Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) 15 October 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Tenth Chamber)

15 October 2026 ( * )

( Appeal – Civil service – Article 266 TFEU – Judgment of the General Court of the European Union annulling the decision not to include the appellant’s name on the reserve list for a competition – Infringement of the principle of the stability of the selection board – Implementation of that judgment by means of financial compensation – Refusal to apply a corrective factor in order to include the appellant’s name on that reserve list – Refusal to apply other non-pecuniary measures of compensation – Action for annulment and compensation – Method of determining that financial compensation – Obligation to take into account loss of opportunity – Method of determining the loss of opportunity – Ex aequo et bono assessment )

In Case C‑1/25 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 2 January 2025,

ZR, represented by A. Champetier and S. Rodrigues, avocats,

appellant,

the other party to the proceedings being:

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by E. Lekan and A. Lukošiūtė, acting as Agents,

defendant at first instance,

THE COURT (Tenth Chamber),

composed of M.L. Arastey Sahún (Rapporteur), President of the Fifth Chamber, acting as President of the Tenth Chamber, J. Passer and D. Gratsias, Judges,

Advocate General: R. Norkus,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written procedure,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By her appeal, ZR seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 23 October 2024, ZR v EUIPO (T‑634/22, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2024:746), by which it, first, upheld her action for annulment of the decision of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 14 December 2021 by which the latter awarded her a sum of EUR 5 000 in compliance with the judgment of 13 January 2021, ZR v EUIPO (T‑610/18, ‘judgment T‑610/18’, EU:T:2021:5; ‘the decision at issue’), secondly, dismissed her action for compensation for the material and non-material damage she had allegedly suffered and, thirdly, ordered EUIPO to pay her financial compensation in the amount of EUR 10 000.

Background to the dispute

2 The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 30 of the judgment under appeal and may be summarised as follows.

3 On 12 January 2017, the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) published in the Official Journal of the European Union the notice of Open Competition EUIPO/AD/01/17 – Administrators (AD 6) in the field of intellectual property (OJ 2017 C 9A, p. 1, and corrigendum OJ 2017 C 315A, p. 2; ‘the notice of competition’). The purpose of that competition, organised by EPSO, was to draw up a reserve list (‘the reserve list’) for the recruitment of administrators by EUIPO.

4 The notice of competition stated that candidates who satisfied the eligibility requirements and had obtained one of the highest marks in the pre-selection based on qualifications would be invited to attend ‘EPSO’s assessment centre’ (‘the assessment centre’) where they would be assessed, inter alia, on eight general competencies and on their specific competencies in the field covered by the competition.

5 The notice of competition stated that general competencies would be assessed out of 80 points, the pass mark required for those general competencies being 40 points, and that the specific competencies would be assessed out of 100 points, the pass mark required for those specific competencies being 50 points.

6 The appellant applied to take part in the competition in question.

7 On 12 July 2017, she was informed by EPSO that she had been invited to the assessment centre, where she took part in the tests provided for by the notice of competition on 12 and 13 September 2017.

8 By letter of 1 December 2017, EPSO informed the appellant that the competition selection board had decided not to include her name on the reserve list for the competition (‘the decision not to include her name on the reserve list’), for the reason that, having obtained 97.5 points for the tests taken at the assessment centre, the appellant was not among the candidates who had obtained the highest marks.

9 On 11 December 2017, the appellant submitted a request for review to the competition selection board.

10 On 1 March 2018, she lodged a complaint with EUIPO pursuant to Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, in the version applicable to the present dispute (‘the Staff Regulations’), followed by a supplement to the complaint on 7 June 2018, against the decision not to include her name on the reserve list.

11 The request for review referred to in paragraph 9 above and that complaint were rejected by decisions of 7 March and of 27 June 2018 respectively.

12 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 9 October 2018, the appellant brought an action for the annulment of the decision not to include her name on the reserve list and, so far as necessary, the decisions of 7 March and 27 June 2018 referred to in the previous paragraph.

13 By judgment T‑610/18, the General Court annulled the decision of 7 March 2018 and dismissed the action as to the remainder.

14 In paragraph 117 of that judgment, the Court upheld the appellant’s complaint alleging infringement of the rule requiring stability in the composition of the selection board. In paragraph 118 thereof, it found that, given the significance of the principles of equal treatment of the candidates, consistent marking and objectivity of the assessment, the failure on the part of the selection board to comply with that rule constituted a breach of essential procedural requirements which should entail the annulment of the decision of 7 March 2018.

