JUDGMENT OF 28. 4. 1966 — CASE 51/65 ILFO v HIGH AUTHORITY
In Case 51/65
THE COURT composed of: Ch. L. Hammes, President, L. Delvaux, President of Chamber, A. M. Donner, R. Lecourt and R. Monaco (Rapporteur), Judges, Advocate-General: J. Gand Registrar: A. Van Houtte
gives the following
JUDGMENT
Issues of fact and of law
I — Facts
The facts may be summarized as follows:
By letter of 8 April 1963, the High Authority informed the ILFO company that the amount of assessable ferrous scrap consumed by the undertaking had been estimated at 29958 metric tons and called upon it to pay the sum of 196197166 lire by way of equalization.
The applicant challenged this letter and basic Decision No 7/63 before the Court of Justice. The Application in Case 61/63 was dismissed by the Court as inadmissible by Judgment of 9 June 1964.
In the light of the observations of the applicant and the documents produced by it in the course of the proceedings, the High Authority made a further review of the quantities of scrap assessable. As a result of these checks and by applying the indirect method of calculation based upon the consumption of electricity, it adopted, on 19 May 1965, two individual decisions one of which estimates the quantity of assessable scrap at 26532 metric tons, whilst the other fixes the amount of the corresponding contribution at 176080828 lire.
These two decisions, which were notified to the ILFO company on 24 June 1965, form the subject of the present application.
II — Conclusions of the parties
The applicant claims that the Court should:
“(a) Exercise the powers conferred on it by Article 33 of the Treaty in order to annul the two individual decisions of 19 May 1965 and, in addition, in so far as it deems it appropriate, Decision No 7/63 to which the individual decisions refer; (b) Exercise the powers conferred on it by Article 34 of the Treaty to refer the matter back to the High Authority for it to take the necessary steps to comply with the judgment, including the re-imbursement of any sum paid in error and the payment of such damages as the Court shall see fit; (c) Order the High Authority to pay the costs; (d) Make interlocutory orders for the conduct of the measures of inquiry indicated in each submission.”
The defendant contends that the Court should:
“Take into account the fact that the metric tonnage of assessable scrap has been reduced to 24979 metric tons and the total of the sums owed by the ILFO company to 171765956 lire, dismiss the application against the two individual decisions of 19 May 1965 and order the applicant to pay the costs.”
III — Submissions and arguments of the parties
The submissions and arguments of the parties may be summarized as follows:
Admissibility
The defendant puts forward no objection to the admissibility of the application.
The substance of the case
1. Misuse of powers in the form of inequality of treatment; infringement of the general rule against discrimination (Article 3(a), together with Articles 53 (4)(b), etc. of the Treaty) The applicant observes that when the administration applies different criteria or methods to similar situations, without the resulting difference in treatment being justified, its assessment of that situation is not made in the normal logical manner. Thus, not only does the administration misuse its powers, but it also infringes the general principle of law which prohibits all discrimination. In this instance the High Authority has misused its powers and infringed this principle by adopting, as regards the applicant, the method of calculation based on the consumption of electricity in the furnaces. First, this method could not be used as regards undertakings which did not operate electric furnaces during the period in question. Secondly, it is known in iron and steel circles that the volume of production and, therefore, the quantity of ferrous scrap consumed, are calculable and have been calculated in more than one case, on the basis of a different criterion, that of the average consumption of ferrous scrap during one working day. It is the latter criterion which ought to have been used in respect of all undertakings with or without electric furnaces. The fact that it was not applied to the applicant, although it was applied to other undertakings, constitutes discriminatory treatment of the former. In order to show that adoption of the criterion based on the actual number of working days during the period under consideration would have produced figures which were both considerably lower than those quoted by the High Authority and very close to those declared by the ILFO company, the applicant suggests that particular measures of inquiry be conducted and declares itselfprepared to produce all necessary documents. The defendant makes the general observation that the applicant is relying on a general and undetermined concept of misuse of powers which is not the one which is sanctioned by Community law. Both Article 33 of the Treaty and the case-law of the Court have distinguished between this submission and those other cases in which an application has been brought against an ultra vires act and considered that it can only be brought if the purpose of the High Authority's action was different from that fixed by the law. It is, moreover, mistaken to conclude that the High Authority has misused its powers from the fact that the treatment of the applicant was different from that of other undertakings. Although it is true that unequal treatment may sometimes