JUDGMENT OF 15.3.1984 — CASE 313/82 TIELUTRECHT SCHADEVERZEKERING / FCGA

In Case 313/82 REFERENCE to the Court under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty by the Burgerlijke Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg [Civil Court of First Instance], Hasselt, for a preliminary ruling in the action pending before that court between

THE COURT (First Chamber) composed of: T. Koopmans, President of Chamber, A. O'Keeffe and G. Bosco, Judges, Advocate General: P. VerLoren van Themaat Registrar: P. Heim

gives the following

JUDGMENT

Facts and Issues

I — Facts and written procedure

1. Mrs Kenis, née van Horne, a Netherlands national residing in Budel in the Netherlands sustained injuries in a road accident which occurred at Hamont-Achel in Belgium on 20 August 1977. Under a healthcare insurance policy by which she was covered she received from the private insurance company NV Tiel-Utrecht Schadeverzekering, BFR 94069 as reimbursement of medical expenses. The accident led to criminal proceedings against Elisabeth Lammers who was driving one of the cars involved in the accident. However, by a judgment of 16 February 1979, which has become res judicata, the Hof van Beroep [Court of Appeal], Antwerp, acquitted the accused, considering that the person actually responsible for the accident was a third unknown driver.

2. Under the Belgian Law of 1 July 1956 on compulsory insurance against liability to third parties in respect of motor vehicles (Moniteur Belge of 15 July 1956), which applied at the time of the accident, a joint guarantee fund assumes the obligations of the person liable to pay the damages in respect of physical injuries caused in Belgium by motor vehicles subject to the obligation to insure where the injuries are caused by the use of an unidentified or stolen motor vehicle or one not covered by insurance in accordance with the provisions of the Law. For that purpose Article 15 of the Law provides that all insurers must be affiliated to a joint guarantee fund authorized by the King. Pursuant to those provisions the Gemeenschappelijk Motorwaarborgfonds (Joint Motor Guarantee Fund, hereinafter referred to as “the Fund”] was created in the form of a mutual insurance association and was authorized by Royal Decree of 31 January 1957 (Moniteur Belge of 10.1.1957).

3. Since the accident in question was caused by an unidentified motor vehicle, one of the conditions for involvement of the Fund thus being fulfilled, Mrs Kenis's Netherlands insurer sued the Fund in the Burgerlijke Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg, Hasselt, for the medical expenses paid to the accident victim. The insurer, NV Tiel-Utrecht Schadeverzekering, relied in the first instance on the final subparagraph of Article 70 (2) of the Belgian Law of 9 August 1963 introducing and regulating a compulsory sickness and invalidity insurance scheme. That provision reads as follows: In the second place the plaintiff relied on Article 93 of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 the first paragraph of which provides as follows:

“The insurance institution shall have a specific right of recovery against the Gemeenschappelijk Motorwaarborgfonds referred to in Article 15 of the Law of 1 July 1956 for the cost of the benefits which it has provided... where the accident in respect of which the benefits were provided was caused by an unidentified or stolen motor vehicle olone not covered by insurance against liability to third parties in accordance with the provisions of the Law of 1 Tuly 1956.”

“(1) If a person receives benefits under the legislation of one Member State in respect of an injury resulting from an occurrence in the territory of another State, any rights of the institution responsible for benefits against a third party bound to compensate for the injury shall be governed by the following rules:

a) where the institution responsible for benefits is, by virtue of the legislation which it administers, subrogated to the rights which the recipient has against the third party, such subrogation shall be recognized by each Member State;

b) where the said institution has direct rights against the third party, such rights shall be recognized by each Member State.”

4. The Fund, the defendant in the main proceedings, challenged the right of the Netherlands insurance company to rely upon Article 70 of the Belgian Law of 9 August 1963 on the ground that by “insurance institution” that Law means only Belgian institutions authorized by a Belgian royal decree and not therefore a private Netherlands medical insurance company which paid the costs in question under a policy. It also considers that Article 93 of Regulation No 1408/71 is not applicable as Mrs Kenis did not receive benefits “under the legislation of one Member State” because the Netherlands insurer's obligation to pay was contractual in nature.

