Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) 30 September 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)

30 September 2026 ( * )

( Civil service – Officials – Certification – 2022-2023 certification exercise – Non-inclusion on the final list of officials authorised to take part in the training programme – Article 45a of the Staff Regulations – Obligation to state reasons – Right to be heard – General provisions for implementing Article 45a of the Staff Regulations – Legal certainty – Equal treatment – Duty of care – Principle of good administration – Plea of illegality – Liability )

In Case T‑84/25,

HP, represented by L. Levi, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Commission, represented by G. Niddam and A. Sauka, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber),

composed of K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, President, R. da Silva Passos and T. Pavelin (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By her action under Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, HP, seeks, first, the annulment of the decision of the European Commission of 13 March 2024 not to include her on the final list of officials authorised to take part in the training programme for the 2022-2023 certification exercise (‘the contested decision’) and, in so far as necessary, of the Commission decision of 25 October 2024 rejecting her complaint of 12 June 2024 (‘the decision rejecting the complaint’) and, second, compensation for the non-pecuniary damage which she claims to have sustained as a result of those decisions.

I. Background to the dispute

2 The applicant is an official of the Commission in grade AST 7.

3 On 16 September 2022, the Commission published in Administrative notices No 32-2022 a call for applications in the context of the certification procedure provided for in Article 45a of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) for the 2022-2023 certification exercise, for the purpose of selecting 50 officials in the assistant function group (AST) eligible for appointment to a post in the administrator function group (AD).

4 The Commission published, in Annex 2 to the call for applications, the guidelines for applicants and directorates-general and services relating to the certification procedure for the 2022-2023 exercise (‘the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise’). In accordance with Article 6(3) of Commission Decision C(2013) 6859 final of 22 October 2013 on general provisions for implementing Article 45a of the Staff Regulations (‘the GIPs’), the purpose of those guidelines was to set out the criteria and selection process for candidates put forward for interview by the joint certification panel. That panel, which was set up for the sole purpose of conducting selection interviews with the chosen candidates, was composed of members of the joint certification committee, pursuant to Article 2 of the GIPs.

5 On 5 October 2022, the applicant submitted her application, following which she took part in a pre-selection interview.

6 On 3 February 2023, the appointing authority published, in Administrative notices No 09-2023, the final list of candidates selected to be interviewed by the joint certification panel. That list included the applicant’s name.

7 On 1 March 2023, the applicant’s selection interview with the joint certification panel took place online.

8 On 4 April 2023, the Commission published, in Administrative notices No 17-2023, the final list of officials authorised to take part in the training programme for the 2022-2023 certification exercise. The applicant’s name was not included.

9 On 4 July 2023, the applicant submitted a first complaint, under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations (‘the first complaint’), against the Commission’s decision not to include her on the final list of officials authorised to take part in the training programme for the 2022-2023 certification exercise (‘the first non-inclusion decision’).

10 By decision Ares(2023) 7411170 of 31 October 2023, the appointing authority upheld the first complaint and annulled the first non-inclusion decision. It also informed the applicant that her candidature would be re-examined with a view to the adoption of a new decision.

11 On 30 November 2023, the joint certification committee met. In the minutes of that meeting it was stated that the members of the committee would receive a detailed note on the follow-up of and the implementation of the decisions upholding the complaints lodged at the time of the 2022-2023 exercise (‘the note on the follow-up of the complaints’).

12 On 25 January 2024, the joint certification committee met again. In the minutes of that meeting, it is stated that the note on the follow-up of the complaints was sent by secure email to the joint certification committee, which approved it by written procedure.

13 By email of 3 March 2024, the applicant’s counsel requested the appointing authority to implement the decision of 31 October 2023 upholding the first complaint and to provide the applicant with access to the note on the follow-up of the complaints.

14 On 13 March 2024, the appointing authority adopted the contested decision, whereby it confirmed the applicant’s non-inclusion on the list of candidates selected to take part in the training programme for the 2022-2023 certification exercise.

15 By email of 15 March 2024, the appointing authority forwarded to the applicant her latest evaluation sheet completed by the joint certification committee following the re-examination of her candidature. However, it did not provide her with the note on the follow-up of the complaints.

16 On 12 June 2024, the applicant submitted a second complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations against the contested decision.

17 On 25 October 2024, the Commission adopted the decision rejecting the complaint. As well as setting out the reasons for not including the applicant on the final list of officials authorised to take part in the training programme for the 2022-2023 certification exercise, the Commission stated in that decision, for the first time, that the first non-inclusion decision had been annulled on the ground that the joint certification panel had failed to take the applicant’s latest appraisal reports into consideration.

II. Forms of order sought

18 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– annul, in so far as necessary, the decision rejecting the complaint;

– order the Commission to pay her the sum of EUR 8 000 for the non-pecuniary damage sustained;

– order the Commission to pay the costs.

19 The Commission contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

III. Law

A. The purpose of the action

20 By her second head of claim, the applicant seeks, in so far as necessary, the annulment of the decision rejecting the complaint.

21 It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, claims for annulment formally directed against the decision rejecting a complaint have the effect, where that decision has no autonomous content, of bringing before the Court the act against which the complaint was submitted (judgments of 17 January 1989, Vainker v Parliament , 293/87, EU:C:1989:8, paragraph 8, and of 13 November 2024, WS v EUIPO , T‑221/23, not published, EU:T:2024:820, paragraph 29).

22 In the present case, the decision rejecting the complaint confirms the contested decision, while providing further information explaining the grounds of the decision upholding the first complaint and, accordingly, the context in which the applicant’s situation was re-examined. Thus, the decision rejecting the complaint contains no re-examination of the applicant’s situation in the light of elements of law or of fact that arose after the adoption of the contested decision, nor does it amend or substantially supplement that decision, so that it has no autonomous content (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 December 2011, de Fays v Commission , F‑30/10, EU:F:2011:194, paragraph 46).

23 The present action must therefore be considered to be directed against the contested decision, the legality of which must be examined also taking into account the elements of context and statement of reasons set out in the decision rejecting the complaint (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 November 2022, QM v Europol , T‑164/21, EU:T:2022:695, paragraph 40 (not published) and the case-law cited).

24 Accordingly, there is no need to give an autonomous ruling on the second head of claim, seeking the annulment of the decision rejecting the complaint.

