JUDGMENT OF 11. 5. 1983 — CASE 87/82 ROGERS v DARTHENAY

In Case 87/82 REFERENCE to the Court under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty by Plymouth Magistrates' Court for a preliminary ruling in the proceedings pending before that court between

THE COURT (Second Chamber) composed of: P. Pescatore, President of Chamber, O. Due and K. Bahlmann, Judges, Advocate General: S. Rozès Registrar: H. A. Rühi, Principal Administrator

gives the following

JUDGMENT

Facts and issues

The facts of the case, the course of the procedure and the observations submitted in pursuance of Article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EEC may be summarized as follows:

I — Facts and written procedure

The accused in the main proceedings, Mr Darthenay, a French national, was master of a fishing boat called the Christine Marie, which on 5 August 1981 was fishing in waters adjacent to the United Kingdom and within British fishery limits. Lieutenant Commander Rogers, Royal Navy, the prosecutor in the main proceedings, for the Ministiy of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, brought a prosecution against the accused on the grounds that, while fishing on 5 August 1981, he had carried on board and used “a trawl, Danish Seine or similar net having attached to it (on the top of the cod-end) a device, a second piece of net.” That was admitted by the accused but it was not, on the other hand, admitted that “the second piece of net necessarily had the effect of obstructing or diminishing the original net.”

Before Plymouth Magistrates' Court, the prosecutor claimed that the device used by the accused has the effect of obstructing or diminishing the mesh in contravention of Article 7 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2527/70 and also contrary to Article 8 of the Fishing Nets (No 2) Order 1980 of 19 December 1980 (Statutory Instruments 1980, No 1994), as amended by the Fishing Nets (No 2) (Variation) (No 5) Order 1981 of 29 June 1981 (Statutory Instruments 1981, No 906), made in accordance with Articles 3 and 11 of the Sea Fish (Conservation) Act 1967, as amended.

Regulation No 2527/80 was in force at the material time, having been extended by successive regulations until 31 October 1981.

However, it is clear from the order making the reference that the accused contended that Article 7 did not apply to him on the ground that that provision provided not only for the prohibition of devices by means of which the mesh in a fishing net was obstructed or diminished but also for exceptions to that prohibition which were to be laid down in detailed implementing rules which at the material time had not been adopted. And, as it has been established since the judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 May 1981 in Case 804/79, Commission v United Kingdom, [1981] ECR 1045, that “Member States are therefore no longer entitled to exercise any power of their own in the matter of conservation measures in the waters under their jurisdiction”, the United Kingdom did not have the authority to exclude certain devices from the general prohibition laid down in Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80 by Statutory Instrument No 1994 of 1980.

In view of that argument, Plymouth Magistrates' Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

a) Whether Article 7 of EEC Regulation No 2527/80 (as extended) has any effect when no detailed implementing rules have been adopted.

b) If not, has a Member State any competence to adopt a measure such as Statutory Instrument No 1994 of 1980?

c) If Article 7 does have some effect when no implementing rules have been adopted, has a Member State any power to define the exceptions to the prohibition upon net attachments in such a way as Statutory Instrument No 1994 of 1980 does?

d) If the answer is “no” to Question (a), (b) or (c), what rights result for an EEC citizen prosecuted under a law such as Statutory Instrument No 1994 of 1980?

The order making the reference was received at the Court Registry on 11 March 1982.

In accordance with Article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EEC, written observations were submitted by Hubert Darthenay, represented by Patrick O'Connor, Barrister, London, Xavier Ghelber of the Paris Bar and J. Evans, Solicitor, Cardiff; by the United Kingdom, represented by R. N. Ricks of the Treasury Solicitor's Department, acting as Agent; and by the Commission of the European Communities, represented by J. Sack and P. Oliver, members of its Legal Department, acting as Agents.

By order of 19 January 1983 the Court, after establishing that no Member State or institution, being a party to the proceedings, had requested that the case be decided in plenary session, assigned it to the Second Chamber pursuant to Article 95 (1) and (2) of the Rules of Procedure.

Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur and the views of the Advocate General, the Court decided to open the oral procedure without any preliminary inquiry but nevertheless requested the Commission to submit to it before the sitting any national provisions similar to those adopted by the United Kingdom and in dispute in this case.