5. In its judgment making the reference to the Court the Burgerlijke Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg, Hasselt, observes that the term “institution” appearing in Article 93 of Regulation No 1408/71 concerning the rights of “institutions” responsible for benefits against liable third parties must be understood as having the meaning given in Article 1 (n) of the regulation, where it is defined as meaning, in respect of each Member State, “the body or authority responsible for administering all or part of the legislation”. The national court considers that the plaintiff clearly has that status and in that respect is therefore entitled under Netherlands law to claim recovery. On the other hand there may well be some doubt as to whether the plaintiff has the status required by the Belgian Law for seeking recovery from the Fund. Although the Law of 9 August 1963 gives a right of recovery to “the insurance institution” and defines an insurance institution as “any authorized national federation [landsbond] and the Relief Fund for Sickness and Invalidity Insurance [Hulpkas voor Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering]”, it is not certain whether the plaintiff is either of those. Furthermore, since the terms “liable third parties” and “a third party bound to compensate for the injury” appear in Article 93 of Regulation No 1408/71 and in the heading to the article, it may be asked whether those terms refer only to the person who, as the person who caused the injury, is bound to compensate for it, or whether they also refer to a body, such as the Fund, set up precisely in order to compensate for injury not caused by it at all. By a judgment of 25 November 1982 the Burgerlijke Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg, Hasselt, therefore stayed the proceedings and referred the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

“1. Whether or not they are regarded as ‘national federations’ [Landsbonden] or ‘relief funds’ [Hulpkas] within the meaning of Article 2 (d) of the Belgian Law of 9 August 1963, must the ‘institutions’ referred to in Article 93 [of Regulation No 1408/71] be understood as being ‘insurance institutions’ within the meaning of the last paragraph of Article 70 of the Belgian Law of 9 August 1963?

2. Must the expressions ‘liable third parties’ and ‘third party bound to compensate for the injury’ appearing in Article 93 of the regulation be taken to mean the same as the terms ‘yergoedingsplichtigen’ [persons liable to make good the damage] and ‘aansprakelijken’ [persons liable] appearing in Article 1382 et seq. of the Belgian Civil Code? Or must they instead be construed more widely as covering any or every other possible right of recovery?”

6. The judgment making the reference was registered at the Court on 10 December 1982. In accordance with Article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of. Justice written observations were submitted by the Gemeenschappelijk Motorwaarborgfonds, the defendant in the main proceedings, represented by Ludovic De Gryse, Advocate with right of audience before the Hof van Cassatie of Belgium, and by the Commission of the European Communities, represented by Manfred Beschel, a member of its Legal Department, acting as Agent. Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur and the views of the Advocate General the Court decided to open the oral procedure without any preparatory inquiry. However, it requested the parties to reply in writing to a number of questions before the hearing. By an order of 8 June 1983 made pursuant to Article 95 (1) and (2) of the Rules of Procedure the Court decided to assign the case to the First Chamber.

II — Written observations submitted to the Court

As a preliminary point the Gemeenschappelijk Motorwaarborgfonds observes that, as far as the first question is concerned, the Court has jurisdiction under Article 177 (b) of the EEC Treaty to rule on the interpretation of an act of a Community institution whereas the interpretation of the national law of Member States is a matter left to national courts. The first question raised by the Burgerlijke Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg, Hasselt, does not, however, concern the interpretation of Community law but rather the interpretation of Belgian law and in particular Article 2 (d) and the final subparagraph of Article 70 (2) of the Law of 9 August 1963 introducing and regulating a compulsory sickness and invalidity insurance scheme.

As framed, the question seeks to establish whether the plaintiff meets the conditions, laid down by the Belgian Law, concerning capacity to seek recovery from the Fund. As a specific right or recovery is given by that Law to insurance institutions, the question to be resolved is whether the plaintiff must be considered “an insurance institution” within the meaning of that Law. Although the question mentions Regulation No 1408/71, it does so only in order to establish whether an institution or authority which may be considered an “institution” within the meaning of Article 93 of that regulation must also automatically be regarded as an “insurance institution” within the meaning of Article 70 of the Belgian Law of 9 August 1963. The question therefore still involves a problem of interpretation of national law and the Court accordingly has no jurisdiction to rule upon it.

