Judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) 21 October 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

21 October 2026 ( * )

( Civil service – EIF Staff – Recruitment – Vacancy notice – Rejection of application – Appointment of another candidate – Plea of illegality – Manifest errors of assessment – Discrimination based on gender – Liability )

In Case T‑519/24,

FT, represented by L. Levi and A. Champetier, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Investment Fund (EIF), represented by P. Dorin and L. Sales, acting as Agents, and by P.-E. Partsch and S. Thomas, lawyers,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber),

composed of S.L. Kalėda (Rapporteur), President, H. Kanninen and T. Perišin, Judges,

Registrar: S. Spyropoulos, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the measure of organisation of procedure of 29 January 2026 and the response of the EIF lodged at the Court Registry on 13 February 2026,

further to the hearing on 2 March 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By his action under Article 270 TFEU and Article 50a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the applicant, FT, seeks, first, in essence, annulment of the decision of the European Investment Fund (EIF) of 30 January 2024 not to select him for the post of [ confidential ] ( 1 ) and to appoint another candidate and, second, compensation for the damage he claims to have suffered.

Background to the dispute

2 The applicant joined the EIF in June 2008. Since then, he has held several positions as an investment professional. Most recently, he has held the position of Senior Head of Unit.

3 In the context of internal restructuring which was announced in July 2023, the EIF published, in November of that year, 19 vacancy notices relating to Head of Division positions. In those recruitment procedures, a two-step process was followed, as described in a document entitled ‘Two-step process Pilot: Guide for Staff’ (‘the Guide’).

4 According to the Guide, candidates are assessed in two stages, namely the ‘reserve list constitution’ (step 1) and the ‘operational selection’ (step 2). During that second stage, a selection committee matches the reserve list to the vacant positions.

5 The first stage is itself divided into two phases of candidate assessment.

6 The first phase consists of an ‘initial screening of applications by a [s]election [c]ommittee’, comprising senior managers (a procedure known as ‘pre-selection’), at the end of which ‘only successful candidates’ proceed to an ‘independent Assessment Centre’. During that phase, candidates are assessed by the selection committee on the basis of a three-colour (red, amber, green (‘RAG’)) rating system. According to page 7 of the Guide, the colour red is awarded when the application ‘does not meet [the] criteria’, the colour amber when it ‘borderline meets [the] criteria, with areas for development or further exploration identified’, and the colour green when it ‘clearly meets [the] criteria’.

7 The second phase involves the candidate attending an assessment centre run by an external consultant, which was introduced to provide a ‘robust and independent evaluation of managerial and behavioural competencies’. The Guide states that ‘the results of the [a]ssessment [c]entre are an important element for the Selection Committee in the overall consideration for an appointment to a role or entry to the reserve list. The results of an [a]ssessment [c]entre are incontrovertible and are documented in an independent report. The Selection committee will use the Assessment Centre report and pre-screening information to establish which candidates will be considered for the reserve list.’

8 The purpose of the second stage is to match candidates on the reserve list established by the selection committee with the published positions based on technical know-how and talent development, ensuring a balanced representation in terms of gender and nationality. To this end, appointments are to be made by matching the most suitable candidate for a role on the basis of the pre-selection criteria, the assessment centre report and the outcomes of any additional assessment tools, if any.

9 On 28 November 2023, the applicant applied for a full-time position at grade [ confidential ] (‘the Head of Division position’). The requirements set out in the vacancy notice related to ‘qualifications’, ‘behavioural competencies’ and ‘technical competencies’.

10 On 13 December 2023, the applicant was invited by the EIF to an assessment centre and, on 11 January 2024, he passed the tests conducted at that centre.

11 On 30 January 2024, the EIF notified the applicant by e-mail of the negative outcome of his application to the Head of Division position (‘the initial non-selection decision’). On the same day, the applicant requested a copy of the assessment centre report. After the applicant sent a second request, the EIF sent him that report on 5 February 2024.

12 On 1 February 2024, the EIF published on its intranet the name of the successful candidate for the Head of Division position.

13 On 4 March 2024, following a request from the applicant, the EIF provided him with an excerpt of the selection note relating to him (‘the selection note’).

14 On 29 March 2024, the applicant submitted a request for review pursuant to Article 41 of the EIF Staff Regulations (‘the request for review’) against the initial non-selection decision.

15 The EIF rejected the applicant’s request for review by decision of 19 July 2024 (‘the decision rejecting the request for review’).

16 On 3 September 2024, the applicant submitted to the EIF’s Data Protection Officer a request for access to documents pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L 295, p. 39). In reply, the applicant received the selection note and his ‘RAG assessment’ carried out at the pre-selection phase.

Forms of order sought

17 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the initial non-selection decision;

– annul the decision rejecting the request for review;

– order the EIF to pay compensation for the damage suffered by the applicant;

– order the EIF to pay the costs even if the action is dismissed.

18 The FEI contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

The subject matter of the action

19 It should be borne in mind that claims for annulment formally brought against a decision rejecting a request for review, where that decision lacks any independent content, have the effect of bringing before the General Court the act against which the request for review was submitted (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 September 2022, LR v EIB , T‑529/20, EU:T:2022:523, paragraph 11 and the case-law cited).

20 In the present case, it should be noted that the decision rejecting the request for review confirms the initial non-selection decision in relation to the Head of Division position, while explaining the reasons for that decision. Thus, while that initial decision merely informs the applicant that he has not been appointed, the decision rejecting the request for review, by contrast, is based on several grounds that do not appear in that initial decision.

