled airspace is also deemed subject to the above additional conditions (in addition to ARC-d, as

per SORA Step #9 (c)). Remote Self- 6.145 The UAS bears a unique serial number compliant Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance.’ identification declaration with standard ANSI/CTA2063-A-2019, Small met. Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers, 2019, according to Article 40(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/945. 6.156 The UAS is equipped with a remote identification Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance.’ system according to Article 40(5) of Regulation met. (EU) 2019/945. Lights Self- 6.167 If the UAS is operated at night, it is equipped Please describe how this condition is ‘I declare compliance.’ or ‘n/a’ declaration with at least one green flashing light according to met or indicate ‘n/a’. point UAS.SPEC.050(1)(l)(i) of the UAS Regulation.

AMC7 Article 11 Rules for conducting an operational risk assessment

OPERATIONS OF UNMANNED FREE BALLOONS

An operation using an unmanned free balloon that complies with the provisions defined in Appendix 2 to Regulation (EU) No 923/2012 is considered meeting the safety objectives of the operational risk assessment laid down in Article 11 and thus implies compliance with this Article.