Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) 21 October 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)

21 October 2026 ( * )

( Civil service – EIF Staff – Recruitment – Vacancy notice – Post of (senior) writer/narrator – Rejection of application – Selection criteria – Professional experience )

In Case T‑471/24,

FC, represented by G. Mayer, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Investment Fund (EIF), represented by L. Sales, F. Dascalescu and O. van Geel, acting as Agents, and by P.-E. Partsch and S. Thomas, lawyers,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber),

composed of K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, President, H. Cassagnabère (Rapporteur) and T. Pavelin, Judges,

Registrar: A. Audras-Hidelot, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 12 March 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By her action under Article 270 TFEU and Article 50a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the applicant, FC, seeks, in the first place, annulment of the decision of the European Investment Fund (EIF) of 9 July 2024 rejecting her application for a position within the EIF (‘the contested decision’), in the second place, in essence, compensation for the material and non-material damage which she claims to have suffered as a result of the rejection of her application and, in the third place, the production of the documents to enable her to assess the material damage alleged.

I. Background to the dispute

2 From July 2001 to October 2009, the applicant worked, with a few interruptions, in particular as an editor in a number of media outlets. In 2010, the applicant and [ confidential ] ( 1 )set up [ confidential ]. The applicant holds the position of managing director of the business. She is responsible for the [ confidential ] strategy, public relations and e-commerce operations.

3 In May 2024, the applicant became aware of a vacancy notice for the position of ‘(Senior) Writer/Storyteller* – internal benchmark (Senior) Marketing Officer’ at the EIF. That vacancy, under job ID 109991, described the position as ‘a full-time position with limited travel requirements at grade 4/5 – F/E’ for which the EIF offered a permanent contract, in its General Secretariat, Marketing Division, Editorial & Storytelling Unit at its headquarters in Luxembourg. The ‘Qualifications’ section of the vacancy notice stated, inter alia, the following:

‘Between three (3) and five (5) years of post-graduation (after having obtained your initial university diploma) relevant professional experience at the same level of responsibility;

University degree (preferably at post graduate level) in communications, journalism or other relevant subjects;

Proven experience in writing for different audiences and different media including blogs and audio visual content’.

4 On 28 May 2024, the applicant applied for that position. To that end, she submitted her curriculum vitae, the duly completed application form and a questionnaire which included a cover letter. In her curriculum vitae, in the ‘Education’ section, she stated: ‘University [ confidential ], Faculty of Journalism [ confidential ] (1998-2002)’.

5 In the application form, the applicant stated that she had obtained her journalism diploma in 2009. In her cover letter, she stated, inter alia, that:

‘The motivation to apply for this position … is informed by [her] nine years of experience as a journalist and 14 years of activity as a micro-entrepreneur in the global market. … [Her] nine years of experience as a journalist provided [her] with exceptional writing skills …’.

6 On 9 July 2024, the applicant received an email notifying her of the contested decision, namely the rejection of her application on the ground that there were more suitable profiles. In that connection, the EIF recruitment team stated, inter alia, that:

‘We regret to inform you that on this occasion you were not selected for further consideration, as other profiles corresponded better to the requirements of this particular post.’

7 On the same day, the applicant requested detailed explanations regarding the rejection of her application.

8 On 12 July 2024, the applicant referred the matter to the EIF Data Protection Officer, informing him of her request for access to information concerning the processing of her personal data. In particular, she asked for his support in this process, explaining that was ‘determined to find out and understand in detail the logic behind the profiling of [her] personal data and how this profiling [led] to a decision that affects [her, and she also wishes] to understand if [her] rights and freedoms have been fully respected, in accordance [with the relevant] laws and regulations.’ In so far as the Data Protection Officer confirmed that her request was being handled, but did not comment on the processing of the applicant’s personal data, she contacted him again to request an ‘exhaustive report’ on the processing of her data.