21 Accordingly, it must be held that the present action has the effect of bringing before the Court a claim for annulment of the initial non-selection decision (‘the contested decision’), the legality of which must be examined by taking into consideration the statement of reasons set out in the decision rejecting the request for review.

The claim for annulment

22 The applicant raises three pleas in law in support of his action, alleging, first, manifest errors of assessment as well as a breach of the vacancy notice and a breach of the interest of the service, second, a breach of the procedure, of the principle of non-discrimination and of the principle of legal certainty, and third, a breach of the obligation to state reasons.

23 In that regard, according to the case-law, the Court must interpret an applicant’s pleas in law by reference to their substance rather than their classification and must, therefore, undertake to characterise the pleas in law and the arguments in the application (see judgment of 5 September 2014, Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission , T‑471/11, EU:T:2014:739, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

24 In those circumstances, it should be noted that the applicant’s arguments should be grouped, in essence, into three pleas alleging, first, a failure to state reasons, second, manifest errors of assessment, and third, a breach of the procedure, of the principle of equal treatment and of the principle of legal certainty.

25 Furthermore, the applicant has implicitly raised a plea of illegality, which it is appropriate to examine first.

The plea of illegality raised against the provisions of the Guide relating to gender balance

26 In response to a question from the Court, the applicant confirmed at the hearing that he had implicitly raised a plea of illegality regarding the provisions of the Guide relating to gender balance. According to the applicant, the Guide lacks clarity on account of the existence of two lists of criteria, namely the initial list and the list appearing in the table that follows it. In addition, the Guide provides that ‘all reasonable efforts will be made to select a diverse group of suitable candidates for assessment’ and that ‘the [s]election [c]ommittee matches candidates on the reserve list with the published positions … ensuring a balanced representation in terms of gender and nationality’. The Guide then states that diversity is ‘not a RAG criterion’. Lastly, there is no legal basis in the rules applicable to the EIF that would provide for ensuring full equality in practice between men and women, or any clear and binding rule which would allow positive discrimination.

27 In addition, at the hearing the applicant disputed the EIF’s affirmation, maintained at the hearing, that the Chief Executive of that institution was competent to adopt the Guide.

28 At the hearing, the EIF disputed the admissibility of that plea of illegality on the ground that it was raised out of time. In any event, according to the EIF, gender was not a criterion for which the candidates were awarded a ‘green’, ‘amber’ or ‘red’ status at the pre-selection stage and, clearly, such a criterion was not applied to the applicant at the pre-selection stage as he was pre-selected and then his name was put on the reserve list. The EIF adds that the successful candidate was appointed because, overall, she had greater merits than the applicant, and not because of her gender. The EIF states that, whilst it does indeed pursue a gender strategy aimed at addressing the under-representation of women at the EIF, particularly in strategic roles and at the highest levels of the organisational hierarchy, it applies the gender criterion as a pivotal criterion only in exceptional cases, when choosing between candidates of equal merit. The use of gender as a pivotal criterion is not illegal but is in line with the general principle of equality between men and women, which is enshrined in Article 157 TFEU and in Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

29 It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, Article 277 TFEU gives expression to the general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge, incidentally, with a view to obtaining the annulment of a measure against which it may bring an action, the validity of an act of general application adopted by an EU institution which constitutes the legal basis of the contested measure, if that party was not entitled to bring a direct action challenging the act which thus affected him or her without his or her having been in a position to seek its annulment (see judgments of 8 September 2020, Commission and Council v Carreras Sequeros and Others , C‑119/19 P and C‑126/19 P, EU:C:2020:676, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited, and of 24 October 2018, Fernández González v Commission , T‑162/17 RENV, not published, EU:T:2018:711, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

30 The general act claimed to be unlawful must be applicable, directly or indirectly, to the issue with which the action is concerned, and there must be a direct legal connection between the individual measure contested and the general act in question. In that regard, the existence of such a connection may be inferred, inter alia, from the finding that the measure against which the main action has been brought is essentially based on a provision of the general act claimed to be unlawful (see judgments of 8 September 2020, Commission and Council v Carreras Sequeros and Others , C‑119/19 P and C‑126/19 P, EU:C:2020:676, paragraphs 68 and 69 and the case-law cited, and of 24 October 2018, Fernández González v Commission , T‑162/17 RENV, not published, EU:T:2018:711, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

31 In the present case, as a preliminary point, it should be noted that the Guide contains binding provisions of general application. Indeed, as is apparent from the explanations provided by the EIF in response to the measure of organisation of procedure, the Guide was adopted by its Chief Executive on 24 October 2023. Article 21(5) of the Statutes of the EIF stipulates that employees of the EIF are under the authority of the Chief Executive and are engaged and discharged by the Chief Executive. Thus, the Guide applies to objectively determined situations and produces legal effects with respect to a category of persons envisaged in the abstract, namely the members of staff of the EIF (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 September 2019, US v ECB , T‑255/18, not published, EU:T:2019:680, paragraph 84).

32 Next, in the first place, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s argument, raised at the hearing, that the Guide was unlawfully adopted, on the ground that it should have been adopted, not by the Chief Executive but by the Board of Directors of the EIF. Indeed, as the EIF correctly explained in response to the measure of organisation of procedure and at the hearing, it follows from the wording of Article 21(5) of the Statutes of the EIF that the Chief Executive is competent to adopt and implement the administrative rules on staff management, the Staff Rules and the corresponding rights and obligations. In that regard, while it follows from Article 16(1)(ii) of the Statutes of the EIF that the Board of Directors is competent to adopt guidelines and directives, those are matters relating not to staff management but to the operations and the management of the EIF.

