Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) 9 September 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

9 September 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the EU figurative mark FISH REVOLUTION – Earlier EU trade mark CANNED TUNA REVOLUTION ! – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑642/24,

Eurest Colectividades, SL, established in Madrid (Spain), represented by J. Mora Cortés, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by D. Stoyanova-Valchanova and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

Fish Tales Holding BV, established in Amsterdam (Netherlands), represented by T. Berendsen, lawyer,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),

composed of E. Buttigieg, President, J. Schwarcz and E. Tichy-Fisslberger (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: G. Mitrev, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 14 April 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Eurest Colectividades, SL, seeks the annulment of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 25 September 2024 (Case R 259/2024-2) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 12 May 2022, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the following figurative sign:

3 The mark applied for covers goods in Class 29 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding to the following description: ‘Meat, fish, poultry and game; meat extracts; precooked food prepared from meat and pre-cooked fish; charcuterie; preserved, dried, cooked and frozen fruits and vegetables or prepared fruits and prepared vegetables; prepared or semi-prepared meals, soups, stuffings and mixes, based mainly on the aforesaid goods; packaged ready-to-eat mixed fruits and salads, fruit salads, vegetable salads, salads containing meat; jellies; jams, compotes; eggs, milk and milk products; edible oils and fats; desserts of yoghurt, quark and/or cream; snacks and snack food consisting primarily of the following goods: potatoes, meat, fish, poultry, not live, vegetables and cheese’.

4 On 15 September 2022, the intervener, Fish Tales Holding BV, filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5 The opposition was based on the earlier EU trade mark filed on 22 July 2021 and registered on 26 November 2021 under the number 18 519 638, reproduced below:

6 The earlier EU trade mark is registered for goods in Class 29 corresponding to the following description: ‘Fish, seafood and molluscs, not live; fish, seafood and molluscs spreads; processed, dried, cooked, frozen and canned fish, seafood and molluscs; tuna fish; tuna preserves; bottled fish; fish extracts; prepared meals and snacks of fish, seafood and molluscs; jellies for food; oils and fats for food’.

7 The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

8 By decision of 4 December 2023, the Opposition Division found that there was a likelihood of confusion in respect of some of the goods covered by the mark applied for and, therefore, partially upheld the opposition in respect of the following goods: ‘Meat, fish, poultry and game; meat extracts; precooked food prepared from meat and pre-cooked fish; charcuterie; preserved, dried, cooked and frozen fruits and vegetables or prepared fruits and prepared vegetables; prepared or semi-prepared meals, soups, and mixes, based mainly on the aforesaid goods; packaged ready-to-eat mixed fruits and salads, fruit salads, vegetable salads, salads containing meat; jellies; jams, compotes; milk products; edible oils and fats; snacks and snack food consisting primarily of the following goods: potatoes, meat, fish, poultry, not live, vegetables and cheese’ (‘the contested goods’).

9 The opposition was rejected with respect to the other goods referred to in paragraph 3 above, namely ‘eggs, milk; stuffings; desserts of yoghurt, quark and/or cream’.

10 On 31 January 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Opposition Division.

11 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the action and found that there was a likelihood of confusion at least on the part of the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public for all of the contested goods. In essence, it held that the level of attention of the relevant public was average; the contested goods were identical or similar, at least to a low degree, to the goods covered by the earlier mark; the verbal element common to the marks at issue ‘revolution’ was distinctive with respect to all of the goods covered by the marks at issue; the signs at issue had at least a weak degree of visual similarity, an average degree of phonetic similarity, a weak degree of conceptual similarity with respect to the goods covered by the marks at issue related to fish and a high degree of conceptual similarity with respect to the other goods; and the earlier mark had a normal distinctive character. It also stated, for the sake of completeness, that there would be no likelihood of confusion, except as regards ‘jams, compotes; milk products; jellies; edible oils and fats’, for the remaining part of the public capable of understanding the meaning of the expressions in the marks at issue.

Forms of order sought

12 The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision; and

– order EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs of the proceedings, including those relating to the proceedings before the General Court, before the Opposition Division and before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO.

13 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action in its entirety; and

– order the applicant to pay the costs incurred by EUIPO, in the event that an oral hearing is convened.

14 The intervener contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action; and

– order the applicant to pay the costs incurred by the intervener in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal and before the General Court.

Law

15 In support of its action, the applicant relies, in essence, on three pleas in law alleging, first, infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, second, breach of the principles of good administration and of equal treatment, and third, breach of its rights of defence.

The f irst plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8 (1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001

16 In support of its first plea, the applicant disputes, in essence, the Board of Appeal’s findings concerning, first, the distinctive character of the common element ‘revolution’, second, the similarity of the signs at issue, third, the distinctive character of the earlier mark and, fourth, the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion.

17 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.

