Judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) 2 September 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber)

2 September 2026 ( * )

Dumping – Imports of steel bulb flats originating in China and Türkiye – Definitive anti-dumping duty – Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/209 – Article 2(10)(j) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 – Currency conversions – Article 2(4), (10) and (11) of Regulation 2016/1036 – Ordinary course of trade – Fair comparison between the export price and the normal value – Quarterly dumping margin calculation )

Case T‑175/24,

Özkan Demir Çelik Sanayi AŞ, established in Izmir (Türkiye), represented by J. Cornelis and M. Van Luchene, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Commission, represented by G. Gattinara and J. Zieliński, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber),

composed, at the time of the deliberations, of L. Truchot, President, H. Kanninen and M. Sampol Pucurull (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: I. Kurme, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 3 October 2025,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Özkan Demir Çelik Sanayi AȘ, seeks annulment of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/209 of 10 January 2024 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of steel bulb flats originating in the People’s Republic of China and Türkiye (OJ L 2024/209; ‘the contested regulation’).

Background to the dispute

2 The applicant is a company incorporated under Turkish law that operates as an exporting producer of non-alloy steel bulb flats with a width of up to 204 mm, for the Turkish market and for the EU market.

3 On 14 November 2022, the European Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of steel bulb flats (‘the product concerned’) originating in China and Türkiye (‘the investigation’).

4 The investigation covered the period from 1 October 2021 to 30 September 2022 (‘the investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the purpose of determining injury covered the period from 1 January 2019 to the end of the investigation period.

5 The applicant provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. It submitted a reply to the anti-dumping questionnaire on 9 January 2023 and a reply to the Commission’s requests for additional information on 24 January and 8 February 2023.

6 A verification visit was carried out from 13 to 16 February 2023.

7 On 12 July 2023, the Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 of 11 July 2023 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of steel bulb flats originating in the People’s Republic of China and Türkiye (OJ 2023 L 177, p. 63; ‘the provisional regulation’), whereby the applicant’s exports of the product concerned to the European Union were made subject to a provisional anti-dumping duty of 13.6%.

8 On 17 November 2023, the Commission disclosed the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose definitive anti-dumping duties.

9 On 27 November 2023, the applicant submitted observations on the document referred to in paragraph 8 above, after a hearing on 24 November 2023.

10 On 10 January 2024, the Commission adopted the contested regulation, imposing an anti-dumping duty of 13.6% on the applicant’s exports of the product concerned to the European Union.

Forms of order sought

11 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested regulation;

– order the Commission to pay the costs.

12 The Commission contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

13 In support of its action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law, alleging (i) errors of law in the interpretation of the introductory part of Article 2(10), of Article 2(10)(j) and of Article 2(11) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (OJ 2016 L 176, p. 21; ‘the basic regulation’) and a manifest error of assessment and (ii) manifest errors of assessment and consequent infringement of Article 2(4) of that regulation and of the introductory part of Article 2(10) thereof.

The first plea, alleging errors of law in the interpretation of the introductory part of Article 2(10), of Article 2(10)(j) and of Article 2(11) of the basic regulation and a manifest error of assessment

14 The first plea consists of four parts, alleging (i) infringement of Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation and a manifest error of assessment in the choice of the date that most appropriately establishes the material terms of sale; (ii) an error of law relating to the introductory part of Article 2(10) of that regulation as regards the burden of proof for making an adjustment; (iii) an error of law in the interpretation of the requirements of Article 2(11) of that regulation as regards the investigation period; and (iv) an error of law in the interpretation of the concept of ‘sales made at, as closely as possible, the same time’ within the meaning of the introductory part of Article 2(10) of that regulation.

15 The Court considers it appropriate to examine, first, the second part of the first plea, relating to the burden of proof for making an adjustment, then the first, fourth and third parts of that plea.

The second part of the first plea, alleging an error of law relating to the introductory part of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation as regards the burden of proof for making an adjustment

16 The applicant submits that, contrary to the requirements regarding the burden of proof for making an adjustment on the basis of the introductory part of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation, the Commission has not demonstrated that the use of the exchange rate in force on the date of the invoice affected prices and price comparability, and therefore justified using the rate in force on the date of the purchase order.

17 In that regard, the applicant disputes the relevance of the proof furnished by the Commission. First, the fact that the time difference between the date of the purchase order and the date of the invoice varied from one transaction to another is a common fact irrespective of the type of commercial activity. That does not demonstrate the need to use the date of the purchase order as the date of sale. Secondly, the fact that it invoiced both its domestic and export sales in foreign currencies does not mean that it tactically used currency-based mechanisms to prevent the distortion of prices agreed at the ordering stage by the devaluation of the Turkish lira. Such a practice arises solely from the fact that scrap steel was sold in United States dollars.

18 The applicant submits that the Commission requires a higher standard of proof for exporting producers than that which it applied to itself in the contested regulation. Notably, that institution refrained from examining whether there was a direct link between the export transactions and the claimed adjustment, whether there was a disparity impacting price comparability and whether the applicant considered a potential devaluation of the Turkish lira when determining its prices. According to the applicant, differences that were unforeseeable or beyond the exporting producer’s control cannot be considered as differences capable of affecting price comparability. In addition, the Commission uses two different evidentiary standards depending on whether the adjustment is made under the first or second sentence of Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation.

19 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

20 In the sphere of the common commercial policy and, most particularly, with regard to measures to protect trade, it follows from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice that the EU institutions enjoy a broad discretion by reason of the complexity of the economic and political situations which they have to examine, with the result that the judicial review of that broad discretion must be limited to verifying whether relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts relied on have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error in the appraisal of those facts or a misuse of powers (see judgment of 12 May 2022, Commission v Hansol Paper , C‑260/20 P, EU:C:2022:370, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

21 In that context, the General Court’s review of the evidence on which the EU institutions based their findings does not constitute a new assessment of the facts replacing that made by the institutions. That review does not encroach on the broad discretion of those institutions in the field of commercial policy, but is restricted to showing whether that evidence was able to support the conclusions reached by the institutions. The General Court must therefore not only establish whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also ascertain whether that evidence contained all the relevant information which had to be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it was capable of substantiating the conclusions reached (see judgment of 12 May 2022, Commission v Hansol Paper , C‑260/20 P, EU:C:2022:370, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

22 By contrast, as regards questions of law, the General Court carries out a comprehensive review, which includes the interpretation to be made of legal provisions on the basis of objective factors and verification of whether or not the conditions for the application of such a provision are satisfied (see judgment of 11 September 2024, ZHLPK v Commission , T‑3/22, not published, EU:T:2024:616, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

23 Article 2(10) of the basic regulation provides that a fair comparison is to be made between the export price and the normal value. To that end, that provision requires that the EU institutions take into consideration any factor that might affect price comparability (judgment of 6 September 2013, Godrej Industries and VVF v Council , T‑6/12, EU:T:2013:408, paragraph 22 (not published)). In other words, the raison d’être of an adjustment is to re-establish the symmetry between normal value and export price (judgments of 10 March 2009, Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP v Council , T‑249/06, EU:T:2009:62, paragraph 194, and of 7 February 2013, EuroChem MCC v Council , T‑459/08, not published, EU:T:2013:66, paragraph 130).

24 It follows from the case-law that the adjustments provided for in Article 2(10) of the basic regulation are made by reference to objective factors which correspond to the particular features of each market (original and export) and have a varying impact on conditions and terms of sale, thus affecting price comparability (judgment of 6 September 2013, Godrej Industries and VVF v Council , T‑6/12, EU:T:2013:408, paragraph 23 (not published)).

25 In accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is apparent from the wording and broad scheme of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation that an adjustment to the export price or to the normal value may be made only to take account of differences in relation to factors which affect both prices, and which thus affect their comparability, in order to ensure that the comparison is made at the same level of trade (see judgment of 28 April 2022, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission , C‑666/19 P, EU:C:2022:323, paragraph 138 and the case-law cited).

26 It is also apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, if a party claims adjustments under Article 2(10) of the basic regulation in order to make the normal value and the export price comparable for the purpose of determining the dumping margin, that party must prove that its claim is justified. Accordingly, the burden of proving that the specific adjustments listed in Article 2(10)(a) to (k) of the basic regulation must be made lies with those who wish to rely on them, irrespective of who they are. Therefore, the party wishing to rely on such an adjustment must demonstrate that the factor in respect of which that adjustment is requested is capable of affecting prices and price comparability (see judgment of 28 April 2022, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission , C‑666/19 P, EU:C:2022:323, paragraph 139 and the case-law cited).

27 Thus, it is for the investigating authority, when it considers that it must make an adjustment, to base its decision on direct evidence, or at least on consistent circumstantial evidence, pointing to the existence of the factors for which the adjustment was made, and to determine its effect on price comparability (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 April 2022, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission , C‑666/19 P, EU:C:2022:323, paragraph 139, and of 9 November 2022, Cambodia and CRF v Commission , T‑246/19, EU:T:2022:694, paragraph 125 and the case-law cited).