33 In the second place, as regards the question whether the plea of illegality concerning the provisions of the Guide relating to gender balance was raised at the application stage, it should be noted that, in the context of his second plea, the applicant states that the Guide is confusing and unclear, creating uncertainty. According to the applicant, while it states quite clearly that diversity is ‘not a RAG criterion’, the Guide specifies that all efforts will be made to improve gender balance in senior roles, that the diversity that the candidates would bring to the team is a specific criterion that will be considered comparatively, and that diversity and specifically the gender balance of candidates will be reviewed to ensure consistency with diversity needs. Furthermore, there is no legal basis in the rules applicable to the EIF requiring full equality in practice between men and women, or any clear and binding rule which would allow positive discrimination.

34 In his third plea, the applicant reiterates that the criteria applied in the two stages of the selection procedure are ‘unknown’.

35 Thus, contrary to the EIF’s contention, it must be noted that the applicant has implicitly, but clearly, raised in the application a plea of illegality against the provisions of the Guide relating to gender balance.

36 In the third place, as regards the scope of the contested provisions of the Guide and the question whether there is, in the present case, a direct legal connection between those provisions and the contested decision within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 30 above, the following should be noted.

37 First, as regards the pre-selection stage, it should first of all be noted that, on page 6 of the Guide, under the heading ‘Pre-Selection’, it is stated that ‘all reasonable efforts will be made to select a diverse group of suitable candidates for assessment in line with the EIF’s strategic intention to improve gender balance in senior roles[;] if this has not been possible for valid reasons, such reasons must be substantiated and captured in the [s]election [c]ommittee’s minutes.’ Similarly, according to the final item in the list on pages 6 and 7 of the Guide, still under the heading ‘Pre-Selection’, it is stated that the selection committee must take into account, inter alia, ‘the diversity that would be brought by the candidates to the team, in which the advertised position sits.’ In addition, the last line of the table on page 7 of the Guide states, in a first sentence, that diversity is ‘not a RAG criterion’ and, in a second sentence, that ‘diversity and specifically gender balance of candidates will be reviewed to ensure consistency with diversity needs’.

38 In that regard, while diversity is stated in the Guide as ‘not a RAG criterion’, that reference is explained by the fact that a candidate’s gender cannot be the subject of a RAG assessment as defined in the Guide – that is, according to whether the candidate ‘does not meet [the] criteria’ (red), ‘borderline meets [the] criteria, with areas for development or further exploration identified’ (amber) or ‘clearly meets [the] criteria’ (green) (see paragraph 6 above).

39 However, contrary to what the EIF claims, it is apparent from that second sentence of the table on page 7 of the Guide, in the light of the statement made on page 6 of the Guide and the last of the items listed on pages 6 and 7 of the Guide, that gender balance is a consideration which may be taken into account as early as the pre-selection stage.

40 Furthermore, as regards the question of whether gender was a criterion taken into account in the present case, it should be noted that the applicant successfully passed both phases of assessment, namely the initial screening of applications by a selection committee and the candidate’s attendance at an assessment centre (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above), and therefore had his name put on the reserve list. Thus, as the EIF states, he would be eligible for another Head of Division role within the EIF, like the one at issue, should there be an opening for such a position in the coming months or years. Indeed, as stated in the contested decision, ‘the [r]eserve [l]ist remains valid for [two] years and may be extended by [one] year’.

41 The applicant therefore did not, in any event, suffer as a result of provisions in the Guide that allegedly favour gender discrimination during pre-selection.

42 Second, as regards the operational selection step, on page 3 of the Guide, it is explicitly stated that the selection committee must ensure a ‘balanced representation in terms of gender’.

43 Nevertheless, in the present case, the selection committee did not apply gender as a pivotal criterion, but considered that, overall, the successful candidate had greater merits than the applicant.

44 As the EIF notes in its defence, it is apparent from the assessment centre report relating to the successful candidate that the latter obtained, in respect of some competencies, better scores than the applicant, a fact which the applicant does not dispute. It was therefore not on the grounds of his gender that the selection committee did not select the applicant at the end of the operational selection step.

45 The applicant has thus failed to establish that the contested decision was based on the provisions of the Guide relating to gender balance, and thus that there was a direct legal connection, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 30 above, between the contested decision and those provisions of the Guide.

46 The applicant’s plea of illegality must therefore be rejected as inadmissible.

The first plea in law, alleging failure to state reasons

47 The applicant claims that he does not understand the decision not to appoint him and to appoint another candidate. In his view, the information provided in the contested decision, in the decision to reject the request for review, in the selection note and in the RAG assessment table is clearly insufficient to identify the grounds for the decision not to appoint him. The criteria applied at each of the two stages, the assessment of the selection committee against those criteria, and the value of each criterion applied remain ‘unknown’.

48 The EIF disputes the applicant’s arguments.

49 According to settled case-law, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 2 December 2020, Thunus and Others v EIB , T‑318/19, not published, EU:T:2020:578, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).

50 It follows from the case-law relating to decisions taken by a selection board in a competition, which must be applied by analogy to decisions taken by a selection committee created in order to fill a management position, that the obligation to state reasons must be reconciled with observance of the secrecy surrounding the proceedings of the selection board under Article 6 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union. That secrecy was introduced with a view to guaranteeing the independence of selection boards and the objectivity of their proceedings, by protecting them from all external interference and pressure, whether it comes from the EU administration itself, the candidates concerned or third parties. Observance of this secrecy therefore precludes both disclosure of the attitudes adopted by individual members of selection boards and disclosure of any factor relating to individual assessments of candidates (see judgment of 14 December 2022, Vanhoudt v EIB , T‑490/21, not published, EU:T:2022:801, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

51 Like the proceedings of a selection board which involve as a rule at least two separate stages, the first being an examination of the applications in order to select the candidates admitted to take part in the competition tests and the second being an examination of the abilities of the candidates for the posts to be filled in order to draw up a reserve list (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 July 1996, Parliament v Innamorati , C‑254/95 P, EU:C:1996:276, paragraph 26), the proceedings of the selection committee included, in the present case, those two stages.