18 According to settled case-law, the risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS) , T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).

19 Where the protection of the earlier trade mark extends to the entirety of the European Union, it is necessary to take into account the perception of the marks at issue by the consumer of the goods at issue in that territory. However, it must be borne in mind that, for an EU trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others) , T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).

The relevant public

20 In paragraphs 33 and 34 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the relevant territory was that of the European Union and that the contested goods were aimed at the general public with an average level of attention. There is no need to call into question those findings of the Board of Appeal, which, moreover, are not disputed by the applicant.

21 In addition, in paragraphs 39 and 48 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, contrary to the Opposition Division, that the likelihood of confusion should be assessed from the perspective of the non-English-speaking public, such as Greek- or Hungarian-speaking consumers, since, first, those consumers, who represented a non-negligible part of the relevant public, could not be expected to understand all the terms of the marks at issue and, second, those consumers were therefore more prone to a likelihood of confusion. There is no need to call into question those findings of the Board of Appeal, which, moreover, are not disputed by the applicant.

22 However, it should be noted that the Board of Appeal, in assessing the distinctive character of the elements making up the signs at issue, also referred to consumers capable of understanding the terms of those signs, including, inter alia, English-speaking consumers (paragraphs 49, 51, 52, 55, 56, 60 and 62 of the contested decision). Similarly, in its global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the Board of Appeal found, ‘for the sake of completeness’, that there was no likelihood of confusion for those consumers, except as regards the contested goods ‘jams, compotes; milk products; jellies; edible oils and fats’ (paragraph 77 of the contested decision).

23 Since the operative part of the contested decision is based on the existence of a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public, and since that conclusion is sufficient to justify the refusal to register the mark applied for, according to the case-law referred to in paragraph 19 above, the Court will examine whether the Board of Appeal was correct to find that there was such a likelihood with regard to that part of the relevant public.

The comparison of the goods

24 According to the case-law, in assessing the similarity of goods or services, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account, including, in particular, their nature, their intended purpose and their method of use, and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account such as the distribution channels of the goods and services concerned (see judgment of 11 July 2007, El Corte Inglés v OHIM – Bolaños Sabri (PiraÑAM diseño original Juan Bolaños) , T‑443/05, EU:T:2007:219, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

25 In the present case, first, in paragraphs 27 and 28 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the contested goods which were or could contain fish, such as ‘fish’, ‘pre-cooked fish’ or ‘snacks and snack food consisting primarily of fish’ (‘the contested goods related to fish’), were identical to ‘fish’ or ‘prepared meals and snacks of fish, seafood, and molluscs’ covered by the earlier mark.

26 Second, the Board of Appeal found that the contested goods which did not contain fish were identical or similar, at least to a low degree, to the goods covered by the earlier mark (‘the contested goods not related to fish’).

27 More specifically, among those goods, the Board of Appeal found, first of all, in paragraphs 27 and 32 of the contested decision, that goods such as ‘jellies’, ‘jam’ or ‘milk products’ were, respectively, identical, ‘at least similar’ or similar to the ‘jellies for food’ and the ‘oils and fats for food’ covered by the earlier mark.

28 The Board of Appeal also found, in paragraphs 30 and 31 of the contested decision, that the remainder of the contested goods not related to fish such as ‘meat’, ‘charcuterie’ or ‘preserved, dried, cooked and frozen fruits and vegetables or prepared fruits and prepared vegetables’ were similar to a low degree to the ‘fish’ covered by the earlier mark.

29 There is no need to call into question those findings of the Board of Appeal, which, moreover, are not disputed by the applicant.

The comparison of the signs

30 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

31 In addition, assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 42). That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that all the other components of the mark are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (judgment of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM , C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43).

32 Before assessing the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, the Board of Appeal first of all examined their distinctive and dominant elements.

– The distinctive and dominant elements of the signs at issue

33 First, as regards the word element ‘revolution’ common to the marks at issue, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 48 and 60 of the contested decision, that that term was not understood by the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public and that, consequently, that word was distinctive.

34 Second, as regards the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal stated in paragraphs 45 and 46 of the contested decision that the word element ‘fish’, as part of basic English vocabulary, would be understood by all consumers in the European Union and would therefore be, on the one hand, devoid of distinctive character in respect of the contested goods related to fish, since it was directly descriptive of those goods, and, on the other hand, distinctive in respect of the contested goods not related to fish. The Board of Appeal found that the graphic elements of the sign were merely decorative elements highlighting the word elements (paragraph 53 of the contested decision). It stated, in paragraph 54 of the contested decision, that the term ‘revolution’ was the most distinctive element of the mark applied for.