15 By letter of 27 July 2021, EUIPO invited the appellant to a meeting in order to discuss the implementation of that judgment and, in particular, an offer of fair compensation. That meeting took place on 15 September 2021.

16 By email of 21 September 2021, the appellant stated that it was difficult for her to regard the compensation of EUR 5 000, proposed by EUIPO during that meeting, as fair, given, inter alia, that there were, in her view, other appropriate solutions for implementing judgment T‑610/18.

17 By email of 30 September 2021, EUIPO replied to the appellant’s comments and offered to pay her a sum of EUR 10 000, explaining that, if that new offer was not accepted within one week, it would be considered as having been rejected and EUIPO would then adopt a decision to comply with its obligation to implement that judgment.

18 By email of 7 October 2021, the appellant submitted additional comments and argued that the new offer could likewise not be regarded as a fair solution, while stating that she was still prepared to continue the dialogue.

19 By email of 26 October 2021, EUIPO stated that it considered that the appellant had rejected its new offer and informed her that it was going to adopt a decision to comply with its legal obligation to implement judgment T‑610/18.

20 On 14 December 2021, EUIPO adopted the decision at issue, in which it stated that, given, first, the impossibility of implementing that judgment without bringing about the same irregularity penalised by the Court or new irregularities, and, secondly, the degree of uncertainty about the outcome which the appellant would have obtained in the absence of that irregularity, a payment of EUR 5 000 was the form of compensation which best redressed that situation and implemented the judgment in question.

21 On 14 March 2022, the appellant lodged a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations against the decision at issue.

22 On 28 June 2022, EUIPO adopted a decision rejecting that complaint (‘the decision rejecting the complaint’).

23 In the decision at issue and the decision rejecting the complaint, EUIPO, in the first place, rejected a solution consisting in organising a new oral test, on the ground that the appellant’s mark would be vitiated by the same defect as the decision at issue.

24 In the second place, EUIPO rejected a solution consisting in applying a corrective factor in order to include the appellant’s name on the reserve list, on the ground that that solution would not make it possible to compensate for the disadvantage caused by the irregularity of the initial tests resulting from the unstable composition of the selection board. According to EUIPO, it was not possible to identify a specific group of candidates who were favoured or disadvantaged compared to other candidates as a result of that irregularity, or to set objective criteria for rectifying it.

25 In the third place, EUIPO found that the principle of equal treatment had not been breached as a result of the treatment of the applicant in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 13 January 2021, Helbert v EUIPO (T‑548/18, EU:T:2021:4), which also concerned a decision of the selection board in the competition at issue, because, first, the procedures for implementing that judgment and judgment T‑610/18 had been carried out separately and, secondly, because the parties concerned were not in the same situation on account of, for example, status under the Staff Regulations, function group and grade concerned.

26 Consequently, EUIPO decided to grant the appellant fair compensation assessed ex aequo et bono at EUR 5 000.

27 In determining that compensation, EUIPO refused to take into account the appellant’s loss of opportunity, which she assessed at 90% on the ground, inter alia, that it was not certain that, in the absence of the procedural irregularity found by the Court in judgment T‑610/18, her name would have been placed on the reserve list or that she would have been recruited.

28 In the decision rejecting the complaint, EUIPO also took the view that a solution consisting in transferring the appellant, who is an official of the European Commission, to EUIPO was not among the options for implementing judgment T‑610/18. It added that it preferred, in that regard, to wait for the outcome of the case which gave rise to the judgment of 12 June 2025, ZR v EUIPO (C‑364/23 P, EU:C:2025:428).

The action before the General Court and the judgment under appeal

29 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 10 October 2022, the appellant brought an action for, first, the annulment of the decision at issue and, so far as necessary, the decision rejecting the complaint and, secondly, compensation for the material and non-material damage she had allegedly suffered.

30 In support of the action, she raised two pleas in law, which the General Court regarded as actually constituting four pleas in law, the first alleging infringement of Article 266 TFEU, the second, breach of the principle of equal treatment, the third, put forward as an alternative to the first two, alleging infringement of Article 266 TFEU in the determination of the financial compensation which she was awarded in implementation of judgment T‑610/18, and the fourth, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and the right to a fair trial, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and of the principle of good administration, the duty of care and the duty to state reasons, laid down in Article 41 of that charter.