52 As regards the second stage, it involves tasks that are primarily comparative in character and, accordingly, covered by the secrecy inherent in those proceedings (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 July 1996, Parliament v Innamorati , C‑254/95 P, EU:C:1996:276, paragraph 28).

53 Having regard to the secrecy surrounding the proceedings of the selection committee, communication of the marks obtained in the various tests constitutes an adequate statement of the reasons on which the committee’s decisions are based. Such a statement of reasons is not prejudicial to the candidates’ rights, since it enables them to know how their performance was evaluated and to ascertain, if such is the case, that they have not in fact obtained the number of marks required by the vacancy notice (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 July 1996, Parliament v Innamorati , C‑254/95 P, EU:C:1996:276, paragraphs 31 and 32).

54 Since promotions and the filling of vacant posts are by selection, the EIF is not required to disclose to the unsuccessful candidate details of its comparison of his or her merits and those of the successful candidate nor to set out in detail in what way it considered that the candidate appointed fulfilled the conditions in the vacancy notice. It is sufficient that the statement of reasons deals with the satisfaction of the legal conditions which, under the EIF Staff Regulations, govern the regularity of the procedure (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 July 2005, Wunenburger v Commission , T‑370/03, EU:T:2005:271, paragraph 31).

55 In the present case, the decision rejecting the request for review states that the applicant was awarded an ‘amber’ rating in respect of ‘diversity of experience’ and ‘green’ ratings for all other RAG criteria. It is also stated in that decision that, in accordance with the Guide, at the operational selection stage, the selection committee first carried out a careful and thorough examination of the short-listed candidates, using the pre-selection evaluation and the assessment centre reports, to identify the candidates to be placed on the reserve list. It is stated that once the reserve list had been established, the selection committee carried out an objective and impartial assessment to identify the most suitable candidate for each vacant position. Following that assessment, the committee reached the conclusion that another candidate was more suitable for the Head of Division position.

56 Furthermore, following his request, the applicant received his assessment centre report, which states the scores he obtained for the various competencies referred to, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 53 above.

57 That statement of reasons makes it possible for the applicant to understand the essential basis of the EIF’s decision. Moreover, the applicant’s detailed arguments in the second and third pleas show that the statement of reasons was sufficient to enable him to challenge the contested decision.

58 It follows from the foregoing that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the obligation to state reasons was not infringed in the present case.

59 The first plea in law must therefore be dismissed as unfounded.

The second plea in law, alleging manifest errors of assessment

60 The applicant submits that the assessment of his application was manifestly erroneous.

61 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the essential function of a vacancy notice is to give those interested the most accurate information possible about the conditions of eligibility for the position in question, so as to enable them to judge whether they should apply for it. The institutions enjoy a wide discretion in deciding upon the criteria of ability required for the posts to be filled and in determining the rules and conditions under which a selection procedure is organised in the light of those criteria and in the interests of the service. The selection committee, which has considerable discretion as regards the procedure for and the detailed content of the tests provided for within the framework of a selection procedure, is nevertheless bound by the wording of that notice (see order of 23 January 2025, Hilpisch v ECHA , T‑346/24, not published, EU:T:2025:96, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

62 According to the case-law, an error may be charactered as manifest only where it is easily perceptible and can be clearly detected by reference to the criteria to which the exercise of the decision-making power in question is subject. Therefore, in order to establish that the selection committee made a manifest error in its assessment of the facts such as to justify the annulment of a decision, the evidence, which it is for the applicant to adduce, must be sufficient to make the findings of the selection committee implausible. In other words, a plea alleging a manifest error must be rejected if, despite the evidence adduced by the applicant, the contested assessment may still be accepted as true or valid (see judgment of 15 December 2021, HB v EIB , T‑689/20, not published, EU:T:2021:891, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

63 It is in the light of those principles that the applicant’s arguments that manifest errors of assessment are obvious must be examined, having regard, first, to the vacancy notice, second, to the selection note and, third, to the decision rejecting the request for review and the RAG table.

– The vacancy notice

64 In the first place, according to the applicant, it follows from the ‘purpose’ section of the vacancy notice, first, that the Head of Division position entails overseeing a team of investment professionals and involves inter alia ‘executing transactions’ and ‘providing [ confidential ] services’, whereas the successful candidate has never worked as an ‘investment professional’.

65 Second, the Head of Division position equally involves monitoring equity fund investments. Such experience, which is gained primarily through a role in the investment sector within the EIF and/or the European Investment Bank (EIB), cannot have been acquired by the successful candidate.

66 Third, the Head of Division position also implies that the selected candidate will have a strong track record in management, which is not the case with the successful candidate. As regards the criteria concerning ‘Technical competencies’, the successful candidate does not meet many of the criteria listed in the vacancy notice. In particular, she does not have in-depth direct investment experience in [ confidential ].

67 In the second place, the applicant adds that the vacancy notice must be interpreted as a whole, ensuring that all its provisions are considered together to determine the eligibility criteria and requirements for the position.