9 On 26 July 2024, the EIF informed the applicant that her application had been rejected on the ground that her professional experience exceeded that required by the vacancy notice (from three to five years). More specifically, the EIF noted the following:

‘Your application was not taken forward due to your professional experience being in excess of what was required in the job advertisement. The job advertisement required that candidates should have: “Between three (3) and five (5) years of post-graduation (after having obtained your initial university diploma) relevant professional experience at the same level of responsibility.”’

10 On 30 July 2024, the applicant requested further explanations, in particular as regards the method of calculating her professional experience and the criteria applied.

11 In response to that request, the EIF informed the applicant, inter alia, in an email of 28 August 2024, as follows:

‘Your professional experience was counted starting from 2002, when you declared to have obtained [a] Bachelor of Journalism degree. In total, your professional experience is exceeding the maximum of 5 years, therefore in excess of what was clearly requested in the Qualifications section of the job advertisement.’

II. Forms of order sought

12 The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– order the EIF to pay her a minimum amount of EUR 10 000 in compensation for non-material damage;

– order the EIF to pay her compensation for loss of opportunity, the amount of which will be determined following disclosure by the EIF of the award conditions, calculations methods and the amounts over the last five years of performance-related awards, the sums paid under the Optional Supplementary Provident Scheme (OSPS) and any other financial benefits provided under the regulations applicable to members of EIF staff holding the post of ‘(Senior) Writer and Storyteller’;

– order the EIF to pay the costs.

13 The EIF contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

III. Law

A. The first head of claim

1. Admissibility

14 The EIF submits that the first head of claim is inadmissible on the ground that the application does not meet the minimum requirements laid down in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. It submits that the application does not identify any plea in law, but ‘resembles a disjointed narrative or a compilation of various grievances and arguments directed against the EIF and the selection procedure in question’.

15 In the present case, however, it cannot be held that the application is inadmissible on account of a lack of clarity as regards the arguments relied on in support of the first head of claim.

16 Under the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute, and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, an application must contain, inter alia, the subject matter of the dispute and a summary of the pleas in law on which it is based. It is clear from the case-law that that summary must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare his or her defence and for the Court to exercise its power of review. It is therefore necessary for the points of law and of fact on which a case is based to be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself. The application must, accordingly, specify the nature of the grounds on which the action is based, with the result that a mere abstract statement of the grounds does not satisfy the requirements of the Rules of Procedure (see judgment of 14 February 2012, Italy v Commission , T‑267/06, not published, EU:T:2012:69, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

17 More specifically, the Court has held that the statement of the grounds for instituting the proceedings need not conform with the phraseology or the list provided for by the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. Thus, it may be sufficient for the grounds for instituting the proceedings to be expressed in terms of their substance rather than of their legal classification, provided, however, that it is sufficiently clear from the application which of the grounds referred to in the Treaty is being relied upon (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 31 May 2016, Jochen Schweizer v EUIPO (Du bist, was du erlebst.) , T‑301/15, not published, EU:T:2016:324, paragraph 11 and the case-law cited).

18 In the application, the applicant sets out in a sufficiently intelligible manner pleas alleging breach of the principle of equal treatment and of the principle of non-discrimination. Moreover, it should be noted that those arguments enabled the EIF to prepare its defence and enable the Court to exercise its power of review. It follows that the application contains sufficient information to make it possible to recognise a plea raised by the applicant in support of the first head of claim and meets the minimum conditions laid down in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, read in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraphs 16 and 17 above.

19 In those circumstances, the EIF’s submission that the first head of claim is inadmissible is unfounded.

2. Merits

20 In support of her first head of claim, the applicant relies, in essence, on a single plea for annulment, which is based on arguments alleging breach of the principle of equal treatment, as enshrined in particular in Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), and breach of the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 21(1) of the Charter. That plea is made up of two parts, the first alleging that the vacancy notice is unlawful, for the purposes of Article 277 TFEU, in so far as it established an unlawful eligibility criterion, and the second alleging unlawful application of that criterion. At the hearing, the applicant stated that she shared that interpretation of her arguments.

(a) The first part of the single plea, alleging that the vacancy notice is unlawful

21 The contested decision is based on the EIF’s application of the eligibility criterion relating to professional experience, namely, according to the vacancy notice, that candidates must prove between three and five years of relevant professional experience (‘the eligibility criterion at issue’) (see paragraph 3 above).