28 Among the factors for which adjustments can be made, Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation states as follows:

‘When the price comparison requires a conversion of currencies, such conversion shall be made using the rate of exchange on the date of sale … Normally, the date of sale shall be the date of invoice but the date of contract, purchase order or order confirmation may be used if those more appropriately establish the material terms of sale. …’

29 It follows from all the factors recalled above that if the Commission wishes to rely on the need to make the adjustment provided for in Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation, it must base its decision on direct evidence, or at least on consistent circumstantial evidence, establishing that export prices and normal prices are expressed in different currencies and that that affects the prices and their comparability.

30 In the present case, it is apparent from recitals 66 and 71 of the contested regulation that although all export sales to the European Union and most domestic sales were performed in euro, that is not the case for costs of production and certain domestic sales. In that regard, the applicant confirmed, at the hearing, the use of different currencies.

31 Moreover, it follows from recitals 61 and 65 of the contested regulation that the need for the adjustment, according to the Commission, resulted from the impact of the exchange rate on prices and price comparability due to the devaluation of the Turkish lira and the fact that the sales were priced in foreign currency. Recitals 65 and 66 of that regulation set out how the variation of the exchange rate could have affected the price comparison, in view of the time difference between the date of the purchase order and the date of the invoice, which varied from one transaction to another and was on average longer for EU sales than for domestic sales.

32 Therefore, the Commission duly met the burden of proof incumbent on it under the introductory part of Article 2(10) and under Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation as to the need to make a currency conversion adjustment.

33 However, it is necessary to distinguish the proof relating to the need for the currency conversion adjustment, which follows from the introductory part of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation, read in conjunction with the first sentence of Article 2(10)(j) of that regulation, from the justification relating to the date of sale, which seeks to demonstrate that the date of contract, purchase order or order confirmation more appropriately establishes the material terms of sale, within the meaning of the second sentence of that provision.

34 In that regard, contrary to what the applicant claims, the provisions cited in paragraph 33 above do not require the Commission to furnish proof that the use of the exchange rate in force on the date of the invoice would have affected prices and price comparability, since that would amount to equating the proof relating to the need for the adjustment with that relating to the determination of the date of sale.

35 In determining the applicable exchange rate, the sole purpose of the demonstration required is to show that the date that most appropriately established the material terms of sale was not that of the invoice. That search for the appropriate exchange rate is not comparable to a currency conversion adjustment, which requires demonstrating that such a conversion is necessary for the fair comparison between the export price and the normal value.

36 As regards the applicant’s arguments relating to the choice of the date of the purchase order instead of that of the invoice, it is appropriate to examine them below, in the context of the first part, concerning the existence of a manifest error of assessment as regards the choice of the document making it possible to determine the date of sale for the purposes of Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation.

37 The second part of the first plea in law must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

The first part of the first plea, alleging a manifest error of assessment as to the choice of the date that most appropriately establishes the material terms of sale within the meaning of Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation

38 The applicant claims that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment in considering that the material terms of sale were set at the time of the purchase order, and not at the time of the invoice.

39 The applicant submits that, based on its use of the term ‘normally’, Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation gives preference to the date of the invoice, and that the other possible dates constitute derogations to be interpreted narrowly. It considers that the material terms of sale had to be set at the time of issuing the invoice, rather than at the date of the purchase order, in the context of the investigation relating to its sales, since those material terms were the quantity sold and the total amount paid, and not the unit price at the time of the purchase order. In that regard, the existence of tolerances as regards the final quantity to be delivered, which are customary in the steel sector, shows that those material terms are determined only at the time of issuing the invoice. Moreover, it is apparent from practice that the quantity ordered differs from that invoiced for both export sales and domestic sales. That difference, which normally falls within the margin of tolerance, may exceed it. The fact that sales made outside the tolerances are not contested, despite the increase in the total invoiced price, indicates that the final agreement on quantity and price occurs only at the time of invoicing. Moreover, exchange rate fluctuation does not constitute a material term of sale.

40 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

41 It should be noted that Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation provides that, ‘normally’, the date of sale is to be the date of invoice but the date of contract, purchase order or order confirmation may be used if those more appropriately establish the ‘material terms of sale’.

42 It is apparent from the clear and precise wording of Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation that that provision contains a rule, according to which it is the date of the invoice that is used to determine the date of sale, subject to derogations allowing the date of one of the other documents or facts mentioned to be used if those more appropriately establish the material terms of the sale.

43 Consequently, where the investigating authority intends to use the date of a document other than that of the invoice as the date of sale in order to determine the exchange rate in force, it is incumbent upon that authority to justify why it considers that one of the derogations provided for in the second sentence of Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation should be applied, which means that the date of the document in question more appropriately establishes the material terms of sale.

44 In that regard, it should be noted that neither the basic regulation nor the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 103; ‘the anti-dumping agreement’) contains a definition of the concept of material terms of sale or its characteristics.

45 However, it is apparent from Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation, read in conjunction with the introductory part of Article 2(10) thereof referring to the fair comparison at the same level of trade between the export price and the normal value, that the term ‘material’ refers to the trading terms of the sale as opposed to legal terms. Thus, such trading terms are, in particular, the price, quantity, methods of payment and delivery, or other commercial characteristics of a transaction specific to a particular economic activity or type of production.

46 In addition, it should be borne in mind that currency conversion adjustment, provided for in Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation, relates to a factor, namely the exchange rate, that affects the actual price of the goods concerned in the context of a fair comparison within the meaning of Article 2(10) of that regulation. That adjustment is intended to provide the best possible assessment of the transaction value by determining the exchange rate of the currencies used at the time of the sale of the product.

47 Therefore, given that the material terms of sale must be interpreted as referring to the trading terms of the sale and even though there is a general rule that they are established on the date of the invoice, the fact remains that not only is it possible for another document to establish all of those terms, but also that particular circumstances may influence them, justifying a different date being chosen, provided that the Commission demonstrates that that different date more appropriately establishes those terms.

48 In the present case, the Commission stated, in recital 61 of the contested regulation, that the material terms of sale were set at the time of the purchase order, and not on the date of the invoice. Those terms are set out in recital 62 of that regulation, which also refers to recital 138 of the provisional regulation. According to those two recitals, those terms are, in particular, the basic quantities and the unit price, as well as the applicant’s concrete practice and price setting practices.

49 In that regard, it should be borne in mind, in line with the case-law previously cited in paragraph 20 above, that the application of the adjustments provided for in Article 2(10) of the basic regulation requires an appraisal of complex economic situations and that the judicial review of such an appraisal must therefore be limited to verifying whether the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts relied on have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error in the appraisal of those facts or a misuse of powers (see judgment of 11 June 2025, Hitit Seramik v Commission , T‑230/23, not published, EU:T:2025:579, paragraph 118 and the case-law cited).

50 In the present case, on the one hand, it is apparent from recital 62 of the contested regulation, referring to recital 138 of the provisional regulation, that the Commission explains that its use of the date of the purchase order as the date of sale is due to the concrete practice of the applicant, under which the material terms of sale are set at the time of the purchase order rather than on the date of the invoice, both for domestic and export sales.

51 In response to the applicant’s arguments that the existence of tolerance relating, in particular, to the price and quantity stipulated in the purchase order has an impact on the material terms of sale, the Commission submits, in recital 64 of the contested regulation, that such a tolerance did not affect quantities or unit prices, while noting that the use of such tolerances was a common commercial practice in the steel sector. Similarly, according to recitals 62 and 64 of the contested regulation, that factor had no impact on the determination of the material terms of sale, since the applicant’s failure to comply with those terms on several occasions did not give rise to any objection on the part of customers.

52 On the other hand, the Commission specified, in recital 66 of the contested regulation, the factors that, in its view, had an impact on the actual material terms of sale in order to explain its decision to take into account the date of the purchase order. First, the Turkish lira depreciated overall by comparison with the euro by approximately 74% during the investigation period. Secondly, the time lag between the date of the purchase order and the date of the invoice varied greatly, from 0 to 266 days for domestic sales and from 20 to 219 days for sales on the EU market. Thirdly, by expressing its domestic and export sales in foreign currencies, the applicant anticipated strong variations in the valuation of the Turkish lira and mitigated its effects on the price agreed at the time of the purchase order and the income that that price could secure when invoiced.

53 It is necessary to determine whether the proof furnished by the applicant in support of the present part is such as to call into question the plausibility of that assessment.

54 First, as regards the effect of the tolerance referred to in paragraph 51 above, it is apparent from the proof furnished by the applicant that, on the one hand, although the quantity ordered is not identical to that invoiced, that difference remained exceptional and, on the other hand, the quantity delivered in excess of the maximum tolerance remained low.

55 Not only is the existence of such an excess established only in respect of 3 purchase orders out of the 10 used by the applicant as examples, but those excesses are between one and five tonnes, which represents approximately 2% of the quantity ordered for each of those three transactions. Moreover, the applicant does not dispute that none of those transactions was called into question on the grounds that the quantity delivered exceeded the maximum tolerance settled at the time of the purchase order, as stated in recital 62 of the contested regulation.

56 Therefore, the mere finding that there is a difference between the total quantity delivered and the total quantity ordered is not such as to render implausible the finding that the date of the purchase order more appropriately establishes the material terms of sale in the present case.