68 According to the applicant, first, as regards ‘qualifications’, it is clear from the information provided by the EIF in the defence that the successful candidate submitted a curriculum vitae (CV) containing false claims regarding her qualifications allegedly acquired at the EIB. Although that CV shows three years’ experience as Senior Head of the Mandate Management Unit, Risk Department, that experience in fact amounts to only two years.

69 Second, with regard to ‘behavioural competencies’, the Human Resources Department expressly confirmed to him that candidates were not ranked on the basis of the assessment centre results.

70 Third, as regards ‘technical competencies’, in essence, the successful candidate’s responsibilities were mainly focused on legal advice and risk management, functions which are fundamentally different from those resulting from the vacancy notice.

71 The EIF disputes the applicant’s arguments.

72 In the first place, according to the ‘Purpose’ section of the vacancy notice:

‘The role holder oversees a team of investment professionals to achieve the EIF’s business and development targets in the Fund’s [ confidential ] activities. This involves developing and executing transactions within the scope of the division and providing [ confidential ] services, while also supporting fund raising and mandate management and cooperation with audit services.

In addition, the division handles the monitoring activities of non-strategic fund investments in [the] EIF’s portfolio, complying with [the] EIF’s fiduciary duties under various mandate agreements and maximising the economic value of these assets through active portfolio management, including [ confidential ].

The position requires conceptual thinking, quality focus, excellent written skills and a strong track record in leading, developing, and engaging staff to operate diligently and respectfully in a multicultural environment.’

73 As the EIF notes, the extract from the vacancy notice cited in paragraph 72 above does not specify the details of what is required from the candidates. Indeed, those requirements are described exhaustively in the other sections of the vacancy notice, in particular the ‘Behavioural Competencies’, ‘Technical Competencies’ and ‘Qualifications’ sections.

74 Thus, first, the applicant cannot claim that the successful candidate never worked as an ‘investment professional’. It is clear from her CV that she worked as an investment professional, notably at an investment firm from October 2006 to December 2015.

75 Second, as the EIF points out, the successful candidate’s CV shows that she has experience in monitoring equity fund investments, thanks to her varied experience within the EIF and the EIB and, previously, as General Counsel at an investment company.

76 Third, while the applicant claims that the Head of Division position also implies that the selected candidate will have a strong track record in management, it must be stated that he does not specify from which part of the ‘purpose’ section of the vacancy notice such a requirement is apparent. In any event, as the EIF states, the successful candidate had two years of management experience at the EIB as Head of the Credit Risk Management Unit, and also acquired management experience when working as General Counsel in an investment company from October 2006 to December 2015 (see paragraph 74 above).

77 In the second place, the vacancy notice lists requirements under the three headings ‘Qualifications’, ‘Behavioural Competencies’ and ‘Technical Competencies’.

78 First, as regards ‘qualifications’, as the EIF notes, the applicant does not dispute that the successful candidate did meet all the requirements set out in the vacancy notice, namely, inter alia, ‘university degree, preferably at postgraduate level, in Law, Economics, Finance, Business Administration or a related field’, and ‘minimum of [10] years of relevant work experience, with a strong emphasis on equity investments’.

79 However, in the reply, the applicant maintains that it is apparent from the successful candidate’s CV, produced by the EIF in its defence, that she submitted false information in her CV which the appointing authority failed to verify. More specifically, according to the applicant, the successful candidate indicated in the ‘Professional experience’ section of her CV that she had held the position of ‘Senior Head of the Mandate Management Unit, Risk Department’ within the EIB since October 2020, whereas that position was not created by the EIB until September 2021.

80 In that regard, as the EIF states, although the successful candidate’s CV does indeed contain an inaccuracy in that regard, it is important to note that her application form indicates the date of ‘16 November 2021’ as the date from which she occupied that position. The EIF was therefore not misled by the successful candidate on that point.

81 Also in the reply, the applicant disputes the statement made by the EIF in its defence that the successful candidate has ‘a minimum of [10] years of relevant professional experience, with a strong emphasis on equity investments’. In his view, her experience as General Counsel in a company, as stated in her CV, cannot be regarded as professional experience ‘with a strong emphasis on equity investment’, as required by the vacancy notice.

82 In that regard, it appears that the selection committee could reasonably consider, without making a manifest error of assessment, that the fact of having been General Counsel of an investment company covering a wide geographical focus of direct, indirect equity and debt investments, with a particular focus on technology investments, necessarily involved participation in capital investment operations.

83 Next, the applicant considers that the EIF is wrong to assert that the successful candidate was ‘involved in the execution of equity investments, particularly in private equity, venture capital, [ confidential ]’. In his view, that claim is demonstrably false, as risk officers operate in a second line of defence capacity and do not make investments.

84 However, as the EIF maintains, the vacancy notice does not stipulate that only candidates conducting investments directly are eligible for the post. As regards ‘qualifications’, the vacancy notice merely requires a ‘minimum of [10] years of relevant work experience, with a strong emphasis on equity investments’, a ‘thorough understanding of the EIF’s objectives, strategies and policies, with the ability to understand its political, statutory and operational framework and its role within the [European Union]’, as well as ‘knowledge of EIB Group objectives, strategies, policies and processes’. The selection committee could therefore reasonably consider, without making a manifest error of assessment, that the successful candidate’s experience in the EIB’s Mandate Management Unit was appropriate and relevant in that regard.

85 Second, with regard to ‘behavioural competencies’, as noted by the EIF (see paragraph 44 above), the successful candidate obtained better scores than the applicant in respect of certain behavioural competencies, a matter which the applicant does not dispute.