22 According to the applicant, in the first place, the eligibility criterion at issue constitutes indirect discrimination on grounds of age, since it leads to the automatic exclusion of candidates with more than five years of professional experience, it being understood that the ‘five years’ parameter constitutes a cap on experience. Professional experience, when measured in number of years, increases with age. Therefore, the way in which the criterion at issue was worded relates, in actual fact, to the age of candidates.

23 In the second place, according to the applicant, the discrimination arising from the eligibility criterion at issue is not justified. The applicant submits that it is clear from the case-law that the rejection of an overqualified candidate is lawful only if the institution relies on evidence showing that that overqualification could prevent the candidates concerned from performing the duties attached to the posts to be filled or would have a negative effect on the quality of their work, their efficiency or their motivation. According to the applicant, the EIF has not provided any evidence to satisfy those conditions.

24 The EIF disputes those arguments.

25 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, EU institutions must enjoy a wide discretion in the organisation of their departments and, in particular, in the determination of the criteria of ability required for the positions to be filled and, in the light of these criteria and in the interests of the service, the conditions and procedure for organising competitions. Thus, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union must be able to determine, on the basis of their needs, the abilities that it is appropriate to require of candidates taking part in competitions in order to organise their departments in a useful and reasonable manner (see judgment of 16 February 2023, Commission v Italy and Spain , C‑635/20 P, EU:C:2023:98, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).

26 It is also settled case-law of the Court of Justice that the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EU law, enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter, of which the principle of non-discrimination laid down in Article 21(1) of the Charter is a particular expression (see judgments of 4 September 2025, Gnattai , C‑543/23, EU:C:2025:653, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited, and of 8 March 2023, SE v Commission , T‑763/21, not published, EU:T:2023:113, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

27 More specifically, according to the Court of Justice, the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see judgment of 1 March 2011, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others , C‑236/09, EU:C:2011:100, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited). A difference in treatment is justified if it is based on an objective and reasonable criterion, that is, if the difference is linked to a legally permitted aim pursued by the rules in question, and it is proportionate to the aim pursued by the treatment concerned (see judgment of 22 May 2014, Glatzel , C‑356/12, EU:C:2014:350, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

28 It is the person who considers himself or herself to have been wronged because the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to him or her who must initially establish the facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination. It is only if that person has established such facts that it is then for the defendant to prove that there has been no breach of the principle of non-discrimination (see judgment of 8 March 2023, SE v Commission , T‑763/21, not published, EU:T:2023:113, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

29 Furthermore, in a matter such as that in the present case, which involves the exercise of a wide discretion, as recalled in paragraph 25 above, there is a breach of the principle of equal treatment where the institution concerned makes a distinction which is arbitrary or manifestly inappropriate by reference to the objective pursued (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 March 2012, Kurrer and Others v Commission , T‑441/10 P to T‑443/10 P, EU:T:2012:133, paragraph 54).

30 At the outset, in so far as the applicant relies on Article 1d of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, Article 80(4) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union and Article 6 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16), which also prohibit any discrimination, it is sufficient to note that the rules of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union and the directive are not directly applicable to EIF staff because of the specific nature of their conditions of employment and the fact that the directives are addressed to the Member States, not to the institutions (judgment of 9 June 2021, Hill Mansilla v Commission , T‑575/19, not published, EU:T:2021:324, paragraph 154). However, although the provisions of that directive do not apply, as such, to legal proceedings in the EU civil service field, the fact remains that the principles underlying that directive and the case-law relating to it are relevant, mutatis mutandis , when it comes to determining the obligations of the EU institutions and agencies having regard, in particular, to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 September 2024, SE v Commission , C‑309/23 P, not published, EU:C:2024:693, paragraph 59).

