Judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) 16 September 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

16 September 2026 ( * )

( Civil service – ECB Staff – Short-term contract – Termination before appointment has been taken up – Breakdown in the relationship of trust – Notice period )

In Case T‑287/24,

EB, represented by A. Pappas, D.-A. Pappa and S. Pappas, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Central Bank (ECB), represented by F. von Lindeiner and O. Bubenzer, acting as Agents, and by B. Wägenbaur, lawyer,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber),

composed of S.L. Kalėda (Rapporteur), President, M. Jaeger and T. Perišin, Judges,

Registrar: A. Marghelis, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the failure of the attempt to reach an amicable settlement on 19 January 2026,

further to the hearing on 17 March 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By her action under Article 270 TFEU and Article 50a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the applicant, EB, seeks the annulment of the decision of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 14 March 2024 by which it decided to withdraw her short-term employment contract (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 The applicant was a trainee at the ECB, for an initial period from 15 March 2023 to 15 September 2023, which was extended until 14 March 2024. In that context, she was housed in one of the residences made available by the ECB, in Frankfurt (Germany) (‘the residence’).

3 On 29 January 2024, the ECB offered the applicant a short-term contract for a period of one year from 15 March 2024 to 13 March 2025 (‘the contract at issue’). On the same day, the applicant accepted the offer of employment and signed the contract at issue. That contract was governed by the Conditions of Short-Term Employment (‘the CoSTE’) and the Rules for Short-Term Employment (‘the RfSTE’) in force at the ECB.

4 By emails dated 12 and 13 February 2024, the Head of Accommodation of the residence informed the applicant of the fact that she had been accused of repeatedly taking other people’s clothes from the residence’s shared laundry room. The Head of Accommodation of the residence instructed the applicant to return the clothing to the caretaker of the residence by the following day at the latest, in which case he would refrain from lodging a complaint with the police, and to vacate the accommodation by 16 February 2024 at the latest, a date subsequently postponed to 20 February 2024.

5 On 19 February 2024, since the applicant was abroad, her mother returned the clothing found in her accommodation that did not belong to her. On 20 February 2024, the applicant left the residence.

6 By email of 8 March 2024, the ECB informed the applicant that it intended to withdraw the contract at issue, without a notice period, due to a breakdown in the relationship of trust caused by the allegation, against the person concerned, of theft in the residence. First, on 16 December 2023, a resident allegedly observed the applicant taking, in the laundry room, a piece of clothing belonging to that resident. Second, a member of housekeeping staff allegedly identified, in the applicant’s accommodation, several pieces of clothing belonging to other residents. The ECB set a deadline of five days for the applicant to submit her written observations, that is to say, until 13 March 2024.

7 By email of 12 March 2024, the applicant submitted written observations, in which she denied any accusation of theft, while also acknowledging her lack of attention.

8 On 14 March 2024, by the contested decision, the Chief Services Office withdrew the contract at issue, without a notice period, before the applicant took up her appointment, due to a breakdown in the relationship of trust. The ECB noted, in particular, that the applicant had taken clothing from the residence’s laundry room that belonged to other residents, which had subsequently been identified by the residence’s cleaning staff in the applicant’s accommodation. The ECB considered that that behaviour demonstrated a ‘lack of diligence and of awareness for the importance of distinguishing between [one’s] own [belongings] and other guests’ belongings’. The ECB concluded that that behaviour had severed the relationship of trust between the applicant and that institution in a manner that it cannot be re-established.

Forms of order sought and procedure

9 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– order the ECB to pay the costs.

10 The ECB contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

11 As a preliminary point, notwithstanding the reference in the application to Article 263 TFEU, it must be held, after hearing the views of the parties in that regard, that the present action, which arises from the employment relationship between the person concerned and an EU institution, was brought under Article 270 TFEU and Article 50a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the action must be reclassified to that effect.

Admissibility

12 At the hearing before the General Court, the parties were invited to state their views on a possible reclassification of the action as an action brought under Article 270 TFEU rather than under Article 263 TFEU.

13 In that regard, the ECB submits that, in the event of such a reclassification, the admissibility of the action would then be subject to compliance with the pre-litigation procedure provided for in Part 8 of the CoSTE and Part 7 of the RfSTE. Since the applicant did not comply with those provisions, the ECB therefore considers the action to be inadmissible.

14 The applicant does not oppose the reclassification of the action, but relies on excusable error as regards the choice of legal basis and the failure to use the mandatory pre-litigation procedure prior to bringing the action before the General Court.

15 It should be noted that, under Article 33 of the CoSTE, a short-term contract employee may bring a legal action only after the pre-litigation procedure has been exhausted. That procedure consists of two steps, namely a request for review then a grievance procedure, as provided for in Part 7 of the RfSTE.