B. The first head of claim, seeking the annulment of the contested decision

25 The applicant raises four pleas in law in support of her claim for annulment, alleging, in essence, first, breach of Article 45a of the Staff Regulations, the GIPs, the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise, the principles of equal treatment and legal certainty and the duty of care and the duty of diligence; second, by way of alternative plea, the illegality of point II.5 of those guidelines; third, breach of the obligation to state reasons; and, fourth, breach of the right to be heard.

26 It is appropriate to examine, in the first place, the pleas relating to the formal legality of the contested decision, namely the third, and then the fourth plea, and, in the second place, the pleas relating to the substantive legality of that decision, namely the first, and then the second plea.

1. The third plea, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons

27 In support of her third plea, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons, the applicant puts forward two complaints. The first alleges failure to state the reasons for the choice of format of the selection interview. The second alleges failure to state sufficient reasons for the contested decision in the light of the comments in the applicant’s evaluation grid.

(a) The first complaint, alleging failure to state the reasons for the choice of format of the selection interview

28 The applicant maintains, by her first complaint, that the Commission did not explain the reasons why the joint certification committee had decided that the selection interviews would take place online. In that regard, she relies, in particular, on point II.5 of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise, according to which the interview is to be held in presence or online depending on the prevailing sanitary conditions. In the applicant’s submission, the sanitary emergency had ceased to exist when the selection interviews took place.

29 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

30 According to settled case-law, the obligation to state the reasons for a decision of the EU institutions adversely affecting an individual is intended to enable the EU Courts to review the legality of that decision and to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to know whether that decision is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect enabling its legality to be challenged (see judgment of 11 June 2020, Commission v Di Bernardo , C‑114/19 P, EU:C:2020:457, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

31 In the present case, it is sufficient to observe that the joint certification committee’s decision to hold the selection interviews online, rather than in presence, does not in itself constitute an element of the operative part or of the grounds of the contested decision, the object of which is the applicant’s non-inclusion on the list of candidates authorised to take part in the training programme for the 2022-2023 certification exercise and which is based on grounds relating to the assessment of her candidature. On the contrary, the choice of the format of the selection interviews is a mere organisational detail of the selection procedure which culminated in to the contested decision, not a decision adversely affecting the applicant, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 30 above.

32 Furthermore, it is apparent from the arguments put forward by the applicant in support of her first complaint that she does not dispute, in reality, the absence of reasoning concerning the choice of the format of the selection interviews, but rather the regularity of the procedure followed.

33 It is settled case-law that, in order for a procedural irregularity to be capable of leading to the annulment of a measure, it must be established that, had it not been for that irregularity, the outcome of the procedure might have been different (see judgment of 18 September 2015, Wahlström v Frontex , T‑653/13 P, EU:T:2015:652, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

34 In the present case, however, it must be held that nothing in the file, and none of the arguments put forward by the applicant, permits the conclusion that the fact that the selection interviews were held online could have had any impact on the purport of the decision relating to her inclusion on the final list of officials authorised to take part in the training programme for the 2022-2023 certification exercise (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 2021, PL v Commission , T‑586/19, not published, EU:T:2021:370, paragraph 90).

35 The first complaint must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

(b) The second complaint, alleging failure to state sufficient reasons for the contested decision in the light of the comments contained in the applicant’s evaluation grid

36 By her second complaint, the applicant claims that she was unable to understand the reasons that led to her non-inclusion on the final list of candidates chosen to take part in the training programme for the 2022-2023 certification exercise, in view of the very general and vague nature of the comments in the second column of her latest evaluation grid and, in particular, in the field entitled ‘General comment’ of that grid. In particular, there is no indication of the information in the applicant’s file that was specifically taken into consideration or of the importance attached to the assessments in her latest appraisal reports by comparison with that attached to her performance in her selection interview, if necessary in the form of weighting factors.

37 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

38 In the first place, as regards the reasons set out in the second column of the applicant’s latest evaluation grid, to which Article 1 of the contested decision makes reference, it must be stated that the reasons that led to the applicant’s non-inclusion on the list of candidates chosen to take part in the training programme for the 2022-2023 certification exercise are set out clearly and unequivocally in that column.

39 More precisely, the applicant’s latest evaluation grid, extracts from which are reproduced in paragraph 61 of the decision rejecting the complaint, expressly states that, in spite of the very positive comments in her three latest appraisal reports, at the selection interview the applicant did not succeed in convincing the joint certification panel that she met all the requirements set out in the evaluation grid, for a number of reasons.

40 The joint certification panel explained that, in giving an oral presentation of her reasons for joining function group AD, first, the applicant had provided a narrative which was difficult to follow; second, she had not clearly set out her vision of a career in that function group; third, her answers had sometimes been unstructured and repetitive; and, fourth, those answers had sometimes missed the point. The joint certification panel also stated that other applicants whom it had heard had been more convincing than the applicant about their motivation and had been able to communicate with more clarity and concision and thus to convey their ideas more easily than the applicant.

41 The reasons set out in paragraphs 39 and 40 above, which reveal the elements of the applicant’s file and interview that were specifically taken into consideration by the joint certification panel, are stated in clear, precise and unequivocal terms, in such a way as to permit the applicant to understand the scope of the contested decision and to determine whether it was appropriate to bring an action before the Court, and to enable the latter to exercise its power of review of the legality of that decision.

42 In the second place, the applicant’s arguments relating to the comments about her in the second column of her latest evaluation grid belong, in essence, not to the formal expression of the grounds on which the contested decision is based, which emerge clearly from a reading of that grid, but to the substantive legality of that decision, in that it is based on an assessment that takes greater account of the applicant’s oral performance in the selection interview than of her latest appraisal reports.

43 Thus, the applicant’s argument alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons seeks, in essence, to contest the merits of the grounds of the contested decision and, in particular, the failure to use a method of weighting the elements taken into consideration, if necessary in the form of weighting factors. According to the case-law, however, those questions go to the substantive legality of the appointing authority’s reasoning. The fact that a statement of reasons may be incorrect does not render the reasoning non-existent or insufficient (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 July 2010, Sevenier v Commission , T‑368/09 P, EU:T:2010:300, paragraphs 24 and 25 and the case-law cited).

44 The Court must therefore also reject the second complaint in the third plea and, accordingly, that plea in its entirety, as unfounded.