(1) The existence of indirect discrimination

31 Even though the eligibility criterion at issue does not directly distinguish on the basis of age, it accords less favourable treatment to all candidates with less than three years’ or more than five years’ professional experience. Accordingly, while it does not refer expressly to the age of the candidates who may be taken into account for the post in question, the eligibility criterion at issue is likely to place older people at a particular disadvantage vis-à-vis other people (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 March 2023, SE v Commission , T‑763/21, not published, EU:T:2023:113, paragraph 56).

32 It follows that the eligibility criterion at issue leads to a difference in treatment indirectly based on age (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 March 2023, SE v Commission , T‑763/21, not published, EU:T:2023:113, paragraph 58).

33 In those circumstances, it is necessary to ascertain whether the EIF shows that the difference in treatment brought about by the eligibility criterion at issue is justified, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 28 above.

(2) Justification of indirect discrimination on grounds of age

34 In the present case, in order to justify the eligibility criterion at issue, the EIF relies, inter alia, on two separate factors:

– first, it is intended to ensure the renewal of staff and the harmonious integration of recruits into the team; in other words, its aim is to strike a balance in the structure of grades, it being understood that such a balance would promote mentoring and compliance with hierarchical requirements;

– second, any criterion linked to a certain level of professional experience, such as that at issue in the present case, allows staff costs to be monitored.

35 In particular, as regards the need to ensure a balance in the structure of grades in the staff renewal exercise, the EIF, in response to a measure of organisation of procedure, explained that, when defining the eligibility criterion at issue, grade 5 (senior officer) was overrepresented. On the date on which the vacancy notice was drawn up, the staff members of EIF included 303 members of staff in grade 5 out of a total of 679 members of staff, that is to say, 45% of the members of staff. Conversely, only 155 members of staff were in grade 4 (officer), that is to say, 23% of the members of staff. According to the EIF, that situation would have led to a heavily unbalanced staff pyramid in favour of higher grades, resulting in a risk of blocking internal mobility and an uncontrolled increase in staff costs.

36 Similarly, as regards compliance with hierarchical requirements, the EIF stated that, in the ‘Editorial and Storytelling’ unit, the two additional posts were filled in grade 4 on ‘bifunctional 4/5’ posts: one of those posts was that of the Head of Unit, which was filled in May 2016 by a person recruited as an ‘officer’ (grade 4) who had, at the time, approximately six years of relevant professional experience. The other post is that of ‘senior officer’ filled by a person recruited in January 2018 as an ‘officer’ (grade 4), who had close to four years of relevant experience at the time.

37 In the first place, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that the mix of different generations of employees can contribute to the quality of the activities carried out, inter alia by promoting the exchange of experience (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 July 2011, Fuchs and Köhler , C‑159/10 and C‑160/10, EU:C:2011:508, paragraph 49). From that point of view, the aim of establishing an age structure that balances young and older civil servants in order to, inter alia, improve personnel management and thereby to prevent possible disputes concerning employees’ fitness to work beyond a certain age constitutes a legitimate aim of employment and labour market policy (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 July 2011, Fuchs and Köhler , C‑159/10 and C‑160/10, EU:C:2011:508, paragraph 50). Therefore, the objective of balanced composition of staff may justify an eligibility criterion having an indirectly discriminatory effect on grounds of age (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 March 2023, SE v Commission , T‑763/21, not published, EU:T:2023:113, paragraphs 69 and 72).

38 In the present case, the need, relied on by the EIF, to ensure a balance in the structure of grades in the context of staff renewal fully illustrates the objective of mixing generations referred to above. It is apparent from the EIF’s replies that its staff pyramid is highly unbalanced in favour of higher grades (303 members of staff in grade 5), resulting in a risk of blocking internal mobility and an uncontrolled increase in staff costs. Therefore, the definition of an eligibility criterion which imposes, for editorial and storytelling posts, a preference for grade 4 candidates (officer) – or even the requirement of a junior profile in the context of a ‘bifunctional 4/5’ post – is a suitable measure for ensuring a more balanced staff pyramid and avoiding the creation of a ‘bottleneck’ in possibilities for internal advancement. That measure pursues a legitimate interest, namely sound workforce management and efficient internal mobility. Moreover, the criterion is appropriate, since it directly targets the identified cause of the imbalance (current overrepresentation of grade 5) without imposing broader restrictions than necessary.