31 By the judgment under appeal, the Court, after rejecting the first two of those pleas, annulled the decision at issue, finding, in its examination of the third plea in law, that the loss of opportunity should have been taken into account in determining the financial compensation awarded to the appellant. It subsequently assessed the damage stemming from that loss of opportunity by setting that compensation, ex aequo et bono , at the sum of EUR 10 000.

32 Since the decision at issue was annulled on the basis of the third plea in law, the Court did not examine the fourth.

Forms of order sought by the parties to the appeal

33 The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

– set aside the judgment under appeal;

– annul the decision at issue and the decision rejecting the complaint or, if that is not possible, refer the case back to the General Court for it to give judgment; and

– order EUIPO to pay the costs.

34 EUIPO contends that the Court of Justice should:

– dismiss the appeal in its entirety as unfounded, and

– order the appellant to pay the costs of the appeal proceedings and of the proceedings before the General Court.

The appeal

35 The appellant raises five grounds in support of her appeal. The first alleges that the General Court erred in law by rejecting the plea in law which alleged infringement of Article 266 TFEU. The second and third grounds of appeal allege that the General Court made several errors in rejecting the plea alleging breach of the principle of equal treatment and in assessing the loss of opportunity suffered by the appellant, respectively. The fourth ground of appeal alleges infringement of the right of access to justice and the appellant’s rights of defence on account of the fourth plea in law she raised at first instance not being examined. Lastly, the fifth ground of appeal alleges that the appellant’s rights of defence were infringed when her action for compensation for the material and non-material damage was dismissed.

36 However, by letter of 3 April 2026, she withdrew the first ground of appeal in part, in so far as it concerned the solution consisting in the organisation of a new oral test.

Admissibility of the first, second and third grounds of appeal

37 It must be recalled at the outset that it is for the Court to examine of its own motion any question relating to the admissibility of an appeal or the grounds of the appeal (judgment of 25 June 2020, HF v Parliament , C‑570/18 P, EU:C:2020:490, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

38 It should be noted that, in accordance with the first and second paragraphs of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal may be brought, inter alia, against final decisions of the General Court by any party which has been unsuccessful, in whole or in part, in its submissions before the General Court.

39 By contrast, a party is not entitled to bring an appeal against a judgment of the General Court which upheld its claims, even if that court rejected certain pleas put forward in support of those claims (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 July 2018, Société des produits Nestlé and Others v Mondelez UK Holdings & Services , C‑84/17 P, C‑85/17 P and C‑95/17 P, EU:C:2018:596, paragraphs 49 and 50, and order of 6 May 2026, Swissgrid v ACER , C‑849/25 P, EU:C:2026:387, paragraphs 24 to 26).

40 The force of res judicata extends only to the grounds of a judgment which constitute the necessary support of its operative part and are, therefore, inseparable from it. Accordingly, when the General Court annuls an act contested before it, the grounds on the basis of which that court dismissed certain arguments relied upon by the parties cannot be considered to have gained the force of res judicata . It follows that the grounds and arguments put forward in an appeal made by the party which succeeded before the General Court in order to challenge the rejection, by that court, of certain pleas and arguments it submitted at first instance cannot procure an advantage for that party or be capable of having an influence on the operative part of the General Court’s judgment (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2021, Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission , C‑174/19 P and C‑175/19 P, EU:C:2021:801, paragraphs 51 to 53 and the case-law cited).

41 In the present case, it is apparent from paragraphs 31 and 32 of the judgment under appeal that, in her action before the General Court, the appellant claimed, first, that the decision at issue should be annulled, secondly, that EUIPO should be ordered to pay the costs and, thirdly, that EUIPO should be ordered to compensate the material and non-material damage she had allegedly suffered.

42 However, it is clear that the appellant’s claim for the annulment of the decision at issue was upheld by the General Court and that that decision was annulled. In those circumstances, and in the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 38 to 40 above, the appellant is not entitled to bring an appeal against the part of the judgment under appeal which upheld that claim, even though the General Court rejected the first and second pleas of her action put forward in support of that claim.

43 It follows that the first and second grounds of appeal, by which the appellant challenges the rejection of the first and second pleas in law of her action, respectively, which were raised in support of the claim for the annulment of the decision at issue, must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible. The same is true of the fourth ground of appeal, by which the appellant challenges the General Court’s decision not to examine the fourth plea in law of her action, which was also raised in support of the claim for the annulment of the decision at issue.