II — Observations submitted to the Court pursuant to Article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EEC

A — First question

According to the accused in the main proceedings, the very wording of Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80 itself shows that it can have no effect until the detailed implementing rules on the exceptions provided for therein have been adopted. Moreover, if the first sentence of Article 7 only were to have effect, the consequences would be, on the one hand, ridiculous, for it is in fact impossible to envisage a fishing net's being usable without an attachment of the type mentioned therein because it must be protected from any damage and, on the other hand, financially disastrous, since that provision would compel all fishermen to have special nets made with no such attachments for use for a temporary period of an unpredictable duration.

Consequently the accused in the main proceedings invites the Court:

“to conclude in answer to Question (a) that Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 2527/80 (as extended) has no effect when no detailed implementing rules have been adopted.”

On the other hand, the United Kingdom takes the view that the contested Article 7 had effect from the time at which it was adopted. In its submission, that article must be interpreted in relation to the legal context in which it was inserted and the time at which it came into being. Regulation No 2527/80 is designed to further the achievement by the Community of the objectives of the common fisheries policy, which is part of the common agricultural policy, and was adopted after the end of the transitional period provided for in Article 102 of the Act of 22 January 1972 concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of Accession”).

The United Kingdom stresses that if Article 7 had no immediate effect from 30 September 1980 fishermen were free to obstruct and effectively to diminish the mesh in any part of their nets; in those conditions, there were no effective Community conservation measures. Consequently, to interpret Article 7 as having no effect unless and until detailed rules were adopted is to adopt “an interpretation which flies in the face of the regulation and amounts to a grave obstruction to the furtherance of Community conservation policy.”

The United Kingdom further submits that the wording of Article 7 ought not to lead to such an obstructive interpretation, for there is no obligation on the Commission or Council to adopt any exceptions to the prohibition mentioned in the first sentence of Article 7. The effectiveness of the prohibition in no way depends upon the creation of exceptions. The first sentence thus stands on its own and is perfectly clear: the Council intended to create a prohibition with immediate effect and to allow exceptions if and when agreement on those exceptions could be achieved.

In conclusion, the United Kingdom considers that at the time at which the regulation was adopted conservation of fish stocks was needed and without Article 7 no effective conservation was possible. Thus having regard to the declared purpose of the regulation, the objectives of the Community, the time of the adoption of that regulation and the wording of Article 7 itself, the United Kingdom submits that Question (a) should be answered in the affirmative.

The Commission shares the United Kingdom's view. It stresses in particular that the exceptions provided for in the second sentence of Article 7 were to be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 20, that is to say after consultation with the Management Committee for Fishery Products.

The Commission states that the original draft regulation which it submitted to the Council contained detailed technical provisions laying down exceptions to the prohibition contained in the first sentence of Article 7, but in order to reach agreement on the regulation as a whole it was decided to remove those provisions and provide for the adoption of exceptions by the Management Committee. In view of the complexity of those questions, the Commission was unable to submit to the Management Committee any proposal concerning Article 7 in the relatively short time in which Regulation No 2527/80 was in force.

However, the Commission submits that the first sentence of Article 7 was applicable and binding throughout that period, since its application “is not made conditional on exceptions being laid down under the second sentence.”

In that regard the Commission stresses that no argument that the first sentence is so conditional can be deduced from the wording of Article 7. The expression “detailed implementing rules” in the second sentence does not mean that exceptions adopted under the second sentence in any way “implement” the first sentence; on the contrary, the expression “detailed implementing rules” is a general term used throughout the regulation to refer to secondary legislation based on that regulation.

Like the United Kingdom, the Commission considers that Article 7 is essential to the operation of the entire regulation.

Consequently, the Commission proposes that Question (a) should be answered as follows :

“The first sentence of Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 2527/80 was applicable throughout the period during which that regulation was in force, in spite of the fact that no exceptions were laid down under the second sentence of that article.”

B — Second question

The accused in the main action considers that the scope of this question may be confined to Article 8 of Statutory Instrument No 1994 of 1980.