39 In the second place, one of the corollaries of the objective of mixing different generations of employees and the balanced composition of staff (see paragraph 37 above) is the need to avoid recruiting candidates with excessive professional experience. Such candidates could, once they have been recruited, claim a higher grade or challenge the hierarchy, which risks disrupting the balance of the team, and, by extension, the mix of different generations of employees.

40 In the present case, the vacancy notice stated expressly that the successful candidate would report to the head of the Marketing Division and would take direction from the head of the ‘Editorial and Storytelling’ unit. That requirement shows that it is important for the EIF to select a candidate capable of integrating rapidly and accepting the existing hierarchy and the instructions of the Head of Unit, in order to prevent a candidate recruited at grade 4/5, but with experience significantly higher than that required for such a post, from subsequently claiming a higher grade, relying on his or her own experience and comparing himself or herself with colleagues of equivalent seniority and hierarchical superiors. The EIF’s desire to prevent the team from finding itself in a situation of potential competition is therefore legitimate.

41 None of the applicant’s arguments is capable of calling into question the fact that the eligibility criterion at issue is justified by legitimate objectives in the general interest in the context of staff policy.

42 In the first place, the applicant complains that neither she nor the General Court is in a position to assess, inter alia, whether the objective of the alleged reorganisation was indeed to rebalance the EIF staff pyramid and to allow better staff cost monitoring; in particular, the applicant was unable to find any information concerning the EIF staff pyramid. However, as is apparent from paragraph 35 above, the Court observes that the EIF provided detailed information relating to that pyramid.

43 In the second place, the arguments that the eligibility criterion at issue implicitly favours a limited group of candidates with an average age of between 29 and 31, excludes persons with a non-conventional career path, penalises those who have had to work before obtaining their diploma for financial or personal reasons, and puts candidates who have undertaken a career change or who have obtained a second diploma following an initial academic course at a disadvantage, do not call into question the legitimacy of the indirect discrimination caused by the eligibility criterion at issue. The argument that the EIF favoured candidates aged between 29 and 31, which could be inferred from the fact that it selected a candidate who was 30 years old at the time, is also insufficient.

44 Although those arguments are capable of demonstrating the existence of a difference in treatment indirectly based on age, as referred to in paragraphs 31 and 32 above, they do not, however, shed light on whether the difference in treatment arising from the eligibility criterion at issue is legitimate. In fact, in so far as they merely seek to establish the existence of discrimination, those arguments bear no relation to the objectives underlying the establishment of that discrimination.

45 In the third place, the fact that the EIF’s recruitment methods differ from those of the European Investment Bank (EIB) similarly does not support the conclusion that the eligibility criterion at issue is unlawful. It is not possible to infer that that criterion is unlawful from a comparison between the requirements relating to professional experience in EIB vacancy notices and those in EIF vacancy notices, as the EIB vacancy notices concern different posts from that at issue in the present case and as the legitimacy of discrimination is to be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of each specific case. Furthermore, when drawing up such vacancy notices, both the EIB and the EIF enjoy a broad discretion in defining the standard profile sought and the applicable eligibility and selection criteria. It cannot therefore be argued that the EIF’s discretion should be limited by the choices made by the EIB in that regard.

46 In the fourth place, although the applicant compares herself with the editorial officer in the Marketing Division of the EIF, who was recruited in 2016 to a similar post even though he had 11 years of professional experience, such a comparison has neither the purpose nor the effect of showing that the discrimination at issue is not legitimate. Moreover, that comparison is, in any event, irrelevant, since it is based on different posts and recruitment procedures.

47 In the fifth place, in so far as the applicant relies on the principle of proportionality, it should be noted that the applicant does not put forward any argument to show that the eligibility criterion at issue is disproportionate in the light of the objectives pursued by the EIF, and that the other evidence in the file does not do so either. The principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (judgment of 13 March 2012, Melli Bank v Council , C‑380/09 P, EU:C:2012:137, paragraph 52). In the present case, it cannot be accepted that requesting professional experience of three to five years goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives relied on by the EIF, namely, in particular, balancing the staff pyramid, staff cost monitoring and compliance with hierarchical requirements.