The third ground of appeal

Arguments of the parties

44 By her third ground of appeal, the appellant submits that, in the examination of the third plea in law she raised at first instance, the General Court vitiated the judgment under appeal by breaching the duty to state reasons, using contradictory reasoning, erring in law and breaching the principles of restitutio in integrum , equal treatment and proportionality.

45 Before the General Court, the appellant criticised EUIPO for not taking into account, when assessing the compensation which the latter granted her in the decision at issue, the loss of opportunity of being recruited which she had suffered as a result of the illegality found by the General Court in judgment T‑610/18.

46 In paragraph 80 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court ruled in the appellant’s favour and found that EUIPO, by not taking into account that loss of opportunity, had infringed Article 266 TFEU.

47 However, according to the appellant, the way in which the General Court found, in paragraph 95 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘the loss of opportunity suffered by the [appellant would] be fairly assessed by setting the financial compensation, ex aequo et bono , at the sum of EUR 10 000’ is vitiated both by a breach of the duty to state reasons and by an error of law.

48 She argues that there is a contradiction between paragraph 95 of the judgment under appeal and paragraph 80 thereof, in which the General Court, in order to annul the decision at issue, stated that the loss of opportunity should have been taken into account, that being a decision in which the ex aequo et bono principle had been applied for the assessment of fair compensation.

49 Moreover, after correctly stating, in paragraph 87 of the judgment under appeal, that, in order to determine the compensation due based on the loss of opportunity, it was appropriate, inter alia, to assess, as a percentage, the chance the appellant had of being recruited following the drawing up of the reserve list, the General Court found, in paragraph 88 of that judgment, that it was apparent from the documents before it that such a percentage could not be determined in the present case.

50 In the appellant’s view, that finding is not sufficiently substantiated to disclose, in a clear and unequivocal manner, the General Court’s reasoning, as required by the case-law relating to the duty to state reasons.

51 Assuming that the alleged impossibility of determining that percentage is linked to it being impossible ‘to assert that, had the selection board been constituted in a more stable manner, the [appellant] would have been placed on the [reserve list]’, and to it being impossible ‘to ascertain the place she would have obtained’ if she had been included on that list, as stated in paragraph 91 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant submits that that analysis is inconsistent with the settled case-law that the EU courts may wait, before determining fair compensation, for the final outcome of an appellant’s request for inclusion on the reserve list of a given competition, for example, until the issuance of the results of a new selection procedure, tailored to the specific nature of that appellant’s case and with the criticised defects removed (judgment of 8 June 2006, Pérez-Díaz v Commission , T‑156/03, EU:T:2006:153, paragraph 76).

52 In accordance with paragraphs 67 and 73 of the judgment of 21 February 2008, Commission v Girardot (C‑348/06 P, EU:C:2008:107), knowing which place the appellant would have obtained on the reserve list is irrelevant to determining the loss of earnings.

53 In addition, according to the appellant, the fact, stated in paragraph 91 of the judgment under appeal, that it cannot be guaranteed that, had the appellant’s name been included on the reserve list, ‘she would have been recruited as an official’ is also irrelevant. It is apparent, she argues, from paragraph 82 of the judgment of 13 September 2011, AA v Commission , (F‑101/09, EU:F:2011:133), that the loss of opportunity of filling a post and, consequently, of receiving a higher salary is, in itself, material damage which must be compensated, irrespective of whether or not the relevant party is recruited.

54 Accordingly, in her view, by finding, in paragraph 93 of the judgment under appeal, that the loss of opportunity suffered by the appellant could not be assessed in the light of the criteria set by the case-law arising from paragraphs 67 and 73 of the judgment of 21 February 2008, Commission v Girardot (C‑348/06 P, EU:C:2008:107), and from paragraph 58 of the judgment of 6 June 2006, Girardot v Commission (T‑10/02, EU:T:2006:148), the General Court misinterpreted that case-law, which led to an error of law.

55 Lastly, according to the appellant, the application of the ex aequo et bono principle is questionable in the present case, since no provision of the Staff Regulations grants the General Court the power to adopt a decision based solely on equity.

56 Compensation of EUR 10 000, as set by the General Court, is, first, manifestly unfair in the light of the salaries and stable situation within EUIPO for the candidates whose names were included on the reserve list and recruited. Secondly, that compensation breaches the principle of restitutio in integrum since it can hardly be regarded as restoring the appellant’s rights given the time elapsed, the costs she had to incur in order to assert her rights and the additional stress she had to endure.