result from a misuse of powers, it is also true that such treatment does not itself necessarily imply the existence of such misuse. In fact, even supposing the High Authority to have treated ILFO differently from the other undertakings, it remains to be established that it did so for a purpose other than that fixed by the law, which is to assess the applicant to contribution on the same footing as all consumers of ferrous scrap. On this point, however, no evidence has been brought. As regards the complaint of unequal treatment considered by itself, it is true that the principle of equality is a fundamental rule of Community law enshrined in Article 4 of the Treaty. On the general level, it is, however, indisputable that by virtue of an established principle of law, a person who makes it impossible for the administration to enforce the law normally cannot then criticize the measures which it has had to adopt in order to achieve its object (cf. Judgments in Cases 18/62 and 108/63). In this instance, the duty of the High Authority to act impartially by requiring the same contribution from all undertakings which have consumed the same quantities of ferrous scrap could only be respected if certain essential data were made available to the High Authority following requests that it be provided by the undertakings concerned. However, although in this case the High Authority took all possible steps, the ILFO company refused to cooperate to such an extent that a pecuniary sanction was imposed. It was thus impossible for the High Authority to carry out a direct assessment of the consumption of ferrous scrap. Furthermore, to claim that an assessment must be based on the same criteria of calculation for all undertakings, however they are organized and whatever their activities, or whatever their conduct vis-à-vis the High Authority, is to claim an unequal treatment in law. In addition, it must be noted on a more technical level that the method of calculation in dispute, based on the consumption of electricity, produced much more reliable results than those produced by the method based on average daily consumption, calculated on the basis of the number of working days. This is so for two reasons; first, the daily scrap consumption cannot be calculated exactly, since several principal and secondary factors in its calculation are bound to be inaccurate. Secondly, it is impossible to establish the “average” without already knowing the total scrap consumption (on the basis of which it would be possible to establish the daily average), that is, without knowing a factor in the calculation which in this instance must be determined inductively. The applicant replies that a misuse of powers does not necessarily always presuppose an intention on the part of the administrative authority to employ the power with which it is entrusted for an illegal purpose. Intention is not a necessary requirement of such a defect, which may also arise from the fact that, by a distortion of the facts or discrimination, the administration has pursued an object which is “abnormal” as compared with that laid down by law. It can be supposed that in this instance the High Authority, motivated by the need to ensure a balance between the debit and credit accounts of the equalization scheme, was led to choose, from the various inductive methods of calculation, not that which would give the most precise results but that capable of producing the results most favourable to the Equalization Fund. Moreover, once it is accepted that unequal treatment may be “the result of a misuse of powers”, it is sufficient to establish the existence of such inequality for the misuse of powers to be also established and for the contested decision to be shown as unlawful. As regards the existence of this inequality, it must be stated first of all that, in view of its inability to provide complete and accurate documents, the applicant never claimed that the High Authority should apply to it “the same method of assessment” as that applied to those undertakings which were able to supply such documentation and that it should not use any inductive method of calculation. It merely puts forward the objection that, in this instance, the High Authority employed an inductive method which does not always give consistent results and which was in fact not applied to other undertakings by reason of the unreliable nature, acknowledged by the High Authority, of the “electricity/steel/scrap” formula. Moreover, the ILFO company has not recommended simply that a single inductive method of assessment be applied to all undertakings, since it accepts that various methods of assessment exist and may be used, provided that they are capable of guaranteeing results equivalent and similar to those reached from the directly relevant and specific documents. On a technical level the applicant then disputes the criticisms made by the defendant of the method of calculation based on the number of working days. Although the method based on the consumption of electricity was at one time approved by experts, experience has shown it to be far from perfect, by reason of the different situations of undertakings operating electric furnaces. This method has in fact been challenged on several occasions and, in certain cases, it was abandoned by the High Authority in favour of the method based on “average daily consumption” which, depending on the number of working days, is based on a certain and undeniable factor: the