16 The admissibility of an action before the General Court under Article 270 TFEU and Article 50a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union therefore depends upon the pre-litigation procedure being conducted in the proper manner and upon the prescribed time limits for that procedure being complied with (see, by analogy, judgments of 6 July 2004, Huygens v Commission , T‑281/01, EU:T:2004:207, paragraph 125, and of 9 January 2007, Van Neyghem v Committee of the Regions , T‑288/04, EU:T:2007:1, paragraph 53).

17 It is undisputed that the applicant did not use the pre-litigation procedure before bringing the present action.

18 As regards the applicant relying on excusable error, it must be borne in mind that the concept of excusable error must be strictly construed and concerns only exceptional circumstances, in particular, where the conduct of the institutions had been, either alone or to a decisive extent, such as to give rise to a pardonable confusion in the mind of an official or a party acting in good faith and exercising all the diligence required (see judgment of 12 July 2019, Steifer v EESC , T‑331/17, not published, EU:T:2019:521, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited).

19 In the present case, it should be noted that, in the contested decision, the ECB explicitly stated that that decision could be challenged before the Court of Justice of the European Union, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU. Furthermore, according to the clarifications given by the applicant before the General Court and in the light of the ECB’s conclusions, the applicant maintained that statement to be based on the premiss that, at the point in time when the contested decision was adopted, she was still considered a trainee by the ECB and not a short-term-contract employee, because she did not fulfil the definition in Article 1(a) of the CoSTE, namely a person who ‘has countersigned an employment contract … and has taken up his/her appointment’.

20 Those statements, present both in the contested decision and in Article 1(a) of the CoSTE, were such as to give rise to a pardonable confusion in the mind of a party, given that they implied that the applicant’s situation, having regard to the fact that the date of her taking up her appointment was subsequent to that of the contested decision, did not fall within the scope of the pre-litigation procedure rules, which – according to the wording of Article 33 of the CoSTE – only included short-term contract employees, and that the person concerned needed to bring her action under Article 263 TFEU in order to challenge the contested decision.

21 In those circumstances, it must be held that there was excusable error on the part of the applicant such as to relieve her of the obligation to comply with the pre-litigation procedure and, consequently, the action must be declared to be admissible.

Substance

22 In support of her action, the applicant puts forward five pleas, alleging, first, procedural irregularity and infringement of the clauses of the contract at issue, second, breach of the right to be heard, third, manifest errors of assessment and errors of fact, fourth, misclassification of the alleged conduct and breach of the principle of proportionality and, fifth – raised at the reply stage – breach of the right to private life.

23 By her first plea, the applicant claims, in essence, that the ECB infringed its contractual obligations by withdrawing the contract at issue unilaterally and without complying with the termination conditions provided for therein. Accordingly, the applicant argues that the contested decision incorrectly deprived her, first, of her right to be given notice stemming from Article 16 of the CoSTE and, second, of the opportunity to bring a grievance as provided for in Part 7 of the RfSTE.

24 According to the applicant, a party to a contract may unilaterally withdraw it and terminate it only in accordance with the clauses regulating its termination, even if the contract has not yet entered into force. The applicant claims, in that connection, that the mutual consent of the contracting parties must exist not only for the creation, but also for the termination, of the contract.

25 The ECB disputes the applicant’s arguments. The ECB submits that, on the date that the contested decision was adopted, the applicant’s status was that of a trainee. The RfSTE do not apply to trainees. Furthermore, the ECB argues that, given that she had not taken up her appointment, the applicant was not, for that reason, a ‘short-term contract employee’ within the meaning of Article 1(a) of the CoSTE, namely a person who ‘has countersigned an employment contract … and has taken up his/her appointment’.

26 According to the ECB, on the date of the contested decision, the employment relationship had therefore not yet taken effect. The acceptance of the contract offer did not cause the rights and obligations arising from the RfSTE to apply. Accordingly, the ECB claims that it was able to withdraw the contract at issue without applying those RfSTE. The ECB asserts that it is common that a contract does not enter into force immediately, since its validity and its entry into force are contingent upon subsequent circumstances or formalities.

27 The ECB submits that, given that the RfSTE were not applicable, it was not required to terminate the contract at issue under the conditions provided for in Article 2.1 of the RfSTE, by, in particular, giving notice. In addition, the ECB considers that it did not terminate that contract, but withdrew it before it took effect. Since the RfSTE did not apply yet, the ECB had recourse, by analogy, to the principle of irreparable breakdown of the relationship of trust, which is inherent in any employment relationship with an EU institution, to justify that withdrawal.

28 It must be borne in mind that the employment relations between the ECB and its staff are of a contractual nature, and not of the type existing between the public service and its officials. However, the employment relationship between the ECB and its members of staff, who are not officials, forms part of the framework for the performance by the latter of their duties in the public interest and therefore bears strong similarities to the relationship of public service between officials and their institutions (judgment of 18 October 2001, X v ECB , T‑333/99, EU:T:2001:251, paragraphs 61 and 68).

29 According to Article 14 of the CoSTE, the employment relations between the ECB and short-term contract employees are governed by employment contracts concluded in accordance with the CoSTE, as specified in the RfSTE.