35 Third, as regards the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal recognised, in paragraph 61 of the contested decision, that the word element ‘tuna’ would be understood by at least a non-negligible part of the relevant Greek-speaking public and a non-negligible part of the relevant Hungarian-speaking public due to the similarity of the equivalent words in those languages. It is apparent from a combined reading of paragraphs 61 and 70 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal found that the term ‘tuna’ has a weak distinctive character in respect of the goods covered by the earlier mark related to fish, since it was descriptive of those goods, but that it was distinctive in respect of the goods covered by the earlier mark not related to fish. As regards the term ‘canned’, the Board of Appeal stated that, although it has no meaning for the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public, it would have less importance in the overall impression given by the earlier mark due to its smaller size (paragraph 62 of the contested decision). Furthermore, the Board of Appeal found that the word elements were more distinctive than the figurative elements, in particular because of their central location in the sign (paragraph 59 of the contested decision). It stated, in that regard, that the colours of the earlier mark, in so far as they were likely to symbolise the aquatic theme, and the representations of fish, were rather non-distinctive (paragraph 63 of the contested decision).

36 Fourth, in paragraphs 57 and 64 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that no element of the marks at issue could be regarded as dominant.

37 In essence, the applicant does not dispute those assessments made by the Board of Appeal. The only arguments which it puts forward in relation to those assessments concern the word element ‘revolution’ which, in its view, is devoid of distinctive character or has, at most, a weak distinctive character. In that respect, the applicant submits that that term is descriptive and laudatory, on account of its frequent usage on the food market to describe innovations, improvements or significant changes, emphasising the quality of a product rather than a commercial origin. It also claims that the Board of Appeal itself, in the contested decision, acknowledged that the weak distinctive character of that term has been recognised with respect to various kinds of goods and services by numerous previous decisions of EUIPO and by the case-law of the EU judicature.

38 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes the applicant’s arguments.

39 First, it must be observed that the applicant has not produced any evidence capable of demonstrating that the term ‘revolution’ is commonly used on the market for foodstuffs, with the result that that argument must be rejected as unfounded.

40 Second, in so far as the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal itself acknowledged that the weak distinctive character of the term ‘revolution’ had been recognised both in the case-law of the EU judicature, in particular in the judgment of 2 June 2016, Revolution v EUIPO (REVOLUTION) (T‑654/14, not published, EU:T:2016:334), and in previous decisions of the Boards of Appeal of EUIPO, in particular those of 18 July 2013 (R 1373/2012-2) and 5 September 2013 (R 1016/2012-1) and that, consequently, it must also be concluded in the present case that that term has a weak distinctive character, it must be held that such an argument is based on a misreading of the contested decision.

41 As EUIPO correctly points out and as is apparent from the first sentence of paragraph 49 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal relied on those cases solely in order to establish that the word element ‘revolution’ could be laudatory and, therefore, had a weak distinctive character for the part of the relevant public capable of understanding that word. As regards the judgment of 2 June 2016, REVOLUTION (T‑654/14, not published, EU:T:2016:334), the relevant public consisted of English-, French- and Slovenian-speaking persons, for whom it had been established that that word was understood. As regards the two decisions of the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, the relevant public consisted, on the one hand, of Ireland, Malta and the United Kingdom (R 1373/2012-2) and, on the other hand, of the United Kingdom (R 1016/2012-1), where English is an official language.

42 In addition, as noted in paragraph 23 above, the operative part of the contested decision is based on the finding that there is a likelihood of confusion from the perspective of the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public.

43 Furthermore, at the hearing, the applicant claimed that the Board of Appeal had not sufficiently proved that the term ‘revolution’ would not be understood by the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public.

44 It should be noted that, during the written part of the procedure, the applicant did not provide any argument or evidence capable of demonstrating that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment as regards the understanding of the term ‘revolution’ by that relevant public.

45 When questioned to that effect by the Court at the hearing, the applicant accepted that that argument did not in fact appear in its application initiating proceedings.

46 Even if it were not a new argument which is inadmissible under Article 84(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, that argument must be rejected, since the reasoning of the Board of Appeal in the contested decision is sufficiently substantiated and well founded. In its reasoning, the Board of Appeal established, first, that knowledge of a foreign language cannot be assumed (paragraph 42 of the contested decision), second, that the word ‘revolution’, falling under level B2 of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages, was not part of basic English vocabulary (paragraphs 43 and 47 of the contested decision) and, third, that its translation in Greek and Hungarian, namely ‘ επανάσταση ’, pronounced ‘epanastasi’, and ‘ forradom ’ or ‘ szabadságharc ’ respectively, was completely different from that term (paragraph 48 of the contested decision), with the result that it could not be claimed that that public would connect that term to its translation in those languages (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 September 2024, Fidia farmaceutici v EUIPO – Vorwarts Pharma (HYALERA) , T‑497/23, not published, EU:T:2024:627, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

47 Thus, since the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public, which constitutes a non-negligible part of the relevant public, does not know the meaning of the term ‘revolution’ in the marks at issue, it will not make a link between that term and the goods covered by those marks, with the result that the Board of Appeal was correct to conclude that that term was, both for the earlier mark and for the mark applied for, distinctive for that part of the relevant public.