calendar. The argument that the total consumption must be known before it is possible to calculate the “average” daily consumption arises from a misunderstanding. In using the expression “average consumption” it is clear that the applicant did not intend to refer to the result produced by the division of the figure representing total consumption during the period under review by the number of working days in this period. This expression was used to mean “typical consumption during a given unit of time”. Taking the particular situation of the ILFO company as a starting point, average consumption would be calculated as follows: The first factor to be determined is the number of working days in one year: in this instance, 289 days. This number of days, divided by 12, corresponds to the number of working days per month: that is, 24 days. As, when the ILFO company is working at full capacity, it operates three shifts of 8 hours each (for a total of 24 hours) per day, the theoretical work rate per month, measured in hours is 24 days of 24 hours; that is, 576 hours. The work rate thus established is only theoretical. The corrections which must be made on the practical level by reason of various technical and commercial factors must be calculated inductively by referring to the figures for the consumption of electricity. Where less electricity has been consumed, it will be necessary to reduce proportionately the number of working hours and days in relation to the abovementioned theoretical data. Taking into account the consumption of electricity from 1955 to 1958, it is clear that during this period the number of working hours at ILFO was 20643. Each charging of the furnace and each tapping requires on average 4.5 hours. By dividing the total number of working hours by this figure, it is possible to establish the number of times the furnace was charged during the period under consideration: that is, 4585 hours. The consumption of raw materials and output in respect of a furnace of 4 to 5 metric tons' capacity such as that operated by the applicant is in the proportion of 4996 metric tons of scrap charged to 5000 metric tons of liquid steel produced. By multiplying these figures by the total number of chargings it is possible to establish the total quantity of scrap charged and liquid steel produced during the four years' period: that is, 22907 metric tons of scrap (without the addition of alloying metals) and 22925 metric tons of liquid steel. The applicant proposes that, should the Court find it difficult to accept the information set out above, it should order an expert's report in order to check the accuracy of these results. The defendant replies that the misuse of powers referred to by the applicant in its reply is based on mere suppositions. Moreover, it is an established legal principle that, even if the administration has in fact pursued other aims, there can be no misuse of powers if it has acted in pursuance of the basic object determined by the law for the exercise of such powers. In this instance, it is clear that, in all its actions concerning the applicant, the High Authority pursued the essential object of its powers, which is the determination of the basis of assessment to contribution and that, in doing so, it tried always to make an objective and realistic assessment. Similarly, the complaint of unequal treatment in law is only supported by presumptions and offers to produce evidence. In the system of Community law, as in any legal system, such an offer can only be accepted if it is reasonable and sufficiently justified in law. This does not apply in this instance. According to the case-law of the Court, the consequences of the inductive assessment which the High Authority was forced to make must be borne by the applicant, which is alone responsible for them: the evidence tendered in order to enable the parties concerned to escape this assessment must therefore be dismissed. Finally, the request for an expert's report regarding the application of the inductive method of calculation must also be dismissed. It is indisputable that, in carrying out the investigations and applying the method of calculation based on the consumption of electricity, the High Authority always acted impartially towards the applicant. It has been possible to apply other indirect methods of calculation in cases where this enabled the basic rate of contribution to be estimated more accurately; the method based on the consumption of electricity constitutes the extrema ratio to be applied in cases such as the present in which the undertaking totally fails to cooperate. Moreover, the applicant criticizes more severely the criteria — such as the coefficient of 900 kw per metric ton — adopted by the experts of the High Authority in the application of this method than the distortion of certain facts, with the result that its request for an expert assessment runs counter to the case-law of the Court which has acknowledged these criteria. Furthermore, the method of calculation based on average daily consumption is incapable of producing credible results. First, the applicant itself acknowledges by implication that this method is beset by uncertainties, since it admits that, in practice, many interruptions may occur in the theoretical work rate. Secondly, it attempts vainly to challenge the fact that this method can only be used if the total consumption of scrap is already known — a factor which must, in this instance, be determined inductively.
