Opinion of Advocate General Ćapeta delivered on 3 September 2026

Provisional text

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

ĆAPETA

delivered on 3 September 2026 ( 1 )

Case C ‑ 320/25 [Lertimene] ( i )

HG

v

Ministero dell’Interno – Dipartimento della pubblica sicurezza

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio, Italy))

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Social policy – Directive 2006/54/EC – Equal treatment for men and women in matters of employment and occupation – Selection procedure for national police force – Entry requirements – Exclusion of a female candidate from the selection procedure on the ground of a visible tattoo when wearing the dress uniform required for women )

I. Introduction

1. Can a tattoo harm your employment prospects?

2. It did for Ms HG, who applied to take part in a public selection procedure for the police force in Italy.

3. After successfully passing the written test, she was excluded from the selection procedure on the ground that she had a small flower tattoo on her left calf.

4. In Italy, it is generally prohibited for police officers to have visible tattoos. The present case does not challenge that rule. However, Ms HG’s tattoo is only visible when wearing a skirt, which is, together with court shoes, the required uniform for female police officers on certain ceremonial occasions. Male police officers are required to wear trousers on such occasions, and would therefore not be denied the opportunity to enter the police force simply because they have a tattoo on their calf. This case, therefore, raises the question of possible discrimination on grounds of sex.

5. In those circumstances, the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio, Italy), before which Ms HG brought an action, asks for the assistance of the Court of Justice in deciding whether her exclusion from the selection procedure represents discrimination on grounds of sex, which is prohibited by EU law, and in particular by Directive 2006/54/EC. ( 2 )

II. Facts in the main proceedings, the question referred for a preliminary ruling and the procedure before the Court

6. By Decreto del Capo della Polizia del 7 luglio 2023 (Decree of the Chief of Police of 7 July 2023), a public selection procedure was announced for the recruitment of 1 650 trainee State Police officers. ( 3 )

7. After successfully passing the written test and being requested to undergo an assessment of her psychological and physical aptitude, Ms HG was excluded from the selection procedure on 1 March 2024 by the medical committee on the ground that she had a ‘tattoo in an area not covered by a uniform (left leg)’ contrary to the applicable national legislation. ( 4 ) Indeed, that tattoo would have been visible when wearing the ‘dress uniform’, worn only on ceremonial occasions, which, for women, includes a skirt and court shoes. ( 5 )

8. Ms HG brought an action before the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio) seeking annulment of the exclusion decision and the adoption of the necessary interim measures to enable her to continue with the selection procedure.

9. In support of her action, Ms HG challenges the fact that she was automatically excluded from the selection procedure based solely on the presence of a tattoo which is visible only when wearing a ‘dress uniform’. She alleges that this constitutes discrimination resulting from the differentiated application of the rules in question based on sex and challenges the failure on the part of the administration to provide justificatory reasons for such treatment.

10. By Order No 2376 of 6 June 2024, the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio), granted interim relief, ordering Ms HG’s admission to the subsequent stages of the selection procedure. As explained in the order for reference, the reason for the granting of this interim relief was, among other things, the referring court’s assessment that the exclusion of Ms HG from the selection procedure constituted discrimination. Indeed, in comparable situations (the presence of a tattoo on the calf), different conclusions have been reached depending on whether the candidate is male or female. The referring court considered this discrimination on the grounds of sex contrary to Directive 2006/54.

11. Ms HG subsequently supplemented her original action with a request for the annulment of the Decreto del Capo della Polizia del 10 maggio 2024 (Decree of the Chief of Police of 10 May 2024), which approved the final ranking and the list of successful candidates – a list that did not include her.

12. Pending the hearing on the merits, the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, Italy), by Order No 3092 of 29 August 2024, upheld the appeal lodged by the administration against Order No 2376 of 6 June 2024, by which the referring court granted interim relief, explaining that ‘members of the State Police … must guarantee their psychological and physical fitness in relation to all the various situations in which they might be called upon to take action’, which is a recurring line of reasoning in its case-law. ( 6 )

13. Thus, the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State) has developed a precept according to which the exclusion of female candidates from a selection procedure on the ground that they have a tattoo visible when wearing a ‘dress uniform’ is not discriminatory.

14. Disagreeing with the position of the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State), the referring court considers that the police force recruitment policy at issue is discriminatory, and thus contrary, among other things, to EU law, which prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex in access to employment. In that context, the referring court considered it necessary to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling before deciding the case on its merits.

15. In the order for reference, the referring court indicates: (i) that the ‘dress uniform’ is only worn at high-profile institutional events (ceremonies, parades, honorary duties and representation duties); (ii) that women may be authorised by senior police officials to wear trousers during such high-profile institutional events without any conditions being set in advance for such an exemption; and (iii) that women may wear trousers and ordinary shoes for active duty and, in any event, the dress uniform does not correspond to the police force’s usual operational outfit.