48 In those circumstances, it must be held that the applicant’s claim that the criterion at issue makes a distinction which is arbitrary or manifestly inappropriate in the light of the legitimate recruitment objectives of the EIF is unfounded.

49 In the light of all of the foregoing, the first part of the plea for annulment, alleging that the vacancy notice establishing the eligibility criterion at issue is unlawful, must be rejected as unfounded.

(b) The second part of the single plea, alleging incorrect application of the eligibility criterion at issue in the contested decision

50 In the first place, the applicant submits that the EIF’s calculation of years of experience contains inconsistencies. The EIF chose to count her professional experience from 2002, the year assumed to be the end of her higher education. However, if professional experience is defined as any paid activity, the applicant should have had her experience counted from 2001, the year in which she began to work as a junior editor at a magazine. In her application form, she admittedly stated that 2009 was the year in which she obtained her diploma, but that date should not be taken into account for the purposes of counting years of professional experience, since it corresponds only to the date on which she passed the final examination. The paper copy of her diploma was issued to her only in August 2012.

51 In the second place, the applicant claims in her reply that the EIF infringed the principle of equal treatment by incorrectly applying the eligibility criterion at issue. In that regard, she ‘proposes’ to compare her application with that of the person whom she assumes to have been ultimately recruited. According to the information that can be obtained on a professional social network, that person does not hold the required university diploma and his professional experience in communications is insufficient. Lastly, the applicant criticises the EIF for having discarded her experience as a micro-entrepreneur in the field of communications, while considering as relevant the lobbying activity of the person ultimately selected, even though it was far from the specific requirements of the post of writer-storyteller.

52 The EIF disputes those arguments.

53 At the outset, it should be noted that the applicant’s arguments relating to the application of the eligibility criterion at issue relate to two different aspects, namely, first, the preselection stage (see paragraph 50 above) and, second, the choice of the candidate who was ultimately selected (see paragraph 51 above).

54 In the first place, as regards the alleged inconsistency in the method of calculating the years of experience applied by the EIF, it should be noted that, during the candidate preselection stage, the applicant did not provide the EIF with the information required to make a correct calculation of her professional experience.

55 In the curriculum vitae which the applicant had attached to her application, she had stated in the ‘Education’ section: ‘University [ confidential ], Faculty of Journalism [ confidential ] (1998-2002)’. However, in the ‘Qualifications’ section of the application form, she stated that the year in which her diploma was obtained was 2009.

56 In the application, contrary to the reference in the application form to nine years of professional experience ‘as a journalist’ (see paragraph 5 above), the applicant does not put forward a precise duration in respect of her professional experience. In fact, when arguing that the eligibility criterion at issue was applied incorrectly, she merely sets out hypotheses regarding the duration of her professional experience, if taken into account as from 2001, 2002, 2009 or 2012.

57 Lastly, at the hearing, the applicant first stated that her professional experience was to be calculated from 2009, which was recorded in the minutes of the hearing. She then appeared to state that the period to be taken into account was that beginning in 2002, without, however, requesting that 2002 also be recorded in the minutes.

58 Such hesitations in the applicant’s arguments – both in her application and at the hearing – as to the date on which her relevant professional experience began do not make it possible to regard her argument alleging that the eligibility criterion at issue was applied incorrectly during the preselection stage as being accompanied by sufficient details to enable its merits to be assessed. Accordingly, that argument must be rejected.

59 The second part of the plea for annulment must therefore be rejected as unsubstantiated.

60 In any event, it should be noted that, because of the overlap between the activities carried out as an editor between September 2006 and October 2009, those activities must be regarded as representing a continuous activity of 38 months. Therefore, the applicant has professional experience, after obtaining her diploma in June 2002, of 80 months, that is to say, 6 years and 8 months. That duration exceeds the limit set by the eligibility criterion at issue, which provided for experience of between three and five years, with the result that any error in calculation which led the EIF to assess the applicant’s relevant professional experience at 6 years and 10 months, instead of 6 years and 8 months, has no bearing on the lawfulness of the contested decision.