2. Misuse of powers arising from the distortion of the facts; infringement of the general principle of law which requires the grounds given for a decision to be accurate Referring in particular to the decision fixing the metric tonnage of assessable scrap consumed by ILFO, the applicant makes the following observations: It is incorrect to state that the undertaking ‘merely declared’ purchases of ferrous scrap of 947 metric tons for the period under consideration, since it stated at the time its total consumption to be 7230 metric tons of ferrous scrap from the beginning of its operations until the end of the equalization scheme. The figure of 947 metric tons thus refers to the quantities of bought scrap subject to equalization. The difference between these metric tonnages represents recovered scrap. The criterion of 900 kw per metric ton is not plausible for a furnace of 4 to 5 metric tons' capacity. During a preliminary check undertaken in 1961, the High Authority had adopted the criterion of 950 kw per metric ton. The most credible criterion was, in fact, that of 1200 kw per metric ton. Similarly, the criterion of 1000 kw per metric ton adopted by the High Authority for the commissioning period, does not represent the common experience. The most credible criterion in this case is 1400 kw per metric ton. — The contested decision does not take into account the use of ‘ferro-alloys’ in the production of liquid steel, which is put at 2 %. The contested decision allows for recoveries of scrap to the extent of 6 %. Taking into account the fact that ILFO produced small ingots of 50 kg, which implies considerable losses, this rate ought to be raised to 8 % which is, moreover, in accordance with the statements made in a publication by the Terni company in which these losses were assessed at 9 %. Of the 17716 metric tons declared by the ILFO company as material for re-use, the High Authority only regarded 12335 metric tons as justified whereas it should also have taken into account documents concerning purchases of other quantities which were subsequently accepted as in order by the tax authorities. The High Authority fixed the arisings from this material for re-use at 25 %. This percentage is lower than that which is suggested by the common experience, which is approximately 35 % for unprepared material from the domestic market. the rate of 7 % fixed by the High Authority for arisings from rolling is also not plausible. Arisings from rolling at the Terni company, for example, were at a rate of 14 %. At all events, the calculation takes into account only 8153 metric tons of material for re-use and ready for rolling and thus ignores the fact that the ILFO company had declared its production of rolled steel to be 26040 metric tons and that the rolling of ingots whether purchased or of own manufacture gives rise to an identical percentage of recoveries. The applicant reserves the right to produce the necessary documents to demonstrate that its allegations are justified and proposes that the Court order the conduct of several measures of inquiry which it sets out in the application. The defendant maintains that, as regards the present submission also, the complaint of misuse of powers is supported by no relevant argument, that it has been wrongly put forward and that the complaint of a distortion of the facts, based on the statement in the contested decision that the ILFO company had only declared the purchase of 947 metric tons of scrap, is without foundation. In order to calculate the consumption of assessable scrap the High Authority had, in fact, to take as its starting-point the declarations concerning scrap consumption made by the undertakings themselves. It is indisputable that, in this instance, the starting-point of this calculation was the declaration that the quantity of assessable scrap was 947 metric tons. In any case the distortion alleged by the applicant did not affect the legality of the decision in question, since it is based not only on the above-mentioned declaration by the company, but more particularly on the result of the investigations carried out by the High Authority. The same distortion of facts has also been alleged in relation to the consequences of the High Authority's application of the inductive method. This complaint is inadmissible, first, because it is not based on facts actually misrepresented, but on facts which it is claimed are to be regarded as misrepresented on the basis of a presumption (irregularity or lack of credibility of the inductive method) which rests itself on arguments which the applicant admits to be unproved to the extent that it refers in their support to documents ‘to be produced’, figures ‘to be checked’, investigations ‘to be carried out’ or methods which are in practice inapplicable. In addition, it must be noted that in an area of finance such as the present the uncertain nature of any estimate when compared to the facts is a typical result of any levy which is not founded on a direct basis of assessment. This complaint is also inadmissible in that, once the regularity of the method of calculation adopted by the High Authority is acknowledged, no inquiry can be held into its consequences (for example, the application of the criterion of 900 kwh per metric ton, the determination of the quantity of bought scrap used to produce liquid steel, the commissioning period, return scrap and scrap recoveries and arisings). In particular, it must be remembered that the application of the criterion of 900 kwh has been endorsed by the Court itself. The applicant replies by stating that the misrepresentation of facts is a form of misuse of powers, since the fact that, in taking its decision, the administration relied on an incorrect representation of the real situation necessarily means that it used its powers for an inappropriate purpose and achieved a result which is unjustified as compared with the true situation. Having said