Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) 2 September 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

2 September 2026 ( * )

( Civil service – Recruitment – Internal competition COM/AD/03/22 (AD 5) – Decision not to admit the applicant to the next stage of the competition – Principle of good administration – Duty of diligence and duty of care – Manifest error of assessment )

In Case T‑416/24,

ES, represented by D. Rovetta and V. Villante, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Commission, represented by J.-F. Brakeland and G. Niddam, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber),

composed, at the time of the deliberations, of R. da Silva Passos, President, N. Półtorak and H. Cassagnabère (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: A. Marghelis, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 23 April 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By her action based on Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, ES, seeks, first, annulment of the decision of the selection board of 2 August 2023 rejecting the request for review concerning the refusal to admit her to the next stage of internal competition COM/AD/03/22 (AD 5) (‘the decision on the request for review’) and, second, compensation for the damage which she claims to have suffered as a result of that decision.

Background to the dispute

2 On 25 October 2022, the Commission published a notice relating to internal competition COM/AD/03/22 (AD 5) (‘the competition’) to which the applicant applied.

3 That competition consisted of a multiple-choice question test (MCQ), as well as another written test and, for the eligible candidates, an oral admission test. The first two admissibility tests could, at the choice of candidates, be held either on the premises of the European Commission or remotely. In the latter case, candidates were required, prior to the tests, to download the TestWe application, made available to them by the Commission, onto the laptop they were using.

4 On 20 February 2023, the applicant, who was a member of the temporary staff (AD 5), was invited by the Commission to take part in the MCQ test and the written test, both scheduled for 15 March 2023.

5 On 15 March 2023, the applicant encountered IT problems during the written test (‘the first test’) and contacted TestWe’s technical support in that regard.

6 On 16 March 2023, the applicant lodged a complaint with the competition secretariat regarding the IT problems she had encountered during the first test and sought permission to sit that test again.

7 By email of 15 May 2023, the competition secretariat acknowledged the existence of the technical problems which had arisen during the first test. It offered all candidates who had encountered such difficulties the option either to retain their results from the first test or to take it again on the following 25 May.

8 On 17 May 2023, the applicant, who had chosen to take the first test again, received an email inviting her to attend the new written test (‘the new test’). That email invited her, first, to ensure that the latest version of the TestWe application (‘the updated application’) was correctly installed on her computer and, second, to carry out a compulsory simulation test (‘the prerequisite simulation test’) before 24 May 2023.

9 Between 17 and 25 May 2023, the applicant exchanged numerous emails with the IT Helpdesk and the Commission’s Directorate-General for Digital Services (‘the Commission’s IT services’) and with TestWe technical support and the competition secretariat, in order to resolve the IT issues she had reported. All those exchanges took place while the applicant was on leave between 18 and 24 May 2023 (18 May corresponding to the Ascension public holiday and 20 and 21 May being, respectively, a Saturday and a Sunday).

10 The applicant took the written test on 25 May 2023. The following day, she sent an email to the competition secretariat complaining of technical problems which she considered she had encountered during the new test.

11 On 21 June 2023, the selection board informed the applicant that she had obtained 19,5 points out of 40 in the written test, a result below the minimum required of 24 points out of 40, with the result that she would not be invited to the next stage of the competition (‘the exclusion decision’).

12 On 23 June 2023, the applicant submitted a request for review, citing the same IT problems.

13 On 2 August 2023, the Commission’s Directorate-General for Human Resources and Security sent the applicant the decision on the request for review, informing her that the selection board had confirmed the exclusion decision. It stated that the selection board had considered that the applicant had received sufficient assistance to put an end to the IT difficulties of which she complained, in that, first, she had received individual technical assistance and, second, she had been offered to come directly to the premises of the Commission’s IT services in order to resolve those difficulties.

14 On 31 October 2023, the applicant lodged a complaint against the decision on the request for review on the basis of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, requesting to take the written test again or to be granted any other measure deemed necessary in order to be admitted to the oral test.

