Judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) 21 October 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

21 October 2026 ( * )

( Civil service – EIF Staff – Recruitment – Vacancy notice – Rejection of application – Plea of illegality – Manifest errors of assessment – Discrimination based on gender )

In Case T‑475/24,

FD, represented by L. Levi and A. Champetier, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Investment Fund (EIF), represented by P. Dorin and L. Sales, acting as Agents, and by P.-E. Partsch and S. Thomas, lawyers,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber),

composed of S.L. Kalėda (Rapporteur), President, H. Kanninen and T. Perišin, Judges,

Registrar: A. Marghelis, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the measure of organisation of procedure of 29 January 2026 and the response of the EIF lodged at the Court Registry on 17 February 2026,

further to the hearing on 2 March 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By his action under Article 270 TFEU and Article 50a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the applicant, FD, seeks, in essence, annulment of the decision of the European Investment Fund (EIF) of 2 January 2024 not to select him beyond the pre-selection stage in four recruitment procedures.

Background to the dispute

2 The applicant is a Head of Unit at the EIF.

3 In the context of internal restructuring which was announced in July 2023, the EIF published, in November of that year, 19 vacancy notices relating to Head of Division positions. In those recruitment procedures, a two-step process was followed, as described in a document entitled ‘Two-step process Pilot: Guide for Staff’ (‘the Guide’).

4 Under that process, candidates are assessed in two stages, namely the ‘reserve list constitution’ (step 1) and the ‘operational selection’ (step 2). During that second stage, a selection committee matches the reserve list to the vacant positions.

5 The first stage is itself divided into two phases of candidate assessment. The first phase consists of an ‘initial screening of applications by a [s]election [c]ommittee’, comprising senior managers (a procedure known as ‘pre-selection’), at the end of which ‘only successful candidates’ proceed to an ‘independent [a]ssessment [c]entre’. During the pre-selection phase, candidates are assessed by the selection committee on the basis of a three-colour (red, amber, green (‘RAG’)) rating system. According to page 7 of the Guide, the colour red is awarded when the application ‘does not meet [the] criteria’, the colour amber when it ‘borderline meets [the] criteria, with areas for development or further exploration identified’, and the colour green when it ‘clearly meets [the] criteria’.

6 The applicant applied to take part in four recruitment procedures for Head of Division positions, namely ‘Head of Secondary Sales, Valuations & Co-Investments – 109519’, ‘Head of GreenTech – 109518’, ‘Head of Portfolio Risk Management & Surveillance – 109517’ and ‘Head of Resource Planning COP Coordination & Performance Monitoring – 109508’ (together, ‘the recruitment procedures’).

7 On 2 January 2024, the applicant received an email informing him that, as he had been advised during a telephone call that same day, his candidature had not been successful at the end of the pre-selection phase and he would receive further feedback at a later date (‘the initial non-selection decision’).

8 Thus, on 25 January 2024, during the applicant’s feedback session, the applicant’s line manager informed him that the three main reasons for the failure of his applications were his limited management experience, a lack of ability to project himself as a manager and the fact that three of his motivation letters merely replicated his curriculum vitae (CV), without having been adapted to the positions applied for.

9 On 1 March 2024, the applicant submitted a request for review pursuant to Article 41 of the EIF Staff Regulations (‘the request for review’) against the initial non-selection decision.

10 By email of 19 July 2024, the request for review was rejected (‘the decision rejecting the request for review’). That email stated that, in accordance with the selection criteria set out in the Guide, as the selection committee had awarded the applicant an amber rating for at least two selection criteria, he was unable to proceed to the second phase of the first stage. Furthermore, the applicant’s gender was not a factor taken into account by that committee.

11 On 2 August 2024, the applicant requested from the EIF’s Data Protection Officer access to the selection committee’s minutes relating to his applications, as well as to any data or information relating to the failure of those applications.

12 On 2 September 2024, the EIF replied to the request of 2 August 2024 stating that no minutes had been taken in respect of the pre-selection meetings held by the selection committee. The EIF nevertheless attached to that reply the extract from the RAG assessment of the criteria laid down in the Guide that had been conducted with regard to the applicant. As the extract in question was difficult to read, the applicant was provided, at his request, with a new version of that extract.

13 On 22 August 2024, the EIF also provided the applicant, following a request from the latter for access to documents, with a breakdown, in terms of percentage, of the candidates by gender at each stage of the process.

Forms of order sought

14 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the initial non-selection decision;

– annul the decision rejecting the request for review;

– order the EIF to pay the costs even if the action is dismissed.

15 The EIF contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

The subject matter of the action

16 It should be borne in mind that claims for annulment formally brought against a decision rejecting a request for review, where that decision lacks any independent content, have the effect of bringing before the General Court the act against which the request for review was submitted (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 September 2022, LR v EIB , T‑529/20, EU:T:2022:523, paragraph 11 and the case-law cited).

17 In the present case, it should be noted that the decision rejecting the request for review confirms the initial non-selection decision at the end of the pre-selection phase, while explaining the reasons for that decision. Thus, while that initial decision merely informs the applicant that he has not passed the first stage, the decision rejecting the request for review, by contrast, is based on several grounds that do not appear in that initial decision.