57 Secondly, as regards the fluctuation in the exchange rate of the Turkish lira, the applicant does not dispute the finding made in recital 66 of the contested regulation that, during the investigation period, it depreciated by approximately 74%.

58 In that regard, the mere fluctuation in the exchange rate of a currency cannot, in principle, suffice to call into question the rule according to which the date of the invoice is the date of sale. According to Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation, the application of one of those derogations presupposes an analysis of the material terms of the sale, that is to say, the trading terms that led to the completion of the sale. Thus, it is for the party seeking to rely on such a derogation to establish that such a fluctuation in the exchange rate affects the actual material terms of the sale, in particular the selling price of the goods concerned.

59 Since the purpose of the currency conversion adjustment is to combat technical dumping caused by mere exchange rate fluctuations, that adjustment must not make it possible artificially to increase or reduce the dumping margin by choosing a particular date as the date of sale.

60 Nevertheless, it is apparent from the factors referred to in paragraph 52 above that the Commission did not consider that that factor, taken in isolation, was sufficient to justify using the date of the purchase order as the date of sale. It is true that, according to recital 66 of the contested regulation, the material terms of sale would have been distorted by the difference in the exchange rate between the date of the purchase order and the date of the invoice due to the devaluation of the Turkish lira.

61 However, it is also apparent from recitals 62, 65 and 66 of the contested regulation, and from recital 138 of the provisional regulation to which reference is made, that the Commission primarily bases its decision to derogate from the rule laid down in Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation as regards the date of sale on the applicant’s concrete price-setting practice, on the average time difference between the date of the purchase order and the date of the invoice being longer for EU sales than for domestic sales and on the applicant’s exchange rate risk-hedging practice resulting from the use of foreign currencies for invoicing. Thus, that decision is based on a number of factors.

62 Thirdly, as regards the time lag between the date of the purchase order and that of the invoice, it should be noted that the applicant does not dispute its existence. It merely states that that is a very common basic fact that, in the past, has not resulted in the use of the date of the purchase order for currency conversions.

63 In that regard, it should be recalled that the lawfulness of a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties must be assessed in the light of legal rules and, in particular, the provisions of the basic regulation, not on the basis of the Commission’s alleged previous practice in taking decisions (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 October 2016, Crown Equipment (Suzhou) and Crown Gabelstapler v Council , T‑351/13, not published, EU:T:2016:616, paragraph 107).

64 Thus, the Commission’s previous decision-making practice is not sufficient, in itself, to call into question the plausibility of the assessment contained in the contested regulation.

65 Moreover, the fact that such a time lag is a common practice is not sufficient to call into question the Commission’s assessment that the unit prices and quantities ordered constituted the material terms of sale, on account of the applicant’s commercial practice. It is not the common nature of that practice that matters, but the fact that it does not distort the determination of the actual price of the goods in question. In that regard, the Commission stated, in recital 65 of the contested regulation, that it had examined its impact on the price comparison.

66 In any event, the applicant has not furnished any proof capable of rendering implausible the assessment carried out by the Commission in the contested regulation, since no direct link can be established between the common nature of that time lag and its lack of influence on the actual material terms of sale on the date of the invoice, for the purposes of Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation. In that regard, by merely claiming that it is a common practice, the applicant has not furnished any proof that calls into question the assessment of the reasons for that variable time lag, nor does it set out its usual practice of invoicing after the production of an order has taken place in order to demonstrate, to the requisite legal standard, that the contested regulation is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment.

67 Fourthly, as regards the use of foreign currencies for export sales and most domestic sales, the applicant submits that that can be explained by the use of the United States dollar on the market for scrap steel and on the Turkish market for the product concerned. However, such a practice is not such as to render implausible the finding that precisely that use had the effect of mitigating the significant fluctuations in the exchange rate of the Turkish lira, irrespective of whether the applicant deliberately used those currencies for that purpose.

68 Furthermore, as regards the argument that unforeseeable differences or differences beyond the control of the exporting producer cannot be regarded as capable of affecting price comparability, that argument relates to the proof required for making an adjustment, and not to that required for determining the date of sale. Such an argument seeks solely to support the view that those differences cannot affect prices and price comparability within the meaning of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation without, however, affecting the material terms of sale for the purposes of Article 2(10)(j) of that regulation. In addition, it is apparent from the factors referred to in paragraphs 23 to 34 above that a currency conversion is ‘required’ under the first sentence of Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation where the transactions are expressed in several currencies. In any event, in order to ensure a fair comparison, adjustments must be made on the basis of objective factors, that is to say, based on verifiable elements, and according to their actual effects on prices and price comparability (see paragraph 24 above).

69 Thus, the proof furnished by the applicant in support of the present part of the plea is not capable of rendering implausible the assessment made by the Commission in the contested regulation as regards the choice of the date of the purchase order as the date of sale, in accordance with the first sentence of Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation.

70 It is apparent from the factors referred to in paragraph 52 above that the Commission justified its use of the date of the purchase order as the date of sale by demonstrating the existence of a set of specific circumstances having an influence on the actual material terms of sale, as set out in the invoice, and of a specific commercial practice on the part of the applicant.

71 Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s arguments concerning the Commission’s obligation to take account of the existence of a direct link between the export transactions and the adjustment claimed, the presence of a disparity affecting price comparability and the fact that the undertaking took into account a potential devaluation of the Turkish lira when determining its prices, it should be noted that they concern a situation in which the exporting producer intended to rely on the derogation provided for in the first sentence of Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation, according to which the exchange rate in the forward sale is to be used if a sale of currency on forward markets is directly linked to the export sale involved, which is not the case here.

72 It follows that the applicant has not furnished any proof capable of rendering implausible the Commission’s assessment in the contested regulation that, in the specific circumstances of the present case, the date of the purchase order more appropriately establishes the material terms of sale due to the applicant’s commercial practice and the impact of external factors on those material terms.

73 It follows from the foregoing that the first part of the first plea in law must be rejected.

The fourth part of the first plea, alleging an error of law in the interpretation of the concept of ‘sales made at, as closely as possible, the same time’ within the meaning of the introductory part of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation

– The plea of inadmissibility, alleging that the argument referred to in paragraph 39 of the reply does not satisfy the requirement of clarity for the purposes of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court

74 The Commission raises a plea of inadmissibility, alleging that paragraph 39 of the reply lacks clarity and precision. In its view, that paragraph is inadmissible under Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, in so far as it refers to ‘few other comments’ in the defence.

75 The applicant disputes the Commission’s arguments.

76 It should be noted that, according to Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must state the subject matter of the proceedings and a summary of the pleas in law and that statement must be clear and precise enough to enable the defendant to prepare its arguments and the Court to rule on the application (judgment of 14 December 2022, PT Pelita Agung Agrindustri and PT Permata Hijau Palm Oleo v Commission , T‑143/20, EU:T:2022:811, paragraph 148).

77 It should be noted that the interpretation of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure also applies to the conditions of admissibility of the reply, which, according to Article 83(1) of those rules, is intended to supplement the application (see judgment of 11 July 2018, Europa Terra Nostra v Parliament , T‑13/17, not published, EU:T:2018:428, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited).

78 In the present case, the applicant states, in paragraph 39 of the reply, that the ‘few other comments of the Commission under the fourth part appear irrelevant, as they address claims the applicant never made’ and then develops the following arguments in support of its claim.

79 First, the applicant disputes the Commission’s claim that, in the application, it stated that ‘the purchase order date can never be used as the date of sale’. It is apparent from paragraph 39 of the reply that that argument clearly refers to paragraph 84 of the defence.

80 Secondly, by referring to paragraph 85 of the defence, the applicant makes a response in paragraph 39 of the reply to what it considers to be an erroneous argument by the Commission.

81 However, it is apparent from the arguments put forward by the Commission in the rejoinder that it was able to understand the criticisms made by the applicant in paragraph 39 of the reply against the arguments set out in its defence.

82 It follows that paragraph 39 of the reply satisfies the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure.

83 Accordingly, the plea of inadmissibility alleging a lack of clarity and precision in paragraph 39 of the reply must be rejected.

– Substance

84 The applicant claims that the Commission did not compare ‘sales made at, as closely as possible, the same time’ within the meaning of the introductory part of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation and Article 2.4 of the anti-dumping agreement. According to the applicant, it is apparent from the report of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Panel in the case United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea (WT/DS179/R, paragraph 6.121) that that obligation requires as a general matter that the periods on the basis of which the weighted average normal value and the weighted average export price are calculated must be the same. However, that was not the case due to the use of the date of the purchase order as the date of sale, which led the Commission to calculate the weighted average export price over the period from 24 July 2021 to 8 August 2022 and the weighted average normal value over the period from 4 May 2021 to 26 September 2022.

85 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

86 According to settled case-law, the interpretation of a provision of EU law requires that account be taken not only of its wording and the objectives it pursues, but also of its context and the provisions of EU law as a whole (see judgments of 10 December 2018, Wightman and Others , C‑621/18, EU:C:2018:999, paragraph 47, and of 30 May 2024, Hengshi Egypt Fiberglass Fabrics and Jushi Egypt for Fiberglass Industry v Commission , C‑261/23 P, EU:C:2024:440, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

87 In the first place, it follows from the wording of the introductory part of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation that the comparison between the export price and the normal value is fair where it is made ‘at the same level of trade and in respect of sales made at, as closely as possible, the same time and with due account taken of other differences which affect price comparability’. Thus, the reference to the date relates to the temporal proximity of the transactions being compared.