2. The fourth plea, alleging breach of the right to be heard

45 By her fourth plea, the applicant claims that she ought to have been heard by the joint certification committee prior to the adoption of the decision rejecting the complaint. As she was not given a hearing, the applicant lost an opportunity to convince the joint certification committee that the contested decision was illegal.

46 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

47 It should be borne in mind that the right to be heard, enshrined in Article 41(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, under the right to good administration, must be observed in all proceedings which are liable to culminate in an act adversely affecting a person, even where the applicable legislation does not expressly provide for such a procedural requirement (see judgment of 30 November 2023, MG v EIB , C‑173/22 P, EU:C:2023:932, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

48 The right to be heard guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his or her views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable to affect his or her interests adversely (see judgment of 11 December 2014, Boudjlida , C‑249/13, EU:C:2014:2431, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

49 Nonetheless, according to the case-law, the right to be heard does not mean that the person concerned must necessarily be put in a position to express his or her views orally. Thus, the implementation of the right to be heard does not necessarily entail a hearing of the person concerned, as the possibility of submitting observations in writing also permits that right to be observed (see judgment of 9 November 2022, QM v Europol , T‑164/21, EU:T:2022:695, paragraphs 65 and 66 (not published) and the case-law cited).

50 It has also consistently been held that the question whether there is a breach of the right to be heard must be examined in relation, inter alia, to the legal rules governing the matter concerned (see judgment of 3 March 2021, Barata v Parliament , T‑723/18, EU:T:2021:113, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).

51 In that regard, the Courts of the European Union have accepted that, in the context of a certification procedure, the right to be heard ensured that every candidate whose name was not on the draft list of the highest placed candidates preselected to take part in the training programme provided for in that procedure had the possibility of effectively making known to the competent administrative authorities his or her views concerning that non-inclusion, which was not yet final (judgment of 2 December 2014, Migliore v Commission , F‑110/13, EU:F:2014:257, paragraph 67).

52 That being the case, Article 8(7) of the GIPs provides that any candidate who was interviewed by the joint certification panel but not authorised to attend the training for the certification exercise may lodge a complaint under Article 90 of the Staff Regulations.

53 In that regard, it is apparent from the case-law that an official who has brought a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations in the context of a certification procedure was, by definition, fully in a position to set out in that complaint any argument that he or she wished to make with regard to the decision of the appointing authority concerned by that complaint. It cannot therefore be claimed that, in order to respect the rights of the defence and the principle of good administration, the joint certification panel or the appointing authority was required to hear the applicant again before the appointing authority ruled on her complaint (see, to that effect, order of 3 December 2020, Barata v Parliament , C‑259/20 P, not published, EU:C:2020:994, paragraph 59).

54 The fourth plea must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

3. The first plea, alleging breach of Article 45 a of the Staff Regulations, the GIPs, the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise, the principles of equal treatment and legal certainty and the duty of care and the duty of diligence

55 The first plea seeks to challenge the merits of the contested decision.

56 The first plea is divided into three parts, relating, first, to the failure to take the appraisal reports of the applicant and the other candidates sufficiently into consideration; second, to the use of two different evaluation grid templates in the context of the 2022-2023 certification exercise; and, third, to the absence of a system for weighting the criteria used in the consideration of candidates’ merits.

(a) Preliminary considerations on the extent of the Court’s power of review

57 Taking into account, first, the broad discretion which can be inferred from Article 45a of the Staff Regulations, which establishes the certification procedure, and, second, the broad discretion which, according to settled case-law, is accorded to the EU institutions in organising their services and, in particular, in determining the procedure and conditions of competitions and in assessing and comparing the merits of applications in the context of any selection procedure, the Court’s review in that field must be limited to the question whether, in the light of the factors on which the administration relied to establish its assessment, the administration has remained within reasonable bounds and did not use its power in a manifestly erroneous manner or for purposes other than those for which such power had been conferred on it (see judgment of 3 March 2021, Barata v Parliament , T‑723/18, EU:T:2021:113, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).

58 The Court cannot therefore substitute its assessment of the merits and qualifications of the candidates for that of the administration where there is nothing in the file to suggest that, in assessing those merits and qualifications, the administration committed a manifest error (judgment of 2 April 2020, Barata v Parliament , T‑81/18, not published, EU:T:2020:137, paragraph 89).

59 The discretion thereby conferred on the administration is, however, circumscribed by the need to undertake a consideration of candidates’ comparative merits with care and impartiality, in the interests of the service and in accordance with the principle of equal treatment. While the appointing authority has the power under the Staff Regulations to conduct that consideration according to the procedure or method it deems most appropriate, in practice that exercise must be undertaken on a basis of equality, using comparable sources of information (see, by analogy, judgment of 20 November 2018, Barata v Parliament , T‑854/16, not published, EU:T:2018:809, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).

60 It is in the light of those considerations that the Court must examine the first plea.

(b) The first part of the first plea, relating to the failure to take sufficiently into consideration the appraisal reports of the applicant and the other candidates

61 By the first part of the first plea, the applicant claims, in essence, that the Commission did not take sufficiently into consideration the appraisal reports of the candidates, including her own.

(1) The admissibility of the first part of the first plea

62 It is appropriate at the outset to examine the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission, alleging breach of the rule of concordance between the complaint and the application, in so far as the arguments put forward in support of the first part of the first plea were raised for the first time in the proceedings before the Court.

63 According to the case-law, the rule of concordance between the pre-litigation complaint and the subsequent action requires, under penalty of inadmissibility, that a plea or complaint raised before the EU Courts must already have been raised in the pre-litigation procedure, so that the appointing authority or the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment was in a position to know the criticisms that the person concerned was making of the contested decision (judgment of 7 September 2022, DD v FRA , T‑470/20, not published, EU:T:2022:511, paragraph 128).

64 In that regard, the applicant acknowledges that her arguments alleging differences in treatment relating to fact that only her appraisal reports, and not those of the other candidates in the 2022-2023 certification exercise, were taken into consideration were actually put forward for the first time in the application. However, she claims that those arguments were developed in the light of new elements of reasoning found in the decision rejecting the complaint.

65 It is apparent from the file that it was only when she received the decision rejecting the complaint that the applicant was informed of the reason why the Commission had upheld her first complaint, namely the joint certification panel’s failure to take her appraisal reports into consideration when her candidature was first examined. Thus, the arguments which the applicant raised in the application in response to that information could not logically appear in the complaint of 12 June 2024.