86 However, in that regard, the applicant asserts that the Human Resources Department of the EIF expressly confirmed, by an email of 15 February 2024, that ‘there [was] no ranking of the candidates retained on the reserve list based on the [a]ssessment [c]enter results [and] when making recommendations for appointment from the reserve list’.

87 After examining the email referred to in paragraph 86 above, it should be noted that the correct quotation is that ‘there is no ranking of the candidates retained on the reserve list based on the [a]ssessment [c]entre results[;] the [s]election [c]ommittee takes several elements into consideration alongside the [a]ssessment [c]entre report when selecting candidates for the reserve list and when making recommendations for appointment from [that] list’.

88 It follows from the full quotation that the selection committee does take into account, inter alia, the assessment centre report, in accordance with the requirements of the Guide, which expressly provides that ‘the results of the [a]ssessment [c]entre are an important element for the [s]election [c]ommittee in the overall consideration for an appointment to a role or entry to the reserve list’ and that ‘appointments will be made by matching the most suitable candidate for that role based upon the pre-screening criteria, the [a]ssessment [c]entre report and the outcomes of any additional [assessment] tools as required’.

89 Third, with regard to ‘technical competencies’, the applicant disputes that the successful candidate met 8 of the 18 requirements set out in that regard, which are described as follows in the vacancy notice:

‘[ Confidential ] Fund Quality Standards Life Cycle: Ensure adherence to common quality standards throughout the entire [ confidential ] fund investment process, encompassing both acquisition and divestiture phases, and transfer knowledge to a diverse team of investment professionals’ (‘technical competency No 1’);

‘Risk and Return Profiling Expertise: Profound understanding of the drivers of risk and return profiles of investment strategies focused on [ confidential ]’ (‘technical competency No 2’);

‘[ Confidential ] Mastery: Deep knowledge of [the] EIF’s [ confidential ] (both sell-side and buy-side)’ (‘technical competency No 3’);

‘[ Confidential ] Strategy Proficiency: Broad experience of different [ confidential ] strategies ([ confidential ]) and how to structure transactions to achieve such strategies’ (‘technical competency No 4’);

‘[ Confidential ] Techniques: Comprehensive knowledge of different [ confidential ] techniques, and [ confidential ] best market practices, with regard to fund investments’ (‘technical competency No 6’);

‘Investment Planning: Ability to plan the [ confidential ] with realistic execution target’ (‘technical competency No 8’);

‘Transaction Origination Proficiency: Extensive transaction origination experience, in particular transactions designed to achieve public policy goals’ (‘technical competency No 11’);

‘Market Best Practices: Deep knowledge of best market practices with regard to the activities of the division’ (‘technical competency No 13’).

90 With regard to technical competency No 1, the applicant submits that the successful candidate lacks investment experience in equity fund investments at the EIF or the EIB, particularly in [ confidential ] and [ confidential ]. As a result, she would not be in a position to ensure adherence to common quality standards throughout the entire [ confidential ] fund investment process, encompassing both acquisition and divestiture phases.

91 However, it should be noted that the vacancy notice does not require experience in that field to have been acquired within the EIF or the EIB.

92 It is clear from the successful candidate’s CV that, prior to joining the EIB, she served as General Counsel at an investment firm from 2006 to 2016. More specifically, in that capacity, she handled legal transactions relating to venture capital, equity (direct and indirect) and debt investments.

93 In addition, as Senior Counsel in the EIF’s Equity Division from 2016 to 2020, the successful candidate acted as an internal lead counsel for different [ confidential ].

94 Lastly, within the EIB’s Risk Department from 2020 to the date of her application, the successful candidate oversaw the portfolio risk management of the EIB’s equity mandates delegated to EIF and the development of portfolio management tools.

95 The selection committee was therefore entitled to consider, without committing a manifest error of assessment, that the successful candidate satisfied the first part of technical competency No 1, namely ‘ensure adherence to common quality standards throughout the entire [ confidential ] fund investment process, encompassing both acquisition and divestiture phases’.

96 As regards the second part of technical competency No 1, namely the ability to ‘transfer knowledge to a diverse team of investment professionals’, it is apparent from her CV that she had the opportunity to provide training for and give presentations to the members of the legal team of the EIF’s Equity Division on the key terms and conditions [ confidential ] based on the past transactions and the market trends.

97 So far as concerns technical competency No 2, as the EIF points out, the applicant has not put forward any specific argument.

98 As regards technical competency No 3, the applicant submits that the job description requires extensive expertise in the field of [ confidential ], which the successful candidate does not have. In his view, providing legal advice on the content of legal contracts at the EIF and/or review of internal approval documents and/or review of compliance with the mandate at the EIB is not equivalent to possessing the requisite experience to lead and manage a team of highly technical and experienced investment professionals specialising in the field of [ confidential ]. It is impossible to possess such deep knowledge without having actively made investments as an investment professional.

99 In that regard, it should be noted that the vacancy notice requires a ‘deep knowledge of [ confidential ]’ and not, as the applicant claims, an ‘expertise’ in that field. As the EIF notes, it is reasonable to consider that the successful candidate acquired a thorough knowledge of those strategies, in particular in the role of Senior Counsel in the EIF’s Equity Division. Furthermore, in her application form, the successful candidate states that she has ‘direct work experience in structuring and negotiating … [ confidential ]’. It therefore appears that her experience was not limited, as the applicant claims, to ‘providing legal advice on the content of legal contracts’ at the EIF.

100 With regard to technical competency No 4, the applicant considers that the successful candidate, as a lawyer, does not have a broad experience of the various [ confidential ] strategies.