57 In the light of the foregoing, the assessment of that compensation is, in the appellant’s view, not only unjustified (including as regards the amount) but also in breach of the principles of equal treatment and proportionality.

58 EUIPO disputes the appellant’s arguments.

Findings of the Court

59 As regards, first of all, the appellant’s complaints alleging breach of the duty to state reasons, it must be recalled, first, that that duty is an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, which is concerned with the substantive legality of the measure at issue. The reasoning of a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. If those grounds are vitiated by errors, those errors will vitiate the substantive legality of the decision, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect (judgment of 5 March 2026, Passalacqua v Commission , C‑309/24 P, EU:C:2026:152, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).

60 Secondly, that duty requires the General Court to disclose, in a clear and unequivocal manner, the reasoning followed by it in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the decision taken and the Court of Justice to exercise its power of review. Contradictory or unintelligible reasoning in a judgment of the General Court amounts to a failure to state reasons (judgment of 13 November 2025, BNP Paribas Public Sector v SRB , C‑4/24 P, EU:C:2025:879, paragraphs 91 and 92 and the case-law cited).

61 In that respect, in the first place, the appellant argues that paragraph 95 of the judgment under appeal, in which the General Court granted her financial compensation set ex aequo et bono , contradicts paragraph 80 of that judgment, in which the General Court found the illegality that justified annulling the decision at issue, with her emphasising that that decision applied the ex aequo et bono principle .

62 However, it is clear that, contrary to what that last claim implies, that decision was annulled not on account of that principle being applied, but on account of the loss of opportunity not being taken into account in the determination of financial compensation. It follows that the judgment under appeal was not vitiated by any contradiction in reasoning by the General Court on that subject.

63 In the second place, the appellant criticises the General Court for not having substantiated the statement, in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, that it was not possible to determine, in the present case, the percentage chance that the appellant might have been recruited if her name had been included on the reserve list.

64 However, it is clearly apparent from the wording of paragraphs 89 to 93 of that judgment that those paragraphs explain that finding, with the result that the General Court has not breached its duty to state reasons.

65 Next, as regards the question whether the reasoning is well founded, the appellant criticises in several respects the three statements in paragraph 91 of that judgment, in which the General Court found, first, that it was impossible to assert that, had the selection board been constituted in a more stable manner, the appellant’s name would have been included on the reserve list, secondly, that, had her name been included thereon, it was impossible to ascertain at what place it would have featured and, thirdly, that, even had her name been included on the reserve list, it could not be guaranteed that the appellant would have been recruited as an official, since inclusion on that list did not confer a right to be appointed.

66 It is true that the fact that it is not possible to determine, if the appellant’s name had been included on the reserve list, at what place it would have featured, or even the fact that it cannot be guaranteed that, in such a situation, she would have been recruited to a post as an official are not, in themselves, factors capable of precluding the determination, in accordance with the case-law arising from paragraphs 67 and 73 of the judgment of 21 February 2008, Commission v Girardot (C‑348/06 P, EU:C:2008:107), as referred to in paragraph 87 of the judgment under appeal, of the loss of earnings suffered by the appellant and the percentage chance of her being recruited if her name had been included on the reserve list.

67 It follows from that case-law that the fact that a successful candidate who has been included on the reserve list of a given competition cannot assert any right to be recruited does not preclude the determination of the loss of opportunity, in accordance with the method referred to in the previous paragraph of the present judgment.

68 However, the first statement in paragraph 91 of the judgment under appeal, according to which it is impossible to assert that, had the selection board been constituted in a more stable manner, the appellant’s name would have been included on the reserve list, suffices in itself to justify the General Court’s decision not to attempt to determine the loss of opportunity in accordance with that method.

69 In that regard, it must be recalled, first, that it is apparent from the case-law that, in its unlimited jurisdiction, the General Court has the power, inter alia, to assess, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, damage caused by the administration according to the ex aequo et bono method (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 February 2008, Commission v Girardot , C‑348/06 P, EU:C:2008:107, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited, and of 8 May 2019, Joint undertaking Fusion for Energy v Galocha , C‑243/18 P, EU:C:2019:378, paragraph 70).