15 By decision of 29 April 2024, the appointing authority rejected the applicant’s complaint (‘the decision rejecting the complaint’). In essence, that authority noted, in the first place, that the applicant had refrained from requesting technical assistance during the new written test, even though that was expressly provided for in the competition notice. In the second place, it claimed that the applicant did not provide evidence of the technical difficulties which she claimed to have encountered during that test, or of the Commission’s breach of the principles of equal treatment and good administration.

Forms of order sought

16 The applicant contends that the Court should:

– annul the decision to exclude her;

– annul the decision on the request for review;

– annul the decision rejecting the complaint;

– order the Commission to pay her EUR 10 000 by way of compensation for the damage suffered as a result of the unlawfulness of the exclusion decision, the decision on the request for review and the decision on the complaint;

– order the Commission to pay the costs.

17 The Commission contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action in its entirety;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

Subject matter of the action

18 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, by her first two heads of claim, the applicant challenges the two decisions of the selection board concerning her, namely the exclusion decision and the decision on the request for review.

19 However, it is settled case-law that the decision taken after review replaces the initial decision of the selection board (see judgment of 9 March 2022, Zardini v Commission , T‑511/20, not published, EU:T:2022:122, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited). It follows that, in the present proceedings, the exclusion decision was replaced by the decision on the request for review and that it must be held that the first and second heads of claim seek only annulment of the decision on the request for review, which constitutes, in the present case, the contested act.

20 By her third head of claim, the applicant also seeks annulment of the decision on the complaint. It is settled case-law that claims directed against the rejection of a complaint have the effect of bringing before the Court the act against which the complaint was submitted in so far as they lack, as such, any independent content (see judgment of 9 March 2022, Zardini v Commission , T‑511/20, not published, EU:T:2022:122, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).

21 However, it must be held that, although, in the present case, the decision on the complaint lacks any independent content and there is therefore no need to rule specifically on it, it contains arguments intended to supplement the scope of those which appeared, inter alia, in the decision on the request for review. Therefore, in the examination of the legality of the review decision, it is necessary to take into consideration the statement of reasons set out in the decision on the complaint, since that statement of reasons is deemed to coincide with that of the review decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 March 2022, Zardini v Commission , T‑511/20, not published, EU:T:2022:122, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).

22 It follows from the foregoing that the subject matter of the present action concerns the decision on the request for review, which constitutes, in the present case, the act adversely affecting the applicant, as supplemented by the decision on the complaint.

The application for measures of organisation of procedure

23 In its reply, the applicant submits that the statements made by the Commission in the defence and relating to the internet and to the technical aspects of the file contradict the evidence on which it relies and require the Court to order the Commission, on the basis of Article 88 of its Rules of Procedure, to produce evidence which only that institution holds or is likely to possess.

24 To that end, the applicant asks the Commission to produce documents relating to the reasons why, first, work computers are now prohibited during the competition tests and why the ‘copy-paste’ function was prohibited in the new test; second, all correspondence with service providers, including TestWe, relating to incompatibilities with work computers and the lack of administrator rights; third, all information relating to the events in March 2023, when the Commission was required to intervene and centrally install the TestWe app on laptops; and, fourth and finally, all internal reports and communications identifying compatibility issues between the TestWe platform and Dell laptops or any other personal or work computers.

25 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the applications for interim relief sought by the applicant must be understood not as asking the General Court to issue directions to the Commission, since the General Court does not, in any event, have jurisdiction to issue such directions in the context of the review of legality based on Article 263 TFEU, but as applications for measures of organisation of procedure under Article 88 of the Rules of Procedure (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 March 2024, Westpole Belgium v Parliament , T‑640/22, not published, EU:T:2024:188, paragraphs 17 and 18 and the case-law cited).

26 In that connection, it must be recalled the General Court is the sole judge of any need to supplement the information available to it in respect of the cases before it (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 July 2011, Diputación Foral de Vizcaya and Others v Commission , C‑474/09 P to C‑476/09 P, not published, EU:C:2011:522, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited).

27 In the present case, the evidence submitted by the parties, in particular that set out in Annexes 1 and 2 to the rejoinder, which shows, first, that the applicant was using a computer of a different make to that which was allegedly prohibited for the competition tests and, second, that the Commission does not systematically prohibit members of its staff from using their work computer for internal competitions, is sufficient to resolve the dispute without there being any need to order measures of organisation of procedure.