18 Accordingly, it must be held that the present action has the effect of bringing before the Court a claim for annulment of the initial non-selection decision (‘the contested decision’), the legality of which must be examined by taking into consideration the statement of reasons set out in the decision rejecting the request for review.

The substance

19 The applicant raises two pleas in law in support of his action, alleging, first, manifest errors of assessment as well as a breach of the principle of legal certainty and a breach of the procedural framework and, second, a breach of the principle of equal treatment, a breach of the principles of legal certainty and transparency and a breach of the procedure.

20 In that regard, according to the case-law, the Court must interpret an applicant’s pleas in law by reference to their substance rather than their classification and must, therefore, undertake to characterise the pleas in law and the arguments in the application (see judgment of 5 September 2014, Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission , T‑471/11, EU:T:2014:739, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

21 In those circumstances, it should be noted that the applicant’s arguments can be grouped, in essence, into five pleas in law, alleging, first, failure to state reasons, second, a breach of the ‘procedural framework’ and of the procedure, third, manifest errors of assessment, fourth, a breach of the principles of legal certainty and transparency and, fifth, a breach of the principle of equal treatment.

22 Furthermore, the applicant has implicitly raised a plea of illegality, which it is appropriate to examine first.

The plea of illegality raised against the provisions of the Guide relating to gender balance

23 In response to a question from the Court, the applicant confirmed at the hearing that he had implicitly raised a plea of illegality regarding the provisions of the Guide relating to gender balance. Indeed, in his view, there is a discrepancy between the list of criteria set out on pages 6 and 7 of the Guide and the table on page 7 in so far as concerns gender considerations. While gender appears to be a criterion to be taken into account according to that list, according to that table gender balance is not such a criterion. Moreover, the applicant notes that the Guide states that reasonable efforts will be made to select a diverse group of suitable candidates for assessment in line with the EIF’s strategic intention to improve gender balance in senior roles, and that if that has not been possible for valid reasons, such reasons must be substantiated and captured in the selection committee’s minutes. However, the Guide specifies that diversity is ‘not a RAG criterion’. In that regard, the Guide is confusing and lacks clarity, with the result that it infringes the principles of legal certainty and transparency.

24 At the hearing, the EIF disputed the admissibility of that plea of illegality on the ground that it was raised out of time. In any event, according to the EIF, gender was not taken into account in the RAG assessment, since that criterion was not assigned red, amber or green in the first phase of the first stage of the recruitment procedures. Taking gender into account would only mean that, among candidates of equivalent merit and in exceptional circumstances, the balance could tip in favour of the candidate belonging to the under-represented gender.

25 It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, Article 277 TFEU gives expression to the general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge, incidentally, with a view to obtaining the annulment of a measure against which it may bring an action, the validity of an act of general application adopted by an EU institution which constitutes the legal basis of the contested measure, if that party was not entitled to bring a direct action challenging the act which thus affected him or her without his or her having been in a position to seek its annulment (see judgments of 8 September 2020, Commission and Council v Carreras Sequeros and Others , C‑119/19 P and C‑126/19 P, EU:C:2020:676, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited, and of 24 October 2018, Fernández González v Commission , T‑162/17 RENV, not published, EU:T:2018:711, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

26 The general act claimed to be unlawful must be applicable, directly or indirectly, to the issue with which the action is concerned, and there must be a direct legal connection between the individual measure contested and the general act in question. In that regard, the existence of such a connection may be inferred, inter alia, from the finding that the measure against which the main action has been brought is essentially based on a provision of the general act claimed to be unlawful (judgment of 24 October 2018, Fernández González v Commission , T‑162/17 RENV, not published, EU:T:2018:711, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited; see judgment of 8 September 2020, Commission and Council v Carreras Sequeros and Others , C‑119/19 P and C‑126/19 P, EU:C:2020:676, paragraphs 68 and 69 and the case-law cited).

27 In the present case, as a preliminary point, it should be noted that the Guide contains binding provisions of general application. Indeed, as is apparent from the explanations provided by the EIF in response to the measure of organisation of procedure, the Guide was adopted by its Chief Executive on 24 October 2023. Article 21(5) of the Statutes of the EIF stipulates that employees of the EIF are under the authority of the Chief Executive and are engaged and discharged by the Chief Executive. Thus, the Guide applies to objectively determined situations and produces legal effects with respect to a category of persons envisaged in the abstract, namely the members of staff of the EIF (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 September 2019, US v ECB , T‑255/18, not published, EU:T:2019:680, paragraph 84).

28 Next, first, as regards the question whether the plea of illegality concerning the provisions of the Guide relating to gender balance was raised at the application stage, it should be noted that, in the context of his first plea, the applicant claims that there is no clear concordance between the criteria in the ‘initial list’ and those appearing in the subsequent table. In particular, while gender appears as a criterion in that initial list, gender balance is no longer listed as such in the table. According to the applicant, that lack of clarity regarding gender considerations strengthens the breach of the principle of equal treatment.