The accused argues that, in view of the judgment in Case 804/79, Commission v United Kingdom, cited above, since the end of the transitional period provided for in Article 102 of the Act of Accession, the Member States no longer have the power to act unilaterally in the field of sea-fish conservation.

Consequently, he invites the Court to conclude in answer to Question (b) that if Question (a) is answered in the negative, a Member State has no competence to adopt a measure such as Article 8 of Statutory Instrument No 1994 of 1980.

The United Kingdom and the Commission consider that since Question (a) has been answered in the affirmative, Question (b) does not require an answer.

C — Third question

The accused in the main proceedings notes by way of preliminary that Article 8 (1) of the United Kingdom Order in question prohibits the carrying of a net with an attachment having the effect of obstructing the mesh, whereas Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80 prohibits the using of such a net. In his submission, the United Kingdom Order thus creates “a quite different and much wider” criminal offence than that which is envisaged by the Council regulation. Similarly, Article 8 (2) of the United Kingdom Order purports to create a single and strictly-defined exception to the total prohibition laid down in paragraph (1); the scope of that exception is limited, whereas no such limited exception may be found in Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80. Finally, the accused in the main proceedings submits that the exception laid down by the United Kingdom was not adopted in accordance with the “Management Committee” procedure.

According to the accused in the main proceedings, the wording of Article 7 prohibits the use of any method other than the “Management Committee” procedure for the adoption of detailed implementing rules on devices by means of which the mesh in any part of a fishing net is obstructed or otherwise effectively diminished.

Consequently, he submits first that “ the adoption of a national measure such as this United Kingdom Order is in breach of the binding procedure laid down in Regulation No 2527/80 and thus incompatible with Community law.”

Secondly, the accused in the main proceedings submits that, in the event of the Court's nevertheless deciding that Regulation No 2527/80 does not prohibit a national measure such as the United Kingdom Order in question, implementation by internal legislation jeopardizes the simultaneous and uniform application of the regulation throughout the Community. Moreover the Court of Justice has already upheld that view, in particular in its judgments of 7 February 1973 in Case 39/73 Commission v Italy [1973] ECR 101, and of 10 October 1973 in Case 34/73 Variola v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze [1973] ECR 891.

The accused in the main proceedings next sets out the dangers inherent in national implementing measures of that kind :

i) The entry into force of Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80 would be earlier in the United Kingdom than in the other Member States, which were awaiting the outcome of the “Management Committee” procedure.

ii) The interpretation of Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80 contained in the United Kingdom Order might be different from any exceptions specified by the proper Community procedure.

iii) The Community nature of the conservation measure is obscured by a national measure purporting to implement a Council regulation but also limiting its scope.

iv) The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice may be restricted because Article 177 of the Treaty does not provide for a reference to the Court in order to obtain an interpretation of the provisions of national legislation.

Thirdly, the accused in the main proceedings submits that, if that second argument should also be rejected by the Court, national implementing measures may not alter the scope of a Community regulation. That principle was laid down by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 18 February 1970 in Case 40/69 Hauptzollamt Hamburg v Bollmann [1969] ECR 69, and reaffirmed in several later judgments. According to the accused in the main proceedings, the national provision in question is in breach of that prohibition in two vital respects: in creating a different and much wider criminal offence than is envisaged by the Council and in providing for only a single and strictly-defined exception.

Consequently:

a) in view of the express prohibition laid down in Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80,

b) in view of the settled principles of the case-law of the Court of Justice prohibiting national implementing measures,

c) in view of the content of the United Kingdom measure which differs markedly from that of the Council regulation,

the accused in the main proceedings proposes that the answer to Question (c) should be:

“Even if Article 7 does have some effect, the United Kingdom had no power to define the exceptions to the prohibition in such a way as that in which' they were defined in Statutory Instrument No 1994 of 1980.”

The United Kingdom submits that it is unnecessary to answer Question (c), since the accused in the main proceedings does not rely upon the exception laid down in Article 8 (2) of the national provision in question; indeed, his Counsel admitted before the Divisional Court that his defence rested upon the proposition that Article 7 of the Council regulation had not yet been implemented at the time of his alleged offence.