101 In that regard, it is apparent from the successful candidate’s CV that she managed various projects in that field within the EIF by acting as internal lead counsel for different [ confidential ]. She subsequently continued to work on matters relating to [ confidential ] at the EIB (development of portfolio management tools).

102 Moreover, as noted in paragraph 99 above, it is apparent from the successful candidate’s application form that she has ‘direct work experience in structuring and negotiating … [ confidential ]’.

103 As for the applicant’s argument that the successful candidate’s status as a ‘lawyer’ does not enable her to satisfy the requirements of technical competency No 4, it should be noted that the expression ‘broad experience’ is a generic formula which is sufficiently broad for the selection committee to be able to consider that lawyers with experience in [ confidential ] strategies, irrespective of their specific diplomas, could satisfy it.

104 In so far as concerns technical competency No 6, according to the applicant, the successful candidate does not have broad [ confidential ] knowledge, since she did not work in the units dealing with those matters within the EIF and/or the EIB.

105 However, the successful candidate’s application form refers in particular to knowledge of the International Private Equity and Venture Capital Valuation (IPEV) valuation guidelines, IFRS 9 and the [ confidential ] concerns relevant to the rules on risk management. As these are, as the EIF explains, without being challenged on this point by the applicant, the main [ confidential ] standards used in the industry and by the EIF, the selection committee was entitled to consider that the successful candidate could leverage that knowledge in order to perform the tasks to which that technical competency was linked.

106 Furthermore, even though the applicant claims that technical competency No 6 explicitly demands practical, hands-on expertise in [ confidential ] techniques which goes beyond mere theoretical familiarity or indirect exposure, it is nevertheless clear from the successful candidate’s application form that she is part of a team which has contributed to the annual update of best banking practices and to relevant assessments of their applicability.

107 As regards technical competency No 8, although the applicant claims to contest the successful candidate’s competency, it must be noted that that claim is not supported by any argument, with the result that it must be rejected.

108 With regard to technical competency No 11, the applicant considers that the successful candidate does not have the required experience in transaction origination, as such experience could only have been gained within the unit he manages.

109 However, the vacancy notice does not require that experience in transaction origination to have been acquired within the EIF. It is apparent from the successful candidate’s CV that, first, in her position within the EIF, she provided support as legal counsel and, second, in her role as General Counsel of an investment firm, she participated in investment committee meetings.

110 Lastly, as regards technical competency No 13, although the applicant claims to contest the successful candidate’s competency, it must be noted that, as with competency No 8, that claim is not supported by any argument, with the result that it must be rejected.

111 It follows from all of the foregoing that the selection committee did not commit a manifest error of assessment in considering that the successful candidate fulfilled the technical criteria set out in the vacancy notice.

– The selection committee’s note

112 The applicant disputes the selection committee’s comments as they appear in the extract from the selection note concerning his application for the position in question. He claims that the comments on his management style, which it says is at times ‘too rough’, and on the fact that ‘he still needs to improve his managerial skills’ are inconsistent with his performance appraisals over the last seven years, the assessment centre report, the inclusion of his name on the reserve list, the other comments made in the selection note and recent correspondence from the EIF’s Human Resources Department.

113 The EIF disputes the applicant’s arguments.

114 In that regard, the selection note states, among the negative points, that ‘[the applicant’s] management style is at times too rough[;] he still needs to improve his management skills[;] even though he is not selected for this position, he is retained on the [r]eserve list and will have other opportunities to apply to a [Head of Division] vacancy …’

115 It should be borne in mind that it is for the selection committee, which has broad discretion, to define the skills required for the posts to be filled (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2022, TM v ECB , T‑440/21, not published, EU:T:2022:800, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited).

116 In the present case, the fact that the comments set out in paragraph 114 above were not mentioned previously in the assessment centre report or in the applicant’s last seven yearly appraisals, the purposes and objectives of which differ from those used in the context of a recruitment procedure, does not mean that that committee could not make such comments when assessing the respective merits of the candidates in order to differentiate between them at the very final stage of the selection procedure.

117 In this regard, the applicant has not pointed to any assessments that were directly contradicted by the selection committee. Although the applicant submits, inter alia, that according to his assessment centre report he ‘came across as a very friendly and open-minded person[;] he convincingly used the richness of his experience which gives him a very solid basis for future career steps …’, such an assessment cannot counter the one in the selection note according to which there is still room for improvement in the area of management.

118 Therefore, it must be held that the applicant has not established that the selection committee made manifest errors of assessment in their comments as they appear in the extract from the selection note. He has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish that the selection committee, by means of those comments, committed a manifest error of assessment such as to justify the annulment of the contested decision, in accordance with the requirement laid down by the case-law referred to in paragraph 62 above.

– The decision rejecting the request for review and the RAG table

119 The decision rejecting the request for review states that the applicant was awarded an ‘amber’ rating in respect of ‘diversity of experience’ and ‘green’ ratings for all other RAG criteria.

120 The applicant contests the ‘amber’ rating awarded to him, since the criterion of ‘diversity of experience’ refers to the fact that the applicant ‘must demonstrate diversity of roles, job content, employers and/or countries’, and he worked for three different employers in three different countries before taking up his post at the EIF. In addition, not having recruited him to that position is manifestly detrimental to the interests of the service.

121 The EIF disputes the applicant’s arguments.

122 As stated in the decision rejecting the request for review, in accordance with the Guide, ‘at the operational selection stage, the [s]election [c]ommittee first carried out a careful and thorough examination of the short-listed candidates, using the pre-selection evaluation and the [a]ssessment [c]entre reports, to identify the candidates to be placed on the reserve list.’ It is also stated that ‘once the reserve list had been established, the [s]election [c]ommittee then carried out an objective and impartial assessment to identify the most suitable candidate for each vacant position.’