29 In the context of his second plea, the applicant states that the Guide is confusing and unclear, creating uncertainty. While it states quite clearly that diversity is ‘not a RAG criterion’, the Guide specifies that all efforts will be made to improve gender balance in senior roles, that the diversity that the candidates would bring to the team is a specific criterion that will be considered comparatively, and that diversity and specifically the gender balance of candidates will be reviewed to ensure consistency with diversity needs. Furthermore, not only are the provisions at issue unclear and uncertain, but there is no clear and binding rule within the EIF which would allow positive discrimination on grounds of gender, which could therefore constitute a valid legal basis for it.

30 Thus, contrary to the EIF’s contention, it must be noted that the applicant has implicitly, but clearly, raised in the application a plea of illegality against the provisions of the Guide relating to gender balance.

31 Second, as regards the scope of the contested provisions of the Guide and the question whether there is, in the present case, a direct legal connection between those provisions and the contested decision within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 26 above, the following should be noted.

32 First of all, it should be noted that, on page 6 of the Guide, under the heading ‘Pre-selection’, it is stated that ‘all reasonable efforts will be made to select a diverse group of suitable candidates for assessment in line with the EIF’s strategic intention to improve gender balance in senior roles[;] if this has not been possible for valid reasons, such reasons must be substantiated and captured in the [s]election [c]ommittee’s minutes.’ Similarly, according to the final item in the list on pages 6 and 7 of the Guide, still under the heading ‘Pre-selection’, it is stated that the selection committee must take into account, inter alia, ‘the diversity that would be brought by the candidates to the team, in which the advertised position sits.’ In addition, the last line of the table on page 7 of the Guide states, in a first sentence, that diversity is ‘not a RAG criterion’ and, in a second sentence, that ‘diversity and specifically gender balance of candidates will be reviewed to ensure consistency with diversity needs’.

33 In that regard, while diversity is stated in the Guide as ‘not a RAG criterion’, that reference is explained by the fact that a candidate’s gender cannot be the subject of a RAG assessment as defined in the Guide – that is, according to whether the candidate ‘does not meet [the] criteria’ (red), ‘borderline meets [the] criteria, with areas for development or further exploration identified’ (amber) or ‘clearly meets [the] criteria’ (green) (see paragraph 5 above).

34 However, contrary to what the EIF claims, it is apparent from that second sentence of the table on page 7 of the Guide, in the light of the statement made on page 6 of the Guide and the last of the items listed on pages 6 and 7 of the Guide, that gender balance is a consideration which may be taken into account as early as the pre-selection stage.

35 Furthermore, as regards the question of whether gender was a criterion taken into account in the present case, it should be noted that, according to the Guide, ‘in general, if a candidate is assessed as having an “Amber” status for two or more criteria points, then they will not proceed to an [a]ssessment [c]entre.’

36 According to the decision rejecting the request for review, for each of his applications the applicant had been awarded an amber rating for at least two selection criteria, namely those relating to ‘technical skills’ and ‘record of achievement’ and/or ‘quality of application’. According to that decision, while his applications contained strong elements leading to the award of green ratings for other criteria, the amber rating being awarded for at least two criteria meant that the selection committee had considered that those criteria were not fully met.

37 This reasoning is borne out by the extract of the applicant’s RAG assessment, which shows that he was awarded two amber ratings in relation to three of the four procedures and three amber ratings in relation to the fourth.

38 It was therefore the award of at least two amber ratings at the pre-selection stage that led to the applicant’s exclusion from the four selection procedures, in accordance with the provision in the Guide stating that the award of at least two amber ratings excludes the candidate from the remainder of the selection procedure, and not the fact that his gender was taken into account.

39 The applicant does not provide any evidence capable of calling into question that finding. The applicant merely asserts that, during the feedback meeting of 25 January 2024, he was informed by his line manager, who was a member of the selection committee, that there was a main driver for bias in the process, namely the application of the EIB Group’s gender strategy.

40 However, first, that alleged information concerning gender is not supported by any evidence in the contested decision, in the decision rejecting the request for review, or in the extract of the applicant’s RAG assessment. In that regard, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s claim that the arguments put forward during the feedback meeting of 25 January 2024 are ‘corroborated by the extract from the RAG assessment’. Although it is true that the applicant’s gender is mentioned, it is only for information purposes, like his surname, first name and diploma, and not as a criterion or factor to be taken into account. Second, as the EIF notes, the applicant’s assertion referred to in paragraph 39 above, even if true, reflects only the subjective view of one member of the selection committee and cannot be regarded as being the view of the selection committee as a whole.

41 The applicant has thus failed to establish that the contested decision was based on the provisions of the Guide relating to gender balance and therefore that there was a direct legal connection, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 26 above, between the contested decision and those provisions.

42 The applicant’s plea of illegality must therefore be rejected as inadmissible.

The first plea in law, alleging failure to state reasons

43 The applicant claims that the contested decision is vitiated, in essence, by a failure to state reasons, in that it is not possible to understand whether the EIF, in the decision rejecting the request for review, acknowledges the fact that the points put forward during the feedback meeting of 25 January 2024, namely his limited management experience, a lack of ability to project himself as a manager and the fact that three of his four motivation letters merely replicated his CV while only one was adapted to the position applied for, had in fact been taken into account, or whether the EIF denies the content of that feedback meeting as reported by the applicant.

44 The EIF disputes the applicant’s argument.

45 According to settled case-law, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 2 December 2020, Thunus and Others v EIB , T‑318/19, not published, EU:T:2020:578, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).