However, in the alternative, the United Kingdom submits that if that question must be answered, it should be answered in the affirmative. Indeed, although it is accepted that from 1 January 1979 Member States were no longer entitled to exercise powers of their own in relation to conservation of the resources of the sea, they nevertheless had a right -and a duty to act as trustees of the common interest in the absence of appropriate action on the part of the Council.

As the Community had not defined any exceptions to Article 7, the United Kingdom was entitled to create the exception laid down in Article 8 (2) of the Fishing Nets (No 2) Order 1980 provided that it was consistent with Community policy as expressed in Regulation No 2527/80 and the United Kingdom had sought and obtained approval of that measure. The United Kingdom submits that since those two conditions were fulfilled, Question (c) should be answered in the affirmative.

The Commission shares the United Kingdom's view. In its opinion, since the accused in the main proceedings does not claim that the device used by him falls within the exceptions to the prohibition on net attachments contained in Article 8 (2) of the Fishing Nets (No 2) Order 1980, and the only other relevant exception clause, that is to say Article 9 of the 1980 Order, is not relevant, Question (c) does not relate to any point at issue in this case; consequently, the Commission suggests that the Court decline to answer that question.

However, the Commission wishes to state that the wording of the second sentence of Article 7 of the Community regulations makes it clear that exceptions to the prohibition laid down in the first sentence may be adopted only by the Management Committee procedure. It is true that the minutes of the meeting of the Council contain a declaration in which the Commission and the Council agree, pending the adoption of measures provided for in the second sentence of Article 7, to continue to apply the procedures and criteria set out in the Hague Resolution, and it is also true that the Commission approved the United Kingdom measures in question. Nevertheless, according to the Commission it is impossible to reconcile those two points with Article 7 of the regulation, since it provides that exceptions may be laid down only according to the Management Committee procedure, and the Commission adds that in any event the provisions of the regulation must take precedence over the other documents.

D — Fourth question

The accused in the main proceedings submits that according to the case-law of the Court of Justice and in particular the judgment of 16 December 1981 in Case 269/80 Regina v Tymen [1981] ECR 3079, the answer to the fourth question should be:

“Where criminal proceedings are brought under a national measure such as Statutory Instrument No 1994 of 1980, which is held to be contraiy to Community law, a conviction in those proceedings is also incompatible with Community law.”

According to the United Kingdom, it is accepted that if the first sentence of Article 7 had no effect at the date of the offence and if the United Kingdom had no power to adopt a national measure providing for its enforcement, the conviction of the accused would be incompatible with Community law.

However, according to the United Kingdom, the mere fact that it had no power to adopt Article 8 (2) of the Fishing Nets (No 2) Order 1981 would not necessarily render a conviction under Article 8 (1) unlawful, since that paragraph merely imposes sanctions for a breach of Community law. It would therefore be absurd if sanctions lawfully provided for by a Member State might not be enforced on the ground that that Member State had unlawfully added exceptions on which no reliance is placed by the accused.

In any event, it is for the national court to decide whether Article 8 (1) of the national Order may be preserved in the event of the Court's declaring that Article 8 (2) is contrary to Community law. In that regard the United Kingdom considers that it is clear that if Article 8 (2) were declared to be contrary to Community law, an English court would sever Article 8(1) from Article 8 (2).

The United Kingdom therefore submits that persons fishing in waters of Member States cannot defeat the object of the Community by reference to invalid exceptions on which they do not rely. Even if the United Kingdom had no power to adopt Article 8 (2), the accused is not entitled to an acquittal unless Questions (a) and (b) are answered in the negative.

The Commission, in the light of its reply to the preceding questions, sees no need for the Court to reply to Question (d).

III — Oral procedure

At the sitting on 24 March 1983 oral argument and answers to questions put by the Court were presented by the following: P. O'Connor, Barrister, Inner Temple, and Mr Ghelber, of the Paris Bar, for the accused in the main proceedings; R. N. Ricks, acting as Agent, assisted by A. Moses, Barrister, Middle Temple, for the United Kingdom; and J. Sack and P. Oliver, acting as Agents, for the Commission.

The Advocate General delivered her opinion at the sitting on 28 April 1983.

Decision

1. By an order dated 7 August 1981, which was received at the Registry on 11 March 1982, Plymouth Magistrates' Court referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty four questions on the interpretation of Regulation No 2527/80 of 30 September 1980 laying down technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources (Official Journal 1980, L 258, p. 1).

