Opinion of Advocate General Medina delivered on 10 September 2026
Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
MEDINA
delivered on 10 September 2026 ( 1 )
Case C ‑ 397/25
EM
v
Ilektronikos Ethnikos Foreas Koinonikis Asfalisis (e-EFKA)
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (Council of State, Greece)
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Social security – Migrant workers – Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 – Article 58 – Concept of ‘minimum benefit’ – National minimum pension thresholds – Article 4 – Equal treatment – Article 6 – Aggregation of periods )
I. Introduction
1. This request for a preliminary ruling from the Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (Council of State, Greece) concerns the concept of ‘minimum benefit’ under Article 58 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. ( 2 ) Pursuant to that provision, a recipient of benefits who resides in a Member State under whose legislation a benefit is payable to him or her may not receive, in that State, a benefit lower than the minimum benefit fixed by that legislation. Where the total of the benefits due to that person in all EU Member States falls short of that minimum benefit, the competent institution of the Member State of residence must pay a supplement equal to that difference.
2. The request arises in the context of proceedings between EM, a Bulgarian national who completed periods of insurance in both Bulgaria and Greece, and the competent Greek social security institution, concerning the level of the supplement payable to her under Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004. Specifically, EM was awarded a supplement on the basis of a Greek law that fixed the minimum benefit specifically for the purposes of Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 at EUR 360 per month. She claims that the relevant benchmark should instead have been the higher minimum pension thresholds applicable, at the time of her application, under the scheme administered by the competent social security institution. Those thresholds operated as floors: pensions that would otherwise fall below the relevant threshold were raised to it. At the material time, they were fixed at amounts ranging upwards from EUR 486.84 per month.
3. Against that background, the referring court asks two questions. First, whether the concept of ‘minimum benefit’ in Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 covers national minimum pension thresholds such as those at issue, which are described as having been established to give effect to social solidarity rather than to guarantee a minimum income, and which vary according to the insurance institution, the date the person was first insured, family status and age. Secondly, it asks whether Article 45 TFEU and Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004 preclude national legislation which, specifically for migrant workers, fixes the Article 58 minimum benefit at an amount lower than the minimum pension thresholds applicable to persons who completed their entire insurance record in Greece.
4. The present case thus affords the Court an opportunity to clarify further its case-law on the interpretation of Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 and in particular on the meaning of the concept of ‘minimum benefit’.
II. Legal framework
A. European Union law
5. Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004, entitled ‘Equality of treatment’, reads as follows:
‘Unless otherwise provided for by this Regulation, persons to whom this Regulation applies shall enjoy the same benefits and be subject to the same obligations under the legislation of any Member State as the nationals thereof.’
6. Article 6 of that regulation, entitled ‘Aggregation of periods’, provides that ‘unless otherwise provided for by this Regulation, the competent institution of a Member State whose legislation makes … the acquisition, retention, duration or recovery of the right to benefits [or] the coverage by legislation … conditional upon the completion of periods of insurance, employment, self-employment or residence shall, to the extent necessary, take into account periods of insurance, employment, self-employment or residence completed under the legislation of any other Member State as though they were periods completed under the legislation which it applies.’
7. Article 9 of that regulation, headed ‘Declarations by the Member States on the scope of this Regulation’, requires Member States to notify the European Commission in writing of, inter alia, the minimum benefits referred to in Article 58 of that regulation. Such notifications are to be submitted annually and are to indicate the date from which that regulation will apply to the schemes specified by the Member States therein.
8. Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004, headed ‘Award of a supplement’, provides:
‘1. A recipient of benefits to whom this chapter applies may not, in the Member State of residence and under whose legislation a benefit is payable to him/her, be provided with a benefit which is less than the minimum benefit fixed by that legislation for a period of insurance or residence equal to all the periods taken into account for the payment in accordance with this chapter.
2. The competent institution of that Member State shall pay him/her throughout the period of his/her residence in its territory a supplement equal to the difference between the total of the benefits due under this chapter and the amount of the minimum benefit.’
B. National law
9. As explained by the referring court, the Greek social security system has been subject to successive reforms. Prior to a comprehensive reform in 2016, it was characterised by a high degree of fragmentation: numerous insurance institutions existed in parallel, each operating on the basis of its own scheme, while, in certain respects, the applicable provisions also differed depending on the date of affiliation, namely whether the insured person had first been insured before or after 31 December 1992 (and therefore belonged to the category of ‘old’ or ‘new’ insured persons respectively). Amongst the various insurance institutions, the Idryma Koinonikon Asfaliseon – Eniaio Tameio Asfalisis Misthoton (Social Insurance Institute – Single Insurance Fund for Employees, Greece; ‘IKA-ETAM’) was, at the material time, the principal insurance fund for private-sector employees in Greece. ( 3 )
10. The present case concerns provisions applicable to the IKA-ETAM scheme, which, as noted in the order for reference, are no longer in force. The most relevant provisions for the purposes of the present analysis, as described by the referring court, are set out below.
1. Old-age pension for mothers of minor children
11. Article 28(3)(d) of Anagkastikos Nomos 1846/1951 (Emergency Law No 1846/1951; ‘the 1951 Law’), in the version relevant to the main proceedings, provided that an insured mother of minor children (or of children incapable of any gainful work irrespective of age), who had completed 5 500 days of insurance and did not receive a pension from IKA-ETAM, the State, a legal person governed by public law or another principal insurance institution, was entitled to a full old-age pension on reaching the age of 55 and to a reduced old-age pension at age 50. In the case of a reduced pension, the amount was reduced by 1 /200 for each month remaining before the full pension age.
2. The national minimum pension thresholds
12. Article 29(14) of the 1951 Law, in the version relevant to the main proceedings, laid down minimum pension thresholds for the category of ‘old’ insured persons under IKA-ETAM. Those thresholds were determined as a multiplier of the daily wage of an unskilled worker, but varied, in particular, according to family status and age. They operated as floors: where the pension yielded by the insured person’s periods of insurance and contributions fell below the applicable threshold, it was raised to that threshold. ( 4 )
13. According to the order for reference, with effect from 1 October 2008, the IKA-ETAM minimum pension thresholds for the category of ‘old’ insured persons ranged, in principle, from EUR 486.84 for an unmarried pensioner without children to EUR 596.31 for a married pensioner with three or more children.