In case the question submitted for a preliminary ruling might nevertheless be understood as concerning the interpretation of Community law, the Fund observes in the alternative that, as regards the question whether the institution liable for payment of benefit may be subrogated to the rights of the accident victim in the Member Sfiite in which the injury occurred or whether it is entitled to exercise a “direct right”, Article 93 of Regulation No 1408/71, just like Article 52 of the previous regulation governing the same subject-matter (Regulation No 3 of the Council of 25.9.1958 concerning social security for migrant workers, Journal Officiel 1958, p. 561), merely refers to the national legislation of the institution. In particular, Article 93 made no change to the rules on non-contractual liability which continues to be governed by national law alone.

The provisions governing the rights of action of road accident victims against a joint guarantee fund in cases where the person responsible for the accident is unknown entail an important derogation from the normal rules of non-contractual liability by making that institution liable to pay compensation instead of the unknown person but they are also part of the body of rules governing that liability which Article 93 of Regulation No 1408/71 has left intact. Community law does not therefore derogate in any way from the rules of national law — in this instance Belgian law — which define the circumstances in which the guarantee fund, instead of the person who caused the injury, becomes liable to pay compensation. One of those rules of national law is Article 70 of the Belgian Law of 9 August 1963 which gives a right of recovery against the Fund only to an “insurance institution”. What constitutes an insurance institution can moreover only be ascertained from a reading of Article 2 (d) of the same Law which mentions “authorized national federations” and the Relief Fund for Sickness and Invalidity Insurance. Since, according to Article 3 of that Law, authorized national federations are only those which are authorized pursuant to the Royal Decree of 22 September 1955, only insurance institutions authorized in accordance with Belgian legislation have a right of recovery. Therefore a private Netherlands insurer, such as the plaintiff in the main action, cannot have a right of recovery.

As regards the second question the Fund points out that Article 93 of Regulation No 1408/71 is open to different interpretations since, whilst the heading of the article mentions the rights of institutions against “liable” third parties, the article itself refers to rights against a third party “bound to compensate for the injury”. Moreover, since the rules goyerning the Fund's intervention form part of the body of legislation governing non-contractual liability, which continues to be governed by national law alone, the question may be resolved only by reference to that law.

The Fund therefore considers that, if the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to answer the questions submitted by the national court, it should conclude that no inferences can be drawn from Community law as regards the question whether a “health-care” insurer in one Member State which has paid compensation for injury caused in a road accident which occurred in another Member State may exercise in that Member State a right of recovery against a guarantee fund which, by virtue of the legislation of that State, takes the place of an unknown third party responsible for the accident.

The Commission too expresses doubts as to the relevance of the questions submitted by the national court, although for reasons different from those advanced by the Fund.

In the Commission's view, Article 93 of Regulation No 1408/71 contains a rule on the conflict of laws inasmuch as it provides for the recognition in all the Member States of the right of recourse afforded by the legislation administered by the institution concerned, in the form either of subrogation or of a direct right of action. Article 93 is not therefore applicable where no problem of recognition arises, as in this case, because the national court applies national law. The interpretation of Article 93 is therefore relevant only if the action for recovery falls ratione materiae and radone personae within the scope of Regulation No 1408/71 and if the right of recourse is governed not by Belgian law but by Netherlands law.

As regards the field of application ratione personae, it is not explained at all in the judgment making the reference to the Court whether the victim of the accident belonged at the material time to the category of persons to which Regulation No 1408/71 applies, that is to say workers and members of their families.

As regards the field of application of the regulation ratione materiae, it must be emphasized that, according to Article 4 (1) thereof, it applies to all “legislation” concerning social security including inter alia sickness benefits. Article 93 mentions persons who receive benefits “under the legislation of one Member State”. According to Article 1 (j) of Regulation No 1408/71, however, the term “legislation” excludes provisions of existing or future industrial agreements, whether or not they have been the subject of a decision by the authorities rendering them compulsory or extending their scope. Therefore the payment by the plaintiff in the main proceedings of medical expenses pursuant to a contract does not come within the ambit of the regulation in question as, according to Netherlands social security legislation, intervention by a private insurer is possible only in one very particular set of circumstances quite unrelated to the present case.

The Commission therefore considers that Regulation No 1408/71 has no application and consequently the questions concerning the interpretation of Article 93 are devoid of purpose.