2. Those questions arose in the course of a prosecution brought by Lieutenant Commander Rogers, Royal Navy, for the Ministry of Agriculture, against the master of a French fishing boat called the Christine Marie, Mr Darthenay, for an infringement of Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80 and Article 8 of the Fishing Nets (No 2) Order 1980 of 19 December 1980 (Statutory Instruments 1980, No 1994), laying down measures relating to boats and methods of fishing and providing for the implementation of certain provisions of the aforementioned regulation, as amended by the Fishing Nets (No 2) (Variation) (No 5) Order 1981 of 29 June 1981 (Statutory Instruments 1981, No 906).

3. Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80, the validity of which was extended by subsequent regulations until 31 October 1981, provides:

“No device shall be used by means of which the mesh in any part of a fishing net is obstructed or otherwise effectively diminished. This provision does not exclude the use of the devices referred to in the detailed implementing rules to be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 20.”

4. According to Article 20, detailed rules for the implementation of the regulation are to be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 31 (2) and 32 of Council Regulation No 100/76 of 29 January 1976 on the common organization of the market in fishery products (Official Journal 1976, L 20, p. 1). Article 31 sets up a Management Committee for Fishery Products which delivers an opinion in accordance with Article 32 (1) and (2). Article 32 (3) authorizes the Commission, or in some cases the Council, to adopt the appropriate measures. In the event, no detailed implementing rules were adopted before the end of the period of validity of Regulation No 2527/80.

5. During that period the British Government issued Statutory Instrument No 1994 of 1980, Article 8 of which provides:

“(1). A trawl, Danish seine or similar net carried (a) in any British fishing boat registered in the United Kingdom, or (b) in any waters adjacent to the United Kingdom and within British fishery limits by a fishing boat not registered in the United Kingdom or not registered in any country shall not have attached to it a device having the effect of obstructing or diminishing the mesh in contravention of Article 7 of the Council Regulation.

(2). Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this article, any canvas, netting or other material may be attached to the underside of the cod-end of a net for the purpose of preventing or reducing wear and tear, if it is fastened to the cod-end only along the forward and lateral edges of such canvas, netting or other material.”

6. On 5 August 1981, the fishing boat Christine Marie was fishing within British fishery limits and using, as was stated by the national court, “a trawl, Danish Seine or similar net having attached to it (on the top of the cod-end) a device, a second piece of net”. That was admitted by the accused in the main proceedings, but he contested Lieutenant Commander Roger's statement that “the second piece of net necessarily had the effect of obstructing or diminishing the original net”.

7. In the course of the prosecution the accused contended that Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80 did not apply to him on the grounds, first, that the exceptions provided for by the second sentence of Article 7 had not been adopted by the Community at the material time and secondly that, since the Member States were no longer entitled to exercise any power of their own in the matter of conservation measures in their territorial waters, the United Kingdom did not have the power to adopt measures such as those contained in Article 8 (2) of Statutory Instrument No 1994 of 1980.

8. Considering that a decision of the Court of Justice was necessary to enable it to give a ruling on those submissions, Plymouth Magistrates' Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice :

a) Whether Article 7 of EEC Regulation No 2525/80 (as extended) has any effect when no detailed implementing rules have been adopted.

b) If not, has a Member State any competence to adopt a measure such as Statutory Instrument No 1994 of 1980?

c) If Article 7 does have some effect when no implementing rules have been adopted, has a Member State any power to define the exceptions to the prohibition upon net attachments in such a way as Statutory Instrument No 1994 of 1980 does?

d) If the answer is “no” to questions (a) (b) or (c), what rights result for an EEC citizen prosecuted under a law such as Statutory Instrument No 1994 of 1980?

First question

9. The first question asks whether Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80 can have effect even though the detailed implementing measures provided for in the second sentence of that article were not adopted by the competent Community authorities.

10. The purpose of Regulation No 2527/80 is to ensure the protection of fishing stocks and also a balanced exploitation of the resources of the sea in the interests both of fishermen and of consumers. It follows that the prohibition laid down in the first sentence of Article 7 of the regulation constitutes an essential provision for the achievement of the objective pursued, since without that prohibition there would be no effective conservation measure at Community level.