28 Consequently, the applicant’s application for measures of organisation of procedure must be dismissed.

The claims for annulment

29 In support of her application for annulment, the applicant puts forward two pleas in law alleging, first, breach of the principle of good administration, the duty of diligence and duty of care and, moreover, a manifest error of assessment by the Commission and, second, breach of the principle of equal treatment.

30 In general, the applicant submits that, from the date she received the letter inviting her to attend the new test, that is to say, 17 May 2023 and until the day before that test, on 24 May 2023, she took all steps necessary to take that test without encountering IT difficulties, even though, during that period, she was on annual leave outside Belgium.

31 In that regard, she emphasises that she provided her personal telephone number to the Commission’s IT services and to TestWe’s technical support team so that they could contact her without difficulty. She states that on 19 May 2023, she proposed, to no avail, to visit the Commission’s premises to ensure that the updated application was properly installed on her work computer or to borrow a laptop containing that application.

32 She adds that she exchanged numerous emails between 19 and 22 May 2023 with the competition secretariat, the Commission’s IT services and the TestWe technical platform. She states that, far from resolving her difficulties, the competition secretariat merely informed her, on 23 May 2023, that it had forwarded her email requesting assistance to the Commission’s IT services, following which that secretariat informed her that the updated version of the application appeared to have been installed on her computer and ultimately told her that it was not competent to provide technical assistance.

33 The applicant asserts that, on the day of 24 May 2023, the Commission’s IT services, after asking her to specify the nature of the problem she was complaining about and having concluded that the problem was linked to the TestWe application, invited her to sit the new test on another laptop. According to the applicant, the proposal thus made to her was impossible to implement on the ground that, first, the new test could only be taken on the computer on which the prerequisite simulation test had been taken, as confirmed by TestWe’s technical support, and, second, the Commission’s IT services no longer had a replacement computer.

34 According to the applicant, the solution proposed by the Commission’s IT services the day before the new test – namely, to have her computer repaired two hours before the test – failed to take into account both the minimum requirements for proper preparation for an examination and the anxiety she was experiencing as a result of her unresolved IT problems.

35 As for the invitation extended to her by the competition secretariat on 23 May 2023 to take the new test in her office because of an allegedly inadequate internet connection at her place of residence, the applicant states that it was impossible for her to take up such a request, given that she works in an open-plan office, which is not conducive to the concentration required to sit an exam and where, in any event, the internet connection is not optimal.

36 In that regard, she states that, contrary to the Commission’s assertion, the real problem she faced was not linked to an inadequate internet connection but, as diagnosed by TestWe’s technical support on 24 May 2023, to the impossibility of downloading the updated application due to the security system installed on her work computer.

37 In her reply, the applicant points out that the Commission has resolved this systemic issue by prohibiting the use of work computers for competition tests, whilst the European Ombudsman has emphasised that the Commission was obliged to ensure optimal technical conditions for the examination and that no candidate in a competition should be disadvantaged by technical problems for which they are not responsible. In her view, this is precisely the case in the competition in question, given that nearly 24% of participants experienced technical difficulties during the test in question.

38 She adds that, during the new test, the difficulties she faced took the form of a very long download time for the test paper, followed by the disappearance of that paper at the end of the test. According to the applicant, this demonstrated that the problems she faced had not been properly resolved by the Commission’s services.

39 The applicant concludes that this overview of all these factors in itself demonstrates the inaction and lack of coordination displayed by the Commission’s services and the TestWe technical support team, and thus constitutes a breach by the administration of the principle of good administration and of the duties of diligence and care.

40 As regards the argument put forward by the Commission concerning the fact that the applicant did not point out, during the new test, the technical difficulties which she claims to have experienced, even though the competition notice expressly provided that a candidate facing such difficulties was required to notify the invigilator immediately by telephone, the applicant contends that such a defence is specious.