30 Article 2.1 of the RfSTE, entitled ‘Termination of contract’, provides as follows:

‘The provisions of Article 14 of the Conditions for Short-term Employment are applied as follows:

2.1.1 Contracts shall be terminated in writing.

2.1.2 In the event of dismissal for gross misconduct, contracts may be terminated by the Executive Board for members of staff at salary band J or above, and by the Chief Services Office, acting on behalf of the Executive Board, for members of staff at salary bands A to I, either without notice or with reduced notice.

2.1.3 The period of notice shall in no case run beyond the normal end of the contract.

2.1.4 The [Director-General] Human Resources or their Deputy may release a short-term contract employee from actual duty during his/her period of notice.’

31 Article 16 of the CoSTE states:

‘The period of notice to be given by the ECB if services are terminated before the term of the contract (except in case of gross misconduct) and to be given by a short-term contract employee if he/she wishes to leave the ECB shall be one month. If the services are terminated by the ECB, the reasons for such a termination will be communicated to the short-term contract employee.’

32 In the present case, it is undisputed that, on the date of the contested decision, that is to say, 14 March 2024, the applicant held a short-term contract concluded with the ECB, but that she had not yet taken up her appointment, since the date of appointment was planned for the day after that decision, as mentioned in paragraph 3 above. In particular, the ECB does not dispute that there was mutual consent on all the essential elements of the contract at issue and that that contract had been validly concluded on 29 January 2024.

33 Once the contract at issue had been concluded, the termination of the contractual relationship was therefore, in the absence of other relevant mandatory provisions, subject to the termination conditions provided for in the CoSTE and the RfSTE.

34 A contrary interpretation would be irreconcilable with the contractual nature of the employment relationship between the ECB and its staff and would jeopardise the protection of the employee as the weaker party to the employment contract with the ECB.

35 Those considerations are, moreover, supported by the judgment of 16 July 2015, Murariu v EIOPA (F‑116/14, EU:F:2015:89). It is apparent from the case-law, and in particular from that judgment, that mutual agreement establishes the beginning of the contractual relationship (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Murariu v EIOPA , F‑116/14, EU:F:2015:89, paragraphs 101 to 105). The fact that, in the case giving rise to the present judgment, the contractual relationship had already begun to be put into practice cannot be interpreted as adding an additional condition necessary in order to establish the beginning of the contractual relationship.

36 It follows that, on the date of the contested decision, the ECB was bound by the contractual clauses relating to the termination of short-term contracts, aimed at protecting the other party to the contract, and was not free to decide unilaterally to terminate that contract.

37 In accordance with Article 16 of the CoSTE and Article 2.1 of the RfSTE, the ECB was required to give the applicant a one-month notice period, except in case of gross misconduct, which is not claimed in the present case.

38 That conclusion cannot be invalidated by the ECB’s argument relating to the principle of the relationship of trust inherent in any employment relationship. Although the breakdown of that relationship of trust, as stated in the contested decision, may indeed constitute a ground for termination of the contract, that fact does not relieve the ECB of its obligation to comply with the procedural conditions for the termination of short-term contracts such as, in the present case, the notice period.

39 Furthermore, as regards the ECB’s argument that the applicant did not fulfil the conditions to be considered a ‘short-term contract employee’ within the meaning of Article 1(a) of the CoSTE, it should be noted that the interpretation of the rights and obligations stemming from the CoSTE must be carried out in the light of the case-law which applies to the staff of EU institutions, as provided for in the first paragraph of Article 15 of that text. It is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 35 above that, once a contractual relationship is established by mutual agreement between the parties, the co-contracting institution is no longer free to terminate the contract unilaterally, even before it has taken effect.

40 Moreover, as regards the ECB’s argument that a contract’s validity and entry into force may be subject to subsequent circumstances or formalities, such as, in the present case, the obligation on the applicant to submit her education and employment certificates and to obtain a security clearance, it should be noted that the ECB did not rely on those contractual terms to adopt the contested decision.

41 Lastly, the ECB’s argument that there would be no point in it initially giving effect to an employment contract only to terminate that contract subsequently cannot succeed. First, practical considerations cannot justify a failure to comply with the conditions provided for by the CoSTE. Second, that argument has no factual basis, given that Article 2.1.4 of the RfSTE allows the Director-General for Human Resources or his or her deputy to release a short-term contract employee from actual duty during his or her notice period.

42 It follows from all of the foregoing that the first plea must be accepted, in so far as it alleges infringement of the applicant’s contractual rights under the provisions in the RfSTE and the CoSTE relating to the termination of the contract.

43 In the light of the above, the contested decision must be annulled, without it being necessary to examine the remainder of the first plea or the other pleas in law raised by the applicant.

Costs

44 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the ECB has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Annuls the decision of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 14 March 2024 withdrawing the short-term employment contract concluded on 29 January 2024 with EB;

2. Orders the ECB to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 16 September 2026.

* Language of the case: English.