In case the Court should not accept its preliminary remarks the Commission observes in the alternative that both the national court and the parties to the main action wrongly assume that the plaintiff's right of action for recovery should be considered in the light of Belgian law and possibly with reference to Article 93 of Regulation No 1408/71. It is accepted in Belgian case-law and academic writing that the insurer's legal subrogation to the rights of the victim of an unlawful act is a matter governed not by the law applicable to that act but by the law governing the payment giving rise to subrogation. It follows that the circumstances in which subrogation arises in Belgium are governed not by the lex loci commissi delicti, which applies to the unlawful act and the consequences thereof, but by the law governing the status of the subrogated party by virtue of which the payment is made. It is clear from Article 93 of Regulation No 1408/71 that the same principle applies for implementation of the Communitysocial security regulations. The national court should therefore have considered whether, by reimbursing the accident victim's medical expenses, the insurer was subrogated under the law governing the insurance policy, which was Netherlands law, to the rights of the insured or whether the payment of the expenses gave it a direct right of action. Consequently, if the Court considers that the issue falls within the field of application of Regulation No 1408/71, the question on the interpretation of Article 93 does then become relevant.

On the basis of those preliminary considerations the Commission observes with regard to the first question that, according to Article 1 (n) of Regulation No 1408/71, the term “institution” means, in respect of each Member State, “the body or authority responsible for administering all or part of the legislation”. The “insurance institutions” referred to in the final paragraph of Article 70 and Article 2 of the Belgian Law of 9 August 1963 fall within the definition of an “institution” contained in the Community regulation. Only in so far as the plaintiff in the main proceedings acts as the institution responsible for administering all or part of Netherlands social security legislation may it be considered to be an “institution” for the purposes of Regulation No 1408/71.

As to the second question, the Commission considers that it can only be answered by interpreting Article 93 in a way which takes account of the fact that it is a conflict of laws rule. This has been stated by the Court on several occasions. In particular the Court has drawn a distinction between the question of the law applicable to the subrogation of rights on the one hand and the question of the law applicable to the exercise of the subrogated or direct rights on the other. The existence of subrogated or direct rights is determined by the legislation applicable to the institution concerned, whereas the substance of the claim is determined by the rules of national law defining how and within what limits the victim's right to compensation arises.

It is therefore the law applicable by virtue of the lex fori to the victim's right of action which will determine whether, in exercising the subrogated or direct rights which it has under its own national law, the insurer may claim only against the third party liable or also against third parties which are not liable but which are nevertheless bound by law to compensate for the injury.

In the present case, therefore, the plaintiff in the main proceedings could claim against the Fund only if under Netherlands law it was vested with a subrogated or direct right of action and provided that the lex loci commissi delicti, which applies in Belgium to the victim's claim, actually afforded the insured person a right of action against the Fund.

In conclusion the Commission suggests that the questions submitted for a preliminary ruling should be answered as follows :

1) According to Article 1 (n) of Regulation No 1408/71 the term “institution”, referred to in particular in Article 93 of that regulation, means, in respect of each Member State, the body or authority responsible for administering all or part of the legislation. Only in so far as the plaintiff in the main proceedings acts as the institution responsible for administering all or part of the social security legislation in force may it be considered to be an “institution” within the meaning of Regulation No 1408/71;

2) For the purposes of Article 93 of Regulation No 1408/71 the law applicable by virtue of the lex fori to the victim's claim determines whether in exercising subrogated or direct rights the insurer may claim only against the third party liable or whether it may also exercise its right of action against third parties which are not liable but which are nevertheless bound by specific statutoiy provisions to compensate for the injury.

Ill — Answers of the parties to the questions put by the Court

The Court asked the Commission to state whether or not the answer which it suggests for the second question submitted by the national court implies that the lex fori in question (in so faias in this case it restricts the right of recovery to Belgian institutions) is compatible with the general principles of Community law and in particular with Article 7 of the Treaty.

In its answer the Commission submitted that no question of any conflict between the lex fori, namely Belgian law, and Community law arises in this case. The fact that Belgian law restricts the subrogated right of action to Belgian institutions can be taken into account only in so far as the lex fori actually provides that Belgian law applies to the victim's right of action, which must be determined by the national court. Even in such a case that fact is immaterial inasmuch as the law thus referred to does not govern the question of the capacity conferred upon the institution concerned to exercise the subrogated or direct right of action. The restriction of the subrogated or direct right of action to Belgian institutions is counteracted by the provisions of Article 93 of Regulation No 1408/71 which makes no provision regarding the recognition of any subrogated or direct right of action.