46 In the present case, the decision rejecting the request for review expressly states that the selection committee was able to carry out its assessments on the basis of the specific criteria laid down in the Guide by comparing the respective merits of the various applications, and that, on that basis, that committee had awarded the applicant, for each of his four applications, an amber rating for at least two selection criteria, namely those relating to ‘technical skills’ and ‘record of achievement’ and/or ‘quality of application’ (see paragraph 36 above). In that regard, it should be noted that it is apparent from the table in Section 8 of the Guide that the ‘quality of application’ involves, inter alia, the examination of the candidate’s CV.

47 It must therefore be held that the statement of reasons set out in the decision rejecting the request for review, which corresponds, in essence, to the reasons communicated orally, as reported by the applicant (see paragraph 43 above), enabled him to understand the reasons why his application was not taken forward to the next stage of the procedures. Furthermore, the applicant’s detailed arguments in the third and fourth pleas in the present action show that the statement of reasons was sufficient to enable him to challenge the contested decision.

48 In those circumstances, the contested decision cannot be regarded as vitiated by a failure to state reasons.

49 The first plea in law must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

The second plea in law, alleging a breach of the ‘procedural framework’ and of the procedure

50 The applicant alleges a breach of the ‘procedural framework’ and of the procedure.

51 The EIF considers that this argument is inadmissible in that, in breach of the rule of correspondence between the application and the request for review, it was not raised in the context of the latter. In addition, the argument alleging a breach of the ‘procedural framework’ is unsubstantiated and must therefore be rejected.

52 In that regard, it follows from Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the General Court pursuant to Article 53 of that statute, and from Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, that an application initiating proceedings must state clearly and precisely the subject matter of the proceedings, as well as the form of order sought, and must contain a summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based.

53 In the present case, the applicant merely alleges a breach of the ‘procedural framework’ and of the procedure without putting forward any specific arguments in support of that claim, the information provided being particularly vague and imprecise.

54 In those circumstances, without there being any need to rule on a possible breach of the rule of correspondence between the application and the request for review, the second plea in law must be rejected as inadmissible.

The third plea in law, alleging manifest errors of assessment

55 The applicant submits that the assessment of his application was manifestly erroneous.

56 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the essential function of a vacancy notice is to give those interested the most accurate information possible about the conditions of eligibility for the position in question, so as to enable them to judge whether they should apply for it. The institutions enjoy a wide discretion in deciding upon the criteria of ability required for the posts to be filled and in determining the rules and conditions under which a selection procedure is organised in the light of those criteria and in the interests of the service. The selection committee, which has considerable discretion as regards the procedure for and the detailed content of the tests provided for within the framework of a selection procedure, is nevertheless bound by the wording of that notice (see order of 23 January 2025, Hilpisch v ECHA , T‑346/24, not published, EU:T:2025:96, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

57 According to the case-law, an error may be charactered as manifest only where it is easily perceptible and can be clearly detected by reference to the criteria to which the exercise of the decision-making power in question is subject. Therefore, in order to establish that the selection committee made a manifest error in its assessment of the facts such as to justify the annulment of a decision, the evidence, which it is for the applicant to adduce, must be sufficient to make the findings of the selection committee implausible. In other words, a plea alleging a manifest error must be rejected if, despite the evidence adduced by the applicant, the contested assessment may still be accepted as true or valid (see judgment of 15 December 2021, HB v EIB , T‑689/20, not published, EU:T:2021:891, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

58 It is in the light of those principles that the three parts on which, in essence, the third plea in law is based, relating, respectively, to (i) the applicant’s limited management experience, (ii) the quality of his application and (iii) his technical skills and record of achievement, must be examined.

– The first part, concerning the applicant’s limited management experience

59 The applicant claims that the assessment that he has limited managerial experience of only a year and a half is manifestly erroneous, as is the award of an amber rating to that criterion under the RAG assessment.

60 First, in the vacancy notices relating to the recruitment procedures as well as in the Guide, management experience is not required and can be regarded only as an ‘advantage’, and not as a sufficient criterion to exclude him from the next stage of the procedures. Thus, the threshold of three years’ management experience, relied on by the EIF in its defence as a parameter taken into account in the assessment, is not set out either in the Guide or in the vacancy notices.

61 Second, in the context of the ‘Lower Mid-Market’ set-up and the creation of ‘geographical expertise centres’ within the EIF, only the applicant was awarded the title of ‘Principal’ in 2018 as the most senior non-management member thereof, that title being equivalent to that of Head of Unit. At that time he was responsible for managing a team of four investment professionals. However, in the EIF’s human resources management system the title of the post was wrongly indicated to be ‘Invest Manager’ instead of ‘Principal’ (Senior Head of Unit). In any event, already for the year 2019 appraisal, as reported in the 2019 appraisal report, the applicant’s generic role was that of ‘unit head’.