41 According to the applicant, that line of argument amounts to exploiting a procedural loophole and disregarding all the difficulties that arose prior to the new test in order, ultimately, to draw the unrealistic conclusion that that test was conducted correctly.

42 In that regard, the applicant asserts that she cannot be criticised for having infringed point 5.1 of Annex III to the competition notice on the ground that, during the test, she did not alert the invigilator of the new test by telephone to the difficulties she was facing.

43 Those instructions – in respect of which she raises a plea of illegality – were contradictory as to whether it was possible to use the telephone in the event of technical difficulties encountered during the test and thus run counter to the principle of good administration. She adds that the plea of illegality which she raises ‘also extends to the subsequent plea regarding the breach of the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment’ and refers, furthermore, to the failure to establish a clear cooperation protocol between the selection board, the competition secretariat, the technical support team and the Commission’s IT services.

44 The applicant states that the Commission’s reply to her complaint contained contradictory grounds and revealed a manifest error of assessment. In that regard, she points out that the Commission criticises her for a lack of diligence, whilst acknowledging the extent of the efforts she made with the services in an attempt to resolve her difficulties. Similarly, she claims that, in its decision on the request for review, the selection board failed to take into account the impact of the technical problems on her performance.

45 Finally, she argues that, by failing to address the technical problems with her computer and by allowing candidates to use personal or work computers of either older or newer generations, the Commission breached the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination, given the specific circumstance that the TestWe technical support team, which did not have administrator rights, was unable to intervene on work computers.

46 In her reply, the applicant states that the breach of the principle of equal treatment also stems from the fact that, unlike in the first test, the ‘copy-paste’ function was not available during the new test.

47 The Commission disputes those arguments.

The plea of illegality in respect of the notice of competition

48 As regards the plea of illegality raised by the applicant in respect of the competition notice, it should be noted that Annex III to that notice, relating to general information, stated in point 5.1:

‘If the problem occurs during a specific test at a test centre or during remote testing, please … alert the invigilators or the contact service mentioned in your invitation immediately so that a solution can be investigated during the test itself. In any case, ask them to record your complaint in writing …’

49 In addition, the instructions sent to candidates who took the tests remotely and to which the competition notice expressly referred provided, in essence and without any ambiguity, that the only exception to the prohibition on the use of the telephone by the candidate during the test was the occurrence of IT difficulties, in which case the candidates had to ‘IMMEDIATELY call TestWe [the telephone number indicated]’.

50 However, it does not appear from any of that information that the competition notice contained any contradictory provisions regarding the possibility for a candidate sitting the examination remotely to telephone the invigilator in the event of technical difficulties in order to report them.

51 As regards the alleged infringement of the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment, it should be noted that the applicant does not specify in what way the provisions contained in the competition rules would infringe those principles; consequently, pursuant to Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, that argument must be declared inadmissible.

52 In any event, even assuming that the applicant is to be regarded as complaining that the competition rules unlawfully allowed participants in the tests to use, at their discretion, either their work computer or their personal computer, it must be noted that she has not demonstrated how such a choice was contrary to the principle of equal treatment, given that, as this was an internal competition organised by the Commission, the Commission’s IT services were responsible for the computers belonging to the Commission and could, at the request of the competition secretariat, intervene in the event of any difficulties.

53 As regards, lastly, the argument relating to the absence of a clear protocol of cooperation between the various services mentioned in the notice of that competition, it should be noted that point 5.1 of Annex III to that notice provided that any technical difficulties had to be reported to the competition secretariat. Thus, since that secretariat was responsible for centralising the problems reported and coordinating the action of any technical services called upon to assist, this argument is in fact unfounded.

54 In the light of the foregoing, the plea of illegality raised by the applicant must be rejected.

The first plea, alleging breach of the duty of diligence and the duty of care, the principle of good administration and a manifest error of assessment

55 The first plea may be divided into two parts, the first alleging breach of the duty of diligence and the duty of care and the principle of good administration, and the second alleging a manifest error of assessment.