3. The ‘minimum benefit’ for coordination cases ( 5 )
14. Articles 1 to 4 of Nomos 3863/2010 (Law No 3863/2010; ‘the 2010 Law’) introduced a pension reform under which the pension for persons retiring from 1 January 2015 would comprise two parts: a ‘basic’ pension financed from the State budget and a ‘proportional’ pension calculated by reference to years of insurance and contributions paid. Article 2 of that law initially set the ‘basic’ pension at EUR 360 per month, to be adjusted periodically.
15. Article 34(1) of Nomos 3996/2011 (Law No 3996/2011; ‘the 2011 Law’) subsequently inserted a new paragraph 11 into Article 20 of Nomos 2434/1996 (Law No 2434/1996). That provision essentially established that the ‘minimum benefit’ for the purposes of Article 58 corresponded to the amount of the basic pension introduced by Article 2 of the 2010 Law, as adjusted from time to time. It read as follows:
‘The minimum benefit within the meaning of Article 58 of Regulation [No 883/2004] is the amount of the basic pension referred to in Article 2 of [the 2010 Law], as adjusted from time to time. The provisions of this paragraph shall apply from the date of publication of this Law. Pending pension applications shall be assessed in accordance with the above provisions.’
16. The abovementioned provisions of the 2010 Law introducing a pension comprising a ‘basic’ and a ‘proportional’ component were repealed in 2016, without ever having been implemented.
17. Article 34(1) of the 2011 Law nevertheless remained in force. As a result, the ‘minimum benefit’ for the purposes of Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 effectively remained fixed at EUR 360 (that being the amount initially set by Article 2 of the 2010 Law and not subsequently adjusted).
III. The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred
18. EM, the appellant in the main proceedings, is a Bulgarian national born in 1957. Between 1977 and 1997, she completed 5 419 days of insurance in Bulgaria. She subsequently settled permanently in Greece, where she completed 1 026 days of insurance with IKA-ETAM between 1997 and 2005.
19. On 30 December 2010, the appellant applied to IKA-ETAM for a principal old-age pension under the special rules applicable to mothers of minor children. In connection with that application, the Bulgarian authorities confirmed her insurance history in Bulgaria and stated that she was not in receipt of a pension in that country.
20. By decision of 27 March 2013, the competent regional IKA‑ETAM director found that the appellant did not have an autonomous entitlement to an old-age pension from IKA-ETAM, since her Greek insurance periods alone did not reach the required 5 500 days. Nevertheless, the combined total of her Greek and Bulgarian insurance periods was used to establish entitlement under the aggregation and pro rata mechanism set out in Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 883/2004. On that basis, the appellant was awarded a pension by IKA-ETAM, reduced pro rata, of EUR 81.38 per month. The same decision was expressly made without prejudice to the possibility of the appellant being granted a supplement under Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004, should the relevant conditions be met.
21. By a further decision, of 23 December 2015, the same director concluded that the appellant satisfied the conditions for a supplement under Article 58 of that regulation, with the effect that her pension should be raised to the minimum benefit applicable under national legislation. Her pension was, therefore, increased to EUR 318.60 per month. That figure was calculated by applying Article 34(1) of the 2011 Law, which designated EUR 360 as the Article 58 minimum benefit, and by reducing that amount by 23 /200 because, at the date of her application, the appellant had not yet reached the age of 55 required for a full pension under the rules for mothers of minor children. The amount was payable from 30 December 2010 to 30 November 2017, subject to review should the appellant be awarded a pension by another insurance institution or change her place of residence.
22. The appellant challenged that latter decision before the Dioikitiko Protodikeio Thessalonikis (Administrative Court of First Instance, Thessaloniki, Greece). She argued that the minimum benefit to be taken into account for the purposes of Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 should not be the EUR 360 resulting from Article 34(1) of the 2011 Law, but one of the higher minimum pension thresholds applicable under the general IKA-ETAM provisions, which, as set out in IKA‑ETAM Circular No 41/21.6.2011 and referred to in point 13 above, ranged from EUR 486.84 upwards at the material time.
23. The appellant’s action was dismissed in 2018 and the first-instance judgment was upheld on appeal by the Dioikitiko Efeteio Thessalonikis (Administrative Court of Appeal, Thessaloniki, Greece) in 2020.
24. She subsequently brought an appeal on a point of law before the Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (Council of State). That court decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1) Must Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 be interpreted as meaning that “minimum benefits” include pension amounts which, although provided for as minimum pension thresholds by national provisions – since they are awarded to insured persons whose pension, based on their period of insurance and the contributions paid, is lower than those thresholds – are not established in order to ensure a guaranteed minimum income but in order to implement the principle of social solidarity between members of the public insurance institutions who have contributed throughout their working lives to [building up the insurance fund] by paying contributions to that institution, and which furthermore vary depending on the insurance institution, the category to which the insured person belongs [based on the date on which] he or she joined the scheme (before or after 31 December 1992), and his or her family status and age, namely criteria that are also applied under the usual method of calculating pensions?
(2) Do the provisions of Article 45 TFEU and Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004 preclude national legislation which fixes a certain sum of money as a minimum benefit within the meaning of Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 where, pursuant to that legislation, migrant workers receive as a minimum benefit (under Article 58) an amount lower than that provided for by other national provisions for persons insured by public insurance bodies who have completed their entire period of insurance in Greece, as an expression of the principle of social solidarity between persons insured by insurance institutions who contribute to [building up the insurance fund], an amount which varies depending on the insurance institution, the category to which the insured person [belongs, based on the date on which he or she joined the scheme], his or her family status and his or her age?’
25. Written observations have been submitted by the Greek and Norwegian Governments and the Commission. No hearing was held.
IV. Assessment
26. As already indicated above, at the time material to the dispute in the main proceedings, national legislation provided for several minimum pension thresholds which differed according to the insurance institution, the category of insured person, family status and age.
27. In that context, as the referring court explains, IKA-ETAM initially considered that, where a supplement was payable under Article 50 of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, ( 6 ) and subsequently under the substantially equivalent Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004, ( 7 ) that supplement was to be paid up to the relevant IKA-ETAM minimum pension thresholds, whether full or reduced. The referring court moreover observes that the Hellenic Republic had also identified those minimum pension thresholds as minimum benefits in its declarations submitted under Articles 5 and 50 of Regulation No 1408/71 (the predecessors, in substance, of Articles 9 and 58 of Regulation No 883/2004).