61 In the second place, the applicant’s argument relating to the selection phase (see paragraph 51 above) must be rejected as ineffective since the choice of the person recruited is in no way relevant to the contested decision.

62 It follows from the foregoing that the second part of the single plea in law must be rejected and, accordingly, that that plea must be rejected in its entirety.

B. The second head of claim

63 The second head of claim in the application concerns whether the EIF has incurred non-contractual liability.

1. Legal context

64 The European Union may incur non-contractual liability under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU only if a number of conditions are fulfilled, namely the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals, actual harm and the existence of a causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the author of the act and the damage sustained by the injured parties (see judgment of 5 March 2024, Kočner v Europol , C‑755/21 P, EU:C:2024:202, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited).

65 If any one of the conditions set out in paragraph 64 above is not satisfied, the action must be dismissed, without it being necessary to consider the other conditions for non-contractual liability (see judgments of 9 September 2008, FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission , C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P, EU:C:2008:476, paragraph 165 and the case-law cited, and of 21 December 2023, United Parcel Service v Commission , C‑297/22 P, EU:C:2023:1027, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

2. The breaches alleged by the applicant

66 In support of her second head of claim, the applicant alleges, in addition to the unlawfulness of the contested decision, several breaches. According to the applicant, the EIF hid behind anonymous communications from the recruitment team, thereby infringing her ‘right to accountability’ and acting in breach of the principles of transparency and sound administration enshrined in EU law. That breach of the requirement of transparency forced her into lengthy correspondence. The applicant also alleges breaches in the investigation of her request for assistance to the EIF Data Protection Officer, referred to in paragraph 8 above, and other breaches relating to the processing of her personal data.

67 All of these arguments can be seen as seeking to establish the existence of three instances of unlawful conduct attributable to the EIF, namely:

– the unlawfulness of the contested decision;

– failure to have regard to the principles of transparency and sound administration due to long anonymous communications; and

– infringements of the EIF’s obligations in relation to the processing of personal data.

68 By pleading that the action is inadmissible on grounds of failure to set out with sufficient clarity and precision the pleas relied on in support of the action, the EIF must be regarded as having intended to argue that both the first head of claim and the second head of claim lacked clear and precise reasons in support of those heads of claim (see paragraph 14 above). It is therefore appropriate to examine whether the account of each alleged breach relied on in support of the second head of claim is sufficiently clear and precise within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 16 above.

3. The existence of wrongful conduct such as to render the EIF liable

(a) The unlawfulness of the contested decision

69 As a preliminary point, it should be noted, as regards admissibility, that it follows from the foregoing that the unlawfulness of the contested decision is set out in a sufficiently clear and precise manner, with the result that that alleged breach is admissible under Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure.

70 As regards the substance, it should be noted that the examination of the first head of claim has not revealed any unlawfulness vitiating the contested decision. Accordingly, in the absence of proof of unlawfulness such as to render its author liable, such a basis cannot be used to render the EIF liable.

(b) Failure to have regard to the principles of transparency and sound administration

71 The applicant submits that, in addition to excluding her from the selection procedure for the post at issue, by ‘hiding’ behind anonymous communications from the recruitment team, the EIF infringed her right to accountability, thereby acting in breach of the principles of transparency and good administration enshrined in EU law. She argues that the EIF refused to engage with her, which constitutes a serious breach of those principles and undermines trust in the EU institutions and in the rule of law.

72 The EIF disputes those arguments.

73 As a preliminary point, as regards admissibility, it is apparent from the applicant’s written submissions that she puts forward arguments in that regard that are sufficiently clear and precise for a finding that that claim alleging such a breach is admissible.

74 As regards the substance, the arguments that the EIF ‘hid’ behind anonymous communications from the recruitment team and refused to engage with the applicant, thereby undermining her ‘right to accountability’ and acting in breach of the principles of transparency and sound administration, are unfounded.