– The first part of the first plea, alleging breach of the duty of diligence and the duty of care and of the principle of good administration

56 As regards the first part of the first plea, relating to a breach of the duty of diligence and the duty of care and of the principle of good administration, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, the duty of care reflects the balance of reciprocal rights and obligations in the relationship between the public authority and public servants. That balance implies in particular that, when deciding on the situation of an official, the administration must take into consideration all the factors likely to determine its decision and that, in so doing, it must take account not only of the interests of the service but also, in particular, of those of the official concerned. The latter obligation is also imposed on the administration by the principle of good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (see judgment of 30 March 2022, PO v Commission , T‑36/21, not published, EU:T:2022:192, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited).

57 The principle of good administration, for its part, includes the duty of diligence, which implies, inter alia, that the administration should act with care and prudence. The Court has already accepted that the duty of diligence is inherent in the principle of good administration and that an administration may incur non-contractual liability for unlawful conduct where it failed to act with due diligence and caused injury as a result (see judgment of 19 December 2019, Wehrheim v ECB , T‑100/18, not published, EU:T:2019:882, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited).

58 It must be determined whether, as the applicant claims, the Commission failed to act with the necessary care and prudence to enable her to sit the new test under conditions of sufficient serenity which any candidate in a competition is entitled to expect.

59 In the present case, it is true that, as the applicant claims, between 17 and 24 May 2023 she exchanged numerous emails with the competition secretariat, the Commission’s IT services and the TestWe technical support team, owing to the IT difficulties of which she complained.

60 In that regard, it should be noted that, as regards the period between 17 and 22 May 2023, during which only 17, 19 and 22 May were working days, the emails relied on by the applicant show that she complained to the administration about her inability to download the updated application. That is confirmed, moreover, by the fact that, on 22 May 2023, she informed the Directorate-General for Human Resources and Security that she had carried out the prerequisite simulation test and had encountered technical problems on that occasion, which she immediately reported to TestWe’s technical support team and to the competition secretariat, which, on the same day, referred the matter to the Commission’s IT services. On receipt of that email, those services mobilised their agents to deal with that request.

61 It was in that context that, on Tuesday 23 May 2023, the Commission’s IT services found that the applicant’s internet connection was not optimal, since the data transfer speed (ping) was above 80 milliseconds, which made any possibility of remote troubleshooting highly uncertain. As a result of those connection difficulties, the Commission’s IT services indicated to the Directorate-General for Human Resources and Security that they ‘strongly recommended that [the candidate] be in the office [both] for the test [and] for the deployment’.

62 Within a quarter of an hour of receiving that email, the competition secretariat informed the applicant that her internet connection was very slow and that, as a result, it advised her to be at her desk for the ‘re-deployment’ and to take the new test. That secretariat also asked her whether she could use a personal computer or make an appointment with the Commission’s IT services to borrow a computer or have the updated application installed on her computer. That secretariat, very shortly after sending that email, informed the applicant that, according to the Commission’s IT services, the correct version of the application was installed on her computer and asked her to check this. The applicant then contacted the competition secretariat to find out which was the correct version of the application and how she could check that everything was in order, to which the competition secretariat replied that it was not authorised to provide IT support.

63 The following day, that is to say, 24 May 2023, after the applicant had informed the Commission’s IT services that, according to TestWe’s technical support, she was unable to download the updated application due to her computer’s security settings, those services invited her to come to their premises the following morning, that is to say, on 25 May 2023, at 8:00, and, if that was not possible, on 26 May 2023, to verify the problem after the new test, using another laptop.

64 On the day of the new test, which began on 25 May 2023 at 11:00, the applicant did not take up the invitation made to her to travel to the premises of the Commission’s IT services, did not take the new test at the Commission’s premises, nor did she report any technical difficulties during that test.

65 It follows from the facts set out in paragraphs 59 to 64 above that, after the applicant reported the technical difficulties encountered during the prerequisite simulation test and the Commission’s IT services had been notified of them in the late afternoon of Monday, 22 May 2023, those services set about diagnosing the difficulties brought to their attention, concluding that remote troubleshooting was, if not impossible, at least highly uncertain, given the poor internet connection at the applicant’s location. It was in that context that, on Tuesday, 23 May 2023, the competition secretariat invited the applicant to visit the Commission’s premises so that the updated application could be installed on her computer or, if that proved impossible, to borrow a computer from the Commission and take her test from her office.