88 In the second place, the contextual interpretation of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation clarifies that rule. First, it should be noted that the concept of ‘date of sale’ is mentioned only as a criterion for selecting the exchange rate applicable in the context of the currency conversion provided for in Article 2(10)(j) of that regulation. That date is presumed to be the date of the invoice, although it is possible to use the date of another document, provided that the latter more appropriately establishes the material terms of sale.

89 Secondly, it should be recalled that Article 2(11) of the basic regulation provides, ‘subject to the relevant provisions governing fair comparison’, two methods for comparing the normal value and the export price: a ‘symmetrical’ method, based either on the comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all export transactions to the European Union, or on a comparison made on a transaction-by-transaction basis, and an ‘asymmetrical’ method, based on the comparison of a weighted average normal value with the prices of all individual export transactions to the European Union.

90 The scope of the rule relating to the temporal proximity of sales in order to comply with the requirement of a fair comparison must be read in the light of the method of comparison chosen to calculate the dumping margin. If the investigating authority opts for a comparison on a transaction-by-transaction basis, then the rule that a fair comparison is to be made ‘in respect of sales made at, as closely as possible, the same time’ means that those transactions took place on the same date or on dates that were close together. Conversely, the choice of a method based on a comparison of weighted averages makes that temporal proximity rule less strict.

91 It follows from the foregoing that it cannot be inferred from the literal and contextual interpretation of the introductory part of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation that the date of sale used to determine the rate of exchange for the purposes of the adjustment under paragraph 10(j) of that article must also be used to identify transactions falling within the investigation period.

92 In the third place, the teleological interpretation supports the literal and contextual interpretation. Article 2(10) of the basic regulation requires the institutions to make a fair comparison between the export price and the normal value. To that end, the EU institutions must take into consideration any factor that might affect price comparability (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 September 2013, Godrej Industries and VVF v Council , T‑6/12, EU:T:2013:408, paragraph 22 (not published)).

93 In any assessment of the fairness of the comparison, the concept of ‘symmetry between the normal value and the export price’ thus constitutes a key element reflecting the need to establish the comparability of prices within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the basic regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2011, Dashiqiao Sanqiang Refractory Materials v Council , T‑423/09, EU:T:2011:764, paragraph 43).

94 Thus, the purpose of the introductory part of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation is to ensure symmetry between the criterion of temporal proximity used to identify the transactions included in the investigation period and the method for calculating the dumping margin used.

95 Furthermore, the anti-dumping agreement, the wording of which is similar to that of the basic regulation as regards the use of the concept of ‘date of sale’, refers in Article 2.4.1 to that date in the context of currency conversion and specifies its meaning.

96 It should also be noted that Article 2.4.1 of the anti-dumping agreement appears in Article 2.4 of that agreement, which deals with fair comparison and requires that that comparison be made ‘in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time’.

97 In that regard, it should be recalled that, on the one hand, the general international law principle of compliance with Treaty commitments ( pacta sunt servanda ), laid down in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 ( United Nations Treaty Series , Vol. 1155, p. 331), means that the Courts must, for the purposes of interpreting and applying the anti-dumping agreement, take account of the interpretation that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has given to the various provisions of that agreement (see judgment of 20 January 2022, Commission v Hubei Xinyegang Special Tube , C‑891/19 P, EU:C:2022:38, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

98 On the other hand, although the interpretations of the anti-dumping agreement by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body cannot bind the Court in its assessment as to whether the contested regulation is valid, there is nothing to prevent the Court from referring to them, where provisions of the basic regulation have to be interpreted (see judgment of 11 July 2017, Viraj Profiles v Council , T‑67/14, not published, EU:T:2017:481, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited).

99 According to the report of the WTO Appellate Body in the case European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Certain Fatty Alcohols from Indonesia (WT/DS442/AB/R, paragraph 5.21), in order for a comparison to be fair, it must be unbiased, objective and even-handed, and Article 2.4 of the anti-dumping agreement focuses on the means to ensure its fairness.

100 Moreover, it is apparent from the report of the WTO Panel in the case United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea (WT/DS179/R, paragraphs 6.120 and 6.121) that, while the date of sales may have implications in respect of the comparability of export and domestic transactions, the type of method for calculating the dumping margin used, within the meaning of Article 2.4.2 of the anti-dumping agreement, must be taken into account when interpreting the requirement of symmetry between sales by date. In the context of weighted-average-to-weighted-average comparisons, the requirement that a comparison be made between sales made at as nearly as possible the same time requires as a general matter that the periods on the basis of which the weighted average normal value and the weighted average export price are calculated must be the same.

101 Thus, Article 2.4 of the anti-dumping agreement does not require the date of sale used for the currency conversion adjustment provided for in Article 2.4.1 of that agreement to be the same as that used to allocate transactions to the investigation period, provided that the requirement of symmetry is complied with.

102 Accordingly, it follows from a literal, contextual and teleological interpretation of the introductory part of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation, read in the light of Article 2.4 of the anti-dumping agreement, that the concept of ‘sales made at, as closely as possible, the same time’ refers to a requirement of symmetry between periods resulting from the criterion of temporal allocation, taking due account of the method for calculating the dumping margin chosen.

103 In the present case, as is apparent from recitals 68 and 70 of the contested regulation, the date of the invoice served to identify the transactions falling within the investigation period both for sales on the domestic market and for export sales. The date of the purchase order was used only for the adjustment under Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation, namely to determine the exchange rate on the date of sale.

104 Moreover, according to recitals 77 and 82 of the contested regulation, the Commission calculated the dumping margin on an annual basis using the method of comparing weighted averages.

105 It follows from the foregoing that, in so far as the Commission used the same criterion for allocating transactions to the investigation period for domestic and export sales, namely the date of the invoice, and since it used the method of comparing weighted averages according to an annual approach, it did not err in law in its interpretation of the concept of ‘sales made at, as closely as possible, the same time’, within the meaning of the introductory part of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation.

106 The fourth part of the first plea in law must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

The third part of the first plea, alleging an error of law in the interpretation of the requirements of Article 2(11) of the basic regulation as regards the investigation period

107 The applicant claims that the Commission erred in law in its interpretation of Article 2(11) of the basic regulation as regards the obligation to make a comparison of all relevant transactions where the date of sale falls within the investigation period.

108 The applicant submits that the choice of the date of the purchase order, rather than the date of the invoice, as the date of sale resulted in the use of an incomplete data set for both domestic and export sales without any adjustment of the data collected. Indeed, the Commission used prices set for sales on the domestic market for purchase orders placed between 4 May 2021 and 26 September 2022, whereas it used prices set for export sales between 24 July 2021 and 8 August 2022. The date of sale is a concept common to Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation and Article 2(11) thereof allowing for the selection of transactions falling within the investigation period. As a result, according to the applicant, the Commission should have taken into account the sales for which the date of the purchase order fell within the investigation period.

109 In addition, the applicant considers that shifting or extending the investigation period runs counter to the purpose of establishing an investigation period aimed at the objective and unbiased determination of the dumping margin. According to the applicant, the Commission must adopt a consistent approach to using the date of sale in order to ensure that the investigation period is fixed.

110 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

111 As recalled in paragraph 89 above, it is apparent from the wording of Article 2(11) of the basic regulation that two methods for comparing the normal value and the export price are provided for – a ‘symmetrical’ method and an ‘asymmetrical’ method.

112 The objective pursued by Article 2(11) of the basic regulation is that both the symmetrical and the asymmetrical methods for calculating the dumping margin must serve to reflect the full degree of dumping being practised (judgment of 5 April 2017, Changshu City Standard Parts Factory and Ningbo Jinding Fastener v Council , C‑376/15 P and C‑377/15 P, EU:C:2017:269, paragraph 54).

113 In addition, it must be noted that, under Article 2(11) of the basic regulation, the dumping margin is calculated by comparing the normal value and the prices of all export transactions to the European Union, ‘subject to the relevant provisions governing fair comparison’.

114 Thus, the citation in paragraph 113 above refers to Article 2(10) of the basic regulation, which states that where a fair comparison cannot be made between the normal value and the export price, due allowance, in the form of adjustments, is to be made for differences in factors which are claimed and demonstrated to affect prices.

115 Indeed, price comparability is taken into account not in the context of the application of Article 2(11) of the basic regulation, but in the context of the application of Article 2(10) of that regulation (judgment of 9 July 2020, Donex Shipping and Forwarding , C‑104/19, EU:C:2020:539, paragraph 55).

116 In the present case, recitals 68 and 70 of the contested regulation confirm that the Commission did not alter the criterion used to identify transactions falling within the investigation period. It is apparent from recital 68 that the investigation period was consistently used to define and base the dumping calculation on a complete set of transactions according to the date of the invoices thereof. Moreover, recital 68 provides that the use of the date of the purchase order was strictly limited to the adjustment under Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation.

117 Furthermore, recital 139 of the provisional regulation and recital 82 of the contested regulation both confirm that the Commission calculated dumping on an annual basis by comparing the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of product concerned.