66 The applicant is entitled to raise, at the stage of the application, arguments against grounds set out for the first time in the decision rejecting the complaint (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 September 2022, Migadakis v ENISA , T‑507/21, not published, EU:T:2022:507, paragraphs 24 to 27).

67 It follows that the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission must be rejected as unfounded and that the first part of the first plea is admissible.

(2) Substance

68 In support of the first part of the first plea, the applicant puts forward two complaints. First, she alleges that the joint certification panel applied two different methods in order to assess the applicant and the other candidates in the 2022-2023 certification exercise. Second, she alleges that that committee did not take their appraisal reports sufficiently into consideration.

(i) The first complaint, alleging that the joint certification panel applied two different methods for the purpose of assessing candidates in the 2022-2023 certification exercise

69 By her first complaint, the applicant maintains that the Commission breached the principle of equal treatment, Article 45a(2) of the Staff Regulations and its duty of care, in that the joint certification panel applied two different methods for the purpose of assessing the merits of candidates in the 2022-2023 certification exercise. She alleges that the Commission did not take candidates’ appraisal reports into consideration in the first assessment of their merits, whereas it took her appraisal reports into consideration when re-examining her candidature.

70 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

71 In the first place, it should be observed that the present complaint is based on the premiss that, because the joint certification committee did not take the applicant’s latest appraisal reports into consideration when carrying out the first assessment of her merits, it did not take the other candidates’ appraisal reports into consideration either. On the other hand, the joint certification committee took the applicant’s appraisal reports into consideration when re-examining her candidature.

72 In that regard, first of all, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, a breach of the principle of equal treatment, applicable to the law relating to the EU civil service, occurs when two categories of person whose factual and legal circumstances disclose no essential difference are treated differently and that difference in treatment is not objectively justified (see judgment of 21 July 2016, WQ v Parliament , F‑1/16, EU:F:2016:171, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

73 It also follows from the case-law cited in paragraph 59 above that the administration is required to undertake a consideration of candidates’ comparative merits with care and impartiality, in the interests of the service and in accordance with the principle of equal treatment, on a basis of equality, using comparable sources of information.

74 Furthermore, it should be observed that, according to settled case-law, the duty of care reflects the balance of the reciprocal rights and obligations which the Staff Regulations have created in the relationship between the public authority and the civil servants, which implies in particular that when the authority takes a decision concerning the situation of an official, it must take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision and, when doing so, should take into account not only the interests of the service but also those of the official concerned. This latter obligation is imposed on the administration by the principle of good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (judgments of 13 December 2017, Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB , T‑482/16 RENV, EU:T:2017:901, paragraph 131 (not published), and of 16 June 2021, Lucaccioni v Commission , T‑316/19, EU:T:2021:367, paragraph 124; see also, to that effect, judgment of 5 December 2006, Angelidis v Parliament , T‑416/03, EU:T:2006:375, paragraph 117).

75 It should also be observed that the acts of the EU institutions enjoy a presumption of legality in the absence of any indication to call that legality into question (see judgment of 13 July 2000, Griesel v Council , T‑157/99, EU:T:2000:192, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

76 Last, it should be observed, as regards the rules relating to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence, that, as a general rule, in order to satisfy the Court as to a party’s claims or, at the very least, as to the need for the Court itself to be directly involved in the taking of evidence, it is not sufficient merely to refer to certain facts in support of the claim; it is also necessary to adduce sufficiently precise, objective and consistent indicia of their truth or probability (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 March 2001, Connolly v Commission , C‑274/99 P, EU:C:2001:127, paragraph 113) or, at the very least, prima facie evidence thereof.

77 It therefore falls to be ascertained whether there are reasons to believe that the Commission did not take the other candidates’ appraisal reports into consideration and that, in not doing so, it breached the principle of equal treatment and also Article 45a(2) of the Staff Regulations and its duty of care.

78 The Court notes that the applicant adduces no indicium or prima facie evidence of the validity of the premiss on which her argument is based, namely that the Commission did not take the other candidates’ appraisal reports into consideration.

79 On that point, the applicant merely refers to the fact that, in paragraph 9 of the decision rejecting the complaint, it is stated that ‘the [applicant’s] latest appraisal reports referred to in Article 43 of the [Staff Regulations] were not available to the [joint certification panel] at the moment of the comparative assessment of the merits.’

80 Contrary to the applicant’s contention, it cannot be logically inferred from the words reproduced in paragraph 79 above that the other candidates’ appraisal reports were not available to the joint certification panel.

81 The assertion that the applicant’s latest appraisal reports were not available to the joint certification panel is a statement of fact confined to the applicant’s situation and does not include any explicit or implicit information relating to the appraisal reports of the other candidates. Thus, the other candidates’ appraisal reports may indeed have been available in full to the joint certification panel, even if the applicant’s were not.

82 In those circumstances, in the absence of any indicia to support the premiss on which the applicant’s reasoning is based, the first complaint must be rejected in its entirety.

(ii) The second complaint, alleging that the applicant’s appraisal reports were not sufficiently taken into consideration by the joint certification panel

83 By her second complaint, the applicant claims that the Commission breached Article 45a(2) of the Staff Regulations and Article 8(2) of the GIPs, read in conjunction with Article 6(2)(a) of the GIPs, in that the joint certification panel did not take her appraisal reports sufficiently into consideration. She alleges that the candidates’ evaluation grid contains no reference to the appraisal reports, so that the appraisal of the candidates is based essentially, indeed almost exclusively, on their performance in the selection interviews.

84 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

85 It should be borne in mind that, under Article 45a(2) of the Staff Regulations, for the purpose of selecting the officials in function group AST authorised to take part in a compulsory training programme to be appointed to posts in function group AD, the appointing authority is to draw up a draft list of AST officials selected to take part in the training programme on the basis of the annual reports referred to in Article 43 of the Staff Regulations and their level of education and training and taking account of the needs of the services. The draft list is to be submitted to a joint committee for its opinion.

86 Thus, it is clear from its wording and its structure that Article 45a(2) of the Staff Regulations makes the preselection of candidates for certification dependent on two categories of criteria, relating, first, to the candidate, namely his or her annual reports and level of education or training, and, second, to the needs of the services (judgment of 4 November 2008, Van Beers v Commission , F‑126/07, EU:F:2008:136, paragraph 35).