70 Secondly, according to settled case-law, where the General Court has found that damage has been caused, it alone has jurisdiction to assess, within the limits of the claim, how and to what extent that damage should be compensated for, subject to the proviso that, in order to enable the Court of Justice to exercise its power of judicial review over the judgments of the General Court, those judgments must contain adequate statements of reasons and, in relation to the assessment of damage, must state the criteria used to determine the amount at which the compensation has been assessed (judgment of 1 October 2020, CC v Parliament , C‑612/19 P, EU:C:2020:776, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

71 In that context, the Court of Justice has found that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to define a method to quantify precisely the opportunity of being recruited to a post within an institution and, consequently, to assess the damage resulting from the loss of that opportunity (judgment of 21 February 2008, Commission v Girardot , C‑348/06 P, EU:C:2008:107, paragraph 60).

72 Consequently, for the purpose of examining whether a judgment is vitiated by an error of law as regards the determination of the extent of the compensation for the damage resulting from the loss of opportunity of being recruited, account must be taken of the margin of appreciation which the General Court has, when exercising its unlimited jurisdiction, in relation to the method to be chosen to carry out such a determination (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 February 2008, Commission v Girardot , C‑348/06 P, EU:C:2008:107, paragraph 61).

73 In the present case, in the light of the first statement in paragraph 91 of the judgment under appeal, read in conjunction with paragraph 90 thereof, the General Court was entitled to find, without erring in law, that it was not possible to apply the method referred to in paragraph 87 of that judgment, with the result that the loss of opportunity had to be determined according to the ex aequo et bono method.

74 Lastly, as regards the actual implementation, in the present case, of that method, the appellant calls into question the sum of EUR 10 000 which the General Court awarded her in paragraph 95 of that judgment, criticising it for not having justified that sum.

75 In that regard, it must be noted that, by its very nature, an ex aequo et bono assessment presupposes an overall consideration of the facts of the case concerned, on the basis of which the court, exercising broad discretion, proceeds to set a sum to serve as reparation of the damage which must be compensated (see, to that effect, judgments of 2 June 2022, EM v Parliament , C‑299/21 P, EU:C:2022:429, paragraph 150, and of 12 March 2026, VP v Cedefop , C‑209/24 P, EU:C:2026:186, paragraph 98).

76 In the present case, it is apparent from an overall reading of paragraphs 89 to 95 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court’s assessments in paragraphs 89 to 92 of that judgment, which refer, inter alia, to certain findings relating to the loss of opportunity made in paragraphs 77 and 79 of that judgment, are the elements which the General Court took into account when, in paragraph 95 of the judgment, it set, ‘in the light of the foregoing’, the amount of financial compensation at EUR 10 000 awarded to the appellant.

77 It must also be stated that the fact that, by the judgment under appeal, the General Court ordered EUIPO to pay that financial compensation to the appellant does not mean that EUIPO is relieved of the obligation to adopt a new decision to replace the decision at issue, which the General Court annulled, in so far as the adoption of such a decision proves necessary to ensuring that judgment T‑610/18 is fully implemented.

78 In that regard, it should be recalled that, under Article 266 TFEU, the institution, body, office or entity whose act has been declared void is required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment annulling that act.

79 Since Article 266 TFEU does not specify the nature of the measures to be taken by the author of the annulled act in order to comply with the obligation laid down by that article, it is for the author to identify those measures, whilst having, in the choice of those measures, a wide discretion, provided that it complies with the operative part of the judgment which annulled that act and with the grounds that constitute its essential basis (judgment of 12 March 2026, VP v Cedefop , C‑209/24 P, EU:C:2026:186, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).

80 It is accordingly for EUIPO, in the present case, to assess whether, in order to ensure that judgment T‑610/18 is fully implemented, a new decision must be adopted to replace the decision at issue. In that context, given that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 40 above, the grounds on the basis of which the General Court rejected the first and second pleas in law in the appellant’s action have not gained the force of res judicata , those grounds do not bind EUIPO in its assessment (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 July 2018, Société des produits Nestlé and Others v Mondelez UK Holdings & Services , C‑84/17 P, C‑85/17 P and C‑95/17 P, EU:C:2018:596, paragraphs 53 and 54).

81 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the third ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

The fifth plea in law

Arguments of the parties

82 By her fifth ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court infringed her rights of defence and erred in law in dismissing her claim for compensation for the material and non-material damage.