16. In those circumstances, the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘Does [EU] law, and in particular Article 2(1)(b) of [Directive 2006/54], Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [(“the Charter”)], the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sex, the principles established in interpreting Directive 2000/78/EC[( 7 )] and the principle of proportionality, preclude the national legislation laid down in Article 3(7- quinquies ) of Legislative Decree No 95/2017 and in Article 3(2) and Table 1(2)(b) of Ministerial Decree No 198/2003, as applied by the public security administration and interpreted in case-law, which allows the exclusion of a female candidate from a selection procedure for a position in the police force on the ground that she has a tattoo in an area not covered by her uniform, where that tattoo is visible only when she is wearing the dress uniform required for representation duties, in the version requiring the wearing of a skirt and [court] shoes?’

17. Written observations were submitted to the Court by Ms HG, the Italian and Greek Governments, as well as the European Commission.

18. A hearing was held on 7 May 2026, at which the Italian Government and the Commission presented oral argument.

III. Analysis

A. Reformulation of the question

19. As is already well known, in the preliminary reference procedure the Court of Justice can reformulate the question referred by the referring court. This is often done when the Court finds, on the basis of the case file before it and the submissions of the parties, that a differently formulated question would yield a more useful answer for the referring court, thereby enabling that court to resolve the dispute pending before it in conformity with EU law. ( 8 ) In the present case, I am of the view that the question referred should be reformulated slightly.

20. First, it should be noted that the prohibition of any discrimination on grounds of sex and the principle of equal treatment between men and women in all areas, including in matters of employment, work and pay, as laid down in Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter respectively, have been given concrete expression by Directive 2006/54 as regards work and employment, including access to employment.

21. Consequently, it is sufficient that the Court interprets that directive in order to provide a useful answer to the referring court. ( 9 )

22. Second, Directive 2006/54, in Article 14 thereof, prohibits any direct or indirect discrimination on grounds of sex in relation to, among other things, conditions for access to employment (Article 14(1)(a)). The referring court asks for the interpretation of, in particular, Article 2(1)(b) of Directive 2006/54, which contains a definition of indirect discrimination. However, as I will argue later, there are good reasons to consider the situation at issue in the main proceedings an example of direct discrimination, as defined in Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2006/54.

23. Third, Article 14(2) of that directive permits Member States to treat candidates for employment on grounds of sex differently if the nature of the particular occupational activity concerned or the context in which it is carried out so requires, provided that the requirement in question constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, and that the principle of proportionality is observed.

24. The arguments offered in the order for reference, as well as the discussion among the parties and other participants in these proceedings, both in their written submissions and at the hearing, demonstrate that the interpretation of all abovementioned provisions of Directive 2006/54 might be useful for the national court to resolve the case pending before it.

25. Therefore, I propose that the question be reformulated to ask: should the prohibition, under Article 14 of Directive 2006/54, of any direct or indirect discrimination, as defined in Article 2(1)(a) and (b) thereof, be interpreted as precluding the national legislation, which allows the exclusion of a female candidate from a selection procedure for a position in the police force on the ground that she has a tattoo in an area not covered by her uniform, where that tattoo is visible only when she is wearing the dress uniform required for representation duties, which includes a skirt and court shoes?

B. Is the recruitment policy at issue discriminatory on grounds of sex?

1. D irect or indirect d iscrimination

26. It is clear from the facts of the present case that Ms HG would not have been excluded from the selection procedure on the sole ground that she has a tattoo on her calf had she been a man. It is, therefore, obvious that, within the selection procedure for the Italian police force, women are treated differently to men. The question that arises, however, is whether that differentiation in treatment represents discrimination on grounds of sex, which is prohibited by EU law.

27. As reflected in the question referred to the Court, and as submitted by the Commission, the exclusion of Ms HG from the selection procedure is the result of the combined application of two national rules regulating the Italian police force. The first rule prohibits police officers from having tattoos that are visible while wearing a uniform (‘the no-tattoo rule’). The second rule concerns uniforms, and provides for different dress uniforms for male and female officers when they participate in ceremonial events (‘the rule on dress uniforms’). During the selection procedure, candidates are checked for visible tattoos while wearing the dress uniform.

28. It is important to clarify at the outset that the present case does not question the legality of either of those two rules when taken in isolation. ( 10 ) What is at issue is only whether their combined application can be classified as discrimination on grounds of sex.

29. That combined application of the no-tattoo rule and the rule on dress uniforms results in the automatic exclusion of female candidates who have a tattoo on the lower part of the leg from the selection procedure and thus from access to employment in the police force in Italy. At the same time, male candidates who have a tattoo in the same place cannot be excluded on that ground alone. I will refer to this policy as ‘the recruitment policy at issue’.

30. The first question that arises in cases involving possible discrimination on grounds of sex is whether a particular rule or practice, which results in differentiated treatment of men and women, should be categorised as direct or indirect discrimination. This then steers further steps in analysis concerning an assessment of whether the application of that rule or practice can be justified.