87 In accordance with Article 8(2) of the GIPs, the selection method used by the joint certification panel is to be explained in detail in the guidelines referred to in Article 6 of the GIPs and is to be based on the criteria set out in paragraph 2 of that article.

88 The second subparagraph of Article 6(2) of the GIPs provides as follows:

‘The selection process must be transparent and must comply with the maximum number of candidates to be selected by the directorate-general and service, as determined by the appointing authority. It must be duly justified and, with the framework of a comparative analysis guided by the needs of the service, must take account of:

(a) merit, as indicated in the reports referred to in Article 43 of the Staff Regulations;

(b) relevant professional experience;

(c) the level of responsibility exercised and the ability and motivation demonstrated by the candidates to carry out the duties of an administrator, particularly as regards the way they have performed or are performing the tasks entrusted to them;

(d) the relevant level of education and training, as demonstrated by officially recognised qualifications/diplomas.’

89 First, in order to examine whether the Commission duly took the applicant’s appraisal reports into consideration in the light of the requirements resulting from the provisions of the applicable law cited in paragraphs 85 and 87 above, it is appropriate to examine, first, the evaluation grid template used by the joint certification panel (‘the evaluation grid template’) and the guidance set out therein and, second, the applicant’s latest evaluation grid.

90 In that regard, it must be observed that the evaluation criteria set out in the first column of the evaluation grid template are the same as those set out in the first column of the applicant’s latest evaluation grid and that none of the criteria set out in those two documents expressly corresponds to the criterion relating to ‘merit, as indicated in the reports referred to in Article 43 of the Staff Regulations’, referred to in Article 6(2)(a) of the GIPs.

91 However, as the Commission emphasises, both the guidance in the second column of the evaluation grid template relating to the examination of the criterion ‘Responsibilities/professional experience’ and the explanations relating to the final part of the evaluation grid template used by the joint certification panel, entitled ‘General comment’, contain references to the ‘elements contained in the application file’, which includes candidates’ appraisal reports.

92 In addition, the applicant’s latest evaluation grid itself also contains several references to her appraisal reports, in particular the following comments: ‘while her writing skills are, judging from her dossier, good’; ‘the superior’s assessment state[s] that [the applicant’s] responsibilities were 100% at AD level and that she possesses the necessary skills for an AD career as well as being effective in her tasks’; ‘taking into consideration both the interview performance as well as the elements contained in the application file, including the three latest assessment reports’ and ‘taking into consideration … the full dossier’.

93 In those circumstances, the applicant’s argument that her appraisal reports were not sufficiently taken into consideration by the joint certification panel must be rejected as unfounded.

94 Second, it should be borne in mind that the applicant maintains that the evaluation grid template attaches excessive importance to candidates’ performance at the interview.

95 It is therefore appropriate to examine whether the importance which the Commission attaches to candidates’ performance in the selection interview is capable of constituting a breach of Article 8(2) of the GIPs, read in conjunction with Article 6(2)(a) thereof.

96 In that regard, it should be observed that, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 57 above and contrary to the applicant’s submission, the Commission was entitled, in the exercise of its broad discretion relating to the organisation of its services, to determine the relative importance which it wished to attach to the different categories of criteria which it was required to take into consideration.

97 In fact, it is for each institution to clarify those criteria further by drawing up general implementing provisions. Thus, according to the case-law, an institution is entitled, first, to explain, if necessary in more detail, the criteria relating to the candidates themselves and referred to in Article 45a of the Staff Regulations, in order to guide the administration in the exercise of its discretion as regards the application of the criteria in question, and second, to specify the scope which it intends to confer on the ‘needs of the services’ by introducing, where relevant, criteria specifically designed to satisfy those needs (judgment of 4 November 2008, Van Beers v Commission , F‑126/07, EU:F:2008:136, paragraph 36).

98 Furthermore, while it is not disputed that the institutions must take officials’ appraisal reports and their level of education and training into consideration, they also have the option of laying down or adding certain criteria with the objective of taking the needs of the services into consideration, criteria which, moreover, they may, in the exercise of their discretion, combine with those relating to the candidates themselves (judgment of 4 November 2008, Van Beers v Commission , F‑126/07, EU:F:2008:136, paragraph 37).

99 In that regard, Article 8(2) of the GIPs provides that the joint certification panel’s selection of candidates is to be explained in detail in the guidelines referred to in Article 6 of the GIPs (see paragraph 87 above).

100 Point II.5 of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise sets out the specific criteria on which the evaluation of candidates by the joint certification panel was to be based, without providing further detail of the scope of each of those criteria. It follows from the criteria ‘Motivation’ and ‘Presentation, clarity, concision’, however, and from the guidance corresponding to each of the criteria defined in those guidelines, as set out in the evaluation grid template, that the Commission intended to set a high value on candidates’ oral skills and, more precisely, in the light of the appraisals set out in the applicant’s evaluation grid, their capacity to express themselves and communicate their ideas clearly, structure their narrative and give a convincing account of their motivation.

101 Thus, taking into account the broad discretion of the appointing authority in the context of a certification procedure, in particular as regards the determination of the criteria relating to the needs of the service and those relating to the candidates themselves, the Commission was entitled, while taking candidates’ appraisal reports and training into consideration, to place the emphasis on the competences and capacities set out in point II.5 of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise.

102 Consequently, the argument alleging that excessive importance was attached by the joint certification panel to candidates’ performance in the selection interviews, and, accordingly, the second complaint in its entirety, must be rejected as unfounded.

103 The first part of the first plea must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

(c) The second part of the first plea, relating to the use of two different evaluation grid templates in the 2022-2023 certification exercise

104 By the second part of the first plea, the applicant maintains that the Commission breached the principle of equal treatment and the principle of legal certainty, by drawing up, and then using, two distinct evaluation grid templates in the same certification exercise.

105 In that regard, the applicant maintains that a revised evaluation grid template was used in the re-examination of her candidature, which differed from that used for the other candidates in the same certification exercise.

106 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

(1) The admissibility of the second part of the first plea

107 It is appropriate at the outset to examine the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission, alleging that the arguments raised in support of the second part of the first plea were relied on for the first time in the proceedings before the Court. In that regard, the applicant accepts that her arguments based on differences in treatment relating to the modification of the evaluation grid template during the procedure were put forward for the first time in the application, in the light of the new reasons contained in the decision rejecting the complaint.