48 Third, as regards the applicant’s argument that the term ‘revolution’ only highlights the quality of a product and does not in any way indicate a specific commercial origin, as has just been found, that term will be devoid of meaning for the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public, with the result that it cannot be maintained that it could be understood by that public as emphasising the quality of a product.

49 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the Board of Appeal’s findings on the distinctive and dominant elements of the two signs at issue contain no error of assessment.

– Visual and phonetic similarity

50 In paragraph 65 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the marks at issue were visually ‘similar to an at least low degree’. It noted that they coincided in the distinctive element ‘revolution’, but that they differed both in their other word elements and in their respective figurative elements and aspects. In paragraphs 66 and 67 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that, phonetically, the marks at issue were similar to an average degree. The marks at issue coincided in the pronunciation of the term ‘revolution’ and differed in the pronunciation of the other word elements, namely ‘fish’ and ‘canned tuna’, which was not, however, capable of significantly affecting the phonetic similarity of those signs, since those other word elements were either descriptive or of secondary importance.

51 The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal overestimated the similarity between the signs at issue by failing to take sufficient account of both the weak distinctive character of the common element ‘revolution’ and the significant differences between their other verbal and figurative elements. To that effect, the applicant claims that the expression ‘canned tuna’ in the earlier mark, reinforced by the image representing a fish surrounded by a can tab, limits the scope of that mark to canned tuna, which is not the case with the mark applied for, which includes the word ‘fish’. That difference is crucial for the consumer to be able to identify the commercial origin of the goods covered by the marks at issue.

52 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes those arguments.

53 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, following a question put by the Court at the hearing, the applicant clarified that the arguments set out in paragraph 51 above are intended to challenge the Board of Appeal’s assessments concerning the visual and phonetic similarity of the signs at issue.

54 It should be borne in mind that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the signs at issue coincide both visually and phonetically in the word element ‘revolution’, which, from the point of view of the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public, is the only element which has distinctive character in respect of all the goods covered by the marks at issue.

55 In the first place, as to the visual comparison, having regard, first, to the additional word elements of the marks at issue, although the words ‘fish’ in the mark applied for and ‘tuna’ in the earlier mark are not negligible in the light of their position in the signs at issue, it must, however, be noted that the common element ‘revolution’ is substantially longer than those terms. In addition, that element occupies the same (final) position in the signs at issue, which also contributes to their visual similarity. As regards the term ‘canned’ in the earlier mark, as the Board of Appeal correctly pointed out in paragraph 62 of the contested decision, it is of only secondary importance in the overall visual impression produced by that mark, on account of its smaller size.

56 Second, as regards the figurative elements of the signs at issue, as the Board of Appeal correctly noted, where a sign is composed of word elements and figurative elements, the word element of that sign is, in principle, more distinctive than the figurative element, because the average consumer will more readily refer to the good in question by quoting its name than by describing its figurative element (see judgment of 9 September 2008, Honda Motor Europe v OHIM – Seat (MAGIC SEAT) , T‑363/06, EU:T:2008:319, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

57 In the present case, it cannot be denied that the figurative elements of the signs at issue, resulting both from their different stylisation arising from the font, the colours used and the arrangement of the word elements, and from the presence of additional figurative elements in the earlier mark, namely the stylised representations of fish and the can tab, contribute, to a certain extent, to distinguishing the signs at issue visually. Nevertheless, those figurative elements cannot be sufficient to offset entirely a certain visual similarity created by the coincidence of a significant part of the marks at issue, namely the distinctive word element ‘revolution’.

58 In the second place, as regards the phonetic comparison, as noted in paragraph 54 above, the signs coincide in the pronunciation of the term ‘revolution’ and differ in the pronunciation of the terms ‘fish’, ‘canned’ and ‘tuna’. First, despite their position in the signs at issue, those differentiating elements cannot completely reduce the phonetic similarity resulting from the pronunciation of the term ‘revolution’, which is composed of four syllables and which is the longest term of the signs at issue. Second, in so far as the figurative elements will not be pronounced by the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public, the phonetic similarity between the signs at issue stands out more than in the visual comparison (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 October 2021, Yadex International v EUIPO – Sütas Süt Ürünleri (PINAR Tam kivaminda Süzme Peynir Yumusacik ve Leziz) , T‑560/20, not published, EU:T:2021:714, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).