62 Third, following an opportunity for internal mobility at the end of 2019, the applicant was appointed Head of Unit with effect from 1 January 2020. However, following a request from the EIF of 6 October 2020, his managers decided, on 9 October 2020, that the applicant would return to the ‘Lower Mid-Market’ set-up and give up the title of Head of Unit. It was agreed, in a video call on 6 October 2020, that the formal loss of that title would not be held against him and that his management skills would continue to be recognised. The fact that, despite the formal loss of the title of Head of Unit, the applicant continued to carry out tasks equivalent to that role is corroborated by his appraisal reports for 2020, 2021 and the first half of 2022, and, on 13 October 2020, the former human resources officer acknowledged, during a telephone call, that his ongoing ‘management performance’ needed to be documented within human resources and that his ‘seniority [needed] to be respected and restored’. Those appraisal reports prove that the criteria set out in the vacancy notices relating to a track record in leading, developing and engaging staff and to talent development are satisfied. Similarly, the actual performance by the applicant of the duties of Head of Unit, even before his official appointment in August 2022, is demonstrated by his participation in the appraisal of his team and in recruitment processes.

63 Fourth, although the applicant was officially renamed Head of Unit when a vacant post arose, in August 2022, his line manager had informed him that that appointment had been delayed due to a lack of available Head of Unit positions.

64 Fifth, in the view of the applicant, his recent appointment as Senior Head of Unit responsible for supervising 13 employees is difficult to reconcile with the assessment that his management experience is limited.

65 Sixth, and in any event, the applicant has project management experience dating back to 2011 within the EIF alone.

66 Seventh, the decision rejecting the request for review did not mention the fact that, under the RAG assessment, the applicant was awarded an amber rating in respect of his limited management experience. However, that experience was crucial as regards the outcome of the evaluation of his applications.

67 Eighth, the applicant has a master’s degree from a reputable business school with a specialisation in management, as attested to by the evidence provided in Annex C.9 to the reply.

68 The EIF disputes the applicant’s arguments.

69 In the present case, first, the applicant submits, in essence, that the criterion relating to limited management experience should not have been given decisive importance during the recruitment procedures. Accordingly, in his view, the EIF should not have applied, as it explained it did in its defence, a threshold of three years’ management experience.

70 In that regard, it should be noted that the four recruitment procedures concern managerial positions, namely Head of Division positions. Under the heading ‘Qualifications’ in the respective vacancy notices, reference is made in particular to the requirement of a ‘minimum of [10] years of relevant work experience’ and to the statement that ‘prior experience in managing teams would be considered an advantage’. Similarly, the Guide states that ‘proven years of professional experience in relevant or similar positions’ may be taken into account by the selection committee.

71 Given the managerial nature of the positions, proven management experience cannot be considered irrelevant. It should be noted that the vacancy notices state that candidates must have a certain number of managerial skills, such as the ability to attract and select the best talent to meet current and future needs, to develop people to meet both their career goals and the organisation’s goals, and to build teams with a strong identity that apply their diverse skills and perspectives to achieve common goals. From that point of view, the four vacancy notices state that the positions in question require solid experience in leading, developing and engaging staff and, as just noted, expressly state that experience in managing teams is an ‘advantage’.

72 It therefore follows from the vacancy notices that the selection committee was required to assess the candidates’ management experience in the comparative evaluation of their merits. Moreover, the applicant admitted in the reply and confirmed at the hearing that management experience was an ‘advantage’ which could be taken into account.

73 Furthermore, even though the vacancy notices do not specify that the management experience should amount to ‘three years’, the selection committee was free to set such a threshold in order to ensure, in the context of the comparative assessments it was required to carry out regarding the respective merits of the candidates and in the candidates’ own interests, a certain consistency in its assessments (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 22 September 2021, JR v Commission , T‑435/20, EU:T:2021:608, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

74 Second, the applicant submits that the selection committee should have considered that his management experience dates back to 2018 on account of his position as ‘Principal’ under the ‘Lower Mid-Market’ set-up. In his view, that position effectively corresponded to a Head of Unit position, even though it was not designated as such in the EIF’s human resources management system.

75 However, the applicant has not adduced any specific evidence capable of calling into question the EIF’s assertion that the general benchmark role structure of that body does not equate the two functions, namely that of ‘Principal’ and that of ‘Head of Unit’. In that regard, the fact that the applicant asked the Human Resources Department to indicate, as ‘job title’ under the EIF’s human resources management system, the title ‘Principal’ and that, in his view, that title corresponds to that of Head of Unit does not constitute conclusive evidence, since it reflects only his personal conviction as to the nature of the tasks he performed, which cannot be regarded as proof of a manifest error of assessment (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2022, TM v ECB , T‑440/21, not published, EU:T:2022:800, paragraph 149 and the case-law cited).

76 As regards the 2019 appraisal report referring to his position as Head of Unit, it is apparent from the EIF’s explanations, that have not been called into question by the applicant, that that statement is merely the consequence of an annual IT update carried out in April. That reference to the post of Head of Unit therefore does not imply that the applicant acquired that title in 2019 and cannot call into question the statement made in the applicant’s appraisal report that he ‘was appointed as Head of Unit as of [1] January 2020’. In any event, the fact remains that the applicant himself states that he was appointed Head of Unit ‘as of 1 January 2020’ (see paragraph 62 above).