118 In that context, although the investigating authority made a currency conversion adjustment in order to ensure price comparability, that fact in no way means that it amended the investigation period, as is apparent from paragraphs 87 to 105 above.

119 Consequently, the applicant is not justified in claiming that the use of the date of the purchase order as the date of sale, under Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation, automatically results in an infringement of Article 2(11) of that regulation. Although the latter is concerned with the method of calculating the dumping margin, the former refers to the symmetry between values and transactions in the context of a fair comparison.

120 It follows from all of the foregoing that the Commission did not err in law in its interpretation of Article 2(11) of the basic regulation.

121 The third part of the first plea in law must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

122 Consequently, the first plea in law must be rejected in its entirety.

The second plea, alleging manifest errors of assessment and consequent infringement of Article 2(4) of that regulation and of the introductory part of Article 2(10) thereof

123 The second plea consists, in essence, of two parts, alleging (i) a manifest error of assessment relating to the refusal to use the quarterly cost of production to identify sales made in the ordinary course of trade within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the basic regulation, and (ii) a manifest error of assessment as regards the refusal to carry out a quarterly dumping margin calculation, in breach of the introductory part of Article 2(10) of that regulation.

The first part of the second plea, alleging a manifest error of assessment relating to the refusal to use a quarterly method to identify the ordinary course of trade, which resulted in an infringement of Article 2(4) of the basic regulation

– The plea of inadmissibility, alleging failure to comply with Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure

124 The Commission contends that the first part of the second plea does not satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and must be declared inadmissible on the basis of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure.

125 The applicant disputes the Commission’s claims.

126 It must be borne in mind that the admissibility of the first part of the second plea must be assessed in accordance with the interpretation of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, as set out in the case-law referred to in paragraph 76 above.

127 In that regard, the mere invocation of the principle of EU law which is alleged to have been infringed, without indicating the matters of fact and of law on which that allegation is based, does not satisfy the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure (see judgment of 16 December 2020, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission , T‑541/18, not published, EU:T:2020:605, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).

128 In the present case, the applicant claims that the contested regulation infringed Article 2(4) of the basic regulation, relying on the existence of a manifest error of assessment on the part of the Commission resulting from the refusal to adopt a quarterly approach for the purposes of applying the ordinary-course-of-trade test under that article, when calculating the normal value, whereas the particular circumstances linked to the significant fluctuations in costs and prices over the investigation period made it necessary to adopt such an approach.

129 In addition, the title given to the second plea by the applicant alleges a ‘manifest error of assessment in refusing to carry out a quarterly dumping margin calculation and consequent violation of Article 2(4) and the chapeau of Article 2(10) [of the] basic [r]egulation’.

130 In that regard, on the one hand, in the introduction to its arguments devoted to the second plea, the applicant ‘considers that, in rejecting such a quarterly calculation, the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment as well as a consequent violation of Article 2(4) and the chapeau of Article 2(10) [of the] basic [r]egulation’. On the other hand, in the concluding part relating to the second plea, the applicant ‘submits that the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment in refusing to carry out a quarterly dumping margin calculation’. In its view, ‘[that] has, in turn, resulted in a violation of Article 2(4) and the chapeau of Article 2(10) [of the] basic [r]egulation’.

131 It follows that the essential matters of law and of fact on which the first part of the second plea is based are set out in a coherent and comprehensible manner in the application itself, despite the reference in the title to an infringement of Article 2(4) of the basic regulation. It is clear from the applicant’s arguments that that part is based on the existence of a manifest error of assessment in the application of that article, due to the presence of exceptional circumstances justifying a departure from the method for calculating the normal value based on an annual approach. Moreover, in view of the arguments submitted by it in the defence and in the rejoinder, the Commission was clearly in a position to understand the applicant’s criticisms of the contested regulation.

132 The first part of the second plea therefore meets the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure.

133 Accordingly, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission in respect of the first part of the second plea in law must be rejected.

– Substance

134 The applicant claims that the Commission vitiated the contested regulation with a manifest error of assessment by concluding that, despite significant fluctuations in costs of production and prices during the investigation period, a quarterly calculation was not appropriate to identify sales made in the ordinary course of trade within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the basic regulation.

135 The applicant puts forward four arguments in support of the present part. First, an annual calculation of the normal value would have an inflationary impact if costs and prices fluctuated during the investigation period, as is apparent from the examples mentioned in the application.

136 Secondly, a quarterly calculation is justified on account of the increase in costs of production and the fluctuation in prices during the investigation period. That calculation increases the share of profitable domestic sales by between 25% and 45% by comparison with an annual calculation for product control numbers (‘PCNs’) 132N and 232N. Such a situation is consistent with the approach taken in the report of the WTO Panel in the case Dominican Republic – Anti-Dumping Measures on Corrugated Steel Bars (Costa Rica, WT/DS605). In any event, the applicant considers that the 10% increase in profitable domestic sales as a result of a quarterly calculation, according to the Commission’s data, constitutes a substantial difference demonstrating the need to use it in the present case.

137 Thirdly, the fact that the cost of production data does not cover the entirety of each quarter does not preclude a quarterly calculation of sales made in the ordinary course of trade. The stock value or cost of production from the previous quarter could remedy that shortcoming. In any event, according to the applicant, for the four PCNs sold the most in the European Union, production data for each quarter of the investigation period are available.

138 Fourthly, the absence of quarterly data on selling, general and administrative costs (‘SG&A costs’) does not preclude a quarterly calculation to identify profitable sales. According to the applicant, SG&A costs did not change significantly over the course of the investigation period and inflation equally affects those expenses and turnover figures. Moreover, they are not affected either by the variation in raw material costs or by the devaluation of the Turkish lira, since they are, for the most part, denominated in that currency, and foreign exchange gains and losses are not taken into account for the dumping margin calculation. Furthermore, the applicant claims that it was no longer able to submit quarterly figures after the verification visit. In any event, the Commission failed to fulfil its obligation under the principle of good administration, interpreted in the light of the requirements of Article 2.4 of the anti-dumping agreement, according to which it is for the investigating authority to tell the parties what information is required in order to ensure a fair comparison.

139 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

140 Under Article 1(2) of the basic regulation, ‘a product is to be considered as being dumped if its export price to the [European] Union is less than a comparable price for a like product, in the ordinary course of trade, as established for the exporting country’. The first sentence of Article 2(12) of that regulation states that ‘the dumping margin shall be the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price’.

141 It follows that the determination of the normal value of a product constitutes one of the essential steps required to prove the existence of dumping (judgment of 1 October 2014, Council v Alumina , C‑393/13 P, EU:C:2014:2245, paragraph 20; see also, to that effect, judgment of 4 February 2016, C & J Clark International and Puma , C‑659/13 and C‑34/14, EU:C:2016:74, paragraph 105).

142 The main method of determining the normal value of a product is set out in the first subparagraph of Article 2(1) of the basic regulation, which provides that ‘the normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country’.

143 As the Court of Justice has pointed out, it is apparent from both the wording and the scheme of the first subparagraph of Article 2(1) of the basic regulation that, in the determination of the normal value, it is the price actually paid or payable in the ordinary course of trade which must, as a matter of priority, be taken into consideration in principle to establish the normal value. Under the first subparagraph of Article 2(3) of the basic regulation, that principle may be derogated from only when there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade or when such sales are insufficient or do not permit a proper comparison. Those derogations from the method of establishing the normal value on the basis of actual prices are exhaustive in nature (see judgment of 1 October 2014, Council v Alumina , C‑393/13 P, EU:C:2014:2245, paragraphs 20 and 21 and the case-law cited).

144 The Court of Justice has also stated that the purpose of the concept of ‘ordinary course of trade’ is to ensure that the normal value of a product corresponds as closely as possible to the normal price of the like product on the domestic market of the exporter. Where a sale is concluded on terms and conditions that are incompatible with commercial practice for sales of the like product on that market at the relevant time for determining whether or not dumping has occurred, that sale does not constitute an appropriate basis on which to determine the normal value of the like product on that market (judgment of 1 October 2014, Council v Alumina , C‑393/13 P, EU:C:2014:2245, paragraph 28).

145 In that context, Article 2(4) of the basic regulation provides that, under certain conditions, sales may be treated as not being in the ordinary course of trade. Thus, under the first subparagraph of Article 2(4) of the basic regulation, sales of the like product in the domestic market of the exporting country, or export sales to a third country, at prices below unit production costs plus SG&A costs may be treated as not being in the ordinary course of trade only if it is determined that they are made within an extended period in substantial quantities, and are at prices which do not provide for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time.

146 The second subparagraph of Article 2(4) of the basic regulation adds that if prices which are below costs at the time of sale are above weighted average costs for the investigation period, such prices are to be considered to provide for recovery of costs within a reasonable period of time.

147 Moreover, the third subparagraph of Article 2(4) of the basic regulation states that the ‘extended period of time’ must normally be understood as meaning one year but is in no case to be less than six months, and sales below unit cost are to be considered to be made in substantial quantities within such a period when it is established that the weighted average selling price is below the weighted average unit cost, or that the volume of sales below unit cost is not less than 20% of sales being used to determine normal value.