59 In the third place, as regards the possibility, referred to by the applicant, that the scope of the earlier mark may be perceived as limited to canned tuna, unlike the mark applied for, it is sufficient to note that if the relevant public is not likely to understand the term ‘canned’, it will not be able to understand the expression ‘canned tuna’ either (see paragraph 35 above). As regards the figurative elements of the earlier mark, although the images of fish may indeed be perceived as reinforcing the term ‘tuna’, which is of particular importance in the conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, as set out in paragraph 62 below, it cannot be accepted that the can tab reinforces the meaning of a term which does not have a meaning for the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 June 2022, Jose A. Alfonso Arpon v EUIPO – Puma (PLUMAflex by Roal) , T‑357/21, not published, EU:T:2022:405, paragraph 63).

60 Thus, it is unlikely that that relevant public, displaying an average level of attention, will perceive the earlier mark as having a scope limited to canned tuna and would, therefore, be able to distinguish it from the mark applied for.

61 It follows from the foregoing that the Board of Appeal correctly took into account all the elements making up the signs at issue, without overestimating their similarity, in concluding that they were visually similar, at least to a low degree, and phonetically similar to an average degree.

– The conceptual similarity

62 It is apparent from a combined reading of paragraphs 68, 74 and 75 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue, having regard to their word elements ‘fish’ and ‘tuna’, conveyed the idea of fish. It is also apparent from reading those same paragraphs that the Board of Appeal concluded that the conceptual similarity was low with respect to the goods covered by the marks at issue related to fish, since that concept stemmed from distinctive elements which were themselves weak, and that it was high with respect to the goods covered by the marks at issue not related to fish.

63 There is no need to call into question those assessments, which, moreover, are not disputed by the parties.

The distinctive character of the earlier mark

64 The Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 70 of the contested decision, that, despite the word element ‘tuna’ and the figurative elements representing fish, the earlier mark was, as a whole, distinctive for the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public.

65 The applicant disputes that assessment and submits that the earlier mark has only a very limited distinctiveness which stems, in any event, from its graphic elements and cannot, therefore, be opposed, at the very least, to the mark applied for.

66 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

67 In that regard, since the intervener has not claimed that its mark had an enhanced distinctive character, it must be noted, as the Board of Appeal did in paragraph 69 of the contested decision, first, that the assessment of the distinctive character of the earlier mark is based on its inherent distinctive character.

68 Second, since the earlier mark does not consist exclusively of elements with a weak distinctive character with respect to the goods which it covers, its distinctive character, considered as a whole, must be classified as average, as the Board of Appeal considered, implicitly but necessarily, in finding, in paragraph 70 of the contested decision, that that mark is distinctive as a whole for the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public.

The likelihood of confusion

69 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon , C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, VENADO with frame and others , T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

70 It should also be borne in mind that the consumer only rarely has the chance to make a direct comparison between the different marks but must place his or her trust in the imperfect picture of them that he or she has kept in his or her mind (judgment of 22 June 1999, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer , C‑342/97, EU:C:1999:323, paragraph 26).

71 Furthermore, according to the case-law, as regards foodstuffs in Class 29, those goods are normally purchased in supermarkets or similar establishments and are chosen directly by the consumer from a shelf, with the result that it is likely that visual contact with the marks predominates in respect of everyday consumer goods (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 April 2010, Cabel Hall Citrus v OHIM – Casur (EGLÉFRUIT) , T‑488/07, not published, EU:T:2010:145, paragraph 54).

72 The Board of Appeal found, first of all, that, in respect of the contested goods related to fish referred to in paragraph 25 above, even though the conceptual similarity could not affect the perception of the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public, given that it derives from weak distinctive elements, a likelihood of confusion could not be ruled out, since those goods were identical to those covered by the earlier mark, and the term ‘revolution’ common to the marks at issue was distinctive (paragraph 74 of the contested decision).

73 Next, in respect of the contested goods not related to fish referred to in paragraph 27 above which were found to be identical or similar to the goods not related to fish covered by the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal found that the degree of conceptual similarity was average, given that the concept of fish was not weakly distinctive in relation to those goods and that, consequently, there was a likelihood of confusion (paragraph 75 of the contested decision).

74 Lastly, the Board of Appeal found that, in respect of the contested goods not related to fish referred to in paragraph 28 above, in view of the average and not enhanced level of attention of the relevant public, a likelihood of confusion could not be ruled out between the signs at issue, which were characterised by the identical and distinctive word ‘revolution’, even if the contested goods were similar only to a low degree to the ‘fish’ covered by the earlier mark (paragraph 76 of the contested decision). Consequently, the Board of Appeal concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue with respect to all the contested goods at least for the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public (paragraph 80 of the contested decision).

75 The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion. According to the applicant, the differences between the signs at issue, coupled with the weak distinctive character of the term ‘revolution’, are sufficient for the consumer not to confuse the two marks. Furthermore, it argues that the refusal to register the mark applied for limits the positive impact of the ‘fish revolution’ educational project on society. It also claims that the contested decision could disincentivise the use of the word ‘revolution’, which could have a negative impact on creativity and the differentiation of trade marks. Finally, it states, in essence, that the contested decision limits the usage of common terms such as ‘revolution’, which has negative implications for the public interest and, moreover, excessively restricts free competition.