77 Third, the applicant submits that, between the loss of the title of Head of Unit in October 2020 and his new appointment to that post in August 2022, he continued to carry out management tasks, in that he exercised responsibilities specific to a Head of Unit. In order to substantiate those claims, the applicant refers to remarks allegedly made by his line managers during a video call on 9 October 2020 and by the former Head of Human Resources during a telephone call on 13 October 2020, as well as to the statements contained in his appraisal reports for 2020, 2021 and the first half of 2022 and to emails relating to his participation in the appraisal of his team, by means of written comments or feedback meetings, and in recruitment processes.

78 Nevertheless, the statements allegedly made during the video call of 9 October 2020 and during the telephone call of 13 October 2020 are not corroborated by any evidence, with the result that they cannot support the applicant’s claims.

79 As regards the 2020 appraisal report, the considerations relating to the applicant’s qualities as Head of Unit concern only the period during which he actually held that position. For the period following the loss of the title of Head of Unit, the applicant himself acknowledges that, since his transfer to the ‘Lower Mid-Market’ set-up, he no longer held that title and no longer had a team to manage. That assertion is, moreover, corroborated by that same report, in which it is noted that the applicant continued to serve as a reference for his ‘ex-team’, since that expression signifies that, after the loss of the title of Head of Unit, he did in fact no longer manage a team.

80 As regards the 2021 appraisal report, it is true that it states that the applicant demonstrated strong management skills, which he had developed during his past experience as a Head of Unit. However, such an assertion is not sufficient to demonstrate that, in respect of 2021, the applicant’s main position was managerial in nature or that his actual responsibilities came within the scope of management. On the contrary, that report states that ‘[the applicant] has been able to find (again) his role inside the team, despite no more having a [Head of Unit] position.’ In addition, the statement in that report that ‘[the applicant] has clearly the level of a [Head of Unit], should the opportunity arise’ means only that he possesses certain management qualities and not that he primarily performed managerial tasks in 2021.

81 As regards the appraisal report for the first half of 2022, the assertion that ‘[the applicant] has had a very good contribution to [the ‘Lower Mid-Market’ set-up], equivalent to the one of a Head of Unit’, is also not sufficient to prove that, during that six-month period, his responsibilities were primarily managerial in nature. Similarly, the reference to the fact that he managed a new team and thus developed new organisational initiatives is too general to be able to infer that he actually performed a managerial role during that six-month period.

82 Lastly, as regards the emails relating to the applicant’s participation in the appraisal of his team, by means of written comments or feedback meetings, and in recruitment processes, submitted as Annexes C.3, C.4, C.5, C.6 and C.7 to the reply, it must be held, without it being necessary to rule on their admissibility, that, although those emails reveal that the applicant may have been entrusted with certain tasks that could be entrusted to a head of unit, they cannot call into question the finding that, between October 2020 and August 2022, the applicant did not have that title, a fact which he himself confirmed (see paragraphs 62 and 76 above). Such a finding cannot be regarded as overly formalistic, given that the selection board, by adopting assessment criteria such as a certain level of experience as a Head of Unit, as in the present case, seeks to ensure a certain consistency in its assessments, in the interests of the candidates, particularly where there are a large number of them (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 November 2021, KV v Commission , T‑430/20, not published, EU:T:2021:791, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

83 Fourthly, even if, as the applicant states, the delay in his appointment as Head of Unit was due to the lack of available posts, such a circumstance cannot affect the selection committee’s assessment that his management experience was limited.

84 Fifth, the applicant does not explain how the fact that he was appointed Senior Head of Unit renders implausible the selection committee’s assessment which is the subject of the present complaint. Indeed, it is not made clear how his appointment as Senior Head of Unit was based on the same selection criteria as those governing the recruitment procedures in question.

85 Sixth, assuming that the applicant has demonstrated experience in project management dating back to 2011, he does not explain how such experience is relevant in the context of the assessment of the criterion contained in the vacancy notices, according to which solid experience in leading, developing and engaging staff is required.

86 Seventh, the fact that the decision rejecting the request for review did not mention the award of an amber rating, under the RAG assessment, as regards management experience is not such as to prevent the applicant from understanding that that criterion constituted a factor against him. Indeed, the fact that his applications were not selected for the second phase of assessment, inter alia on account of that criterion, was communicated to him during the feedback session of 25 January 2024.

87 Eighth, without there being any need to rule on the admissibility of the document submitted as Annex C.9 to the reply, the fact that the applicant holds a master’s degree in management is irrelevant to the assessment of his professional experience in that field.

88 In the light of the foregoing, the first part of the third plea in law must be rejected.

– The second part, concerning the quality of the applicant’s application

89 The applicant claims, first, that the criterion relating to lack of vision, as reported in the extract from the RAG assessment, does not appear in the Guide or in the vacancy notices.

90 Second, the selection committee’s assessment that he is unable to project himself as a manager is manifestly incorrect. According to the applicant, the various mentees he has had over the course of his career, and even his superiors, come to him for advice. The applicant’s appraisal reports support that position, in so far as the 2019 report states that he had been ‘able to lead and motivate the team members’, the 2021 report states that ‘he [had] coached very efficiently the new recruits’ and that he had ‘given valuable [feedback] to [the Lower Mid-Market] management’ and the 2023 report highlights his ‘leadership and management skills’ and ‘team development and coaching’. The applicant’s ability to project himself as a manager is confirmed by his email of 6 November 2023 to the Chief Executive of the EIF in which he indicates that his appraisal reports demonstrate his ‘strong team management skills’ and his role as a ‘mentor to less experienced staff’.