75 The Court cannot find that the applicant encountered a lack of transparency during the dialogue between her and the EIF, subsequent to the applicant’s various requests regarding the basis of the contested decision and the analysis which preceded it.

76 On the contrary, all the emails exchanged between 9 July and 28 August 2024 show that the EIF had put the applicant in a position to understand the grounds on which the contested decision was based. That assessment follows in particular from the EIF’s reply of 26 July 2024 and from the email of 28 August 2024 referred to in paragraphs 9 and 11 above. It follows, in essence, from those emails that the applicant’s application was not successful on the ground that her professional experience was higher than that required in the vacancy notice, which required candidates to have ‘between three (3) and five (5) years of post-graduation (after having obtained your initial university diploma) relevant professional experience at the same level of responsibility’.

77 In view of those elements, the arguments seeking to establish the liability of the EIF for breach of the principles of transparency and sound administration in relation to alleged ‘anonymous communications’ (see paragraph 71 above) must be rejected as unfounded.

(c) The unlawfulness vitiating the processing of the applicant’s personal data

78 It is apparent from the file that, on 12 July 2024, the EIF Data Protection Officer replied to the applicant that he had received her request to ‘find out and understand in detail the logic behind the profiling of [her] personal data and how this profiling lead to a decision that affects [her, and she also wishes] to understand if [her] rights and freedoms have been fully respected, in accordance [with the relevant] laws and regulations’. In that regard, the applicant complains that the EIF data protection officer did not, however, ‘comment anything regarding the lack of clear and easily accessible information on the Applicant’s right to access her personal data (results of her profiling) and did [not] provide her with any information regarding her options to contest the disputed decision’.

79 At the hearing, the EIF replied to those complaints indicating, inter alia and in essence, that the adoption of the contested decision had not required any processing of personal data.

80 On the basis of those elements, it is impossible to determine precisely what conduct of the Data Protection Officer would be attributable to the EIF.

81 In that regard, it is clear that, although the applicant relies on several data processing regulations, she never specifies which provisions of those regulations were allegedly infringed. In those circumstances, she cannot be considered to have identified in a sufficiently precise manner the breaches committed by the EIF in the processing of her personal data. Since the claims regarding those alleged breaches are not accompanied by sufficient details to enable their merits to be assessed, they cannot be accepted.

C. The third head of claim

82 By its third head of claim, the applicant asks the Court to order the EIF to disclose certain items of information which she considers necessary to be able to quantify the material damage which she claims to have suffered as a result of her exclusion, by way of the contested decision, from the selection procedure in question in the present case.

83 The applicant submits in that regard that she does not have the required information to assess accurately the financial impact of her exclusion from the competition, since the salary scale does not encompass all the remuneration paid to EIF employees. According to public data, members of staff receive additional financial benefits, including additional performance-related awards and social protection schemes, which could constitute a substantial portion of the predicted compensation. She argues that detailed disclosure is necessary in order for the calculation of the material damage to be comprehensive and to reflect all the financial benefits of which she alleges to have been unlawfully deprived.

84 The EIF disputes those arguments.

85 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the third head of claim seeks an order from the Court to adopt a measure of organisation of procedure in order to assess the extent of the damage which the applicant claims to have suffered.

86 However, as noted in paragraph 81 above, the applicant has not established that the EIF had acted wrongfully. It follows that the measures of organisation of procedure requested by the applicant are not necessary in order to rule on the action.

87 Accordingly, all the heads of claim must be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

IV. Costs

88 According to Article 149(5) of the Rules of Procedure, where the recipient of the legal aid is unsuccessful, the Court may, in ruling as to costs in the decision closing the proceedings, if equity so requires, order that one or more parties should bear their own costs or that those costs should be borne, in whole or in part, by the cashier of the General Court by way of legal aid.

89 In the present case, in a situation in which the applicant was a recipient of legal aid and she was unsuccessful, equity requires that each party to these proceedings bears its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders FC and the European Investment Fund (EIF) each to bear their own costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 October 2026.

* Language of the case: English.

1 Confidential information redacted.