76 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes those arguments.

77 In the present case, the applicant reiterates its arguments based on the weak distinctive character of the common element ‘revolution’ and on the differences between the word and figurative elements of the marks at issue. Since those arguments have already been rejected in paragraphs 39 to 49 and 54 to 61 of the present judgment, they cannot, in themselves, call into question the Board of Appeal’s global assessment of the existence of a likelihood of confusion.

78 It is true that the contested decision contains an inconsistency, which, moreover, is not disputed by the applicant. The Board of Appeal found, when comparing the signs at issue, that there was a ‘high’ degree of conceptual similarity in respect of the goods covered by the marks at issue not related to fish (paragraph 68 of the contested decision). By contrast, in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, it found that those signs were conceptually similar to an average degree in respect of the goods covered by the marks at issue not related to fish referred to in paragraph 27 above (paragraph 75 of the contested decision).

79 However, it must be stated that that inconsistency has no bearing on the legality of the contested decision, since the Board of Appeal was correct to find that there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public in respect of all of the contested goods (see, by analogy, judgment of 9 September 2020, Gothe and Kunz v EUIPO – Aldi Einkauf (FAIR ZONE) , T‑589/19, not published, EU:T:2020:397, paragraphs 75 to 78), even taking into account an average – and not high – degree of conceptual similarity in respect of the goods covered by the marks at issue not related to fish referred to in paragraph 27 above, which is the situation most favourable to the applicant.

80 In the present case, the likelihood of confusion must be assessed taking into account the fact that, first, the level of attention of the relevant public is average (paragraph 20 above), second, the contested goods are identical or similar, at least to a low degree, to the goods covered by the earlier mark (paragraphs 25 to 28 above) third, the signs at issue have at least a low degree of visual similarity, an average degree of phonetic similarity and a low degree of conceptual similarity in respect of the goods covered by the marks at issue related to fish and a high degree of conceptual similarity in respect of the goods covered by the marks at issue not related to fish (paragraphs 61 and 62 above), and, fourth, the distinctive character of the earlier mark as a whole is average (paragraph 68 above).

81 In the first place, as regards the contested goods related to fish referred to in paragraph 25 above, it was in accordance with the principle of interdependence between the factors of a likelihood of confusion that the Board of Appeal found that there was such a likelihood of confusion in respect of those contested goods, in so far as they are identical to the goods covered by the earlier mark and the signs at issue are visually similar at least to a low degree and phonetically similar to an average degree on account of their distinctive and common word element ‘revolution’, despite the fact that the conceptual similarity of the signs at issue cannot affect the perception of the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public, since the common concept of fish is descriptive of the goods covered by the marks at issue.

82 In the second place, as regards the contested goods not related to fish referred to in paragraph 27 above, the Board of Appeal was also correct to find that there was a likelihood of confusion in respect of those contested goods since they were found to be identical, ‘at least similar’ or similar to the goods covered by the earlier mark, the signs at issue are visually similar at least to a low degree and phonetically similar to an average degree, even taking into account an average and not high degree of conceptual similarity, as stated in paragraph 79 above.

83 In the third place, as regards the contested goods not related to fish referred to in paragraph 28 above, it cannot be ruled out that the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public, when confronted with the mark applied for, could make a link between that mark and the earlier mark, despite the low degree of similarity between those contested goods and the ‘fish’ covered by the earlier mark. That link results, first, from a certain visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity between the signs at issue, second, from the common distinctive word element ‘revolution’ which the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public will be likely to identify as indicating the commercial origin of those goods and, third, from the average distinctive character of the earlier mark. Consequently, the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public, which will have to trust its imperfect recollection, may reasonably believe that those contested goods and the ‘fish’ covered by the earlier mark come, if not from the same undertaking, from economically linked undertakings, with the result that the Board of Appeal was correct to find that there is a likelihood of confusion with regard to those contested goods.

84 The Board of Appeal’s finding that there is a likelihood of confusion in respect of all the contested goods cannot be called into question by the applicant’s arguments that, first, the contested decision excessively restricts the freedom of competition, in that it prevents the use of common terms such as ‘revolution’ and, second, it has an impact on the public interest in that it limits the ability of innovative undertakings in the food sector to use such common terms. As has been noted in paragraph 39 above and as EUIPO correctly submits, those claims are based on the unfounded premiss that the term ‘revolution’ is a common term on the market for foodstuffs, with the result that those claims must be rejected.