that, the applicant emphasizes that in any case the inaccuracy of the information on which the High Authority based its action in itself violates an undeniable general principle of law. The objection put forward in the statement of defence to the effect that the complaint of misrepresentation is inadmissible in that it is based on mere presumptions, disregards the rules on the provision of evidence in Article 38 of the Rules of Procedure, according to which the applicant must provide ‘an indication of any evidence’. That the ILFO company has in fact acted in accordance with such a provision is shown by its indication of evidence and requests for verification made on each contested point. In particular, as regards the material for re-use, to the debit notes produced earlier for the purchase of 17716 metric tons and accepted by the tax authorities must now be added further notes which were held by these authorities for a long period and which evidence the purchase of 4188.329 metric tons of material for re-use. The total tonnage of this material is thus increased to 21904 metric tons (whereas the calculations of the High Authority estimated it at 12335 metric tons). The applicant concludes by emphasizing that by letter of 22 August 1963 it had stated its output to be 22290 metric tons of liquid steel and 20068 metric tons of ingots. These figures are almost the same as those prepared every month by the foundry manager. Had the defendant used the inductive method of calculation based on the number of working days, it would have seen that the quantities declared are very close to those produced by applying this method. The defendant replies that the applicant's declarations have always been incomplete and unclear. Moreover, the applicant persists in providing the evidence necessary to justify its claim only in a piecemeal fashion, only deciding at the last minute on the production of certain essential documents and in some cases after the expiry of the reasonable period provided for in Article 42 of the Rules of Procedure. This applies in particular to the documents concerning the material for re-use. The notes produced earlier referring to 4333 metric tons were not accepted by the High Authority, since they had been prepared by the ILFO company and did not mention the supplier. The applicant then produced two notes which had been accepted by the tax authorities and which it considered to be evidence of the purchase of this scrap. These invoices, however, show a price which does not correspond to the declared value of the scrap in question. As regards the probable percentage of recoveries of scrap, the High Authority cannot accept the figure of 9 % indicated in the publication of the Terni company, as the conditions of production of this undertaking cannot be compared with those of the ILFO company. Similarly, as regards the arisings from rolling, in the light of the type of production of this undertaking the percentage calculated by the High Authority must be maintained. As regards the invoices annexed to the reply and concerning the purchase of 4188.329 metric tons of material for re-use, the High Authority, while noting the delay with which the applicant produced the documents, decided to take them into account by reducing the tonnage of assessable scrap by 1553 metric tons of material for re-use. The final tonnage of ferrous scrap subject to equalization was thus reduced from 26532 to 24979 metric tons and the amount of contribution owed by ILFO 176080828 lire to 171765956 lire. In the opinion of the High Authority, the fact that the two contested decisions have been amended in this way need not necessarily lead to their annulment, as the amendment was not the result of an error on the part of the High Authority, but arose from the delay with which the applicant provided the necessary information.
3. Misuse of powers in the form of a failure to give reasons for Decision No 7/63 and the inconsistencies therein As set out in the application this submission presupposed that the estimate of the quantities of scrap consumed and the calculation of the debt notified to ILFO could have been regarded as final, although Decision No 7/63 on which these two measures were based only allowed a provisional calculation to be made of the contributions owed by each undertaking. As the High Authority specified in the statement of defence that this estimate and calculation were provisional, the applicant withdrew this submission in the reply.
IV — Procedure
The written procedure followed the normal course.
Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur and the opinion of the Advocate-General, the Court submitted a written question to the defendant, requesting it to reply by 15 February 1966 at the latest.
The defendant complied with this request on 15 February 1966.
The parties presented their oral submissions at the hearing on 22 February 1966.
The Advocate-General delivered his opinion at the hearing on 22 March 1966.
Grounds of judgment
Admissibility
The defendant has not challenged the admissibility of the application and no grounds exist for the Court to raise the matter of its own motion.
The present application is therefore admissible.
The substance of the case
The amendment of the contested decisions
The two individual decisions of 19 May 1965, contested in the present application, fixed the basis of assessment to contribution in the case of the applicant company at 26582 metric tons for the accounting periods from 1 April 1954 to 30 November 1958 and the amount owed by the applicant to the financial scheme for equalization at 176080828 lire. In the light of the invoices annexed to the reply concerning the purchase of 4188.329 metric tons of materials for re-use, the High Authority partially amended the operative part of these decisions by reducing the amount of assessable scrap to 24977 metric tons and the sum payable by way of equalization to 171756956 lire.