148 According to the Court of Justice, the ‘ordinary course of trade’ is a concept which relates to the nature of sales themselves. It is designed to exclude, for the determination of the normal value, situations in which sales on the domestic market are not made under conditions corresponding to the ordinary course of trade, in particular where a product is sold at a price below production costs (see judgment of 1 October 2014, Council v Alumina , C‑393/13 P, EU:C:2014:2245, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

149 In that regard, it should be noted that the price of a product is only one of the conditions of a commercial transaction. The question whether a price is charged in the ordinary course of trade depends also on the other conditions of a transaction which are capable of affecting the prices charged, such as the volume of the transaction, the additional obligations assumed by the parties to that transaction or the delivery period. In the context of that assessment, which has to be carried out on a case-by-case basis, the institutions must take into consideration all the relevant factors and all the particular circumstances relating to the sales at issue (judgment of 1 October 2014, Council v Alumina , C‑393/13 P, EU:C:2014:2245, paragraph 30).

150 Furthermore, it is clear from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice that the choice between different methods for calculating the dumping margin and the assessment of the normal value of a product entail an appraisal of complex economic situations, in connection with which those institutions enjoy a broad discretion (see judgment of 3 December 2020, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Distillerie Bonollo and Others , C‑461/18 P, EU:C:2020:979, paragraph 152 and the case-law cited). Review by the Courts of such an appraisal must therefore be limited to verifying that relevant procedural rules have been complied with, that the facts on which the contested choice is based have been accurately stated, and that there has been no manifest error in the appraisal of those facts or a misuse of powers (see judgment of 13 April 2011, Far Eastern New Century v Council , T‑167/07, not published, EU:T:2011:165, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

151 Thus, in order to establish that the Commission had committed a manifest error in the assessment of the facts such as to justify the annulment of the contested regulation, the proof furnished by the applicant must be sufficient to render implausible the assessments of the facts used in that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2023, Hengshi Egypt Fiberglass Fabrics and Jushi Egypt for Fiberglass Industry v Commission , T‑301/20, EU:T:2023:93, paragraph 47).

152 It is in the light of those considerations that the applicant’s complaints relating to the Commission’s alleged manifest error of assessment as regards the choice of the method of calculation for identifying sales made in the ordinary course of trade must be analysed.

153 In the present case, as is apparent from recitals 122 to 133 of the provisional regulation, to which recital 43 of the contested regulation refers, the Commission determined the normal value as follows.

154 In the first place, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic regulation, first, it examined whether the applicant’s total volume of domestic sales, namely in Türkiye, of the like product to independent customers was representative in relation to its total volume of export sales to the European Union, in that the total volume of such sales represented at least 5% of the total volume of export sales of the product concerned to the European Union. It concluded that that was the case (recital 122 of the provisional regulation).

155 Secondly, the Commission examined whether the applicant’s sales on its domestic market for each product type that is identical to or comparable with the product type sold for export to the European Union were representative, namely whether the total volume of domestic sales, by product type, was at least 5% of the total volume of export sales of the identical or comparable product type to the European Union. It established that for a small number of product types that were exported to the European Union during the investigation period, there were either no domestic sales at all, or the domestic sales of that product type were below 5% in volume and thus not representative (recitals 123 and 124 of the provisional regulation).

156 In the second place, for the product types that were sold in Türkiye in representative quantities, the Commission applied the ordinary-course-of-trade test. To that end, it calculated the proportion of profitable domestic sales to independent customers on the domestic market during the investigation period (recital 125 of the provisional regulation).

157 For each product type sold in Türkiye where more than 80% by volume of sales on the domestic market of the product type were above cost and the weighted average sales price of that type was equal to or above the unit cost of production, normal value was calculated as the weighted average of the actual domestic prices of all sales of the product type in question, irrespective of whether those sales were profitable or not (recital 126 of the provisional regulation).

158 Where the volume of profitable sales represented 80% or less of the total sales volume of a product type sold in Türkiye, or where the weighted average price of that product type was below the unit cost of production, the normal value was based on the actual domestic price, which was calculated as a weighted average price of only the profitable domestic sales of that product type made during the investigation period (recital 128 of the provisional regulation).

159 The analysis of domestic sales showed that 50% to 70% of all domestic sales of the product types sold in Türkiye were profitable and that the weighted average sales price was higher than the cost of production. The normal value was therefore calculated either as a weighted average of all domestic sales during the investigation period or as a weighted average of the profitable sales only depending on the volume of profitable sales (recitals 129 and 130 of the provisional regulation).

160 In the third place, for the product types whose sales in Türkiye were not overall profitable or were overall non-existent or insufficient, and where there was no specific information about market prices for those product types not sold by the applicant on the domestic market, the Commission constructed the normal value, in accordance with Article 2(3) and (6) of the basic regulation, on the basis of the cost of production per product type, plus an amount taking into account SG&A costs and profit (recitals 131 and 132 of the provisional regulation).

161 In the fourth place, for the product types not sold in representative quantities on the domestic market, the average SG&A costs and profit of transactions made in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market for those types were added. For the product types not sold at all on the domestic market, the weighted average SG&A costs and profit of all transactions made in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market were added (recital 133 of the provisional regulation).

162 In addition, as is apparent from recital 45 of the contested regulation, the Commission noted that ‘nothing in the text of Article 2(4) of the basic [r]egulation mandates for the use of quarterly cost of production data’ and that the ‘weighted average costs for the period of investigation’ constituted a reasonable calculation period to determine whether prices provided for the recovery of costs. The Commission considered that a departure from the use of annual average costs could be made in very exceptional circumstances and that such circumstances were not present in the present case.

163 The applicant submits, in essence, that the Commission’s use, in the contested regulation, of the annual average costs of production in the application of the ordinary-course-of-trade test constitutes a manifest error of assessment, in view of the significant fluctuations in costs of production and prices that took place during the investigation period. That error led the Commission unduly to exclude profitable sales from the dumping margin calculation.

164 It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether, by relying on an annual average of the costs of production for the purpose of identifying sales made in the ordinary course of trade, the Commission made a manifest error of assessment resulting in an infringement of Article 2(4) of the basic regulation.

165 In the first place, in support of its line of argument, the applicant refers to fictitious examples to demonstrate the impact of a quarterly calculation on the normal value, given that costs and prices fluctuated during the investigation period.

166 However, as is clear from the case-law referred to in paragraph 149 above, such calculations based on fictitious examples, which bear no relation to the present case, cannot demonstrate the actual impact of those fluctuations on the determination of the normal value in the present case nor demonstrate, to the requisite legal standard, the existence of a manifest error of assessment vitiating the contested regulation.

167 In the second place, the applicant submits that a quarterly calculation would have been justified on account of the increase in costs of production and price fluctuations during the investigation period.

168 In that regard, it should be stated, concerning the cost of production, that certain fluctuations are a normal feature of business operations. That said, in order to establish that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment by failing to take sufficient account of fluctuations in costs of production, it is for the applicant, in the present case, not only to demonstrate that those costs underwent changes, but also to prove that taking those costs into account on a quarterly basis would have had an impact on prices and, consequently, on the determination of the normal value.

169 Moreover, as regards the share of sales made in the ordinary course of trade, the applicant submits that a quarterly calculation would have allowed a substantial increase in profitable transactions. It cites as examples two product types, namely PCNs 132N and 232N, for which, in its view, that increase amounted to 25 and 45 percentage points, respectively.

170 However, suffice it to note that the increase in the share of profitable transactions under a quarterly calculation for only 2 of the 21 product types manufactured by the applicant during the investigation period does not demonstrate, to the requisite legal standard, the impact a quarterly approach to the method of calculating the normal value would have on the results derived from the annual approach. Indeed, the applicant makes no comment either on the share of that increase for all the product types concerned or on its consequences for the normal value.

171 In addition, as regards the argument based on the report of the WTO Panel in the case Dominican Republic – Anti-Dumping Measures on Corrugated Steel Bars (WT/DS605/R), it must be stated that, although it is noted in that report that the investigating authority is required to use a methodology that reasonably allows it to identify sales that are above costs at the time of sale so as not to exclude them unduly from the calculation of the dumping margin, it does not follow that the weighted average cost must as a matter of priority be calculated quarterly or monthly rather than annually. On the contrary, that report concludes that the most appropriate method depends on the specific circumstances of each case.

172 In that regard, for the purpose of applying Article 2.2.1 of the anti-dumping agreement, which contains a provision similar to that of Article 2(4) of the basic regulation, it is also apparent from the report of the WTO Panel in the case European Communities – Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway (WT/DS337/R, paragraphs 7.243, 7.274 and 7.275) that the relevant period for calculating unit costs at the time of sale must include the day of sale, whether it is a calculation made on that day or an average over a period including that day and up to the entire period covered by the investigation.

173 Therefore, it follows from the factors set out in paragraphs 171 and 172 above that it is not sufficient to rely on specific circumstances to justify the use of a particular method of calculation, but that it is still necessary to demonstrate their effects, in accordance with the method of calculation used, on the normal value or the dumping margin as regards the types of the product concerned during the investigation period.