85 Nor can the applicant succeed with the argument that the refusal to register that mark complicates the promotion of the ‘fish revolution’ educational project, which is intended to promote the consumption of fish among children, and thus limits its positive impact on society, since, as EUIPO correctly points out, given that the particular marketing strategies for goods covered by marks can vary over time and depend on the wishes of the proprietors of those marks, the prospective assessment of the likelihood of confusion between two marks cannot be dependent on the marketing intentions of the proprietors of the marks, whether implemented or not, which are by their very nature subjective (see judgment of 9 September 2008, MAGIC SEAT , T‑363/06, EU:T:2008:319, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

86 It is also necessary to reject the applicant’s argument that the contested decision discourages undertakings from using the term ‘revolution’, and thus has a negative impact on the creativity and differentiation of the marks, since the EU trade marks cited by the applicant and set out in paragraph 96 below show that EU law does not prevent the registration of marks containing the term ‘revolution’ as EU trade marks (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 April 2016, Franmax v EUIPO – Ehrmann (Dino) , T‑21/15, not published, EU:T:2016:241, paragraph 88).

87 In the fourth place, at the hearing, the applicant relied on the judgments of 23 July 2025, Impossible Foods v EUIPO – Impossible Foods (IMPOSSIBLE BAKERS) (T‑67/24, not published, EU:T:2025:755), and of 10 September 2025, Ffauf Italia v EUIPO – Industria de Diseño Textil (pastaZARA Sublime) (T‑425/24, EU:T:2025:849), to support its view that a likelihood of confusion must be ruled out in the present case. It claimed that, as the General Court found in those judgments, the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public would not confuse the marks at issue because of their marked differences resulting from the additional figurative elements of the earlier mark.

88 However, the reasoning developed in the two judgments cited in paragraph 87 above cannot be applied to the present case. The judgment of 23 July 2025, IMPOSSIBLE BAKERS (T‑67/24, not published, EU:T:2025:755), concerned a word mark and a figurative mark composed of a figurative element whose position in the sign and size were very different from those of the figurative elements examined in the present case. Furthermore, the other components of the marks at issue in that judgment, as well as their weight in the overall impression produced by those marks, were also different from the present case. In the case which gave rise to the judgment of 10 September 2025, pastaZARA Sublime (T‑425/24, EU:T:2025:849), the stylisation of the mark applied for, as well as the additional figurative element, its size and its position in that mark, were also different from the present case. As the General Court found in paragraph 56 of that judgment, the additional figurative element was of a considerable size and was placed in the centre of the upper part of the sign applied for, whereas, in the present case, it is the word elements which are placed in the centre of the earlier mark and the figurative elements representing fish, of a size relatively similar to those word elements, are positioned all around those word elements, which further highlight those word elements.

89 It follows from the foregoing that no conclusions can be drawn from those judgments as to the existence of a likelihood of confusion in the present case.

90 Lastly, in so far as the applicant submitted for the first time, at the hearing, first, that the term ‘tuna’ would not be understood by the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public and, second, that in the earlier mark the term ‘revolution’ would be understood by that public as two separate words, namely ‘revo’ and ‘lution’, on account of the stylisation of that mark, it must be held that those arguments are neither based on matters of law or of fact which came to light in the course of the proceedings, nor an amplification of arguments put forward previously, directly or implicitly, in the application initiating proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 May 2021, Alba Aguilera and Others v EEAS , T‑119/17 RENV, EU:T:2021:254, paragraphs 121 and 122 and the case-law cited). They therefore constitute new arguments which are inadmissible for the purposes of Article 84(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

91 In the light of the foregoing and given that a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public is sufficient to uphold the opposition, the applicant’s first plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.

The second plea in law, alleging breach of the principles of equal treatment and of good administration

92 In support of its second plea, alleging breach of the principles of equal treatment and good administration, the applicant submits that EUIPO’s decision-making practice is not consistent. The applicant submits that, for certain EU trade marks, the term ‘revolution’ has been considered to have a descriptive and laudatory character, whereas other similar EU trade marks containing that term were registered without objection.

93 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes those arguments.

94 In that regard, it should be noted that the legality of the decisions of the Board of Appeal, which are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers and are not a matter of discretion, must be assessed solely on the basis of Regulation 2017/1001, as interpreted by the EU judicature, and not on the basis of a previous decision-making practice of EUIPO which cannot, in any event, bind the EU judicature (see judgment of 30 April 2013, Boehringer Ingelheim International v OHIM (RELY-ABLE) , T‑640/11, not published, EU:T:2013:225, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

95 Although, in the light of the principles of equal treatment and good administration, EUIPO must, when examining an application for registration of an EU trade mark, take into account the decisions already taken in respect of similar applications and consider with especial care whether it should decide in the same way or not, the way in which those principles are applied must be consistent with respect for the principle of legality. Consequently, a person who files an application for registration of a sign as a trade mark cannot rely, to his or her advantage and in order to secure an identical decision, on a possibly unlawful act committed for the benefit of someone else. Moreover, for reasons of legal certainty and, indeed, of good administration, the examination of any trade mark application must be stringent and full, in order to prevent trade marks from being improperly registered. That examination must thus be undertaken in each individual case, for registration of a sign as a mark depends on specific criteria, which are applicable in the factual circumstances of the particular case and the purpose of which is to ascertain whether the sign at issue is caught by a ground for refusal (judgment of 10 March 2011 in Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM , C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraphs 74 to 77).