108 It is apparent from the case file that those arguments are based on paragraph 72 of the decision rejecting the complaint, reproducing an extract from the note on the follow-up of the complaints. According to that extract, entitled ‘Follow-up of the complaints received on the certification exercise for 2022-2023’, the joint certification panel is required to re-assess the merits of the complaints of officials whose complaints were given a positive reception and to observe the subsequent procedural steps provided for in Article 8 of the GIPs. It states that that re-assessment will have to be carried out using the ‘revised evaluation grid[,] which is subject to the approval of the [joint certification committee] members’.

109 Thus, those arguments could not be raised by the applicant before she became aware of the decision rejecting the complaint.

110 It follows, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 66 above, that the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission must be rejected as unfounded.

111 Consequently, it must be held that the second part of the first plea is admissible.

(2) Substance

112 It should be borne in mind, as a preliminary point, that according to the case-law cited in paragraphs 59 and 72 above, there is a breach of the principle of equal treatment, in the law relating to the EU civil service, when persons in comparable factual and legal situations are treated differently without objective justification, while the administration is required, in the context of a certification procedure, to undertake a consideration of candidates’ comparative merits with care and impartiality, in the interests of the service, on a basis of equality, using comparable sources of information.

113 It should also be borne in mind that the principle of legal certainty – which is one of the general principles of EU law – requires, in particular, that rules of law be clear, precise and predictable as regards their effects, especially where they may have negative consequences on individuals and undertakings (see judgment of 29 January 2020, Aquino and Others v Parliament , T‑402/18, EU:T:2020:13, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

114 It must therefore be ascertained whether the Commission used two different evaluation grid templates in the 2022-2023 certification exercise and, if so, whether it breached the principles of equal treatment and legal certainty.

115 In the first place, as regards the principle of equal treatment, first, as is apparent from paragraph 11 of the decision rejecting the complaint, the applicant’s evaluation grid completed following re-examination of her candidature by the joint certification committee replaced the applicant’s evaluation grid completed following her selection interview with the joint certification panel, which is reproduced in paragraph 6 of the decision rejecting the complaint.

116 Second, it should be observed that the extract from the note on the follow-up of the complaints reproduced in paragraph 72 of the decision rejecting the complaint states in clear and unambiguous terms that the joint certification panel was required to re-assess the candidatures of candidates whose complaints had been received positively ‘using the revised evaluation grid[,] which [was] subject to the approval of the [joint certification committee] members’.

117 However, the Commission firmly rejects the existence, and the application, of a second evaluation grid template during the 2022-2023 certification exercise, including in its reply to the measure of organisation of procedure of 29 January 2026.

118 In that reply, the Commission points out that the same evaluation grid template was applied to all candidates in the 2022-2023 certification exercise and that that template was modified only for the subsequent certification exercise. However, the Commission provides no explanation concerning the extract from the note on the follow-up of the complaints reproduced in paragraph 72 of the decision rejecting the complaint, which it merely contradicts.

119 In those circumstances, it cannot be precluded that the guidance contained in the evaluation grid template used by the joint certification committee was revised between the first assessment of candidatures in the context of the 2022-2023 certification exercise and the re-assessment of the candidatures of candidates whose complaints had been received positively, in order to make explicit reference to the taking into consideration of candidates’ appraisal reports.

120 However, it must be stated that the assessment criteria set out in both of the applicant’s evaluation grids are the same and that those two grids follow the evaluation grid template and that set out in point II.5 of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise, referred to in paragraph 25 of the decision rejecting the complaint.

121 The evaluation grid template and the applicant’s two evaluation grids all contain the same five criteria, laid down in the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise, namely the criterion ‘Motivation’, the criterion ‘Presentation, clarity, concision’, the criterion ‘Candidate’s ability to express himself/herself in a language other than his/her main language’, the criterion ‘Responsibilities/professional experience’, the criterion ‘Relevant training/academic program’ and a heading entitled ‘General comment’ and a part entitled ‘Final result: Selection’.

122 In addition, according to settled case-law relating to the principle of equal treatment, in order for an institution to be criticised for having breached that principle, the treatment in question must have entailed a disadvantage for certain persons by comparison with others (judgment of 17 May 2017, Piessevaux v Council , T‑519/16, not published, EU:T:2017:343, paragraph 67).

123 In the present case, while relying on a breach of the principle of equal treatment on account of the alleged application of a different evaluation grid template to candidates in the same certification exercise, the applicant does not demonstrate, or even assert, that she suffered a disadvantage by reason of the alleged difference in treatment.

124 In any event, such a difference in treatment, were it to be deemed established, did not alter the outcome of the procedure concerning the applicant, in so far as it is apparent from the comments in her revised evaluation grid, as reproduced in paragraph 11 of the decision rejecting the complaint, that the taking into consideration of her appraisal reports did not suffice to compensate for her oral performance.

125 In the second place, as regards the principle of legal certainty, it is sufficient to state that the applicant wholly fails to explain, in her written submissions, how the alleged modification of the guidance contained in the evaluation grid template for candidates in the 2022-2023 certification exercise constitutes a breach of that principle.

126 In the light of the foregoing, the second part of the first plea must be rejected.

(d) The third part of the first plea, relating to the absence of a system for weighting the criteria for the assessment of candidates’ merits

127 By the third part of the first plea, the applicant claims that the Commission breached its duty of diligence, the principles of legal certainty and equal treatment and Article 6(2) and Article 8(2) of the GIPs by failing, when adopting the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise, to define a weighting system, if necessary in the form of weighting factors, for each of the assessment criteria referred to in the evaluation grid, and to apply that system.

128 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

129 In the present case, the question arises whether, in order to comply with its duty of diligence, the principles of legal certainty and equal treatment and Articles 6 and 8 of the GIPs, the Commission was required to establish, and then apply, a system of weighting of the assessment criteria, if necessary in the form of weighting factors.

130 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the administration enjoys a certain discretion as to the importance which it attaches to each of the criteria provided for in Article 45a(2) of the Staff Regulations, the wording of which does not preclude the possibility of weighting (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 20 October 2021, YG v Commission , T‑599/20, not published, EU:T:2021:709, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited).