28. However, no declaration to that effect was subsequently made under Article 9 of Regulation No 883/2004 after that regulation entered into force. Moreover, following the adoption of Article 34(1) of the 2011 Law, the concept of ‘minimum benefit’ was viewed as having been ‘decoupled’ from the various national minimum pension thresholds. ( 8 ) The explanatory memorandum to that law, adopted during a period of extensive social-security reform and in the midst of the economic crisis in Greece, stated, in essence, that Greek legislation had not previously provided for a ‘minimum benefit’; that the earlier equating of the statutory thresholds with such a benefit had resulted from an unduly broad interpretation; and that doing so had caused difficulties in applying Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 and adverse financial consequences for the national insurance system. Since the 2010 Law had meanwhile introduced the ‘basic’ pension (see point 14 above), Greek legislation could now be understood to contain such a minimum benefit. Accordingly, Article 34 of the 2011 Law expressly designated that ‘basic’ pension – then amounting to EUR 360 per month – as the ‘minimum benefit’ for the purposes of Article 58. Although the relevant 2010 Law provisions were repealed before implementation, the amount of EUR 360 remained the ‘minimum benefit’ applicable to Article 58 cases.
29. Against that backdrop, the referring court seeks to ascertain, first, whether the Greek minimum pension thresholds are capable of falling within the concept of ‘minimum benefit’ under Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 and, secondly, whether national legislation which creates a separate, lower minimum benefit for Article 58 cases is compatible with that regulation and with the free movement of workers. I will address those questions in turn (B and C), after setting out certain preliminary remarks on Article 58 (A).
A. Preliminary observations
30. Both questions referred turn primarily on the function of Article 58. It is therefore useful first to situate that provision within the coordination system established by Regulation No 883/2004 (1), then to identify its principal function and features (2), and lastly to recall the Court’s case-law on the concept of ‘minimum benefit’ (3).
1. A system of coordination, not harmonisation
31. As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that Regulation No 883/2004 does not establish a common scheme of social security, but allows different national schemes to exist. The Member States thus retain the power to organise their social security schemes and to determine the conditions governing entitlement to benefits. The aim of the regulation is instead to ensure the coordination of the disparate national systems, in particular so that persons who exercise their right to freedom of movement are not thereby placed at a disadvantage. ( 9 )
32. As regards old-age benefits (pensions), the specific coordination rules are laid down in Chapter 5 of Title III of Regulation No 883/2004. When a person has completed periods of insurance in more than one Member State in the course of his or her career, each of the Member States concerned remains, in principle, responsible for the pension payable under its own legislation.
33. The coordination rules seek to ensure, however, that a person does not lose pension rights merely because his or her insurance career was divided between several Member States. In particular, where entitlement to a pension under national law depends on the completion of a certain period of insurance, periods completed in other Member States must, where necessary, be taken into account. If entitlement exists, each competent social security institution must calculate the amount of the pension which it must award to the person concerned. Article 52 of Regulation No 883/2004 sets out the principal rules for that calculation.
34. Under that provision, each competent institution calculates, first, the amount of the benefit that would be due under the applicable national legislation on the basis of the periods completed under that legislation alone, where the relevant entitlement conditions are met (the ‘independent benefit’). Secondly, it calculates the ‘pro rata benefit’. To that end, it determines the theoretical amount which the person concerned could claim if all periods of insurance and/or residence completed under the legislation of other Member States had been completed under the legislation which it applies. It then, essentially, reduces that amount in proportion to the periods actually completed under that legislation. The person concerned is then entitled to receive the higher amount of the independent benefit and the pro rata benefit, calculated as described above.
2. The function and features of Article 58
35. Once an old-age benefit is payable under Chapter 5 of Title III of Regulation No 883/2004 in the Member State where the person concerned resides, Article 58 of that regulation comes into play. It provides that the benefit recipient should not receive benefits that are, in total, lower than the minimum benefit which is fixed by the legislation of the Member State of residence for a period of insurance or residence equal to all the periods taken into account for the payment of benefits in accordance with Chapter 5. If the total of the benefits payable under Chapter 5 by all the competent institutions concerned falls below that minimum benefit, the competent institution of the Member State of residence must pay a supplement to cover that difference, for as long as the person resides in that State. Essentially, that institution ‘tops up’ the total of the benefits due to the person concerned to the level of the national minimum benefit. ( 10 )
36. As the Court has consistently held, Article 58 does not require Member States to establish a minimum benefit, but only applies where national legislation already provides for such a benefit. ( 11 ) Indeed, it follows clearly from the wording of Article 58, which refers to the minimum benefit ‘fixed by [the] legislation’ of the Member State of residence, that it places the person concerned within the national minimum benefit arrangements, as they exist.
37. As regards the context of Article 58, one specific point is worth noting for the purposes of the present analysis. That provision requires the minimum benefit applicable to the person concerned to be determined by reference to all the periods taken into account under Chapter 5. Taken in context, that requirement reflects the logic of Article 6 of Regulation No 883/2004, according to which periods completed in another Member State are, to the extent necessary, taken into account as though they had been completed under the legislation applied by the competent institution.
38. Lastly, as regards its purpose, it must be noted that Article 58 forms part of the system of coordination established pursuant to Article 48 TFEU in order to facilitate the effective exercise of the free movement of workers. Its function is to prevent a person from being deprived, merely because his or her career was divided between several Member States, of the minimum protection which the legislation of the Member State of residence guarantees to a person who has completed the corresponding total period of insurance or residence entirely in that Member State. It thus effectively places a migrant worker with a cross-border insurance record, for the purposes of that minimum protection, in a position comparable to that of a person whose relevant insurance record was completed entirely under the legislation of the Member State of residence, without otherwise altering either the allocation of financial responsibility or the Member States’ competence to determine the content of their minimum benefit schemes (if any).
3. The meaning of ‘minimum benefit’ and the Browning ‘test’
39. With the above points clarified, the question of when a ‘minimum benefit’ can be considered to exist in the legislation of a Member State remains. The Court examined that concept most notably in the case which gave rise to the judgment in Browning . ( 12 )
40. That case concerned a worker who had completed periods of insurance in both Ireland and the United Kingdom. The competent institution in the United Kingdom had initially granted him, in addition to his United Kingdom pension, a supplement under Article 50 of Regulation No 1408/71. In essence, it had treated as the minimum benefit for the purposes of that provision the amount of the flat-rate pension which would have been payable under United Kingdom law if all the worker’s periods of insurance had been completed in the United Kingdom. It therefore brought his pension up to that amount, which corresponded to the theoretical amount referred to in Article 46(2)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71 (now, in substance, Article 52(1)(b)(i) of Regulation No 883/2004). The institution later withdrew the supplement, considering that it had been based on a mistaken interpretation of the concept of ‘minimum benefit’. The central issue addressed by the Court was whether the lowest amount resulting from the ordinary application of the United Kingdom pension rules could itself be regarded as a ‘minimum benefit’ for the purposes of the coordination rules.