These amendments are not the result of the adoption of new methods of calculations as distinct from those used in the contested decisions, but rather are the result solely of the belated production of fresh documents which led the High Authority to reconsider certain factors in the basis of assessment to contribution. As, therefore, the essential questions of fact and law on which the contested decisions are based have not been amended as a result of this correction in the calculations, these decisions remain valid and a ruling must be given on the other claims made by the applicant.
The first submission
The applicant maintains that the High Authority misused its powers and violated the general principle prohibiting discrimination by applying to the applicant a method of assessment based on the consumption of electricity, although it had applied to other undertakings, in particular to those not possessing electric furnaces a method based on the average consumption of ferrous scrap per working day. The applicant complains that the High Authority did not choose from among the various inductive methods of calculation the one capable of giving the most accurate results but that which yielded the most favourable results from the point of view of balancing the accounts of the Equalization Fund.
The applicant requests that measures of inquiry be instituted and states that it is ready to produce all the necessary documents in order to prove in particular that the application of the method of calculation based on average consumption per working day would have yielded figures for scrap consumption lower than those calculated by the High Authority and very close to those declared by the applicant. The applicant merely alleges that the method of calculation adopted by the High Authority has been found by experience to be far from perfect, by reason of the different situations of undertakings equipped with electric furnaces, but brings no evidence to justify this claim. In this instance, adoption of the method of calculation based on the number of working days could only be justified if it appeared from certain or probable data that their use would have enabled the basis of assessment to contribution to be assessed with greater accuracy.
The declarations as to scrap consumption made by the applicant are incomplete and imprecise and do not render it possible to challenge the degree of probable accuracy of the results obtained through the method of calculation chosen by the High Authority. In support of its claim, the applicant merely gives one example of the calculations involved in the method based on the number of working days and reserves the right to produce any other necessary documents, without in any way specifying the nature of these documents. Finally, the applicant requests measures of inquiry, in particular, an expert's report, but offers no evidence whatever to justify such measures. This being so, the request for measures of inquiry must be rejected.
Moreover, with reference to the complaint of discrimination, the applicant has put forward no evidence to show in what way, as regards the application of the method of calculation based on average scrap consumption per working day, its position was comparable to that of the undertakings which benefited from the application of this method.
The complaints of misuse of powers and violation of the principle of non-discrimination must, therefore, be dismissed as unfounded.
The second submission
The applicant maintains that the defendant misused its powers by misrepresenting the facts and gave incorrect reasons for its decisions. First, it criticizes the criterion of 900 kWh per metric ton adopted by the High Authority, as well as that of 1000 kWh for the commissioning period of three months, contending that these figures and this period were improbable for a furnace of 4 to 5 metric tons' capacity. It puts forward only one specific argument — namely that the defendant adopted the criterion of 950 kWh for an assessment carried out in 1961 through the Société Fiduciaire Suisse — and otherwise has merely requested certain checks to be carried out on the spot. Such an argument is insufficient to question the criterion actually employed, and which was adopted in 1962 by a committee of experts, for furnaces of the same capacity as that of the applicant. Similarly, criticisms of the criterion of 1000 kWh and of the duration of the commissioning period are based on allegations too vague to be accepted.
The applicant also maintains that the percentages accepted by the High Authority in calculating arisings from rolling and recoveries of scrap are not plausible. In support of this contention, it relies on a publication of the Terni company which specifies higher percentages. In the absence of concrete factors peculiar to the applicant undertaking itself, such an argument cannot invalidate the assessments made by the technical departments of the High Authority.
The other complaints made by the applicant are too imprecise to justify measures of inquiry.
For all these reasons, therefore, this submission must be dismissed.
The claim for damages
The applicant claims that the High Authority should be ordered to pay such damages as the Court shall see fit.
The applicant has not brought any evidence as to the existence or the amount of the damage alleged.
These submissions must therefore be dismissed.
Costs
Under the first paragraph of Article 69 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, where each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads, or where the circumstances are exceptional, the Court may order that the parties bear their own costs.
As in the course of proceedings the defendant amended the contested decisions on a point which might have justified their annulment, it is appropriate to order that the parties shall bear their own costs.
On those grounds, Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur; Upon hearing the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate-General; Having regard to Articles 15, 33, 34, 47 and 53 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community; Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community; Having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, in particular Article 69 (3); THE COURT hereby:
1 Dismisses Application 51/65 as unfounded;
2 Orders the parties to bear their own costs.