131 However, the use of a weighting system in the context of a certification exercise is merely an option for the administration.

132 First, it must be stated that neither Article 45a of the Staff Regulations, nor Article 6(2) and Article 8(2) of the GIPs, on the breach of which the applicant relies, nor even the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise lay down an obligation for the Commission to put in place a system for weighting the assessment criteria for candidates in certification procedures. Second, it cannot be accepted that compliance with the duty of diligence and the principles of legal certainty and equal treatment requires that the Commission put in place such a weighting system.

133 In the present case, it should be observed, first, that the Commission set out in its guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise the five criteria that appear in paragraph 121 above, which it would apply in order to determine the final list of candidates authorised to take part in the training programme for the 2022-2023 certification exercise, and did so in a clear, precise and predictable manner within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 113 above. Second, the Commission issued guidance on the way in which each of those criteria would be examined, as shown in the evaluation grid template.

134 Third, not having established weighting factors, the Commission undertook the comparative consideration which it is required to undertake in the context of a certification procedure by means of a global assessment of the various assessment criteria established in advance (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 2021, RA v Court of Auditors , T‑867/19, not published, EU:T:2021:361, paragraphs 105 and 106).

135 In proceeding as described in paragraphs 133 and 134 above, the Commission complied to the requisite legal standard with its duty of diligence, the principles of legal certainty and equal treatment and the GIPs.

136 That conclusion cannot be invalidated by the parallel which the applicant seeks to draw between competitions and the certification procedure by relying on the judgment of 22 September 2021, JR v Commission (T‑435/20, EU:T:2021:608), relating to a competition, in order to assert that the Commission was required to provide for weighting factors.

137 In that regard, it is apparent from paragraph 174 of the judgment of 26 September 2011, Pino v Commission (F‑31/06, EU:F:2011:151), that the certification procedure replaced, from 1 May 2006, internal competitions for a change in category. It follows that the legislature decided that it would no longer envisage a change in category as an internal competition, but would introduce a specific procedure. Thus, the parallel drawn by the applicant is not pertinent in the present case.

138 In any event, it should be borne in mind that, even in the context of a competition, the selection board has the option of providing for weighting when such weighting has not been set in the competition notice, but is under no obligation to do so (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 December 2021, JR v Commission , T‑265/20, EU:T:2021:850, paragraph 113, and of 15 December 2021, QF v Commission , T‑85/21, not published, EU:T:2021:897, paragraph 73).

139 Therefore, the third part of the first plea and, accordingly, the first plea in its entirety, must be rejected as unfounded.

4. The second plea, alleging the illegality of point II.5 of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise

140 The applicant raises the second plea by way of alternative to the first plea. By the second plea, she claims that point II.5 of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise is contrary to Article 8(3) of the GIPs, relating to the establishment of the preliminary draft list of candidates authorised to take part in the training programme, in that the criteria set out in point II.5 of those guidelines do not perfectly reflect those set out in Article 6(2) of the GIPs, to which Article 8(3) of the GIPs refers.

141 Specifically, she maintains, first, that point II.5 of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise contains two new criteria by comparison with those set out in Article 6(2) of the GIPs, namely the criterion ‘Presentation, clarity, concision’ and the criterion ‘Candidate’s ability to express himself/herself in a language other than his/her main language’. In the applicant’s submission, those new criteria relate directly to the selection interview rather than to the application file.

142 Second, point II.5 of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise does not contain the first of the criteria set out in Article 6(2) of the GIPs, namely the criterion relating to ‘Merit, as indicated in the [appraisal] reports’. The applicant maintains, in essence, that if the joint certification panel had applied the criteria set out in Article 6(2) of the GIPs instead of those set out in point II.5 of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise, she would have been selected to take part in the training programme.

143 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

144 In the first place, it must be ascertained whether the Commission was entitled to add new criteria by comparison with those provided for in the GIPs.

145 As is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraphs 86, 97 and 98 above, Article 45a(2) of the Staff Regulations provides that the preselection of candidates for certification is to be based, first, on criteria relating to the candidates themselves, concerning in particular their annual reports and their level of education and training, and, second, on criteria connected with the needs of the services, each institution being authorised, in the exercise of its discretion and by adopting general implementing provisions, to specify those criteria in order to guide the administration, to specify the scope which it intends to attach to the needs of the services and, where necessary, to set or add specific criteria in order to satisfy those needs, which may be combined with the criteria relating to candidates, provided that they observe the framework fixed by the Staff Regulations.

146 Furthermore, while the administration may set or add specific criteria by means of general provisions implementing the Staff Regulations, there is nothing to prevent guidelines implementing the general implementing provisions from clarifying, by criteria that are even more specific, those provided for in Article 45a(2) of the Staff Regulations, concerning, on the one hand, the candidate and, on the other, the needs of the services.

147 Under Article 6(3) of the GIPs, the guidelines setting out the criteria and selection process for the candidates put forward for interview by the joint certification panel are to be drawn up by the appointing authority after consulting the joint certification committee. They are to be communicated to the directorates-general and services and made known to staff. They may be amended at the beginning of each certification exercise.

148 In the same way, Article 8(2) of the GIPs provides that the joint certification panel’s selection method is to be explained in detail in the guidelines referred to in Article 6 of the GIPs and is to be based on the criteria set out in Article 6(2) of the GIPs.

149 In the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 145 to 148 above, it was open to the Commission to add assessment criteria to those expressly set out in Article 6(2) of the GIPs, and to do so under Article 8(2) of those GIPs, while remaining within the framework of the two categories of criteria provided for in Article 45a(2) of the Staff Regulations.

150 In the second place, it must be ascertained whether point II.5 of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise departs from the criterion concerning merit, such as that criterion is reflected in the appraisal reports and referred to in Article 6(2)(a) of the GIPs.

151 In that regard, it follows from the case-law that the guidelines adopted by the EU institutions and bodies, even on the assumption that they exercise a broad discretion, cannot lawfully, in any event, narrow the scope of the Staff Regulations or establish rules which derogate from hierarchically superior rules, such as the provisions of the Staff Regulations or general principles of law (see judgment of 15 February 2023, Freixas Montplet and Others v Committee of the Regions , T‑260/22, not published, EU:T:2023:71, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

152 In the present case, it must be stated that the criteria set out in point II.5 of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise permit candidates’ merits to be taken into account in the light of the appraisal reports, as referred to in Article 6(2)(a) of the GIPs. That is the case, in particular, of the criterion ‘Responsibilities/professional experience’ and of the heading ‘General comment’.