41. In that regard, the Court held that a minimum benefit exists only where national legislation lays down a specific guarantee intended to secure for pensioners a minimum income exceeding the benefit to which they would be entitled solely on the basis of their insurance periods and contributions. ( 13 ) It stressed, moreover, that such a ‘minimum benefit’ guarantee must be distinguished from the minimum pension amounts which result from the normal operation of the rules determining pension rights on the basis of insurance periods completed and contributions paid. ( 14 ) Accordingly, the minimum benefit must not be equated with the theoretical amount under what is now Article 52(1)(b)(i) of Regulation No 883/2004, namely the amount calculated on the assumption that all the relevant periods had been completed under the legislation applied by the competent institution. ( 15 )
42. It is against that background that I turn to the questions referred.
B. The first question: do the Greek minimum pension thresholds fall within Article 58?
43. By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 must be interpreted as covering national minimum pension thresholds, such as those at issue, which serve as floors to which pensions based on insurance periods and contributions are raised, although those thresholds were established to give effect to the principle of social solidarity amongst the insured persons rather than to secure a guaranteed minimum income and although they vary depending on the insurance institution, the category of insured person, family status and age.
44. On the basis of how they are described in the order for reference and subject to verification by the referring court, those thresholds appear, at first glance, to satisfy the Browning test. They apply where a pension calculated on the basis of the insured person’s periods of insurance and contributions is below a statutory floor, and have the effect that the pension in question is raised to that level. As such, they serve to guarantee a minimum amount exceeding the amount that the ordinary insurance and contribution record would otherwise yield.
45. The fact that the thresholds at issue were previously treated by the Greek authorities as ‘minimum benefits’ for the purposes of Article 50 of Regulation No 1408/71 and were included in the Hellenic Republic’s declaration under that regulation serves, in my view, as additional support for that reading. ( 16 ) Although neither that administrative practice nor the previous declaration is determinative under Regulation No 883/2004, they provide some support for the argument that the thresholds were understood as being capable of performing the function of a minimum income guarantee and thus of a minimum benefit.
46. The referring court nevertheless entertains doubts as to whether the thresholds at issue can indeed be regarded as ‘minimum benefits’, relating to two main points: their rationale as an expression of social solidarity rather than as a minimum income guarantee (1); and their variation according to criteria also used in the ordinary calculation of pensions (2). The Norwegian Government adds a third point, relating to the reference in the Court’s case-law to a reasonable standard of living (3).
1. Social solidarity and minimum income guarantee
47. The referring court notes that it does not follow from any national provision or relevant preparatory act that the minimum pension thresholds at issue were regarded by the legislature as a guaranteed minimum income for pensioners. Rather, those thresholds formed part of a redistributive mechanism, giving effect to social solidarity among persons insured with public social security institutions who contributed to building up the insurance fund throughout their working lives.
48. Both the referring court and the Greek Government emphasise that aspect, without however elaborating on it. It seems to me, nonetheless, that three points need to be addressed in that regard, each corresponding to a different layer of the issue.
49. First, significance is attached to the fact that the minimum pension thresholds at issue were not explicitly referred to, when they were established, as a ‘minimum benefit’ or as a minimum income guarantee. That circumstance, however, does not, in my view, negate their function and preclude them from being regarded as minimum benefits. What I consider does matter is not whether there is an explicitly spelled out legislative intent, or the label chosen by national legislation, but whether the benefit at issue in fact serves to ensure a minimum amount above the pension resulting from the insured person’s periods of insurance and contributions, and below which no person covered by the relevant scheme actually receives a pension.
50. As appears to be accepted in essence by all three interested persons that submitted observations, ( 17 ) the term ‘minimum benefit’ in Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 must be understood as an autonomous concept of EU law. ( 18 ) That autonomous nature, along with – as the Commission posits – the effet utile of Article 58, would be compromised if a Member State could remove a benefit from the scope of that provision merely by the terminology it chooses to use.
51. Secondly, the underlying premiss seems to be that a provision giving effect to social solidarity is, for that reason, not one laid down as a minimum income guarantee. Those two purposes are not, in my view, mutually exclusive. Quite the contrary. A guaranteed minimum pension is, to my mind, a characteristic expression of social solidarity: it redistributes within the insured community, from those whose contributions suffice to those whose contributions fall short, precisely so that the latter are lifted to a level not below a given income floor. The referring court itself describes the thresholds as operating in a redistributive manner, in support of the economically weakest insured persons, so as to secure a more satisfactory standard of living for them than their own insurance record would yield. Solidarity can therefore be the means by which the minimum income is secured.
52. Thirdly, the fundamental practical concern appears to be that persons who contributed to the Greek social security system for their entire working lives should not bear the cost of guaranteeing a minimum pension for persons who contributed to that system for only part of their careers. ( 19 ) While such a concern may be prima facie understandable to a certain extent, it relates to the financial consequences of Article 58 and is not relevant in determining whether the thresholds at issue constitute minimum benefits within the meaning of Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004.
53. I must first observe in that regard that the Greek legislation already accepts, by means of the EUR 360 benchmark, that a person with only part of his or her insurance record in Greece may receive a supplement under Article 58 of that regulation. The issue is therefore not whether the competent Greek institution may ever bear a residual cost in respect of such a person, but the level of the minimum protection to be granted.
54. In any event, in so far as the concern identified above is that supplements for persons with only a partial Greek insurance record would be financed by contributions to the relevant insurance scheme (notably from persons insured in Greece throughout their career), that consideration is not, in my view, decisive. Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 does not make the classification of an amount as a ‘minimum benefit’ dependent on the source from which that amount is financed. That provision requires the competent social security institution to pay the relevant supplement and does not distinguish between benefits financed from the State budget and those financed, wholly or partly, through contributions to a social security scheme.