66 After the competition secretariat had informed the applicant on 23 May 2023 that, according to the Commission’s IT services, the correct version of the application had been installed, the following day – that is, the day before the new test – the Commission’s IT services reiterated the secretariat’s invitation to the applicant to attend at their premises, in particular at 8:00 on 25 May.

67 In the light of the facts referred to in paragraphs 59 to 66 above, it must first be held that, after the applicant reported the technical difficulties encountered in the course of the prerequisite simulation test and the Commission’s IT services had been notified of them in the late afternoon of Monday, 22 May 2023, the latter set about resolving them, despite the difficulties arising from the fact that the applicant was on holiday abroad.

68 Next, it should be pointed out that, far from following the advice given to her by the competition secretariat and the Commission’s services, the applicant denied that there was an internet connection problem and also did not take up the invitation made to her, in particular, to visit the premises of the Commission’s IT services. Taking such a step would have enabled her, if not to have the technical difficulties of which she complained resolved – possibly by the loan of a computer – then at least to have them recorded, in circumstances where, moreover, she has not substantiated her claims that, on 19 May 2023, she had unsuccessfully proposed to visit the premises of the Commission’s IT services to have the updated application installed on her computer.

69 Lastly, as regards the technical difficulties encountered during the test, in addition to the fact that the applicant obtained a final mark for that test and was able to participate in it using the software provided for that purpose, it must be noted that she failed to comply with the instructions set out in the competition notice and referred to in paragraph 49 above, thereby making it impossible for the administration, first, to officially and in good time ascertain the existence of the alleged problems and, second, to provide her with appropriate technical assistance during the new test.

70 Whilst it is true that the applicant made repeated approaches to the administration to report and complain about the IT problems she claimed to be experiencing, the fact remains that, by failing to follow the advice given to her by both the competition secretariat and the Commission’s IT services, and by failing to comply with the competition rules regarding the occurrence of technical problems during the new test, the applicant, through her own conduct, made it impossible for the administration, on the one hand, to provide her with effective and practical assistance and, on the other hand, to establish, objectively and officially, the existence of the problems she claims to have encountered during the test.

71 The arguments put forward by the applicant are not such as to invalidate the findings set out in paragraphs 67 to 70 above.

72 In the first place, as regards the claim that an allegedly bad internet connection could not explain the difficulties she faced, it must be noted that the nature and source of the difficulties of which the applicant complains remain unknown. Furthermore, the applicant’s assertion that the internet connection did not constitute a problem, on the ground that no connection was required for the start and end of the new test, appears to bear no relation to the problem at issue, which lay in the impossibility of downloading the updated application onto her computer. As regards the allegation that, contrary to the Commission’s statement, she had a sufficient internet connection, it should be noted that the document on which the applicant bases this allegation is undated and refers to the city of Brussels (Belgium), even though the applicant states that, during the period leading up to the new test, she was on holiday abroad and was therefore not in Brussels.

73 In the second place, it is undeniable that the invitation made by the administration to the applicant to travel to the premises of its IT services three hours before the start of the test (and not two, as she claims) was likely to cause her some inconvenience. Nevertheless, such inconvenience would have been largely offset by the fact that the applicant could have taken her test having had, beforehand, if not the certainty that the technical difficulties of which she complained resolved – possibly through the provision of a replacement computer – at the very least the assurance of an objective and definitive diagnosis of those difficulties, which the Commission would have been required to take into account once those difficulties had been definitively established.

74 In this regard, and as regards the assertion that it was not possible to use a computer other than the one on which the prerequisite simulation test had been taken, it must be noted that the applicant cannot substitute her own assessment for that of the competition organisers, who had themselves offered her the option of using a personal computer or borrowing one from the Commission’s IT services. Furthermore, the applicant has not proved that the Commission’s IT services were unable to provide her with a replacement computer.

75 As regards the claim that it was impossible to download the new application onto her computer because of the firewall software installed on it, in addition to the fact that that claim has not been established with certainty, it must be held that such a difficulty could have been resolved under the conditions referred to in paragraph 73 above.