In reply to another question put by the Court, the insurance company NV Tiel-Utrecht Schadeverzekering confirmed that the basis of Mrs Kenis's insurance is purely contractual. It also stated that Mrs Kenis is not a worker or a member of a worker's family within the meaning of Regulation No 1408/71.

IV — Oral procedure

Oral argument was presented for the Commission of the European Communities by Manfred Beschel, a member of its Legal Department, acting as Agent, assisted by F. Herbert of the Brussels Bar.

The Advocate General delivered his opinion at the sitting on 20 October 1983.

Decision

1. By a judgment of 25 November 1982, which was received at the Court on 10 December 1982, the Burgerlijke Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg [civil court of first instance], Hasselt, Belgium, referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty two questions on the interpretation of Article 93 of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1971 (II), p. 416).

2. Those questions were raised in a dispute between a Netherlands insurance company, NV Tiel-Utrecht Schadeverzekering, and the Belgian Gemeenschappelijk Motorwaarborgfonds [Joint Motor Guarantee Fund, hereinafter referred to as “the Fund”] following a road accident in Belgium in which Mrs Kenis, a Netherlands national living in the Netherlands, was injured.

3. As a result of legal proceedings it was established that the accident in question had been caused by an unknown third party. Tiel-Utrecht, which had paid Mrs Kenis BFR 94069 as reimbursement of medical expenses under a healthcare insurance policy held by her, brought an action in Belgium for the recovery of that amount against the Fund, which under Belgian law is responsible for paying compensation for injuries and damages caused by unidentified, stolen or uninsured motor vehicles.

4. The Fund argued before the Belgian court that it was not liable to reimburse the sum paid to Mrs Kenis by Tiel-Utrecht because the Belgian Law of 9 August 1963 introducing a compulsory sickness and invalidity insurance scheme, in particular Article 70 thereof, intended that only the Belgian institutions responsible for applying the provisions on compulsory insurance were to have a right of recovery against the Fund.

5. Tiel-Utrecht, relying on Article 93 of Regulation No 1408/71, submitted that it should be considered an “institution” within the meaning of that regulation and therefore treated in the same way as Belgian insurance institutions.

6. The Fund submitted that Regulation No 1408/71 was inapplicable in this case, on the ground that the relationship between Tiel-Utrecht and die insured person was of a contractual nature, and argued that the Belgian legislation could not be applied “by analogy” to a legal entity incorporated under Netherlands law.

7. In those circumstances the Burgerlijke Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg Hasselt, referred the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

“1. Whether or not they are regarded as ‘national federations’ [Landsbonden] or ‘relief funds’ [Hulpkas] within the meaning of Article 2 (d) of the Belgian Law of 9 August 1963, must the ‘institutions’ referred to in Amele 93 [of Regulation No 1408/71] be understood as being ‘insurance institutions’ within the meaning of the last paragraph of Article 70 of the Belgian Law of 9 August 1963?

2. Must the expressions ‘liable third parties’ and ‘third party bound to compensate for the injury’ appearing in Article 93 of the regulation be taken to mean the same as the terms ‘vergoedingsplichtigen’ [persons hable to make good the damage] and ‘aansprakelijken’ [persons liable] appearing in Article 1382 et seq. of the Belgian Civil Code? Or must they instead be construed more widely as covering any or every other possible right of recovery?”

8. It must be pointed out that Article 15 of the Belgian Law of 1 July 1956 on compulsory insurance against liability to third parties in respect of motor vehicles provides that all insurers must be affiliated to a joint guarantee fund which is required to assume the obligations of persons causing certain accidents and in particular to pay damages in respect of physical injuries caused by unidentified or stolen motor vehicles or vehicles not covered by insurance in accordance with the provisions of the law. It was precisely for that purpose that the Fund was created in the form of a mutual insurance association and was authorized by Royal Decree of 31 January 1957.