55. As a final point on the present issue, I note that, while Regulation No 883/2004 does not establish an overarching system of pan-European solidarity, Member States can be understood to have accepted a certain degree of solidarity in the interests of the effective coordination of their social security systems. ( 20 ) Article 58 of that regulation gives specific expression to that choice by requiring the competent institutions of the Member State of residence to bear the residual cost of bringing the total benefits received by the pensioner up to the applicable minimum benefit, essentially expanding the territorial circle of solidarity to cover migrant workers. ( 21 ) Otherwise, migrant workers would not necessarily be able to enjoy a minimum level of protection in any State where such protection exists, simply because their insurance record was divided across borders.
56. In the light of the foregoing, the solidarity-based rationale of the minimum pension thresholds at issue does not, in my view, prevent them from constituting a minimum income guarantee and thus from being regarded as ‘minimum benefits’ within the meaning of Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004.
2. Varia tion in the minimum pension thresholds and the normal operation of pension rules
57. The referring court, along with the Greek and Norwegian Governments, stresses that the minimum pension thresholds vary by insurance institution, category of insured person, family status and age – criteria which may also be relevant to the ordinary calculation of pensions – with the result that there is not one minimum but many.
58. As regards, in the first place, the mere fact of that variation, I am not persuaded that it prevents the thresholds from being minimum benefits. The variation goes to the amount of the floor, not to its function as a floor. A national legislature may fix a higher floor for pensioners with dependants, or a lower floor for pensioners who retire early, without those floors ceasing to serve as minimum guarantees. ( 22 )
59. Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 merely refers to the minimum benefit fixed by the legislation of the Member State concerned and contains no requirement that that amount be fixed as a single uniform amount for all beneficiaries. Such a requirement would also sit uneasily with the choice, reflected in recital 4 of that regulation, to respect the special characteristics of national social security legislation and to establish only a system of coordination. The existence of several thresholds reflecting the structure and complexity of a national pension system cannot therefore, in itself, take those thresholds outside the scope of Article 58.
60. The Court has effectively already accepted as much. In the case which gave rise to the judgment in Zaniewicz-Dybeck , ( 23 ) the Swedish guaranteed pension was itself graduated, being reduced pro rata for insurance records shorter than the 40-year maximum, so that it too produced not one minimum but several. That did not prevent the Court from treating it as a minimum benefit.
61. It is worth noting that, relying, inter alia, on the judgment in Zaniewicz-Dybeck , the EFTA Court recently likewise held that a minimum benefit within the meaning of Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 need not be a fixed or specified amount. That court considered that a minimum benefit may be calculated by applying increases and reductions designed to take into account, inter alia, the personal circumstances of the person concerned. It moreover essentially took the view – which I share – that by referring specifically to the periods of insurance or residence completed, Article 58 already inherently accepts the possibility that a minimum benefit may vary according to such periods. ( 24 )
62. With respect to variation by insurance institution and category of insured person, the issue seems to me to be even more straightforward. The relevant threshold is that fixed by the legislation applicable to the person concerned. The question is not whether there is one single minimum for all insured persons but whether, for the institution and category to which the person concerned belongs, the applicable law guarantees an amount exceeding that which the ordinary contribution-based calculation would provide.
63. As regards, in the second place, the fact that the criteria leading to the variation of the thresholds may also be used in the ordinary calculation of the pension, that circumstance likewise does not, in my view, call into question the nature of those thresholds as minimum benefits.
64. The Norwegian Government has drawn an analogy with the case which gave rise to the judgment in Browning , positing that the Greek thresholds form part of the ‘normal operation’ of the pension rules, like the United Kingdom flat-rate pension in that case, and thus do not constitute a ‘minimum benefit’. That analogy, however, is not in my view appropriate.
65. In the case which gave rise to the judgment in Browning , the pension amount relied on as the alleged minimum benefit was calculated on the basis of the pensioner’s contribution record, whereas the Greek thresholds, as understood from the order for reference, go beyond the contribution and insurance record by increasing the pension calculated on that basis whenever it is below a specific floor. More importantly, what was decisive in that case, as outlined above, was the fact that the benefit which the pensioner, unsuccessfully, sought to have recognised as a minimum benefit was the pension that would arise from the ordinary contribution-based calculation if all periods of insurance had been completed under the legislation of the Member State of residence – in essence, the ‘theoretical amount’ under what is now Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 883/2004. ( 25 ) By contrast, the Greek thresholds are not the different theoretical amounts that would result for individual pensioners if all periods of insurance across Member States had been completed in Greece. They are (even if subject to certain variations) actual statutory floors to which pensions falling below them are, in principle, topped up.
66. In view of the foregoing, the decisive question is not, in my view, whether the minimum benefit is to be found within the ordinary pension legislation or whether it uses criteria also relevant to the ordinary pension calculation, but whether it corresponds to the ordinary insurance-record- and contribution-based calculation or instead operates as a protective mechanism on top of, or going beyond, that calculation.
3. The ‘reasonable standard of living’ argument
67. The Court has previously held that what is now Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 ‘covers cases where the periods of employment of the worker under the legislation of the States to which he was subject were relatively short, with the result that the total amount of the benefits payable by those States does not provide a reasonable standard of living’. ( 26 ) The Norwegian Government reads that statement as introducing what is, in essence, a quantitative condition: a benefit qualifies as a ‘minimum benefit’ only if it is high enough to ensure such a standard of living.
68. At the outset, it must be observed that no claim has been made in the present proceedings that the thresholds at issue were insufficient to secure a reasonable standard of living for pensioners.
69. In any event, in the above-cited statement, the Court was merely describing the cases that what is now Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 was intended to address. It did not lay down a strict quantitative condition as to the level required of a ‘minimum benefit’. Such a condition would be difficult to reconcile with the nature of Regulation No 883/2004 as an instrument of coordination which respects the specific characteristics of national social security systems. Member States therefore remain free to determine the level of the minimum benefit, if any, provided by their legislation. The role of Article 58 is not to determine whether that level is sufficiently generous, but to ensure that a person falling within its scope is not denied that protection. In my view, in accordance with the judgment in Browning , and as the Commission also appears to accept, it suffices that the minimum benefit affords a more satisfactory standard of living than the person’s contributions and insurance record alone would provide.
70. In view of the above, I do not consider that the Norwegian Government’s argument has any bearing on the classification of the Greek minimum pension thresholds as ‘minimum benefits’.