31. Direct discrimination is defined in Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2006/54. According to that provision, direct discrimination exists ‘where one person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation’.

32. Indirect discrimination is defined in Article 2(1)(b) of Directive 2006/54. According to that provision, indirect discrimination is considered to exist ‘where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary’. ( 11 )

33. In both cases, a person belonging to one sex is treated less favourably. However, in the case of direct discrimination, sex is the direct reason for adverse treatment, whereas in the case of indirect discrimination, it is not obvious that sex is the reason for the less favourable treatment of one sex.

34. Whereas, in principle, direct discrimination on grounds of sex cannot be accepted, Article 14(2) of Directive 2006/54 allows for a distinction between the sexes if it can be justified by a genuine and determining occupational requirement (‘the genuine and determining occupational requirement exception’). Indirect discrimination may be justified if the apparently neutral rule that results in the less favourable treatment of one sex is indeed neutral, that is, it does not aim to make a distinction between the sexes but has another legitimate objective and is appropriate and necessary for achieving that objective, even if it results in placing persons of one sex in a disadvantageous situation. Directive 2006/54 does not provide a list of reasons which would justify an apparently neutral rule that results in placing one sex in an adverse position, as those reasons will inevitably differ depending on the nature and aims of such a rule. However, the genuine and determining occupational requirement exception, which may be a reason to derogate from the prohibition on direct discrimination, can also be used to justify indirect discrimination. ( 12 )

35. In terms of legal consequences, the key difference between categorising a situation as direct or indirect discrimination lies in the number and types of justifications that may be invoked to render lawful the same result, namely the less favourable treatment of persons of one sex.

36. Categorising real life situations under one or another type of discrimination is not always easy, as demonstrated by the following cases.

37. In Dekker , a pregnant woman was not offered a job, despite being the best candidate, because the employer would not have been entitled to reimbursement of the daily benefits it would have been obliged to pay her during her maternity leave under the existing insurance scheme, which covered workers who were prevented from working due to illness. Despite the apparent neutrality of the reliance on the insurance scheme in question – which itself did not distinguish between men and women, but which nonetheless assimilated pregnancy to illness – the Court found that the refusal to offer the woman the job constituted direct discrimination, as only women could be pregnant and thus refused jobs for that reason. ( 13 )

38. However, in Kalliri , the Court considered an apparently neutral national law, which made the admission of candidates for the competition for entry into the Greek police school subject to a minimum height requirement, to constitute indirect discrimination. ( 14 ) The Court found that, because women are generally shorter than men, that rule affected more women than men, amounting to indirect discrimination, which the Court found to be unjustified.

39. The situation in the present case shares similarities with both cases. Even if the wearing of skirts does not, in principle, represent an innately female characteristic, in the same way as, for example, the ability to become pregnant does, a rule which obliges men to wear trousers and women to wear skirts as part of the dress uniform results in only women being required to wear a skirt when performing their police duties. The combined application of the no-tattoo rule and the rule on dress uniforms in the recruitment policy at issue in fact treats the wearing of skirts at ceremonies as an exclusively female characteristic. That rule results, in the same way as in Dekker , in a situation where only women are excluded from the selection procedure if they have a tattoo on their lower leg. That would be an argument in favour of categorising the situation in the main proceedings as direct discrimination.

40. At the same time, there are similarities with the situation in Kalliri . In relation to the prohibition on having a visible tattoo, the no-tattoo rule appears neutral in so far as sex as a prohibited ground for discrimination is concerned. However, the recruitment policy at issue – whereby candidates are checked for tattoos when wearing a dress uniform – results in some women being excluded from the selection procedure. Thus, that neutral rule, when combined with the rule on dress uniforms, adversely affects only women, without, however, demonstrating any intention to treat them less favourably. That may lead one to conclude that the situation at issue is one of indirect discrimination.

41. I am inclined to categorise the present situation as direct discrimination, finding it more similar to the facts in Dekker . Unlike in the situations where the Court has found there to be indirect discrimination on grounds of sex, the combined application of two rules during the recruitment policy at issue excludes only women (as does pregnancy in Dekker ), whereas the rules based on height or being a part-time worker (as in Kalliri and Bilka-Kaufhaus respectively), could also affect men, even if, in practice, they had a disproportionate effect on women. Importantly, even if not an innately female characteristic, the obligation to wear a skirt on certain occasions under national law inextricably links the dresswear to the sex of the person, which, in other areas of non-discrimination law, the Court has considered an important element for finding direct discrimination. ( 15 )

42. The recruitment policy at issue fulfils, in my view, all three elements required by the definition set out in Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2006/54 necessary to classify a situation as direct discrimination: (i) less favourable treatment; (ii) compared to a person in a comparable situation; and (iii) based on the sex of the person.

43. Under the recruitment policy at issue, to which all candidates are subject, a woman having a tattoo on her lower leg and a man having a tattoo in the same place (comparable situation) are treated differently. A woman is excluded from the procedure whereas a man is not (less favourable treatment). This differentiation between people in a comparable situation is based on sex, as women are examined wearing a skirt because of the applicable rule on uniforms which obliges women to wear skirts as part of the dress uniform precisely because they are women (based on sex).