9. The Belgian Law of 9 August 1963, introducing and regulating a compulsory sickness and invalidity insurance scheme, regulates in Article 70 the relationship between the institutions responsible for administering the sickness and invalidity insurance scheme and the Fund as far as concerns the costs which the insurance institutions incur as a result of road accidents caused by unidentified, stolen or uninsured vehicles. That Law provides that in such cases “the insurance institution shall have a specific right pf recovery against the Gemeenschapplijk Motorwaarborgfonds referred to in Article 15 of the Law of 1 July 1956”. Article 2 (d) of the same Law defines “insurance institutions” as the Relief Fund for Sickness and Invalidity Insurance [Hulpkas voor Ziekte-en Invaliditeitsverzekering] and the “authorized national federations” [Landsbonden], that is to say Belgian institutions only.

10. As regards Regulation No 1408/71, Article 93, which is headed “Rights of institutions responsible for benefits against liable third parties”, provides that:

“If a person receives benefits under the legislation of one Member State in respect of an injury resulting from an occurrence in the territory of another State, any rights of the institution responsible for benefits against a third party bound to compensate for the injury shall be governed by the following rules :

a) where the institution responsible for benefits is, by virtue of the legislation which it administers, subrogated to the rights which the recipient has against the third party, such subrogation shall be recognized by each Member State;

b) where the said institution has direct rights against the third party, such rights shall be recognized by each Member State.”

11. In the Commission's opinion, Regulation No 1408/71 is not applicable in the present case since, as regards its applicability ratione personae, it does not appear from the information available that Mrs Kenis belongs to the category of workers moving within the Community or members of their families and since, as regards its applicability ratione materiae, the relationship between Mrs Kenis and Tiel-Utrecht seems to be based on a contract governed by private law and not on the application of legislation on compulsory sickness and invalidity insurance.

The first question

12. In so far as the first question seems to be formulated in such a way as to require the interpretation of a provision of national law — namely, Article 70 of the Belgian Law of 9 August 1963 —, it must be pointed out that the Court may select from all the information provided by the national court those elements of Community law which, having regard to the facts of the case, require a ruling on interpretation or validity.

13. Accordingly, and in view of the fact that in the grounds of its judgment requesting a preliminary ruling the national court expressed doubts about the meaning of the term “institution” in Article 93 (1) of Regulation No 1408/71, the first question must be understood as seeking an interpretation of that term.

14. According to Article 1 (n) of Regulation No 1408/71, the term “institution” means, in respect of each Member State, “the body or authority responsible for administering all or part of the legislation”. Article 4 (1) of the same regulation restricts the term “legislation” by stating under the heading “Matters covered” that the regulation is to apply to all legislation concerning the branches of social security listed in paragraphs (1) and (2). In this context “legislation” is defined by Article 1 (j), which provides that “ ‘legislation’ means in respect of each Member State statutes, regulations and other provisions and all other implementing measures, present or future, relating to the branches and schemes of social security covered by Article 4 (1) and (2)“, but excludes ”existing or future industrial agreements”.

15. The answer to the first question must therefore be that the term “institution” in Article 93 of Regulation No 1408/71 means, in respect of each Member State, the body or authority responsible for administering all or part of the Member State's legislation relating to the branches or schemes of social security mentioned in that regulation.

16. It is clear from the considerations set out above that Regulation No 1408/71 does not apply to “industrial agreements”. Yet Tiel-Utrecht has stated, in answer to a question put to it by the Court, that the basis of the insurance under which it made payments to Mrs Kenis was purely contractual. It must therefore be concluded that the relationship between Mrs Kenis and Tiel-Utrecht does not, by reason of its nature, fall within the scope of Regulation No 1408/71.

17. In those circumstances it is not necessary to answer the second question raised by the national court, since it refers to a particular provision ot a regulation which, as a whole, is not applicable to the relationship considered above.

Costs

18. The costs incurred by the Commission of the European Communities, which has submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. As these proceedings are, in so far as the parties to the main proceedings are concerned, in the nature of a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court.

On those grounds, THE COURT (First Chamber), in answer to the question submitted to it by the Burgerlijke Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg, Hasselt, by judgment of 25 November 1982, hereby rules:

1 The Dutch, French and Italian versions of Regulation No 1408/71 use expressions which appear to be wider than the term “industrial agreements”: namely, contractuele bepalingen, dispositions conventionnelles and disposizioni contrattuali, all of which might be rendered as “contractual arrangements”.