174 Lastly, relying on recital 81 of the contested regulation, the applicant claims that an increase of less than 10% in the share of profitable domestic sales, if the normal value were to be calculated on a quarterly basis, would have constituted a substantial difference. However, it is sufficient to note that the applicant has not furnished any proof in support of its assertion capable of demonstrating, to the requisite legal standard, the substantial nature of that increase or its impact on the determination of the normal value and the dumping margin calculation.

175 In the third place, the applicant disputes the Commission’s assessment that the fact that the cost of production data does not cover the entirety of each quarter was an obstacle to a quarterly calculation for the purpose of applying the ordinary-course-of-trade test.

176 In the present case, the Commission found that the applicant did not produce the products under investigation continuously, which led to gaps in the data, as there was no production during certain months during the investigation period. It inferred from that that the use of quarterly intervals would not lead to an average result that accurately represented the costs for the period it covered. In its view, an annual calculation more accurately represented the costs of production during the investigation period (recital 46 of the contested regulation).

177 Furthermore, the Commission noted that, for several product types, there was a mismatch between the quarters during which certain models were manufactured and the quarters when they were sold on the domestic market. Accordingly, it considers that, if the quarterly approach were adopted, for those product types, it would not be possible to carry out an ordinary-course-of-trade test under Article 2(4) of the basic regulation, since, for some of the quarters where sales occurred, there would be no data on costs. The Commission considered that the quarterly approach would not only lead to unrepresentative values when considered generally, but, for specific types of the product concerned, it would not allow a comparison of the price applicable in that quarter with corresponding costs in the same quarter. It therefore rejected the quarterly approach (recital 47 of the contested regulation).

178 The applicant acknowledges that that mismatch between the purchase order and the start of production is the result of the particular production set-up of the product concerned.

179 As regards the availability of data on costs of production for each quarter of the investigation period, the applicant uses four types of the product concerned as examples.

180 As regards PCNs 242N and 142N, it should be noted that production data for each quarter are available, although they are not evenly distributed over the investigation period. Data relating to a single month in the fourth quarter of 2021, to two months of the first and third quarters of 2022 and to three months of the second quarter of 2022 are available. As regards PCNs 232N and 132N, those data are available for two months in each of the quarters covered by the investigation period.

181 Those factors are not such as to call into question the finding made by the Commission and recalled in paragraphs 176 and 177 above that the representativeness of the quarterly average costs of production was lower than that resulting from a calculation based on an annual average, on account of the gaps in the data relating to each quarter. Those factors do not call into question the fact that the applicant’s practice of pooling orders and of grouped production makes the annual approach more consistent by comparison with the quarterly approach in order to determine more precisely the sales made in the ordinary course of trade.

182 Moreover, the solution proposed by the applicant to remedy the data gaps – consisting of using either the stock value or the cost of production from the preceding quarter – does not reflect the actual costs of each quarter and does not allow for the impact of the increase in costs and actual prices to be taken into account when determining the normal value, thus disregarding the objective of the concept of ‘ordinary course of trade’, as set out in paragraph 144 above.

183 In the fourth place, the applicant disputes the Commission’s argument that the lack of quarterly data for SG&A costs prevents a quarterly calculation of profitable sales.

184 In the present case, it is apparent from recital 48 of the contested regulation that the data submitted by the applicant were submitted on an annual basis and for the investigation period as a whole. The Commission found that no quarterly data on SG&A costs were available to allow for the ordinary-course-of-trade test to be applied or for the quarterly dumping margin to be calculated.

185 The applicant asserts that SG&A costs typically did not fluctuate substantially over the course of the investigation period, solely on the basis of a comparison between the share that they represented in 2021 and during the investigation period.

186 In that regard, it should be recalled that the first sentence of Article 2(6) of the basic regulation governs the determination of the amounts for SG&A costs and for profits and provides that they ‘shall be based on actual data pertaining to production and sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the like product by the exporter or producer under investigation’. If those amounts cannot be determined on the basis of ‘actual data’, that provision lays down other methods of calculation.

187 In the present case, the applicant does not dispute that SG&A costs were provided only on an annual basis. Furthermore, the mere comparison of the variation in the share of SG&A costs between 2021 and the investigation period is not such as to render implausible the Commission’s assessment that the lack of quarterly data for SG&A costs constituted an obstacle to the use of a quarterly approach, in the light of the ordinary-course-of-trade test.

188 Moreover, contrary to what the applicant claims, it is apparent from the case-law that losses on foreign currency transactions and conversions must be included in the SG&A costs if they are linked to the undertaking’s main activity (judgment of 11 July 2017, Viraj Profiles v Council , T‑67/14, not published, EU:T:2017:481, paragraph 177).

189 Moreover, it must be held that the gains on transactions and conversions into foreign currency, in so far as they are also related to the applicant’s main production activity and to the sales related thereto, may also be taken into account, up to the level of the financial charges resulting directly from that production and sale activity (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2017, Viraj Profiles v Council , T‑67/14, not published, EU:T:2017:481, paragraph 178).

190 It follows that the applicant has failed to establish that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment in finding, in recital 50 of the contested regulation, that the percentages of SG&A costs in 2021 did not relate to the various quarters of the investigation period and hence did not provide an analytical insight into the fluctuation of such values across the investigation period, in view, in particular, of the likely impact of foreign exchange gains and losses.

191 Furthermore, as regards the argument alleging that the Commission failed to comply with the principle of sound administration, it should be noted that, in the context of anti-dumping investigations, it is for the institutions to ensure compliance with the principle of good administration enshrined in Article 41(1) and (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, according to which every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union (see judgment of 12 December 2014, Crown Equipment (Suzhou) and Crown Gabelstapler v Council , T‑643/11, EU:T:2014:1076, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

192 Those principles are implemented in the basic regulation by a comprehensive system of procedural safeguards aimed, inter alia, at ensuring that interested parties can effectively defend their interests (see judgment of 22 September 2021, NLMK v Commission , T‑752/16, not published, EU:T:2021:611, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited).

193 Moreover, it follows from Article 18(3) and (6) of the basic regulation that the information which the interested parties are required to provide to the Commission must be used by the EU institutions for the purpose of establishing the findings of the anti-dumping investigation and that those parties must not omit relevant information. Whether an item of information is necessary must be ascertained on a case-by-case basis (judgment of 3 December 2019, Yieh United Steel v Commission , T‑607/15, EU:T:2019:831, paragraph 76).

194 Moreover, as the EU Courts have already observed, it is admittedly for the Commission, as the investigating authority, to establish that the product concerned has been dumped, that there has been injury and that there is a causal link between the dumped imports and the injury. However, in so far as there is no provision in the basic regulation conferring on the Commission the power to compel producers or exporters which are the subject of a complaint to participate in the investigation or to produce information, that institution depends on the voluntary cooperation of the parties in supplying the necessary information (judgment of 3 December 2019, Yieh United Steel v Commission , T‑607/15, EU:T:2019:831, paragraph 77).

195 It should be noted that the applicant does not dispute that it was the party that requested the quarterly calculation. To that end, it provided the quarterly production costs, but not the related SG&A costs, even though the latter constitute relevant information for the application of the ordinary-course-of-trade test for the purposes of Article 2(4) of the basic regulation.

196 It follows that the Commission, in taking the view that it did not have the information necessary to carry out a quarterly calculation, did not breach the principle of good administration.

197 Furthermore, the applicant submits that, even if it had submitted SG&A costs quarterly after being put on notice, those expenses would most likely not have been taken into account by the Commission, since they would have been submitted after the verification visit. Suffice it to note that the applicant has never submitted such data, so that any conclusions that the Commission may or may not have drawn from them are not such as to relieve the applicant of its obligation to cooperate in supplying the necessary information (see paragraph 194 above). Thus, that argument fails to prove that the principle of good administration has been breached or that there is a manifest error of assessment vitiating the contested regulation.

198 Accordingly, in the light of all the foregoing considerations, the first part of the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.

The second part of the second plea, alleging a manifest error of assessment and consequent infringement of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation

– The plea of inadmissibility, based on the use of information obtained in the context of another anti-dumping procedure

199 The Commission submits that the applicant’s arguments based on the information obtained in the context of the proceedings that gave rise to the judgment of 8 May 2024, Çolakoğlu Metalurji and Çolakoğlu Dış Ticaret v Commission (T‑630/21, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:304), should be declared inadmissible. It considers that that information must be treated in the same way as documents obtained by a lawyer in the context of another anti-dumping procedure, which are inadmissible. It relies for that purpose on the judgment of 2 April 2020, Hansol Paper v Commission (T‑383/17, not published, EU:T:2020:139, paragraphs 192 to 195).

200 The applicant disputes the Commission’s arguments.

201 It should be pointed out that each case brought before the Court has its own case file, containing, inter alia, the documents and pleadings produced by the parties to the case in question and that each case file is completely separate (order of 15 October 2009, Hangzhou Duralamp Electronics v Council , T‑459/07, EU:T:2009:403, paragraph 12).

202 It should also be noted that it is settled case-law that, according to the rules governing the treatment of cases before the General Court, parties are entitled to protection against the misuse of pleadings and that, therefore, the parties to a case, whether the main parties or interveners, have the right to use the pleadings of other parties to which they have been granted access solely for the purpose of defending their own legal position in the context of that case (see order of 15 October 2009, Hangzhou Duralamp Electronics v Council , T‑459/07, EU:T:2009:403, paragraph 13 and the case-law cited).