91 Third, the finding that only one of the applicant’s motivation letters was appropriate for the position applied for, while the other three were a copy/paste of each other and mainly replicated his CV, resulted in him being given an amber rating in each of those three recruitment procedures. However, according to the applicant such an assessment is also manifestly incorrect. Indeed, the applicant’s motivation letters all followed the same structure. With the exception of the personalised sections, it is logical that the other parts of those letters would be similar. Those similarities are also explained by the fact that, according to the Guide, ‘there should be a strong coherence between the CV and the [m]otivation [l]etter’. Furthermore, it is not easy to understand why, despite the identical structure of the applicant’s motivation letters, that criterion was given a green rating under the RAG assessment for one recruitment procedure and an amber rating as regards the other procedures. In any event, it is apparent from an email of 28 November 2023 that, even if the applications were an exact copy/paste of each other, that should not have affected the different procedures.

92 The EIF disputes the applicant’s arguments.

93 First, as regards the applicant’s argument that the selection committee held against him a ‘lack of vision’, whereas no such criterion is provided for either in the Guide or in the vacancy notices, it should be noted that it is apparent from the extract from the RAG assessment that, according to the selection committee, the applicant’s ‘lack of vision’ was apparent from his motivation letters. Indeed, with regard to the recruitment procedure for the positions of Head of Portfolio Risk Management & Surveillance and Head of GreenTech, it states in that extract ‘motivation letter lacking vision’.

94 As is apparent from the table on page 7 of the Guide, candidates’ motivation letters are assessed under the criterion relating to the quality of the application. It is thus stated, in respect of that criterion, that the motivation letter must clearly demonstrate the reasons the candidate is specifically applying for a particular role.

95 It follows that the ‘lack of vision’ was assessed in the context of the criterion relating to the quality of the application. The applicant cannot therefore maintain that the selection committee’s considerations relating to that lack have no basis in the vacancy notices.

96 In addition, as the applicant acknowledges, the vacancy notices state, under the heading ‘behavioural competencies’, that the desired candidate ‘drives vision and purpose: [he or she] paints a compelling picture of the vision and strategy that motivates others to action’. The selection committee was thus entitled to rely on those vacancy notices in order to find that the applicant had a ‘lack of vision’.

97 In those circumstances, the applicant’s argument that a criterion not provided for in the vacancy notices was taken into account must be rejected.

98 Second, the applicant submits, in essence, that, in taking the view that he was unable to project himself as a manager, the selection committee committed a manifest error of assessment.

99 In that regard, the applicant’s ability to project himself as a manager received an amber rating under the RAG assessment in all four recruitment procedures.

100 It should be noted, first of all, that the applicant has not adduced any evidence capable of rendering implausible the assessments made by the selection committee, such as ‘motivation letter lacking vision’ (for posts 109518 and 109517) and ‘no projection into the position’ (for post 109508), in accordance with the requirement laid down by the case-law referred to in paragraph 57 above.

101 Next, as regards the appraisal reports for 2019, 2021 and 2023 to which the applicant refers, they were not included in the application files. Even if the job advertisements could include the statement that applicants, by submitting their applications, agreed that the information concerning their performance for the previous three years would be accessible to the selection committee, such a statement could not impose on that committee an obligation to consult that information and to take it into account.

102 Similarly, as regards the email of 6 November 2023, first, it was not included in the application files and the applicant cannot therefore criticise the selection committee for not having taken it into account. Second, the reference made by the applicant in that email to his own view that one of his main responsibilities as a future Head of Division would be to enable the EIF to deliver on its commitment to being an equal opportunity employer concerns only an isolated aspect relating to staff management and, in any event, reflects only his personal conviction (see paragraph 75 above).

103 It follows that the applicant’s argument that the selection committee made a manifest error of assessment in considering that he was unable to project himself as a manager must be rejected.

104 Third, the applicant disputes the selection committee’s assessment that his motivation letters were not adapted to the requirements of the positions of Head of GreenTech, Head of Portfolio Risk Management & Surveillance and Head of Resource Planning COP Coordination & Performance Monitoring, in that they were a copy/paste of each other and mainly replicated his CV.

105 The applicant does not, however, adduce, in support of his arguments, any evidence capable of demonstrating that that assessment by the selection committee is vitiated by a manifest error.

106 Indeed, the applicant’s allegation that three of the four sections of his motivation letters – namely the general introduction, the section highlighting his management experience and track record and the general closing remark – were bound to overlap is based solely on his personal choice as to how to structure those letters. The selection committee was entitled, in the exercise of its broad discretion, to consider that such a structure was in itself incapable of demonstrating that the applicant’s applications were adapted to the particularities of the three positions referred to in paragraph 104 above. Moreover, it cannot be inferred from the statement contained in the email of 28 November 2023 – that the applicant’s applications would be examined individually in the light of the position for which he had applied – that the Committee could not take the view that, taken in isolation, none of the three motivation letters in question was adapted to the requirements of those positions.

107 In view of the foregoing, the applicant’s argument concerning the selection committee’s assessment of his motivation letters must be rejected, as must, accordingly, the second part of the present plea in law.