96 In the present case, in support of its claim that the contested decision is not consistent with EUIPO’s previous practice, the applicant refers, in paragraph 67 of the application, to several trade mark registrations containing the term ‘revolution’, namely the international registration SWEET REVOLUTION (No 1454465) and the EU trade marks FOOD REVOLUTION (No 11745346), R&D FOOD REVOLUTION (No 12228573), FOOD REVOLUTION (No 17660606), Meal Revolution (No 17900013) and N’ice Roll food revolution (No 17904141).

97 It must be held, first, as observed by EUIPO and the intervener, that those marks were not the subject of opposition proceedings on the basis of the earlier mark, which means, consequently and at most, that they were considered, as a whole, not to be devoid of any distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 January 2022, Diego v EUIPO – Forbo Financial Services (WOOD STEP LAMINATE FLOORING) , T‑498/20, not published, EU:T:2022:26, paragraph 101). Thus, no conclusion can be drawn from the registration of those marks as regards either the distinctive character of the term ‘revolution’ or, a fortiori, the lawfulness of the refusal to register the mark applied for in the light of the relative ground for refusal based on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

98 In those circumstances, the applicant’s argument is unfounded in so far as it alleges breach of the principle of equal treatment.

99 Second, as is apparent from the analysis of the first plea in law, and irrespective of what may have been the case for certain earlier trade mark applications and the findings made by EUIPO in the context of those applications, the Board of Appeal carried out a full and specific examination of the application for registration of the mark applied for within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 95 above and correctly found that that application was caught by the ground for refusal laid down in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. Accordingly, the applicant also cannot argue that the principle of good administration has been infringed.

100 It follows that the second plea in law must also be rejected as unfounded.

The third plea in law, alleging breach of the applicant’s rights of defence

101 In support of its third plea, alleging breach of its rights of defence, the applicant submits that, by finding that there is a likelihood of confusion ‘at least’ for the relevant Greek- or Hungarian-speaking public, the Board of Appeal suggests that such a likelihood exists in countries other than Greece and Hungary without identifying them specifically, depriving the applicant of the possibility of converting its EU trade mark application into an application for a national trade mark.

102 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes that line of argument. According to settled case-law, the general principle of protection of the right to defend oneself is enshrined in the law of EU trade marks by Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001, and provides that decisions of EUIPO are to be based only on reasons or evidence on which the parties concerned have had an opportunity to present their comments (see judgments of 6 September 2012, Storck v OHIM , C‑96/11 P, not published, EU:C:2012:537, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited, and of judgment of 7 February 2007, Kustom Musical Amplification v OHIM (Shape of a guitar) , T‑317/05, EU:T:2007:39, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). Under that principle, any person adversely affected by a decision of a public authority must have been afforded the opportunity effectively to make known his or her views before the adoption of that decision. Furthermore, a breach of the rights of defence entails the annulment of the decision taken at the end of the administrative procedure in question only if, had it not been for such an irregularity, the procedure might have had a different outcome (see judgment of 6 April 2022, Biogena v EUIPO – Alter Farmacia (NUTRIFEM AGNUBALANCE) , T‑370/21, not published, EU:T:2022:215, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

103 In the present case, the use of the expression ‘at least’, allegedly preventing the applicant from converting its EU trade mark application into a national trade mark application, cannot be regarded as a breach of its rights of defence, since compliance with that principle is assessed at the stage of the proceedings before EUIPO and not in the light of hypothetical procedural effects subsequent and external to those proceedings, with the result that that argument must be regarded as ineffective.

104 It follows from the foregoing that the arguments put forward by the applicant concerning the breach of its rights of defence must be rejected.

105 Accordingly, the third plea in law must be rejected, as must the action in its entirety.

Costs

106 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

107 Since a hearing has taken place and the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the forms of order sought by EUIPO and the intervener.

108 Finally, as regards the intervener’s request that the applicant be ordered to pay the costs relating to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, it is sufficient to note that the present judgment dismisses the action brought against the contested decision and that, therefore, it is the operative part of that decision which continues to determine the costs at issue (judgment of 26 March 2025, Hamster Polska v EUIPO – Budotechnika (Public toilets) , T‑610/23, not published, EU:T:2025:334, paragraph 89).

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Eurest Colectividades, SL to pay, in addition to its own costs, those incurred by Fish Tales Holding BV and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 9 September 2026.

* Language of the case: English.