44. For those reasons, I consider that the situation at issue should be treated as one of direct discrimination and can be accepted only if a genuine and determining occupational requirement so dictates.

45. However, even if I propose that the Court treat a situation such as the one in the present case as a situation of direct discrimination, I would agree with the Commission that in the present case categorising the situation as direct or indirect discrimination does not have a very significant effect, as none of the reasons put forward by the Italian Government can justify the less favourable treatment of women in selection procedures for access to employment in the police force.

46. In the following part of my analysis, I will show that the recruitment policy at issue cannot be justified by relying on the genuine and determining occupational requirement exception, and that none of the objectives that the Italian Government offered as rationale for the recruitment policy would allow that policy to be regarded as being proportionate to attaining those objectives. That analysis could be applied to find discrimination, even if the situation in the present case is treated as one of indirect discrimination.

2. Can the recruitment policy at issue be justified ?

(a) G enuine and determining occupational requirement exception

47. As stated above, the genuine and determining occupational requirement exception is the only reason for which Directive 2006/54 allows for explicit differentiation between men and women. ( 16 )

48. For that purpose, Article 14(2) of that directive states: ‘Member States may provide, as regards access to employment including the training leading thereto, that a difference of treatment which is based on a characteristic related to sex shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that its objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.’

49. The Italian Government seems to consider participation in ceremonial events a necessary occupational requirement for police officers. It relies on the case-law of the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State) which, as already explained (see points 12 and 13 of the present Opinion), considers that the recruitment policy at issue is not discriminatory, because members of the State Police must guarantee their physical fitness for all the various situations in which they might be called upon to take action. That includes participating in police force ceremonial events. The ability to participate in such events, therefore, seems to be understood as a genuine and determining occupational requirement, which justifies the policy that excludes women who cannot participate in such activities because their tattoos would be visible while wearing the dress uniform required for ceremonial occasions.

50. In the case-law related to Directive 76/207/EEC, ( 17 ) a predecessor of Directive 2006/54, the Court accepted that the exclusion of women from certain occupational activities in the police force or army was justified on the basis that sex constituted a determining factor due to specific circumstances or the nature of the activity at issue. Thus, in Commission v France , the Court recognised that sex may be a determining factor for posts such as those of prison warders and head prison warders. ( 18 ) In Johnston, it accepted that women might be excluded from policing activities performed in situations where there are serious internal disturbances, such as the prevailing situation in Northern Ireland at the time. ( 19 ) In Sirdar , in relation to military forces, the Court considered that the exclusion of women from service in special combat units, such as the Royal Marines, may be justified by reason of the nature of the activities in question and the context in which they are carried out. ( 20 )

51. In all those cases, given that Article 14(2) of Directive 2006/54 is an exception to the rule prohibiting differentiation on grounds of sex, the Court repeatedly considered that it must be interpreted strictly. ( 21 )

52. In line with that requirement for narrow interpretation, several conditions may be discerned from the case-law of the Court. ( 22 )

53. First, the concept of a ‘genuine and determining occupational requirement’ refers to a requirement that is objectively dictated by the nature of the occupational activities concerned or the context in which they are carried out. Thus, that concept cannot ‘cover subjective considerations , such as the willingness of the employer to take account of the particular wishes of the customer,’ which was at issue in Bougnaoui , a case concerning discrimination on the ground of religion. ( 23 )

54. Second, the difference in treatment is based not on sex, but on the characteristic related to sex ; accordingly, it is that characteristic that must constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement. ( 24 ) Thus, for instance, in Wolf , in relation to discrimination on grounds of age, the Court explained that the requirement to be physically fit, which can be connected to age, is a genuine and determining requirement of being a firefighter. ( 25 )

55. Third, in order to rely on the genuine and determining occupational requirement exception, the exclusion of persons of one sex from certain activities because of the characteristic related to that sex must have a legitimate objective and the rule resulting in distinction between the sexes must be appropriate and necessary for that objective. Thus, for instance, in Sirdar , ( 26 ) the Court accepted that the necessity of being prepared for combat actions as a member of the Royal Marines, regardless of the position of the person, can be accepted as appropriate and necessary for ensuring public security.

56. Turning to the first and second of those conditions as applied in the present case, it seems that the Italian Government considers that the wearing of a skirt, a characteristic connected with the female sex by the applicable law, is objectively dictated by the nature of being a police officer, which requires participation in ceremonial events.

57. To my mind, first, even though the Member States enjoy discretion in organising their police force, deeming the participation of police officers in ceremonies a determining occupational activity that would justify discrimination on grounds of sex is at odds with the need to interpret that derogation narrowly. The ceremonial activities, even if not unimportant for presenting the police force to the public and thus building trust in that public service, are, nevertheless, only very marginal parts of the job of a police officer, as noted by the referring court. Therefore, in my view, the first condition necessary to rely on the genuine and determining occupational requirement exception is not fulfilled in the present case, as the objective requirements derived from the nature of police duties do not justify excluding women from the police force simply because they cannot participate in ceremonial activities.