– The third part, concerning the applicant’s technical skills and record of achievement

108 First, the applicant submits that the selection committee’s assessment that his technical skills should be awarded an amber rating under the RAG assessment for three of the four recruitment procedures is incorrect. Article 14(1) of the EIF Staff Regulations states that Function C positions, such as the positions at issue, are management positions, therefore the applicant focused his applications on his management experience. Such experience is supported not only by his appraisal reports, since at least 2017, but also by the fact that he has a master’s degree from a reputable business school with a specialisation in management. Furthermore, he enjoys a very positive reputation with the staff of the EIF for his technical skills. The selected Head of Division for one of the positions at issue indeed confirmed to the applicant that she was relying on his technical skills. Lastly, it is apparent from the appraisal reports for 2019 and 2021 that the EIF trusted him to transfer his technical skills to more junior colleagues.

109 Second, according to the applicant, the award of the amber rating under the RAG assessment concerning his record of achievement in two of the recruitment procedures reveals an additional error of assessment on the part of the selection committee. His past experience corresponds precisely to the specific requirements of the positions at issue.

110 The EIF disputes the applicant’s arguments.

111 In that regard, first, as regards the criterion relating to the applicant’s technical skills, he repeats, in essence, the same arguments as those raised in support of the first and second parts of the third plea in law. The present argument must therefore be rejected for the same reasons as those set out above.

112 Second, as regards the criterion relating to his record of achievement, it should be noted, as a preliminary point, that he was awarded an amber rating under the RAG assessment in respect of only three of the recruitment procedures, namely those relating to the positions of Head of Portfolio Risk Management & Surveillance, Head of GreenTech, and Head of Secondary Sales, Valuations and Co-investments.

113 As regards the criterion relating to his record of achievement, the applicant sets out his past professional experience in order to prove that he actually possesses all the competences corresponding to the positions referred to in paragraph 112 above and that, as a result, the award of an amber rating for that criterion under the RAG assessment for those posts is manifestly incorrect.

114 However, such claims are based not on concrete evidence, but solely on the applicant’s assessment of the merits of his own application, that is to say, on his personal conviction, which cannot be regarded as proof of a manifest error of assessment within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 75 above.

115 Furthermore, and in any event, even if the applicant were able to demonstrate significant experience and qualifications in the field relevant to the positions, it is apparent from the decision rejecting the request for review that a comparative assessment of the selection criteria was carried out by the selection board with regard to all the candidates who applied for the vacant positions. Thus, the fact of having obvious and acknowledged merits does not exclude the possibility, in the context of such a comparative consideration of merits, that other candidates may have greater merits (see judgment of 7 February 2019, Duym v Council , T‑549/17, not published, EU:T:2019:72, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited).

116 In the light of the foregoing, the third part and, accordingly, the third plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.

The fourth plea in law, alleging a breach of the principle of legal certainty

117 The applicant claims that the EIF ‘brings … confusion’ when it states in the decision rejecting the request for review that, according to the Guide, diversity was not a criterion and that the gender of the candidate was not a factor which was evaluated by the selection committee. In his view, that assertion contradicts a number of factors which show that gender was a decisive criterion in the recruitment procedures.

118 The EIF disputes the applicant’s arguments.

119 It should be borne in mind that the principle of legal certainty, which is a general principle of EU law, aims to ensure that situations and legal relationships governed by EU law remain foreseeable and requires that any act of the administration which produces legal effects is clear and precise so that those persons may ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and act accordingly (see judgment of 21 September 2022, Casanova v EIB , T‑266/21, not published, EU:T:2022:566, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

120 In the present case, it follows from paragraphs 35 to 38 above that it was the award of at least two amber ratings at the pre-selection stage that led to the applicant’s exclusion from the four selection procedures, in accordance with the provision in the Guide stating that the award of at least two amber ratings excludes the candidate from the remainder of the selection procedure, and not the fact that his gender was taken into account.

121 The applicant cannot therefore claim that the principle of legal certainty was infringed in the present case.

122 In the light of the foregoing, the fourth plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.

The fifth plea in law, alleging a breach of the principle of equal treatment

123 The applicant claims that taking into account gender as a criterion for recruitment purposes constitutes a breach of the principle of non-discrimination, especially since the completed recruitment campaigns resulted in less than 30% of the successful candidates being male. With such a large number of positions to fill, the statistical deviation from parity is evident. In that regard, by the reply of 22 August 2024 to the applicant’s request for access to documents, based on Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43), the applicant was informed of the breakdown, in terms of percentage, of the candidates by gender at each stage of the recruitment procedures. The statement of percentages prove that female candidates were favoured at the expense of male candidates.

124 The EIF disputes the applicant’s arguments.

125 It should be noted that the applicant’s arguments relate, in reality, not to an alleged breach of the principle of equal treatment, but, more specifically, to discrimination based on gender.

126 However, that premiss is incorrect. Indeed, it follows from paragraphs 36 to 38 above that the decision to reject the applicant’s applications was not taken on account of his gender.

127 The fifth plea in law must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

128 As a result, in the light of all of the foregoing considerations, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

129 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party must be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

130 It follows that, since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the EIF.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders FD to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 October 2026.

* Language of the case: English.