123 Thus, the RAG assessment, carried out in the first phase of the first stage (see paragraph 6 above), is primarily intended to identify candidates to be included on the reserve list as part of the second phase of the first stage (see paragraph 7 above).

124 As the EIF states, that assessment is only one of a number of factors which, ultimately, the selection committee takes into account. Indeed, the Guide states that ‘appointments will be made by matching the most suitable candidate for that role based upon the pre-screening criteria, the [a]ssessment [c]entre report and the outcomes of any additional [assessment] tools as required.’

125 It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the selection committee enjoys, in principle, broad discretion when assessing, as a condition of admission, the previous professional experience of candidates, both as regards the nature and duration of that experience and as regards its relevance to the requirements of the post to be filled (see judgment of 14 December 2022, TM v ECB , T‑440/21, not published, EU:T:2022:800, paragraph 129 and the case-law cited).

126 Therefore, as the EIF explains, the selection committee was able, in the context of that broad discretion, to award the applicant – whose experience abroad, prior to his entry into service at the EIF, dates back to almost 20 years ago – an ‘amber’ rating for the criterion ‘Diversity of experience’, without making a manifest error of assessment in that regard.

127 The applicant’s assertion that it cannot be considered that he could be awarded an ‘amber’ rating merely because he worked for three different employers in three different countries is therefore not sufficient to establish that the selection committee committed a manifest error of assessment such as to justify the annulment of the contested decision, in accordance with the requirement laid down by the case-law referred to in paragraph 62 above.

128 As for the applicant’s assertion that the decision not to recruit him was ‘detrimental to the interests of the service’, that assertion is based not on concrete evidence but on his personal conviction. Such a personal conviction cannot suffice to constitute irrefutable proof of a manifest error of assessment (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 January 2003, Angioli v Commission , T‑53/00, EU:T:2003:12, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited).

129 It follows from all of the foregoing that the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.

The third plea in law, alleging a breach of the procedure, of the principle of equal treatment and of the principle of legal certainty

130 The applicant states that, although Article 1d(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union provides that, with a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment is not to prevent the EU institutions from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers, the EIF rules do not contain any equivalent provision and the content of the Guide or vacancy notices cannot constitute such a measure. Moreover, the document on the ‘Diversity and Inclusion Policy at [the] EIF’ does not contain any clear, specific and binding provisions, but rather is an ‘aspirational document’ setting objectives. However, of the 19 Head of Division positions to be filled (see paragraph 3 above), less than 30% were filled by male colleagues.

131 The EIF disputes the applicant’s arguments.

132 First, as regards an alleged breach of procedure and of the principle of legal certainty, it follows from Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the General Court pursuant to Article 53 of that statute, and from Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, that an application initiating proceedings must state clearly and precisely the subject matter of the proceedings, as well as the form of order sought, and must contain a summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based.

133 In the present case, the applicant alleges a ‘breach of procedure’ without specifying which procedure was allegedly infringed. Assuming that he is referring to a breach of the Guide’s two-step process, the applicant does not explain how that process was allegedly infringed.

134 Similarly, the applicant provides no specific explanation in support of his allegation that the principle of legal certainty has been infringed, the information provided being particularly vague and imprecise.

135 As a result, those complaints are not sufficiently clear and precise to enable the Court to rule on their merits. They must therefore be rejected as inadmissible.

136 Second, as regards an alleged breach of the principle of equal treatment, it should be noted that the arguments put forward by the applicant relate, in reality, more specifically to discrimination based on gender.

137 However, it follows from the foregoing that the applicant has not demonstrated that he suffered discrimination based on gender, either at the first stage of the process (see paragraph 41 above), or in the context of the second (see paragraph 44 above).

138 As a result, the third plea must be rejected as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded and, accordingly, the claim for annulment must be rejected in its entirety.

The claim for damages

139 The applicant seeks compensation for the material damage he claims to have suffered as a result of the loss of the chance, of at least 50%, to be selected for the Head of Division position, at least from 30 January 2024 until the date of execution by the EIF of the annulment judgment. The effect of that loss of opportunity justifies the right to claim compensation for the damage he suffered because he was deprived of the opportunity to receive, in the longer term, a higher remuneration and a higher retirement pension.

140 The EIF disputes the applicant’s arguments.

141 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in the context of a claim for damages made by an official or other staff member, in order for the institution to incur liability for damages a series of three conditions must be met: the conduct of which the institution is accused must have been unlawful, the damage must be real and a causal connection must exist between that conduct and the damage in question. The three conditions giving rise to the institution’s liability are cumulative, which means that if one of them is not met, the institution does not incur liability (see judgment of 10 March 2021, AM v EIB , T‑134/19, EU:T:2021:119, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited).

142 According to settled case-law, a claim for compensation of material or non-material damage must be dismissed where it is closely related to a claim for annulment which has itself been rejected as inadmissible or as unfounded (see judgment of 16 July 2025, ET v EIB , T‑417/24, not published, EU:T:2025:728, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited).

143 In the present case, it is common ground between the parties that the claim for damages is closely linked to the claim for annulment. The material harm in respect of which the applicant seeks compensation stems from the unlawfulness which allegedly vitiates the contested decision.

144 Since the application for annulment of the contested decision must be dismissed, the claim for damages must also be dismissed.

145 As a result, in the light of all of the foregoing considerations, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

146 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party must be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

147 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the EIF.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders FT to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 October 2026.

* Language of the case: English.

1 Confidential information redacted.