11. Moreover, that first sentence of Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80 is an independent and perfectly clear provision, creating a prohibition with immediate effect which cannot depend upon the adoption of the detailed implementing rules provided for in the second sentence of Article 7.

12. The expression “detailed implementing rules” used in the second sentence of Article 7 refers to the determination of certain fishing attachments the use of which appears to be compatible with the prohibition laid down in the first sentence and not to implementing measures necessary to ensure the full effect of that prohibition. Consequently, the fact that the detailed implementing rules referred to in Article 7 have not been adopted cannot in any event prevent the prohibition laid down in the first sentence of that article from taking full effect.

13. The answer to the first question should therefore be that the prohibition in Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80 takes full effect even though the detailed implementing rules provided for in the second sentence of that article have not been adopted.

Second question

14. The second question, which was asked only in the event of the first question's being answered in the negative, does not require to be answered.

Third question

15. In the third question the national court, having established that the detailed implementing rules provided for in the second sentence of Article 7 have not been adopted, refers to the law applicable in this case. In that regard it must be borne in mind that since the expiry on 1 January 1979 of the transitional period provided for in Article 102 of the Act of Accession the power to adopt, as part of the common fisheries policy, measures to conserve the resources of the sea vests fully and finally in the Community.

16. Consequently, it is necessary first to examine whether Article 7 may be interpreted in such a way that, even in the absence of the detailed implementing rules provided for in the second sentence, it is possible to infer directly from that provision whether and on what conditions the use of devices for the protection of nets is permitted.

17. In this regard it should be noted that until the end of the transitional period the use of devices for the protection of fishing nets was permitted under the rules and practice of several Member States and that Article 7 does not intend to substitute for such a possibility a general prohibition on the use of all, even protective, devices.

18. Such an interpretation would in fact be contrary to the purpose of Article 7, the first sentence of which, although it lays down a general prohibition, nevertheless does not exclude the use of certain devices. It is true that the aim of the first sentence of Article 7, which is to protect fishing stocks, requires that the mesh of fishing nets may not be obstructed or diminished; however, that requirement must be qualified inasmuch as account should be taken of the fact that fishermen need to use certain types of device in order to protect their fishing nets.

19. It would therefore be contrary to the scheme of Regulation No 2527/80 if such protection of fishing nets could not be taken into consideration simply because detailed implementing rules have not been adopted.

20. That is also clear from the terms of Article 7. Indeed, the beginning of the second sentence (“This provision does not exclude the use of the devices ...”) and also the expression “detailed implementing rules”, used to qualify the provisions to be adopted, show clearly that all the rules, including therefore the permission to use devices for the protection of nets, must have immediate effect and that the essential task of the Commission and the Management Committee was merely to give formal expression to that permission in implementing legislation.

21. In the absence of such legislation, it is for the competent courts to fill the resulting lacuna in a manner which is consistent with the aim of protecting fishing stocks and which also takes into account the fact that protection of fishing nets should be permitted.

22. Under those circumstances, it appears that the third question does not require any other answer.

23. The answer to be given to the national court should therefore be that Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80 does not prohibit the use of devices designed to protect fishing nets, provided that the use of such devices is compatible with the purpose of Article 7.

Fourth question

24. In so far as the use of devices for the protection of fishing nets is compatible with Community law, the fourth question has ceased to have any purpose.

Costs

25. The costs incurred by the United Kingdom and the Commission of the European Communities, which have submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. As these proceedings are, in so far as the parties to the main proceedings are concerned, in the nature of a step in the proceedings before the national court, costs are a matter for that court.

On those grounds, THE COURT (Second Chamber), in answer to the questions submitted to it by Plymouth Magistrates' Court by order of 7 August 1981, hereby rules:

1 The prohibition in Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80 of 30 September 1980 laying down technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources (Official Journal 1980, L 258, p. 1) takes full effect even though the detailed implementing rules provided for in the second sentence of that article have not been adopted.

2 Article 7 of Regulation No 2527/80 does not prohibit the use of devices designed to protect fishing nets, provided that the use of such devices is compatible with the purpose of Article 7.