83 As regards, in the first place, the non-material damage stemming from the lack of care on the part of EUIPO when dealing with the appellant’s file, she challenges the General Court’s assessment, made in paragraph 102 of the judgment under appeal, that her action for compensation for that damage was inadmissible on the ground that she had not specified in what EUIPO’s lack of care consisted, thereby infringing the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

84 According to the appellant, paragraphs 97 to 99 of her application at first instance raise two explicit reasons to substantiate her argument alleging breach of the duty of care by EUIPO. She had submitted in that application, first, that EUIPO had ‘not [taken] into consideration all the factors capable of affecting its decision since legally tenable options [had been] rejected and the alternative option [ignored]’ and, secondly, that ‘the exchanges with [EUIPO] based on one option envisaged by the administration [could] hardly qualify as a comprehensive dialogue aiming at finding a just solution’.

85 Moreover, the form of order sought in that application indicated, in summary form but coherently and intelligibly, that the appellant was requesting ‘compensation for the moral prejudice she suffered which derives from the lack of care with which her file was dealt with and which resulted in an important stress and strong feelings of injustice’.

86 The General Court, she argues, has acknowledged in paragraph 261 of the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), the existence of non-material harm arising from a state of uncertainty, which might involve significant stress and strong feelings of injustice, such as referred to by the appellant in the present case.

87 Consequently, in the judgment under appeal, the General Court interpreted the application at first instance incorrectly, leading to an infringement of the appellant’s rights of defence.

88 As regards, in the second place, the material damage, in paragraph 106 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court stated that that damage was not described in that application, with the result that the claim relating to it had to be rejected as inadmissible. In the appellant’s view, that statement runs counter to the settled case-law that the loss of opportunity of filling a post and, consequently, of receiving a higher salary is material damage which must be compensated, as is apparent from the judgment of 13 September 2011, AA v Commission (F‑101/09, EU:F:2011:133, paragraph 82 and the case-law cited).

89 In the present case, according to her, since the loss of opportunity was considered to have been demonstrated in paragraphs 78 to 80 of the judgment under appeal, it constitutes material damage, without it being necessary to elaborate further. The General Court therefore applied the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 76(d) of its rules of procedure incorrectly, which constituted an error of law that also led to an infringement of the appellant’s rights of defence.

90 EUIPO disputes the appellant’s arguments.

Findings of the Court

91 As regards, in the first place, the non-material damage stemming from an alleged lack of care on the part of EUIPO when dealing with the appellant’s file, it must be found that, in order to justify rejecting the appellant’s application for compensation for that damage, the General Court, in paragraphs 102 and 103 of the judgment under appeal and in paragraphs 104 and 105 thereof, respectively, gave two reasons, relating to the appellant’s failure, first, to specify in what the lack care she accused EUIPO of consisted and, secondly, to comply with the pre-litigation procedure provided for in Article 90 of the Staff Regulations.

92 However, in the fifth ground of appeal, the appellant contests only the first of those two reasons. Since the second reason is, in itself, sufficient to justify that rejection, the appellant’s arguments concerning the non-material damage which allegedly stems from a lack of care on the part of EUIPO must be rejected as ineffective.

93 As regards, in the second place, the material damage, which the General Court found had not been described in the application at first instance, the appellant claims that, according to the case-law, the loss of opportunity of filling a post constitutes material damage and that, since such damage was demonstrated in the present case, it is not necessary to elaborate further regarding the existence of such damage.

94 Those arguments must also be rejected as ineffective since they refer to the fact that the appellant’s name was not included on the reserve list and do not concern any material damage suffered by the appellant as a result of the alleged lack of care on the part of EUIPO when dealing with her file.

95 In addition, it must be recalled that the loss of opportunity of becoming an official in the months that followed the drawing up of the reserve list, suffered by the appellant, was compensated for financially by the General Court awarding the appellant EUR 10 000.

96 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the fifth ground of appeal must be rejected as ineffective.

97 Since none of the grounds raised in support of the present appeal have been upheld, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

98 Under Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs.

99 Under Article 138(1) of those rules, which applies to the procedure on appeal by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

100 In the present case, since EUIPO has applied for costs and the appellant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by EUIPO in the present appeal and at first instance.

On those grounds, the Court (Tenth Chamber) hereby:

1. Dismisses the appeal;

2. Orders ZR to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) in the present appeal and at first instance.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 15 October 2026.

* Language of the case: English.