76 In the third place, it is apparent from the documents in the file that the applicant took the new test outside her place of work, contrary to the advice given to her by both the competition secretariat and the Commission’s IT services, even though, as the Commission claims, she should have been at her place of work in accordance with the information recorded in the Sysper software.

77 In that regard, as regards the allegation that the applicant could not have sat the new test at her place of work under suitable conditions, it must be noted that, apart from the fact that the applicant did not report any such difficulty to the competition organisers, nothing prevented her from asking her line managers to provide a private room for the duration of the new test, which she failed to do. As for the claim that the internet connection at the Commission’s premises was not optimal, it suffices to note that the applicant has not substantiated that claim.

78 In the fourth place, as regards the allegation that the difficulties encountered by the applicant occurred during her holidays, it must be observed that that is a fact wholly unrelated to the conduct of the Commission officials and staff responsible for organising the competition or the Commission’s IT services. Furthermore, whilst the Commission may have refrained from contacting the applicant during her holiday out of a desire not to disturb her, even though she had provided her mobile phone number, the fact remains that, once she was contacted, the call was cut off due to a poor connection via the Skype application, which, incidentally, lends credence to the Commission’s claim that the applicant’s holiday destination did not have an optimal internet connection.

79 In the fifth place, as is apparent from paragraphs 48 and 49 above, there is nothing to suggest that the applicant had to refrain from telephoning technical support in order to resolve the technical difficulties of which she complained or, at the very least, to have her complaint recorded.

80 In the sixth and last place, as regards the arguments referred to in paragraph 37 above, it should be noted, first, that all the evidence on which the applicant relies concerns external open competitions organised by the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO). Such competitions differ fundamentally from the Commission’s internal competitions, in that, in the latter case – as is apparent from the document attached as Annex D 2 to the rejoinder – the Commission authorises the use of work computers over which it has administrator rights, which is by definition not the case in external competitions, where the work computers do not belong to the institutions. Second, as regards the alleged high rate of competitors who encountered technical difficulties, it must be stated that, as is apparent from the document attached as Annex B4 to the defence, these were entirely different problems from those complained of by the applicant. Third, and in any event, nothing exonerates the applicant from having, as is apparent from paragraph 70 above, made it impossible for the administration, on the one hand, to provide her with effective and practical assistance and, on the other hand, to ascertain the existence of the problems she claims to have encountered during the test.

81 It follows from the foregoing that the first part of the first plea must be dismissed.

– The second part of the first plea, alleging a manifest error of assessment

82 The applicant claims that, in the decision on the complaint, the Commission ‘inexplicably’ blamed her for having failed to exercise due diligence in resolving the problems of which she complained, even though that decision states that, ‘between 17 [May 2023] and 24 [May 2023, she] exchanged a total of 26 emails with TestWE IT support [and the Commission services]’ which demonstrated the ‘exceptional diligence’ she had exercised in trying to resolve her problems.

83 The applicant infers from this that the decision on the request for review is based on contradictory grounds which reveal the existence of a manifest error of assessment on the part of the Commission.

84 The Commission disputes those arguments.

85 In the present case, in the decision on the complaint, in the first place, the Commission noted, in essence, that the applicant had received personalised support to resolve the technical difficulties she was facing, which had initially led, on 23 May 2023, the Commission’s IT services and, subsequently, on 25 May 2023, the competition secretariat to inform her that the correct version of the TestWe application had been installed on her computer. In the second place, the Commission relied on the fact that, contrary to the provisions of the competition notice, the applicant had not, during the new test, immediately contacted the TestWe centre to report her difficulties and had not provided evidence that those difficulties had been substantial, with the result that it had been impossible for the competition selection board to establish a direct and certain link between the applicant’s marks and the alleged difficulties.

86 As mentioned in paragraph 69 above, regardless of whether the TestWe software had in fact been installed or was functioning correctly, it must be noted that, contrary to the provisions of the competition notice and the instructions given to candidates sitting the tests remotely, as referred to in paragraphs 48 and 49 above, the applicant failed to report the technical difficulties of which she complains to the services set up for that purpose and thus made it impossible for the administration to identify them and, where appropriate, to remedy them, if necessary by granting her additional time to compensate for the abnormally long time the software allegedly took to record her answers.