153 Furthermore, consideration of candidates’ appraisal reports is also apparent from the evaluation grid template, which reproduces the criteria set out in point II.5 of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise. That template refers to the information in the application file, which contains candidates’ appraisal reports.

154 That is also confirmed in practice, since, as may be seen from paragraphs 91 and 92 above, the joint certification panel, in application of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise, did in fact take the applicant’s merits, as disclosed in her appraisal reports, into consideration.

155 Consequently, the applicant cannot validly claim that point II.5 of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise departs from the criterion relating to candidates’ merits laid down in Article 6(2) of the GIPs.

156 It follows from the foregoing that the applicant has not shown that point II.5 of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise constituted a measure that misapplies Article 45a(2) of the Staff Regulations, or the GIPs, or that the Commission had restricted the scope of the minimum condition provided for in that article or in the GIPs, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraphs 86, 97 and 98 above.

157 In those circumstances, the second plea and, accordingly, the claims for annulment in their entirety must be rejected as unfounded.

C. The third head of claim, seeking compensation for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant

158 The applicant requests the Court to order the Commission to compensate for the non-pecuniary damage which she claims to have sustained and which she evaluates ex aequo et bono at EUR 8 000 owing to the illegalities relied on in the context of the present action and the ensuing barrier to the advancement of her career.

159 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

160 It should be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, claims for compensation must be rejected in so far as they are closely linked to claims for annulment which have themselves been rejected as unfounded (judgments of 30 September 2003, Martínez Valls v Parliament , T‑214/02, EU:T:2003:254, paragraph 43, and of 28 February 2018, Paulini v ECB , T‑764/16, not published, EU:T:2018:101, paragraph 86).

161 In the present case, since the alleged damage has its origin in the contested decision and the claim for annulment of that decision has been rejected as unfounded, as is apparent from paragraph 157 above, the claim for compensation must also be rejected.

D. The request for measures of organisation of procedure

162 In the reply, the applicant asks the Court to order the Commission to produce, by way of measures of organisation of procedure, first, the other version of the evaluation grid, in addition to the template produced as an annex to the defence, and, second, the note on the follow-up of the complaints in its entirety.

163 The Commission objects to the applicant’s request.

164 According to the case-law, to enable the Court to determine whether it is conducive to proper conduct of the procedure to order the production of certain documents, the party requesting production must not only identify the documents requested but also provide at least minimum information indicating the utility of those documents for the purposes of the proceedings (see judgment of 13 December 2018, Pipiliagkas v Commission , T‑689/16, not published, EU:T:2018:925, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).

165 It should be observed that the Commission, first, claimed that the first document requested did not exist and, second, provided details of the essential elements of the second document requested. That information is sufficient to assess the criteria used by the joint certification panel in the candidates’ interviews. Thus, the applicant has failed to indicate the utility of those documents.

166 In any event, it should be borne in mind that the Court is the sole judge of any need to supplement the information available to it concerning the cases before it (see judgment of 13 December 2018, Pipiliagkas v Commission , T‑689/16, not published, EU:T:2018:925, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited). The Court considers that it is sufficiently informed by the material in the case file.

167 Thus, the Court considers that there is no need to grant the applicant’s request for measures of organisation of procedure.

168 In the light of all of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

IV. Costs

169 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. However, under Article 135(1) of the Rules of Procedure, if equity so requires, the General Court may decide that an unsuccessful party is to pay only a proportion of the costs of the other party in addition to bearing his or her own, or even that he or she is not to be ordered to pay any.

170 In the present case, first, having regard to the factual context set out in paragraphs 10 to 17 above, it must be held that the certification procedure was more time-consuming than it should have been for the applicant, owing, inter alia, to the Commission’s error that led to the annulment of the first non-inclusion decision and the re-examination of her candidature. However, the applicant was made aware of the grounds of that annulment only at the stage of notification of the decision rejecting the complaint, which did not occur until 25 October 2024, or virtually one year after the adoption of the first non-inclusion decision and therefore at an advanced stage of the procedure.

171 Second, as pointed out in paragraph 118 above, the Commission declined to provide clarification of the contradiction between, on the one hand, the content of the extract from the note on the follow-up of the complaints reproduced in paragraph 72 of the decision rejecting the complaint and, on the other, its assertion that the same evaluation grid template had been applied to all candidates in the 2022-2023 certification exercise.

172 In those circumstances, the parties must be ordered to bear their own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders HP and the European Commission to bear their own costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 30 September 2026.

Table of contents

I. Background to the dispute

II. Forms of order sought

III. Law

A. The purpose of the action

B. The first head of claim, seeking the annulment of the contested decision

1. The third plea, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons

(a) The first complaint, alleging failure to state the reasons for the choice of format of the selection interview

(b) The second complaint, alleging failure to state sufficient reasons for the contested decision in the light of the comments contained in the applicant’s evaluation grid

2. The fourth plea, alleging breach of the right to be heard

3. The first plea, alleging breach of Article 45a of the Staff Regulations, the GIPs, the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise, the principles of equal treatment and legal certainty and the duty of care and the duty of diligence

(a) Preliminary considerations on the extent of the Court’s power of review

(b) The first part of the first plea, relating to the failure to take sufficiently into consideration the appraisal reports of the applicant and the other candidates

(1) The admissibility of the first part of the first plea

(2) Substance

(i) The first complaint, alleging that the joint certification panel applied two different methods for the purpose of assessing candidates in the 2022-2023 certification exercise

(ii) The second complaint, alleging that the applicant’s appraisal reports were not sufficiently taken into consideration by the joint certification panel

(c) The second part of the first plea, relating to the use of two different evaluation grid templates in the 2022-2023 certification exercise

(1) The admissibility of the second part of the first plea

(2) Substance

(d) The third part of the first plea, relating to the absence of a system for weighting the criteria for the assessment of candidates’ merits

4. The second plea, alleging the illegality of point II.5 of the guidelines relating to the 2022-2023 certification exercise

C. The third head of claim, seeking compensation for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant

D. The request for measures of organisation of procedure

IV. Costs

* Language of the case: English.