4. Conclusion on the first question
71. In the light of all of the foregoing, I am of the view that the considerations raised by the referring court and by the Greek and Norwegian Governments are not such as to call into question the classification of the Greek minimum pension thresholds as ‘minimum benefits’ within the meaning of Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004.
72. I therefore propose that the Court answer the first question to the effect that Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 must be interpreted as meaning that a minimum benefit exists where national legislation lays down minimum pension thresholds which serve to guarantee a pension exceeding that which would result solely from the insured person’s periods of insurance and contributions. It is not decisive in that regard that such thresholds have been established as an expression of social solidarity, or that they vary according to insurance institution, category of insured person, family status or age.
73. It is ultimately for the referring court, having regard to the relevant legal and factual framework, to determine whether the minimum pension thresholds at issue do in fact correspond to that description.
C. The second question: can a lower ‘minimum benefit’ be applied to coordination cases?
74. While the second question is not formally expressed in conditional terms, it follows from the order for reference that it arises if the minimum pension thresholds at issue are to be considered as a ‘minimum benefit’ within the meaning of Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004. On that premiss and even though an affirmative answer to the first question is likely to resolve the dispute in the main proceedings to a large extent, the referring court also seeks to ascertain whether Article 45 TFEU and Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004 preclude national legislation that fixes, as the Article 58 minimum benefit, an amount lower than the national minimum pension thresholds.
75. Although the referring court formulates its question by reference only to Article 45 TFEU and Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004, the compatibility of the national legislation with those provisions cannot, in my view, be appropriately assessed without first determining whether that legislation is consistent with Article 58 itself. I shall therefore examine the legislation in question first in the light of that provision, having regard also to the principle of aggregation of periods (1), and, secondly, with regard to the principles of equal treatment and free movement (2).
1. Article 58 and the principle of aggregation of periods
76. As already explained above, Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 places the person concerned within the existing national minimum benefit arrangements. It does not oblige Member States to create a minimum benefit and does not contemplate a separate minimum, which is created exclusively for coordination cases and does not apply to domestic cases.
77. However, that seems to be precisely the effect of Article 34(1) of the 2011 Law. As the Greek Government confirmed, following a written question from the Court, the EUR 360 amount, established as a minimum benefit under that provision, is applicable only in coordination cases (specifically, to migrant workers, such as the appellant, whose pension entitlement is established by taking into account periods of insurance completed in more than one Member State), ( 27 ) and is not paid to persons whose entire insurance record was completed in Greece. ( 28 )
78. In addition, as set out in point 37 above, Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 and Article 6 of that regulation require that, in determining the applicable minimum benefit, account be taken of the person’s aggregated periods of insurance (and residence) in all Member States.
79. However, according to the order for reference and the Greek Government’s clarifications, while the EUR 360 amount is applied solely in coordination cases, the higher minimum pension thresholds are reserved exclusively for persons with a purely domestic insurance record. As the Commission has rightly observed, that means that foreign insurance periods are not taken into account as if they had been completed in Greece for the purposes of giving access to the relevant threshold, which entails a breach of the principle of aggregation of periods.
80. Consequently, the designation of a separate minimum benefit solely for coordination cases and the ‘decoupling’ of the treatment of those cases from wholly domestic insurance cases thus effected is, in my view, not in line with Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 or Article 6 thereof. That reading is borne out especially by the purpose of Article 58 as detailed above, which is to ensure for migrant workers the minimum benefit that they would have received if their periods of insurance had all been completed in the Member State of residence: no more, no less.
2. Free movement of workers and the principle of equal treatment
81. I turn next to the compatibility of the national legislation with the freedom of movement of workers and the principle of equal treatment.
82. Article 45(2) TFEU provides that freedom of movement for workers entails the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment. That principle of equal treatment is given concrete expression in Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004, which requires that the persons falling within the scope of that regulation must be treated in the same way, under the legislation of a Member State, as the nationals of that Member State. Accordingly, Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004 is to be interpreted in the same way and in conformity with Article 45 TFEU. ( 29 )
83. As recalled above, in the absence of harmonisation at EU level, Member States retain the power to organise their own social security schemes. In exercising that power, however, they must comply with EU law and, in particular, with the provisions of the FEU Treaty governing freedom of movement. ( 30 )
84. Moreover, as the Court has consistently held, the FEU Treaty offers no guarantee to a worker that extending his or her activities into more than one Member State or transferring them to another Member State will be neutral as regards social security. Given the disparities in the social security legislation of the Member States, such an extension or transfer may or may not be to the worker’s advantage in terms of social security, depending on the circumstances. It follows that, even where its application is less favourable, such legislation is still compatible with Article 45 TFEU, provided however that it does not place the worker at a disadvantage as compared with those who pursue all their activities in the Member State where it applies. ( 31 )
85. Indeed, the aim of Article 45 TFEU (and of Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004) would not be met if, through exercising their right to freedom of movement, migrant workers were to lose social security advantages guaranteed to them by the laws of a Member State. Such a consequence might discourage EU workers from exercising their right to freedom of movement and would therefore constitute an obstacle to that freedom. ( 32 )
86. Lastly, I note that the principle of equal treatment, as laid down in Article 45 TFEU and Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004, prohibits not only overt discrimination based on nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, through the application of other distinguishing criteria, lead in fact to the same result. Accordingly, conditions imposed by national law must be regarded as being indirectly discriminatory where, although applicable irrespective of nationality, they affect essentially migrant workers or the great majority of those affected are migrant workers; where they are applicable without distinction but can more easily be satisfied by national workers than migrant workers; or where there is a risk that they may operate to the particular detriment of the latter. ( 33 )
87. The national legislation at issue does not establish a distinction expressly based on nationality. Both the EUR 360 amount and the statutory thresholds apply irrespective of whether the person concerned is Greek or a national of another Member State. Hence, the legislation does not give rise to direct discrimination on grounds of nationality.
88. By contrast, that legislation establishes a distinction based on where the worker completed the periods of insurance relevant to the award of the pension. According to the information before the Court, the minimum amount of EUR 360 applies to persons whose pension entitlement is determined under the coordination rules by taking account of periods completed in more than one Member State. The higher minimum pension thresholds are, on the other hand, reserved for persons who completed all their periods of insurance in Greece.
89. Consequently, a person who has exercised his or her right to freedom of movement may receive a lower minimum pension than a person who, in equivalent personal circumstances and with an equivalent insurance and contribution record, never exercised that freedom but instead completed the entirety of his or her career in Greece. In fact, as I understand it, even a person with a lower total insurance record than that of the appellant in the main proceedings, if that record was completed entirely in Greece and the relevant entitlement conditions were satisfied, would receive (as opposed to the appellant) a pension topped up to the applicable domestic threshold.