203 As regards, more specifically, the judgment of 2 April 2020, Hansol Paper v Commission (T‑383/17, not published, EU:T:2020:139), relied on by the Commission in support of its plea of inadmissibility, it is clear from paragraphs 192 to 195 of that judgment that the document at issue in that case, reproduced as an annex to the application, originated from an anti-dumping procedure in which the applicant was not even an interested party for the purposes of Article 5(10) of the basic regulation.

204 In the present case, the Commission considers that the last sentence of paragraph 87 and paragraphs 113 to 115 of the application should be regarded as inadmissible on the basis of the judgment cited in paragraph 203 above.

205 First, the last sentence of paragraph 87 of the application refers, in the context of a case recently brought before the Court, to a statement by the Commission on its practice concerning the dumping margin calculation in a situation of hyperinflation. It should be noted, on the one hand, that that information is not confidential and, on the other hand, that since it concerns the Commission’s decision-making practice, at the very least, it may be inferred from an analysis of the regulations imposing anti-dumping duties adopted by the Commission over the years.

206 Next, paragraph 113 of the application reproduces information contained in recital 95 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1100 of 5 July 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Turkey (OJ 2021 L 238, p. 32).

207 Lastly, paragraphs 114 and 115 of the application refer to matters contained in Commission Regulation (EC) No 230/2001 of 2 February 2001 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain iron or steel ropes and cables originating in the Czech Republic, Russia, Thailand and Turkey and accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in the Czech Republic and Turkey (OJ 2001 L 34, p. 4) and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1251/2003 of 14 July 2003 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of hollow sections originating in Turkey (OJ 2003 L 175, p. 3), or matters that may be inferred therefrom.

208 The Commission does not explain how that information and the arguments based on it, in view of their nature and the fact that they are public, should be regarded as inadmissible solely because that information originates from another anti-dumping procedure within the meaning of the judgment cited in paragraph 203 above.

209 Accordingly, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission concerning the information referred to in the last sentence of paragraph 87 and paragraphs 113 to 115 of the application must be rejected.

– Substance

210 The applicant claims that the Commission vitiated the contested regulation by a manifest error of assessment by refusing to carry out a quarterly dumping margin calculation, despite the existence of special circumstances, in order to ensure a fair comparison in accordance with the introductory part of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation. An annual approach would not allow for such a comparison to be made when calculating the dumping margin in the circumstances of the present case.

211 The applicant relies on fictitious examples to demonstrate that an uneven distribution of sales during the investigation period constitutes one of those special circumstances. There would be artificial dumping margins if exports were proportionally higher when prices are low and if domestic sales were proportionally higher when prices are high, even if the normal value and the export price were at exactly the same level.

212 Furthermore, the applicant submits that other special circumstances justifying a quarterly approach to the dumping margin calculation can be inferred from the Commission’s previous decision-making practice. The present case concerns the fluctuation in costs of production and prices, the high inflation and devaluation of the Turkish lira and the uneven distribution of sales volume over the investigation period.

213 In addition, the applicant reiterates its position that the distribution of sales should be determined on the basis of the date of the purchase order, rather than the date of the invoice, so as not to use two different dates of sale for the same investigation.

214 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

215 In accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic regulation, a fair comparison is to be made between the export price and the normal value of the product concerned. That comparison is to be made in a fair manner, in accordance with that article, where it is made at the same level of trade and in respect of sales made at, as closely as possible, the same time and with due account taken of other differences which affect price comparability. Where the normal value and the export price as established are not on such a comparable basis, due allowance, in the form of adjustments, is to be made in each case, on its merits, for differences in factors which are claimed, and demonstrated, to affect prices and price comparability.

216 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 20 above, in the realm of measures to protect trade, the institutions enjoy a broad discretion by reason of the complexity of the economic, political and legal situations that they have to examine.

217 That broad discretion extends, in principle, to appraisal of the facts relied on to demonstrate the fairness of the comparison method used, the concept of fairness being vague in character and needing to be narrowed down by the institutions in each individual case having regard to the relevant economic context (judgment of 16 December 2011, Dashiqiao Sanqiang Refractory Materials v Council , T‑423/09, EU:T:2011:764, paragraph 41).

218 Moreover, it is clear from the case-law referred to in paragraph 150 above that the choice between different methods of calculating the dumping margin requires an appraisal of complex economic situations and that judicial review of such an appraisal must therefore be limited to verifying whether the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts on which the contested choice is based have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error in the appraisal of those facts or a misuse of powers.

219 Moreover, in the context of Article 2.4 of the anti-dumping agreement, which deals with fair comparison and contains a provision similar to that of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation, the report of the WTO Panel in the case United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea (WT/DS179/R, paragraphs 6.122 and 6.123) noted that the obligation under Article 2.4 to take into account sales made at as nearly as possible the same time did not preclude the possibility that there might be factual circumstances in which the use of several periods for the calculation of averages might be appropriate to ensure that comparability was not affected by differences in the dates of sales within the periods for calculating averages on the domestic and foreign markets. However, the report does not accept that the wording of Article 2.4 of the anti-dumping agreement implies a preference for short periods for the calculation of averages.

220 The applicant’s arguments must be examined in the light of those considerations.

221 In the first place, in support of its argument, the applicant refers to fictitious examples to establish the impact of a quarterly approach as opposed to an annual approach on the dumping margin calculation in the event of an uneven distribution of domestic and export sales over the investigation period.

222 However, as is clear from the case-law referred to in paragraph 149 above, such calculations established on the basis of hypothetical values unrelated to the present case cannot demonstrate the actual impact of such an uneven distribution of sales during the investigation period on the dumping margin calculation and the fairness of the comparison in the present case. The applicant has not rendered the approach adopted in the contested regulation implausible.

223 In the second place, relying on the Commission’s previous practice in relation to regulations imposing anti-dumping duties, the applicant submits that the presence, in the present case, of certain special circumstances makes a quarterly approach to the dumping margin calculation necessary and appropriate in order to comply with the requirement of fair comparison. In its view, those circumstances include the fluctuation in costs of production and prices, high inflation and devaluation of the Turkish lira and an uneven distribution of sales volume over the investigation period.

224 First of all, as has been pointed out in paragraph 168 above, fluctuations in costs of production or prices are a normal feature of how businesses operate on the market.

225 In that regard, the applicant relies on two examples concerning PCNs 242N and 232N, and on a table containing data on the increase in costs and prices, to demonstrate the existence of a steady increase in costs of production.

226 However, it is for the applicant not only to establish the existence and extent of such fluctuations, but also their actual impact on the reliability of the dumping margin calculation in relation to the method used by the Commission. However, it confines itself to establishing their existence.

227 Next, the applicant submits that the presence of high inflation on the Turkish domestic market during the investigation period and the devaluation of the Turkish lira constitute special circumstances justifying the use of a quarterly approach to the dumping margin calculation.

228 However, the applicant relies on a previous practice of the Commission, without, however, furnishing proof capable of casting specific doubt on the credibility of the method used in the present case by that institution. In particular, the data produced by the applicant do not sufficiently show the consequences of those factors on the dumping margin calculation and on the fairness of the comparison in the present case.

229 Lastly, the applicant relies on an uneven distribution of sales volume during the investigation period justifying a quarterly approach to the dumping margin calculation.

230 It should be noted, as the Commission did, that differences in domestic and export sales are bound to occur.

231 Moreover, as regards the criterion to be used for the distribution of sales during the investigation period, the applicant proceeds from the incorrect premiss that the date of the purchase order is the relevant criterion for distributing domestic and EU sales across the various quarters. As is apparent from paragraph 105 above, the date of the purchase order was used exclusively in the context of the currency conversion adjustment for the purposes of Article 2(10)(j) of the basic regulation. Consequently, the calculation of the normal value and the export price was based on the transaction prices as allocated according to the date of the invoice.

232 It follows that, since the criterion relied on by the applicant to distribute sales over the investigation period is not the one applied in the present case, the proof furnished cannot demonstrate that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment in relying on annual weighted averages for the dumping margin calculation, thereby undermining the requirement of a fair comparison.

233 In any event, as regards the argument that the quarterly method suggested by the applicant corresponds to the Commission’s previous practice when faced with the particular circumstances referred to in paragraph 223 above, it should be borne in mind, as regards the reference to several regulations imposing anti-dumping duties, that it is clear from the case-law cited in paragraph 63 above that the lawfulness of such a regulation must be assessed, on a case-by-case basis, in the light of legal rules and, in particular, the provisions of the basic regulation, not on the basis of the alleged previous decision-making practice of the EU institutions.

234 Consequently, it must be concluded that the applicant has neither rendered the annual approach to the dumping margin calculation implausible nor demonstrated that that approach undermined the requirement of a fair comparison set out in the introductory part of Article 2(10) of the basic regulation.

235 Accordingly, the second part of the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded and, consequently, the second plea in law must be rejected.

236 In the light of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

237 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

238 In the present case, since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Özkan Demir Çelik Sanayi AŞ to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 2 September 2026.

* Language of the case: English.