87 In that regard, it should be emphasised that, even if the TestWe technical centre had informed her, in the days leading up to the new test, that it was unable to resolve her technical difficulties, the applicant’s telephone call would at the very least have enabled her complaint to be recorded in writing, as provided for in the competition notice.

88 It follows from the foregoing that the Commission did not commit a manifest error of assessment in rejecting the applicant’s challenge on the ground that she had failed to provide evidence of the technical difficulties she claimed to have experienced during the test at issue.

89 The second part of the first plea must therefore be rejected and, accordingly, the first plea must be rejected in its entirety.

The second plea: infringement of the principle of equal treatment

90 As regards the second plea, alleging breach of the principle of equal treatment, the applicant complains, first, that the competition notice authorised the use of both work and personal computers and, second, that the use of the ‘copy-paste’ function was available during the first test, whereas it was no longer available during the new test.

91 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently unless such treatment is objectively justified and meets legitimate objectives of general interest in the framework of staff policy. Furthermore, it is for the selection board, which is required to ensure that the assessment criteria are applied consistently to all candidates, to act in such a way that all candidates for the same competition take the same test in the same conditions, and thus to ensure that the tests present substantially the same degree of difficulty for all candidates (judgment of 14 December 2022, SY v Commission , T‑312/21, EU:T:2022:814, paragraph 125).

92 Furthermore, it follows from the case-law that every competition embodies, generally and inherently, a risk of unequal treatment. Thus, an infringement of the principle of equal treatment can be established only when the selection board, when choosing the tests, did not limit the risk of inequality of opportunities that is generally inherent in any test. Consequently, the decision not to include a candidate on a reserve list must be annulled if it transpires that the competition was organised in a way that that led to a risk of unequal treatment that was greater than that inherent in any competition, without the candidate concerned being required to provide evidence of the fact that some candidates were actually at an advantage (see judgment of 14 December 2022, SY v Commission , T‑312/21, EU:T:2022:814, paragraph 126 and the case-law cited).

93 In the present case, as regards her first argument, it should be noted that the applicant does not explain how authorisation to use a work computer or a personal computer would have been such as to create any discrimination between candidates, even though, as is apparent from paragraphs 62 and 63 above, the competition secretariat had offered the applicant the option of using, at her discretion, either a personal computer or a Commission computer, regardless of the fact that the prerequisite simulation test had previously been carried out on her work computer.

94 As regards the second argument, it should be noted that the decision to no longer allow the ‘copy-paste’ function was objectively justified by the fact that, during the first test, the use of that function had caused technical problems. Moreover, the applicant has not provided any evidence to establish that the exclusion of that function was likely to expose candidates to a risk of inequality going beyond that inherent in any competition.

95 Thus, and without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the second argument, the plea alleging breach of the principle of equal treatment must be rejected. Consequently, the claim for annulment must be rejected.

The claims for damages

96 In support of her claim for damages, the applicant argues that she was excluded from the competition on unfair grounds, despite having devoted a great deal of time and money to preparing for it.

97 The Commission disputes those arguments.

98 It should be borne in mind that, in civil service matters, claims for compensation for material or non-material damage must be dismissed where they are closely linked to the claims for annulment which have themselves been dismissed as unfounded (see judgment of 16 October 2019, Palo v Commission , T‑432/18, EU:T:2019:749, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).

99 In the present case, it should be noted that, in support of her claim for compensation, the applicant relies on the fact that she was excluded from the competition on unfair and unlawful grounds, which essentially constitutes the substance of the arguments she put forward in support of her application for annulment.

100 Consequently, given that the applicant’s claim for damages is closely linked to her application for annulment, it is necessary – without it being necessary to rule on the inadmissibility of that claim, as raised by the Commission – to dismiss the claim for damages and, consequently, the action in its entirety.

Costs

101 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

102 As the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders ES to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 2 September 2026.

* Language of the case: English.