90. Completion of all relevant insurance periods in Greece is, by its nature, a condition more easily satisfied by nationals of that State than by nationals of other Member States. Such a requirement in order to qualify for the higher minimum pension thresholds is thus a measure which is liable to operate mainly to the detriment of nationals of other Member States – and, I would argue, is in any event liable to discourage the exercise of free movement.
91. The difference in treatment which arises constitutes, in my view, indirect discrimination on the ground of nationality. The disadvantage is concrete: according to the figures provided by the referring court, a migrant worker such as the appellant receives a minimum benefit that is more than EUR 125 per month lower than the threshold guaranteed to a worker in a comparable situation (in terms of personal circumstances and insurance record), who never left Greece.
92. National legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings may nonetheless be justified in so far as it pursues a public interest objective and is proportionate thereto, meaning that it is appropriate for the purpose of ensuring the attainment of the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain it. ( 34 )
93. The Greek Government does not expressly advance a justification for the difference in treatment, its main position being that persons whose insurance careers extend across Member States are not in a situation comparable to that of persons with a wholly domestic career. ( 35 )
94. I note, however, that both the Greek Government and the referring court refer to considerations supporting the legislation at issue, in particular those set out in the explanatory memorandum to the 2011 Law. That memorandum refers, first, to the aim of ‘harmonising’, or rather ‘aligning’, the Greek legislation with the EU approach to the concept of minimum benefit and, secondly, to the adverse financial consequences of treating the minimum pension thresholds as minimum benefits. Those considerations were intended to explain why the 2011 Law designated another, recently introduced, component of the domestic pension system as the Article 58 minimum benefit. They do not appear to support a stand-alone Article 58 minimum benefit, with no counterpart in the pension system applicable to wholly domestic cases, while the higher minimum pension thresholds continued to apply in those cases. I therefore do not consider that they can justify the difference in treatment at issue.
95. Even if those considerations were nevertheless regarded as objectives pursued by the legislation in the form in which it was ultimately applicable, I have doubts as to whether they constitute legitimate objectives capable of justifying the difference in treatment identified above. For the present purposes, I shall confine myself to the following. As regards, first, alignment with the EU concept of ‘minimum benefit’, Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004 neither requires nor justifies the creation of a separate lower floor for coordination cases while a higher national minimum benefit remains in place for comparable domestic cases. As regards, secondly, adverse financial consequences, budgetary considerations may underlie a Member State’s social policy choices, but they do not in themselves justify discrimination against migrant workers. ( 36 ) While the preservation of the financial balance of a social security system may constitute a legitimate objective where a genuine risk of seriously undermining that balance is established, ( 37 ) no such risk, arising specifically from the level of minimum benefits for migrant workers, has been demonstrated here.
96. Nor, in any event, even if such an objective were to be accepted as legitimate, does the legislation in question appear proportionate to it. The distinction in question is not drawn by reference to the actual burden imposed on the Greek institution, and applies to coordination cases as a category, in an overly broad manner, irrespective of, inter alia, the duration of the periods completed in Greece and the amount of the Greek pension or of the supplement actually payable.
97. On the basis of the information and arguments before the Court, I therefore do not consider the difference in treatment created by the legislation at issue to be justified. It would, of course, be for the referring court to assess, in the specific circumstances of the case, whether that difference can be justified and whether the measure is proportionate.
3. Conclusion on the second question
98. In the light of the foregoing, I would suggest that the Court reformulate the second question so that it may also be understood as concerning the compatibility of the national legislation at issue with Articles 6 and 58of Regulation No 883/2004, in order to provide a useful answer to the referring court. ( 38 )
99. On that basis, I would propose that the Court answer the second question to the effect that Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004, read in conjunction with Articles 4 and 6 of that regulation and Article 45 TFEU, precludes national legislation which fixes, for persons whose pension entitlement is determined by taking into account insurance periods completed in more than one Member State, a minimum benefit lower than the minimum benefit guaranteed to persons with equivalent personal circumstances and insurance records who completed all their insurance periods in the Member State concerned.
V. Conclusion
100. In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court answer the questions referred by the Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (Council of State, Greece) as follows:
(1) Article 58 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems
must be interpreted as meaning that a minimum benefit exists where national legislation lays down minimum pension thresholds which serve to guarantee a pension exceeding that which would result solely from the insured person’s periods of insurance and contributions. It is not decisive in that regard that such thresholds have been established as an expression of social solidarity, or that they vary according to insurance institution, category of insured person, family status or age.
(2) Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004, read in conjunction with Articles 4 and 6 of that regulation, and Article 45 TFEU,
precludes national legislation which fixes, for persons whose pension entitlement is determined by taking into account insurance periods completed in more than one Member State, a minimum benefit lower than the minimum benefit guaranteed to persons with equivalent personal circumstances and insurance records who completed all their insurance periods in the Member State concerned.
1 Original language: English.
2 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems (OJ 2004 L 166, p. 1).
3 IKA-ETAM was absorbed in 2017 into the Eniaios Foreas Koinonikis Asfalisis (Single Social Security Body, Greece (EFKA)), since renamed e-EFKA, which is therefore now the respondent in the main proceedings. As the dispute concerns the prior IKA-ETAM scheme, I will refer, where necessary, to IKA-ETAM.
4 It is understood, on the basis of the case file, that these are the thresholds relevant to the dispute in the main proceedings. The referring court nevertheless also sets out the provisions on the thresholds applicable to the category of ‘new’ insured persons. It is ultimately for the referring court to determine the precise thresholds relevant in the case of the appellant. I nevertheless note, in any event, that, although they differ in their method of calculation and slightly in their final amount, both sets of thresholds perform the same function: that of floors having the effect that pensions below that level are raised.
5 The expression ‘coordination cases’ is used in the present Opinion to refer to cases where pension entitlement has been determined in accordance with the coordination rules set out in Regulation No 883/2004.
6 Regulation of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community (OJ, English Special Edition: Series I Volume 1971 (II), p. 416).
7 As Article 50 of Regulation No 1408/71 corresponds, without material change, to Article 58 of Regulation No 883/2004, the case-law on the former – which will be cited in the present Opinion – remains relevant also with respect to the latter.