58. Second, the fact that women wear skirts is not an innate characteristic of the female sex, but rather one imposed by the law that prescribes skirts as part of the dress uniform for women. Even if such a stereotype is accepted as a characteristic related to the female sex, it is difficult to see how such a characteristic is necessary for participating in ceremonies, if that participation is understood as objectively dictated by the nature of police work. That is especially so given the fact that the active-duty uniform worn by female police officers includes trousers.

59. Thus, the recruitment policy based on the rule that women must not have visible tattoos when wearing a dress uniform does not satisfy the first two conditions as stated in points 53 and 54 of the present Opinion for relying on the genuine and determining occupational requirement as an exception from the prohibition on direct discrimination on grounds of sex.

60. Furthermore, and as I will demonstrate under the next title, the recruitment policy at issue also fails to satisfy the third condition for relying on Article 14(2) of Directive 2006/54, as stated in point 55 of the present Opinion. That policy is not proportionate to any of the objectives discussed during these proceedings as possible justificatory reasons. This is also an argument in favour of a conclusion that the recruitment policy at issue is contrary to the principle of proportionality, even if the Court decides to treat this situation as indirect, rather than direct, discrimination.

(b) The o bjectives and p roportionality of the recruitment policy

61. Article 14(2) of Directive 2006/54 requires that the derogation on the basis of an occupational requirement has a legitimate objective and satisfies the principle of proportionality. ( 27 )

62. The Italian Government invoked reasons relating to the uniformity and dignity of the police force in order to justify the no-tattoo policy. However, as stated at the outset, that national policy choice is not at issue in the present case.

63. Rather, it is necessary to make a connection between the requirement for women to wear a skirt while performing ceremonial duties and the rule that excludes them from the police force because they have a tattoo that is visible while wearing such a uniform. The question thus comes down to justifying the (almost) unconditional requirement to wear a skirt at ceremonies.

64. In that respect, the Italian Government offered two arguments connected to the function of a uniform at ceremonies: first, it conveys the values of the Italian police force to the general public; and, second, it ensures uniformity, thereby facilitating the public’s recognition of an officer’s belonging to that police force. At the hearing, a third possible justification, namely the need to take positive action aimed at attracting women to the police force, was also discussed. I will assess those three objectives in turn, as well as the appropriateness, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu of the recruitment policy, which denies women access to the police force if they have a tattoo visible while wearing the dress uniform required for female police officers, in achieving each of those objectives.

(1) Conveying values

65. When asked at the hearing to explain what values are conveyed by the wearing of skirts by female police officers as part of their dress uniform, the Italian Government offered a very general answer, that it conveys ‘traditional values’.

66. The choice of a uniform and the reasons for that choice may be a reflection of tradition, which is different from one Member State to another. The choice of uniform in any case falls to the discretion of each Member State. The Italian Government explained at the hearing that the police force in that State is proud to be among the first armed public services to have allowed access to women, which is reflected in ceremonial events, where women wear traditional uniforms. Thus, the choice that women wear uniform on ceremonial occasions might be understood as a reflection of that tradition.

67. Nevertheless, the discretion that Member States have in choosing uniforms cannot justify discrimination, including on grounds of sex. It is true that the requirement that women on certain occasions wear traditional uniforms, which are no longer worn for daily duties, might arguably not be discriminatory in itself. However, that choice becomes discriminatory when it places women in a less advantageous position than men in accessing employment. In the present case, that requirement results in the automatic exclusion of women from the police force if they have a tattoo visible while wearing a skirt, but does not lead to the exclusion of men with tattoos that would be visible were they to wear a skirt.

68. In any case, the recruitment policy at issue is not proportionate to achieving an objective that consists in demonstrating tradition.

69. Starting with appropriateness, the rule might indeed be appropriate, as, if only women without tattoos on the lower leg are admitted to the police force, they will all be able to wear skirts at ceremonial events and thus demonstrate the tradition.

70. However, one may legitimately question the coherence of that rule. The referring court explained, and this has not been disputed, that a higher-ranking officer may, at his or her discretion, ( 28 ) allow a female police officer to wear trousers at any given ceremony. If wearing a skirt as part of the dress uniform for women is so important at ceremonies, such a possibility allowing for departure from that rule does not seem coherent. Additionally, why is such a strict standard set for the selection procedure, and a much lower one enforced once female officers have been recruited? This also illustrates the point that the objective is not pursued coherently.

71. Even if the recruitment policy were to pass the appropriateness and coherence test, I have difficulty in considering such a rule necessary. If those women who cannot wear a skirt due to a visible tattoo are allowed to wear trousers, whereas other women who do not have such a tattoo participate in the same ceremonial events wearing a skirt, this would still enable the desired demonstration of tradition.

72. Lastly, the burden imposed by the policy, which entirely prevents women with tattoos visible while wearing a skirt from accessing the police force, is clearly disproportionate when compared to the symbolic benefit of having female officers participate, from time to time, in ceremonial activities while wearing dress uniform.

73. In the present case, women who have visible tattoos while wearing the dress uniform are entirely denied access to the police force; they are not excluded solely from participation in ceremonial activities (which could be problematic in itself). ( 29 )

74. In conclusion, the recruitment policy at issue cannot withstand the proportionality test in relation to the first objective offered –conveying values understood as a demonstration of tradition.

(2) Uniformity and representativeness

75. The second objective that the Italian Government presented as being a matter of conveying a value has to do with the very purpose of the uniform, which is to identify a person as a police officer. ( 30 )

76. Whereas this identification role can indeed be accepted as an objective of uniforms, it must be borne in mind that the uniform at issue in the main proceedings is not the one worn for daily active duty, but only for particular and specific events, relating exclusively to representation. On most other occasions, female officers wear trousers. Therefore, one may doubt that a woman in dress uniform consisting of a skirt would be identified as a police officer.

77. However, even if wearing such a uniform is appropriate for identifying that person as a police officer, it is difficult to accept that it is necessary for a female police officer to wear a skirt in order to be identified as a police officer at ceremonies. Wearing trousers would have the same effect. ( 31 )

78. One may add to this that, when relying on the genuine and determining occupational requirement exception, the Court has insisted that the Member States must take into account social developments. ( 32 ) In both Johnston and Sirdar , the Court explained that, it was clear from Article 9(2) of Directive 76/207 that if a Member State relied on the derogation based on a genuine and determining occupational requirement it has a duty to assess periodically the activities concerned in order to decide whether it may be maintained in the light of social developments. ( 33 ) A similar requirement exists in Article 31(3) of Directive 2006/54. As today it is common that women wear trousers in all aspects of life, including in the police force, a claim that wearing a skirt can have any identification role is misplaced.

79. Furthermore, if a function of a uniform is also, as its name suggests, to uniformise the appearance of the police corps, such an aim would be better served if both men and women wore the same uniform.

80. To conclude, the recruitment policy at issue cannot withstand the proportionality test in relation to the second objective offered either.

(3) Positive action

81. The requirement for women to wear skirts might arguably be understood as a measure to promote the inclusion of women in the police force.

82. When asked about that matter at the hearing, the Italian Government responded that, in Italy, there is no need for a policy aimed at attracting women to the police force. However, as this issue was discussed at the hearing, I feel obliged to add a few thoughts on the matter.

83. Positive action is an accepted method aimed at rectifying structural inequalities in a society. ( 34 )

84. Indeed, originally, introducing a rule that female police officers are to wear skirts might have served to encourage women to join the police force. ( 35 )

85. I am not convinced, however, that obliging women to wear skirts at ceremonial events could today be justified as appropriate in order to attract women to police force. It would deter those women who do not want to wear skirts. Therefore, a more appropriate rule in that respect would be to allow women to choose to wear a skirt and not to force them to do so. ( 36 )

86. Adopting appropriate measures to rectify entrenched societal inequalities, such as the disparity between the number of men and women in the police force or army, is a matter for the Member States. However, what should be kept in mind is that measures of positive action adopted to increase the representativeness of women (or men) in certain occupations could trigger challenges based on discrimination on grounds of sex by a member of the other sex. This is demonstrated by a recent ruling decided by the Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court, Austria), in which that court accepted a complaint made by a male member of the Austrian army and considered that the prohibition on men having long hair in the army cannot be accepted when women are allowed the same. ( 37 ) Thus, even if some measures are taken to attract women to certain occupations, this may require justifying, according to the principle of proportionality, the resulting discrimination against the other sex.

87. In any case, positive action can be justified if improving (and not worsening) the position of the under-represented sex. Even though the recruitment policy at issue is seen in the light of attracting women to the police force, in this particular case it actually prevented a woman from entering that service.

88. In conclusion, a policy of automatic exclusion from the selection procedure for the police force of women with tattoos on the parts of the body exposed while wearing the dress uniform, which is, for women, a skirt and court shoes, cannot be seen as proportionate to any of the objectives offered for the justification of that recruitment policy.

IV. Conclusion

89. In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court answer the question referred by the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio, Italy) as follows:

Article 14 of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, read in conjunction with Article 2(1)(a) thereof,

must be interpreted as prohibiting a national recruitment policy which, on the basis of the combination of two legal rules, allows the automatic exclusion of a female candidate from a selection procedure for a position in the police force on the ground that she has a tattoo in an area not covered by her uniform, where that tattoo is visible only when she is wearing the dress uniform required for representation duties, which differs for men and women and which, for women, consists of a skirt and court shoes.

1 Original language: English.

i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.

2 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (OJ 2006 L 204, p. 23).

3 The number of new posts was subsequently increased to 2 650.

4 As explained by the referring court, Article 3(2) and Table 1(2)(b) of Decreto del Ministero dell’Interno del 30 giugno 2003, n. 198 (Decree No 198 of the Ministry of the Interior of 30 June 2003 (‘Ministerial Decree No 198/2003’)), and Article 3(7- quinquies ) of Decreto legislativo del 29 maggio 2017, n. 95 (Legislative Decree No 95 of 29 May 2017 (‘Legislative Decree No 95/2017’)) allows for the exclusion of an applicant when that applicant has a tattoo on a part of the body not covered by the uniform.

5 The guidelines on uniforms are laid down in the Decreto del Capo della Polizia del 31 dicembre 2015 (Decree of the Chief of Police of 31 December 2015), as amended by the Decreto del Capo della Polizia del 10 luglio 2019 (Decree of the Chief of Police of 10 July 2019), which revises and updates the tables annexed to the former. The Decree of the Chief of Police of 31 December 2015 also gives, in an annex, some ‘explanatory information’, which includes guidelines on the use of uniforms. In particular, that annex stipulates that ‘the dress uniform for men and women … shall be … worn only on occasions of significant institutional importance’ and that ‘the dress uniform for women shall consist of a skirt, and trousers may be worn only with the permission of senior police officials’.

6 As reported in the order for reference, the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State) has already expressed the opinion that tattoos on the legs, ankles and calves (which, for women, are parts of the body exposed while wearing a skirt and court shoes) may legitimately constitute grounds for excluding female candidates from selection procedures (even if not visible when wearing tights) since ‘members of the State Police must guarantee their psychological and physical fitness in relation to all the various situations in which they might be called upon to take action’ (Council of State, Fourth Section, 2 March 2020, Judgment No 1477, and 8 June 2021, Judgment No 4386). Furthermore, that court ruled that ‘where the medical committee asserts that a tattoo on a part of the body not covered by the uniform (such as, for female personnel, the calf or ankle) is still visible and supports that assertion by providing a detailed description of the shape, size and subject of the tattoo, it is irrelevant that they were not made to wear tights at the time of the examination. It is also irrelevant that the uniform, including tights, is reserved for occasional use: indeed, members of the State Police must guarantee their psychological and physical fitness in relation to all the various situations in which they might be called upon to take action. …’ (Council of State, Second Section, 3 November 2022, Judgment No 9583).

7 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16).

8 See, for example, judgment of 24 June 2025, GR REAL (C‑351/23, EU:C:2025:474, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

9 That, however, does not mean that the principles enshrined in Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter or the case-law relating to Directive 2000/78, to which the referring court also refers in its question, are not relevant for the interpretation of Directive 2006/54. To that extent, the Court will take them into consideration, along with any other principle relevant for understanding Directive 2006/54.

10 In that respect, it is worth mentioning that the comparative study undertaken by the Court’s research and documentation department found that rules on tattoos in the army and in the police force differ from one Member State to the next. In some Member States, tattoos are not regulated at all, in others they are prohibited on certain parts of the body or, as in Italy, when visible when in uniform, and in some Member States, they are tolerated if discreet. See, in that regard, Court of justice of the European Union, Direction de la Recherche et Documentation, ‘L’application du principe de non-discrimination fondée sur le sexe à l’égard des codes vestimentaires et des normes d’apparence physique sur le lieu de travail’, Note de Recherche , 26/004, April 2026.

11 The same concept of direct and indirect discrimination exists for other prohibited grounds. See Article 2(2)(a) and (b) of Directive 2000/78 and Article 2(2)(a) and (b) of Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (OJ 2000 L 180, p. 22).

12 For an interesting discussion on that topic, see Iglesias Sánchez, S., ‘The concept of “genuine and determining occupational requirements” in EU equality law: A critical approach’, in Giegerich, T. (ed.), The European Union as Protector and Promoter of Equality , Springer, 2020, pp. 219 to 233.

13 Judgment of 8 November 1990, Dekker (C‑177/88, ‘ Dekker ’, EU:C:1990:383, in particular paragraph 12).

14 Judgment of 18 October 2017, Kalliri (C‑409/16, ‘ Kalliri ’ , EU:C:2017:767, paragraphs 27 to 32). For an earlier example, see judgment of 13 May 1986, Bilka-Kaufhaus (170/84, ‘ Bilka-Kaufhaus ’, EU:C:1986:204), in which the Court found that a company’s policy that offered different benefits to part-time and full-time workers constituted indirect discrimination, as the majority of part-time workers in that company were women.

15 In relation to discrimination on the ground of disability, see, to that effect, judgment of 26 January 2021, Szpital Kliniczny im. dra J. Babińskiego Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej Krakowie (C‑16/19, EU:C:2021:64, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited). In relation to discrimination on grounds of religion, see, also to that effect, judgment of 15 July 2021, WABE and MH Müller Handel (C‑804/18 and C‑341/19, EU:C:2021:594, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).

16 The other possibility, although it is not treated as an exception in Directive 2006/54, is positive action, provided for in Article 3 thereof.

17 Council Directive of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (OJ 1976 L 39, p. 40), as amended by Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 (OJ 2002 L 269, p. 15).

18 See, to that effect, judgment of 30 June 1988, Commission v France (318/86, ‘ Commission v France ’, EU:C:1988:352, paragraphs 11 to 18).

19 See, to that effect, judgment of 15 May 1986, Johnston (222/84, ‘ Johnston’, EU:C:1986:206, paragraphs 36, 37 and 40).

20 See, to that effect, judgment of 26 October 1999, Sirdar (C‑273/97, ‘ Sirdar ’, EU:C:1999:523, paragraphs 29 to 32).

21 See, for example, judgment of 6 March 2014, Napoli (C‑595/12, EU:C:2014:128, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

22 See, in that respect, Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, J., ‘Genuine and Determining Occupational Requirement as an Exception to the Prohibition of Discrimination in EU law’, in Giegerich, T. (ed.), The European Union as Protector and Promoter of Equality , Springer, 2020, pp. 199 to 217, at p. 204.

23 Judgment of 14 March 2017, Bougnaoui and ADDH (C 188/15, ‘ Bougnaoui ’, EU:C:2017:204, paragraph 40) (emphasis added). The same was reiterated in subsequent case-law, for example, judgment of 17 March 2026, Katholische Schwangerschaftsberatung (C‑258/24, EU:C:2026:211, paragraph 82).

24 See, in relation to religion as a prohibited ground, Bougnaoui , paragraph 37 and the case-law cited. In relation to discrimination on grounds of sex, see, for instance, judgment of 6 March 2014, Napoli (C‑595/12, EU:C:2014:128, paragraph 42).

25 See, to that effect, judgment of 12 January 2010, Wolf (C‑229/08, ‘ Wolf ’, EU:C:2010:3, paragraph 41).

26 See Sirdar , paragraphs 28 and 29.

27 The proportionality requirement was not included in the wording of Article 2(2) of Directive 76/207, the predecessor of Directive 2006/54, but was required in the case-law to which that earlier directive applied.

28 Statistically, there is a greater chance that that superior officer will be male, which could add another layer of differentiation on grounds of sex. See, in that respect, Pascali, M., ‘Poliziotte, un cammino democratico’ (‘Policewomen, a democratic path’), Collettiva , 8 March 2023. Available at: https://www.collettiva.it/speciali/anno-d/poliziotte-un-cammino-democratico-bd8t0h97; Acquadro Maran, D., Grandi, A. and Colombo, L., Stress, job satisfaction, and workplace climate in Italian police workers, Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice , Vol. 18, 2024, paae079. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paae079 .

29 In Kreil , a case that concerned the exclusion of women from the Bundeswehr (German armed forces), the Court made it clear that a derogation based on a genuine and determining occupational activity can apply only to specific activities within military forces, but cannot exclude women from all posts in that service. See, to that effect, judgment of 11 January 2000, Kreil (C‑285/98, EU:C:2000:2, in particular paragraph 27).

30 Arroyo, J., ‘L’uniforme en droit public’, Revue française de droit administratif , 2024, p. 509, mentions three functions of a uniform: (i) protection (like the armour of a knight); (ii) identification; and (iii) control, both internally and externally within the respective organisation.

31 An argument could be made that wearing a skirt could aid in identifying a police officer as a female police officer. I can imagine why, on certain occasions, this may be useful, for instance when a female victim of sexual violence feels safer talking to a female officer. However, the arguments discussed during the hearing were not concerned with a necessity to identify a person as a female police officer, but rather as a police officer.

32 See, for instance, Commission v France , paragraph 25.

33 See, to that effect, Johnston , paragraph 37, and Sirdar , paragraph 25.

34 In that respect, Article 3 of Directive 2006/54 envisages positive action as another possible reasons derogation from the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex.

35 Indeed, as the research note mentioned in footnote 10 to the present Opinion highlighted, in some Member States women are allowed more freedom in relation to their physical appearance as an incentive to join the armed forces. For example, in Germany, given that women are under-represented in the armed forces, the rules governing the appearance of female soldiers, particularly with regard to hairstyles and the wearing of jewellery, may be subject to regulations derogating from the general rules applicable to soldiers, as a permissible measure aimed at promoting female participation within the German armed forces (Court of Justice of the European Union, Direction de la Recherche et Documentation, , op. cit. , §§ 57 to 59).

36 In at least four Member States (Ireland, Spain, Poland and Romania), trousers are the standard uniform for all officers, and female police officers are permitted, under certain conditions, to wear a skirt as part of their ceremonial uniform (Direction de la Recherche et Documentation, footnote 10, op. cit., § 52).

37 See Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court), 9 March 2026, 243/2025-8, § 4.3.1.