8 As indicated in IKA-ETAM Circular No 9/6.2.2012.
9 See judgments of 14 March 2019, Vester (C‑134/18, ‘the judgment in Vester ’, EU:C:2019:212, paragraphs 29 to 31), and of 22 January 2026, Sovisso (C‑633/24, ‘the judgment in Sovisso ’, EU:C:2026:36, paragraphs 35 to 37); see also recitals 1, 3 and 4 of Regulation No 883/2004.
10 See judgment of 7 December 2017, Zaniewicz-Dybeck (C‑189/16, ‘the judgment in Zaniewicz-Dybeck ’, EU:C:2017:946, paragraph 58).
11 See judgment of 30 November 1977, Torri (64/77, ‘the judgment in Torri ’, EU:C:1977:197, paragraphs 7 and 13), and the judgment in Zaniewicz-Dybeck , paragraph 47.
12 Judgment of 17 December 1981, Browning (22/81, ‘the judgment in Browning ’, EU:C:1981:316).
13 See the judgment in Browning , paragraph 15; see also the judgment in Zaniewicz-Dybeck , paragraph 45.
14 See the judgment in Browning , paragraph 13.
15 Ibid., paragraph 14. That is, of course, not to say that the theoretical amount can never coincide with the minimum benefit; see, to that effect, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Stinco and Panfilo (C‑132/96, EU:C:1997:436, point 61).
16 It must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, a Member State’s declaration that a benefit falls within the relevant coordination concept is proof that it does, whereas the absence of a declaration is not proof that a benefit falls outside it; see judgments of 29 November 1977, Beerens (35/77, EU:C:1977:194, paragraph 9), and of 11 July 1996, Otte (C‑25/95, EU:C:1996:295, paragraph 20).
17 As follows from their replies to a written question from the Court.
18 The amount of the benefit is, of course, a matter for national law, since Article 58 refers to the minimum benefit fixed by national legislation. However, whether a particular national provision falls within the concept of ‘minimum benefit’ in Article 58 is a matter of EU law. While the Court stated in its judgment in Torri that that concept is to be defined primarily by reference to the minimum benefits fixed by the laws of the various Member States, it merely undertook a comparative exercise of minimum benefits existing at the time in order to, as the Norwegian Government observes, derive a single EU law meaning therefrom.
19 As I understand it, however, the IKA-ETAM fund was financed not only by contributions but also partly by the State.
20 See, by analogy, judgment of 15 March 2005, Bidar (C‑209/03, EU:C:2005:169, paragraph 56), and Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Jeltes and Others , (C‑443/11, EU:C:2013:6, point 57).
21 See Paju, J., ‘The Charter and social security rights: Time to stand and deliver?’, European Journal of Social Security , Vol. 24, Issue 1, 2022, pp. 21 to 39.
22 Comparative practice also indicates that minimum old-age protection in several Member States may vary depending, inter alia, on personal circumstances; see Devetzi, S. (ed.), Minimum Income in Old Age – A legal comparison of selected European countries (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens - Thessaloniki, 2023).
23 See the judgment in Zaniewicz-Dybeck , in particular paragraphs 21 to 23 and 44 to 46.
24 Judgment of the EFTA Court of 18 April 2024, A v Arbeids- og velferdsdirektoratet , E-3/23, paragraphs 73 and 74.
25 See the judgment in Browning , paragraphs 3, 13 and 14.
26 See the judgments in Torri , paragraph 5, in Browning , paragraph 12, and in Zaniewicz-Dybeck , paragraph 57.
27 It is unclear from the information before the Court whether a person who completed insurance periods in another Member State but qualifies for an autonomous Greek pension – namely, an independent benefit under Article 52 of Regulation No 883/2004 – would be subject to the EUR 360 benchmark or the ordinary minimum pension thresholds. That issue need not be addressed here, as it is not relevant to the appellant in the main proceedings, who was only entitled to a pro rata benefit (see point 20 above). Accordingly, the present analysis refers to coordination cases such as that of the appellant, to which the EUR 360 amount applies.
28 The intention does not appear to have been to create an ad hoc minimum, but merely to identify the minimum benefit as the ‘basic pension’ of the 2010 Law. Since that pension was never implemented, there is no need to consider whether it was itself a ‘minimum benefit’ for the purposes of Article 58. The relevant point is that, as the referring court observes, the EUR 360 amount did not correspond to any minimum pension ever actually paid under the ordinary Greek rules.
29 See judgment of 11 April 2024, Sozialministeriumservice (C‑116/23, ‘the judgment in Sozialministeriumservice’, EU:C:2024:292, paragraphs 48 and 54 and the case-law cited).
30 See the judgments in Vester , paragraphs 29 to 31, and in Sovisso , paragraphs 35 to 37 and the case-law cited.
31 See the judgments in Vester , paragraph 32, and in Sovisso , paragraph 38 and the case-law cited.
32 See the judgments in Vester, paragraph 33, and in Sovisso , paragraph 39 and the case-law cited.
33 See judgments of 5 December 2019, Bocero Torrico and Bode (C‑398/18 and C‑428/18, ‘the judgment in Bocero Torrico and Bode ’, EU:C:2019:1050, paragraphs 40 and 41), and of 22 June 2011, Landtová (C‑399/09, EU:C:2011:415, paragraphs 44 and 45 and the case-law cited).
34 See, to that effect, the judgment in Bocero Torrico and Bode , paragraph 43.
35 The Greek Government claims that those categories are not comparable, since the wholly domestic worker is governed solely by national law, whereas the migrant worker is subject to aggregation and apportionment and may receive benefits from several States. That distinction is relevant for the calculation of benefits under Article 52 of Regulation No 883/2004, but not for Article 58 thereof, which itself requires that the migrant worker be guaranteed the national minimum as if he or she had had a wholly domestic career. In that regard, the only difference between those two categories of persons is that, for the domestic worker, the minimum benefit tops up a single Greek pension, whereas, for the migrant worker, it tops up the aggregate of the Greek and foreign benefits.
36 See judgments of 17 March 2005, Kranemann (C‑109/04, EU:C:2005:187, paragraph 34), and of 20 June 2013, Giersch and Others (C‑20/12, EU:C:2013:411, paragraph 51).
37 See, to that effect, the judgment in Sozialministeriumservice, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited.
38 See, by analogy, the judgment in Sozialministeriumservice, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited.