lagen.nu
T-119/25

Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) 4 November 2026

CELEX
62025TJ0119
Datum
2026-11-04
Källa
eur-lex.europa.eu

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

4 November 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the EU figurative mark Le SAC OUTLET – Earlier national figurative mark Lesac – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑119/25,

Le Sac Srl, established in Milan (Italy), represented by L. Trevisan and G. Affer, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by D. Stoyanova-Valchanova and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO being

Felipe Domingo Asunción, residing in Madrid (Spain),

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),

composed of E. Buttigieg (Rapporteur), President, J. Schwarcz and F. Bestagno, Judges,

Registrar: G. Mitrev, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 20 April 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Le Sac Srl, seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 18 December 2024 (Case R 1073/2024‑4) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 10 June 2021, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the following figurative sign:

3 The mark applied for covered goods and services in Classes 18, 25 and 35 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:

– Class 18: ‘Handbags, purses and wallets; tool bags sold empty; luggage, bags, wallets and other carriers; key cases; walking staffs; trunks and suitcases; suitcases with wheels; vanity cases, not fitted; umbrellas and parasols; briefcases [leather goods]; animal skins, hides; leather and imitation leather’;

– Class 25: ‘Clothing; shoes; headgear; parts of clothing, footwear and headgear; neckwear; collar protectors; neck tube scarves; shawls and headscarves; gloves [clothing]; waist belts; socks and stockings; cravats; suspenders’;

– Class 35: ‘Presentation of goods on communication media, for retail purposes; wholesaling, retailing and mail order and by communications media and via the internet, in relation [to] the following goods: coin pouches, pocket wallets, tool bags, empty, luggage, bags, wallets and other carriers, cases for storing keys, canes, trunks and travelling bags, trolleys (trolley cases), vanity cases not fitted for toiletry articles, umbrellas, parasols, cases of leather, animal skins, hides, leather, imitations of leather, clothing, shoes, headgear for wear, parts of clothing, parts of footwear, parts of headgear, neckwear, snood style scarves, shawls and neckerchiefs, gloves, belts, socks and stockings, neck ties, braces (suspenders)’.

4 On 11 November 2021, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, Mr Felipe Domingo Asunción, filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5 The opposition was based on the following earlier marks:

– the Spanish figurative mark depicted below, filed on 18 December 2020 and registered on 16 August 2021 under No M4 099 063, covering goods and services in Classes 18 and 35 and corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:

– Class 18: ‘Bags; purses; suitcases; briefcases [leather goods]’;

– Class 35: ‘Wholesale and retail services in commerce and through worldwide computer networks of handbags, purses, suitcases, leather wallets, clothing, footwear and headgear’.

– the Spanish figurative mark depicted below applied for on 30 June 1999 and registered on 1 March 2020 under No M2 244 284 for goods in Class 25 and corresponding to the following description: ‘Clothing, footwear, headgear’:

6 In support of the opposition, Mr Asunción relied, inter alia, on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

7 On 26 March 2024, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition in part on the basis of that provision. It upheld the opposition for the following goods and services:

– Class 18: ‘Handbags, purses and wallets; tool bags sold empty; luggage, bags, wallets and other carriers; key cases; walking staffs; trunks and suitcases; suitcases with wheels; vanity cases, not fitted; briefcases [leather goods]’;

– Class 25: ‘Clothing; shoes; headgear; parts of clothing, footwear and headgear; neckwear; collar protectors; neck tube scarves; shawls and headscarves; gloves [clothing]; waist belts; socks and stockings; cravats; suspenders’;

– Class 35: ‘Wholesaling, retailing and mail order and by communications media and via the internet, in relation the following goods: coin pouches, pocket wallets, tool bags, empty, luggage, bags, wallets and other carriers, cases for storing keys, canes, trunks and travelling bags, trolleys (trolley cases), vanity cases not fitted for toiletry articles, cases of leather, clothing, shoes, headgear for wear, parts of clothing, parts of footwear, parts of headgear, neckwear, snood style scarves, shawls and neckerchiefs, gloves, belts, socks and stockings, neck ties, braces (suspenders)’.

8 On 22 May 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.

9 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal. As a preliminary observation, the Board of Appeal stated that, despite the applicant requesting the annulment of the Opposition Division’s decision in its entirety, it would examine that decision only in so far as it adversely affected the applicant. The Board of Appeal focused its assessment on the earlier Spanish figurative mark M4 099 063 (‘the earlier mark’). It found, first of all, that the relevant public is the Spanish-speaking public and that its level of attention varied from average to high. It then took the view that the goods and services covered by the mark applied for and those covered by the earlier mark were partly identical and partly similar to varying degrees. Furthermore, after having analysed the distinctive and dominant elements of the signs at issue, the Board of Appeal found that those signs were visually similar to an average degree and phonetically identical or highly similar, while they were conceptually not similar – the latter, according to the Board of Appeal, not carrying much weight in the overall comparison. It also took the view that the earlier mark was of normal distinctiveness, as it did not have any meaning for a significant part of the relevant Spanish-speaking public in relation to the goods and services covered by that mark. In the light of that, it found that the Opposition Division had not erred in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion with regard to the goods and services covered by the mark applied for, listed in paragraph 7 above, on the basis of the earlier mark, for at least a non-negligible part of the relevant Spanish-speaking public. The Board of Appeal thus took the view that there was no need to examine the opposition on the basis of the other earlier Spanish figurative mark M2 244 284.

Forms of order sought

10 The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– order EUIPO to pay the costs.

11 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.

Law

12 The applicant relies, in essence, on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. In support of that plea, it raises five complaints, alleging (i) an error of assessment with respect to the relevant public and its level of attention, (ii) an error of assessment with respect to the similarity of the goods and services in question, (iii) an error of assessment with respect to the distinctiveness of the earlier mark, (iv) an error of assessment with respect to the similarity of the signs at issue, and (v) an error of assessment with respect to the likelihood of confusion.

13 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

14 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark. Furthermore, under Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation 2017/1001, ‘earlier trade marks’ means trade marks registered in a Member State with a date of application for registration which is earlier than the date of application for registration of the EU trade mark.

15 The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS) , T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).

16 For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel) , T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

The relevant public

17 In the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, account should be taken of the average consumer of the category of goods or services concerned, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question (see judgment of 13 February 2007, Mundipharma v OHIM – Altana Pharma (RESPICUR) , T‑256/04, EU:T:2007:46, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

18 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the goods and services in question are directed at the public at large, as well as business customers with specific professional knowledge or expertise (in particular as regards wholesale services), and that its level of attention varies from average to high, depending on the specialised nature of the goods, the frequency of purchase and their price. The Board of Appeal also found that, since the earlier mark is a Spanish trade mark, the relevant public is the Spanish-speaking public.

19 In the first place, the applicant maintains that the Board of Appeal erred in that it acknowledged that the goods and services in question are directed at the general public, as well as business customers with specific professional knowledge or expertise, with a level of attention that varied from average to high but nevertheless did not consider, as a consequence, that the relevant public would be able to perceive the differences between the signs at issue, due to its level of attention and to being accustomed to being exposed to several trade marks in the fashion sector. That is all the more true with reference to the services in Class 35. Accordingly, according to the applicant, the relevant public in the present case displays a high level of attention, which affects the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion.

20 In the second place, the applicant submits that account should be taken of the different purposes for which the goods and services in question are purchased. The public seeks the goods and services covered by the mark applied for to find leather products from well-known brands with discounted prices whereas the public seeks the earlier mark because it is interested in the specific goods and services offered under that latter trade mark. According to the applicant, in the light of the high level of attention of the relevant public and the different purposes for which the goods and services compared are purchased, consumers will be particularly attentive and will easily note the differences between the signs at issue, also considering the applicant’s long presence on the specific market.

21 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

22 Even if, by its line of argument, the applicant intended to maintain that the relevant public’s level of attention does not vary from average to high, but that it is only high, it must be found, as noted by EUIPO, that such an argument would be ineffective. It is apparent from paragraphs 44 and 46 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal found that a likelihood of confusion could not be excluded, despite a high level of attention on the part of the public, for all the goods and services covered by the mark applied for.

23 The applicant, by its line of argument, actually seems to take issue with the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion carried out by the Board of Appeal. Therefore, in the following, the applicant’s arguments relating to the high level of attention of the relevant public and the different purchasing purposes of the goods and services under comparison will be examined.

The comparison of the goods and services

24 In assessing the similarity of the goods or services in question, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, in particular, their nature, their intended purpose and their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary (judgment of 29 September 1998, Canon , C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 23). Other factors may also be taken into account, such as the distribution channels of the goods concerned, or the fact that the goods are often sold in the same specialist sales outlets, which is likely to facilitate the perception by the relevant consumer of the close connections between them and strengthen the perception that the same undertaking is responsible for the production of those goods (see judgments of 2 October 2015, The Tea Board v OHIM – Delta Lingerie (Darjeeling) , T‑627/13, not published, EU:T:2015:740, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited, and of 4 October 2018, Asolo v EUIPO – Red Bull (FLÜGEL) , T‑150/17, EU:T:2018:641, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).

25 In that regard, it should also be borne in mind that where the goods covered by the trade mark application are included in a more general category of goods covered by the earlier mark, those goods may be considered to be identical. Conversely, goods can also be considered to be identical when the goods designated by the earlier mark are included in a more general category designated by the trade mark application (see judgment of 21 February 2024, Azalee Cosmetics v EUIPO – L’Oréal (UK) (LA CREME LIBRE) , T‑765/22, not published, EU:T:2024:106, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

26 At the outset, it should be pointed out that the Board of Appeal confirmed the Opposition Division’s decision in its entirety. Moreover, the Board of Appeal noted in the contested decision that the Opposition Division had found that the goods and services covered by the mark applied for and those covered by the earlier mark were identical and similar to varying degrees and that the Opposition Division’s reasoning, which had not been challenged by the parties, was correct and formed an integral part of the contested decision. In view of the continuity in terms of functions between the Opposition Divisions and Boards of Appeal, it is thus appropriate to refer to the Opposition Division’s reasoning with respect to the comparison of the goods and services (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 March 2015, Naazneen Investments v OHIM – Energy Brands (SMART WATER) , T‑250/13, not published, EU:T:2015:160, paragraph 16).

27 It should also be noted, as does EUIPO, that the applicant contests the findings of the contested decision only in relation to ‘tool bags sold empty, other carriers; key cases; walking staffs; vanity cases’ in Class 18; ‘neckwear, collar protectors, neck tube scarves, shawl and headscarves, gloves, waist belts, socks and stockings, cravats, suspenders’ in Class 25; and ‘wholesaling, retailing and mail order and by communications media and via the internet, in relation the following goods: cases for storing keys, canes, vanity cases not fitted for toiletry articles, cases of leather, neckwear, snood style scarves, shawls and neckerchiefs, gloves, belts, socks and stockings, neck ties, braces (suspenders)’ in Class 35 and covered by the mark applied for.

The goods in Class 18

28 The applicant maintains that the contested decision erred in confirming a certain degree of similarity between the goods and services covered by the earlier mark and ‘tool bags sold empty, other carriers; key cases; walking staffs; vanity cases’ in Class 18 and covered by the mark applied for. According to the applicant, such goods are not included in the list of goods covered by the earlier mark and do not clearly overlap with them, as they have different purposes (such as to help consumers to walk).

29 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. It maintains, in particular, that the applicant has not presented any arguments which could cast doubt on the correct application of the relevant criteria for establishing similarity between the cited contested goods and services in Classes 18 and 35.

30 First, it should be noted in that regard that the Board of Appeal was correct to find that ‘tool bags sold empty’ in Class 18 and covered by the mark applied for were included in the broader category of ‘bags’ in the same class and covered by the earlier mark. Consequently, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 25 above, the Board of Appeal was correct to take the view that those goods were identical.

31 Secondly, as noted by the Board of Appeal, a purse is a small bag or pouch, often made of soft leather, for carrying money, especially coins. Therefore, ‘purses’ in Class 18 and covered by the earlier mark are included in the broader category of ‘wallets and other carriers’ in the same class and covered by the mark applied for. Accordingly, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 25 above, the Board of Appeal did not make any error of assessment in finding that those goods were at least similar to a high degree.

32 Thirdly, the Board of Appeal was correct to take the view that ‘vanity cases’ in Class 18 and covered by the mark applied for, and ‘bags’ in the same class and covered by the earlier mark, which includes travelling bags, coincided in their distribution channels, relevant public and producers. In addition, it should be noted that they have their function as carriers in common, typically when travelling. The Board of Appeal therefore did not make an error of assessment in taking the view that those goods were similar to a high degree.

33 Fourthly, the Board of Appeal also did not make an error of assessment in taking the view that ‘key cases’, covered by the mark applied for, and ‘bags’, covered by the earlier mark, coincided in their distribution channels, relevant public and producers. In addition, it should be noted that those goods also have their function as carriers in common. The Board of Appeal thus was correct to find that those goods were similar.

34 Fifthly, by contrast, the Board of Appeal did err in finding that ‘walking staffs’ in Class 18 and covered by the mark applied for, and ‘bags’ of the same class and covered by the earlier mark, were similar to a low degree. Those goods are generally made from different materials. In addition, as maintained by the applicant, ‘walking staffs’ and ‘bags’ have different purposes, as the former are used to help walking while the latter are used to carry objects. Lastly, while, admittedly, ‘walking staffs’ in the category ‘canes’ can be sold in the same sports goods stores as ‘rucksacks’ which are included in ‘bags’, the fact remains that ‘rucksacks’ and ‘walking staffs’ are generally sold in different aisles. It follows that, contrary to what the Board of Appeal found, ‘walking staffs’ in Class 18 and covered by the mark applied for, and ‘bags’ in the same class and covered by the earlier mark, are dissimilar.

The goods in Class 25

35 The applicant maintains that the Board of Appeal erred in confirming that there is a certain degree of similarity between ‘neckwear, collar protectors, neck tube scarves, shawls and headscarves, gloves, waist belts, socks and stockings, cravats, suspenders’ in Class 25 and covered by the mark applied for and the services in Class 35 covered by the earlier mark. According to the applicant, it follows from settled case-law that retail services of specific goods are not similar to other specific goods. Apart from being different in nature since services are intangible whereas goods are tangible, they serve different needs. Furthermore, goods and services have different methods of use and are neither in competition nor complementary.

36 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

37 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the principles applicable to the comparison of goods also apply to the comparison between goods and services. It is true that, by their very nature, goods are generally different from services, but it nevertheless remains the case that they can be complementary or that services may have the same purpose or use as goods, and thus compete with the latter. It follows that, in certain circumstances, goods and services may be found to be similar. In particular, there is a similarity between goods and the retail services which relate to those goods, based on the existence of a complementary connection between those goods and services (see judgment of 21 February 2024, LA CREME LIBRE , T‑765/22, not published, EU:T:2024:106, paragraphs 49 and 50 and the case-law cited). Such similarity also exists between retail services and sales via the internet, and identical or highly similar goods which relate to those services (see judgment of 15 September 2021, Freshly Cosmetics v EUIPO – Misiego Blázquez (IDENTY BEAUTY) , T‑688/20, not published, EU:T:2021:567, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

38 In the present case, the Board of Appeal was correct to note that ‘neckwear, collar protectors, neck tube scarves, shawls and headscarves, gloves, waist belts, socks and stockings, cravats, suspenders’ in Class 25 and covered by the mark applied for were all articles of clothing. Those goods are thus identical or highly similar to ‘clothing’ in the same category to which the services in Class 35 relate and which are covered by the earlier mark.

39 Accordingly, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 37 above, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that those goods in Class 25 and covered by the mark applied for and ‘wholesale and retail services in commerce and through worldwide computer networks of clothing’ in Class 35 and covered by the earlier mark were similar.

The services in Class 35

40 As regards the services covered by the mark applied for in respect of which the applicant challenges the contested decision, in the first place, the Board of Appeal took the view that ‘wholesaling, retailing and mail order and by communications media and via the internet, in relation the following goods: neckwear, snood style scarves, shawls and neckerchiefs, gloves, belts, socks and stockings, neck ties, braces (suspenders)’ covered by the mark applied for and, moreover, ‘wholesale and retail services in commerce and through worldwide computer networks of suitcases, clothing, footwear and headgear’ covered by the earlier mark were at least similar to a high degree (if not identical) because they coincide at least in relevant factors such as their intended purpose, method of use, distribution channels, relevant public and providers.

41 In the second place, the Board of Appeal found that ‘wholesaling, retailing and mail order and by communications media and via the internet, in relation the following goods: cases for storing keys, vanity cases not fitted for toiletry articles, cases of leather’ covered by the mark applied for and, moreover, ‘wholesale and retail services in commerce and through worldwide computer networks of handbags, purses’ covered by the earlier mark were at least similar to a low degree because they coincided at least in relevant factors, namely same nature, distribution channels, relevant public and providers.

42 In the third place, the Board of Appeal took the view that the criteria, for which ‘walking staffs’ in Class 18 and covered by the mark applied for were found to be at least similar to a low degree to ‘bags’ in the same class and covered by the earlier mark, equally apply to ‘canes’ which are subject to wholesale, retail and mail order services covered by the mark applied for. Consequently, the Board of Appeal found that ‘wholesaling, retailing and mail order and by communications media and via the internet, in relation the following goods: canes’ covered by the mark applied for were similar at least to a low degree to ‘bags’ in Class 18 and covered by the earlier mark.

43 The applicant maintains that the contested decision is incorrect in that the Board of Appeal confirmed that there was a certain degree of similarity between the goods and services covered by the earlier mark and ‘wholesaling, retailing and mail order and by communications media and via the internet, in relation the following goods: cases for storing keys, canes, vanity cases not fitted for toiletry articles, cases of leather, neckwear, snood style scarves, shawls and neckerchiefs, gloves, belts, socks and stockings, neck ties, braces (suspenders)’ covered by the mark applied for.

44 According to the applicant, in essence, the goods to which those services relate and covered by the mark applied for are not included in the list of goods covered by the earlier mark and do not overlap with them.

45 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. It relies, in particular, on paragraph 33 of the judgment of 21 February 2024, LA CREME LIBRE (T‑765/22, not published, EU:T:2024:106), according to which the retail services of the goods covered by the mark applied for, which are identical and similar to an average degree to the goods covered by the earlier mark, must be considered to be similar to an average degree to the respective goods covered by the earlier mark and, moreover, the retail services of the goods covered by the mark applied for, which are similar to a low degree to the goods covered by the earlier mark, must be considered to be similar to a low degree to those latter goods.

46 It must be noted that the applicant’s argument set out in paragraph 44 above cannot cast doubt on the Board of Appeal’s finding on the similarity between ‘wholesaling, retailing and mail order and by communications media and via the internet, in relation the following goods: cases for storing keys, vanity cases not fitted for toiletry articles, cases of leather, neckwear, snood style scarves, shawls and neckerchiefs, gloves, belts, socks and stockings, neck ties, braces (suspenders)’ covered by the mark applied for and ‘wholesale and retail services in commerce and through worldwide computer networks of handbags, purses, suitcases, leather wallets, clothing, footwear and headgear’ covered by the earlier mark, which is based on an assessment of the relevant factors deriving from the case-law cited in paragraph 24 above, such as their nature, intended purpose, distribution channels, relevant public and providers.

47 However, it should be pointed out that it is apparent from the contested decision that the Board of Appeal found ‘walking staffs’ in Class 18 and covered by the mark applied for, and ‘bags’ in the same class and covered by the earlier mark, were similar to a low degree and that it is, in essence, on the basis of that finding that the Board of Appeal found that ‘wholesaling, retailing and mail order and by communications media and via the internet, in relation the following goods: canes’ covered by the mark applied for were at least similar to a low degree to ‘bags’ in Class 18 and covered by the earlier mark (see paragraph 42 above). Since the Board of Appeal should have found that ‘walking staffs’ in Class 18 and covered by the mark applied for, and ‘bags’ in the same class and covered by the earlier mark, were different (see paragraph 34 above), it should also have found that the services in Class 35 which were designated by the mark applied for and referred to in the present paragraph, and ‘bags’ in Class 18 and covered by the earlier mark, were different.

48 It follows from all of the above that the applicant has not established that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in taking the view that the goods and services covered by the mark applied for and the goods and services covered by the earlier mark were identical or similar to varying degrees, except for ‘walking staffs’ in Class 18 and ‘wholesaling, retailing and mail order and by communications media and via the internet, in relation the following goods: canes’ in Class 35 and covered by the mark applied for.

The comparison of the signs

49 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

50 Assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole. The overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components. It is, however, only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (see judgment of 8 May 2014, Bimbo v OHIM , C‑591/12 P, EU:C:2014:305, paragraphs 22 and 23 and the case-law cited). That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (judgment of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM , C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43).

51 In the present case, before addressing the issue of the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the marks at issue, it is necessary to examine the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements of the marks at issue.

The distinctive and dominant elements of the marks at issue

52 For the purpose of assessing the dominant character of one or more given components of a composite trade mark, account must be taken, in particular, of the intrinsic qualities of each of those components by comparing them with those of other components. In addition, and accessorily, account may be taken of the relative position of the various components within the arrangement of the composite mark (judgment of 23 October 2002, Matratzen Concord v OHIM – Hukla Germany (MATRATZEN) , T‑6/01, EU:T:2002:261, paragraph 35).

53 With regard to the assessment of the distinctive character of an element making up a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the element in question in the light of whether it is at all descriptive of the goods for which the mark has been registered (see judgment of 13 June 2006, Inex v OHIM – Wiseman (Representation of a cowhide) , T‑153/03, EU:T:2006:157, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

54 In the first place, the Board of Appeal noted that the earlier mark was a figurative sign which consisted of the word element ‘Lesac’ written in a slightly stylised, lower-case script, save for the initial letter ‘L’ which was capitalised. The Board of Appeal also noted that that word element was depicted in dark red. It found that the earlier mark did not have a dominant element.

55 In the second place, the Board of Appeal pointed out that the mark applied for consisted of the words ‘le’, ‘sac’ and ‘outlet’, depicted in three horizontal lines, in black and in common fonts. It also noted that that mark had two decorative orange lines. It found that the word ‘sac’ of that mark visually stood out in the mark applied for on account of its size and central placement, and that it was that mark’s more dominant element. It also took the view that since the word ‘le’ did not have a particular meaning for the relevant public, it was distinctive. According to the Board of Appeal, that word will not go unnoticed, even though it is of a relatively small size. As regards the word element ‘outlet’ of the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal pointed out that it was not in dispute that it was an English word, widely used and understood in Spain as referring to a ‘commercial establishment retailing the goods of a particular producer or wholesaler, often at a discount’. It found that, as such, that element was non-distinctive for all the relevant goods and services, given that it described the establishment where the goods and services may be offered for sale or rendered.

56 In the third place, the Board of Appeal emphasised that the Court had already held that it could not be presumed that the Spanish consumer would make a direct link between the French word ‘ le sac ’ and the word ‘bag’, despite the fact that the word ‘ saco ’ existed in Spanish and added that the word ‘ sac ’ might not be identified in the earlier mark’s word element ‘lesac’ as that element was written without a space.

57 The Board of Appeal also noted that, although the evidence submitted by the applicant shows that the Spanish word ‘ saco ’ might be translated as ‘bag’, that did not mean that the Spanish public immediately would understand the words ‘le’ and ‘sac’ as meaning ‘the bag’. In addition, as regards the applicant’s argument that the French word ‘ sac ’ exists in Catalan, the Board of Appeal noted that Catalan was not widely spoken in Spain, as it followed, according to the Board of Appeal, from the evidence adduced by the applicant. Moreover, the evidence on teaching of French in Spain does not show that a large part of the Spanish public would immediately understand the words ‘le sac’ as referring to the meaning of ‘ le sac ’ in French. Lastly, the Board of Appeal emphasised that the fact that Spanish tourists visit France could not be interpreted in such a way as that all those tourists would understand the meaning of the words ‘ le sac ’.

58 The Board of Appeal found that the word element ‘le sac’, present in each of the signs at issue, was a meaningless term for a significant part of the relevant Spanish public and was therefore distinctive for that public.

59 The applicant does not challenge the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the word ‘outlet’, contained in the mark applied for, is non-distinctive for all of the goods and services covered by that mark or that the element ‘sac’ of that mark is a dominant element.

60 However, in the first place, the applicant challenges, in essence, the Board of Appeal’s finding that the word element ‘le sac’, present in each of the signs at issue, was a meaningless term for a significant part of the relevant Spanish public and claims that that word element will be understood by the relevant Spanish public as meaning ‘the bag’.

61 In the second place, the applicant maintains that the most prominent element of the earlier mark is the letter ‘l’, while the most prominent elements of the mark applied for are the word ‘sac’ and the figurative element. It emphasises that that element undoubtedly catches the public’s attention as it is the only element of the mark applied for having a colourful design and is the biggest element of the sign, towering and surrounding the whole sign.

62 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

– The understanding of the element ‘le sac’ or ‘lesac’ by the relevant public

63 It should be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, knowledge of a foreign language cannot, in general, be assumed (see judgment of 14 July 2021, Cole Haan v EUIPO – Samsøe & Samsøe Holding (Ø) , T‑399/20, EU:T:2021:442, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited). Similarly, according to the case-law, understanding of a sign may be assumed to exist if a sign is applied for in respect of a territory in which the language of the sign is the native language of the population of the territory. However, such an understanding must be proven in territories in which the relevant language is not the native language of the population, unless a sufficient knowledge of the language of the sign on the part of the target public in those territories is a well-known fact (see judgment of 29 April 2020, Cimpress Schweiz v EUIPO – Impress Media (CIMPRESS) , T‑37/19, not published, EU:T:2020:164, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

64 Sufficient knowledge of French by the Spanish public does not constitute a well-known fact (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 September 2012, Serrano Aranda v OHIM – Burg Groep (LE LANCIER) , T‑265/09, not published, EU:T:2012:472, paragraphs 65 and 66).

65 The onus was therefore on the applicant to show that the word element ‘lesac’ or ‘le sac’ would be understood by the Spanish public (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 June 2024, Google v EUIPO – EPay (GPAY) , T‑78/23, not published, EU:T:2024:378, paragraph 52).

66 It is therefore necessary to examine whether the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the evidence adduced by the applicant was not capable of demonstrating that the word element ‘Lesac’ or ‘le SAC’ would be understood by the relevant Spanish public as meaning ‘the bag’.

67 First, as regards the evidence adduced by the applicant to show that the word ‘ saco ’ exists in Spanish, it must be borne in mind that it follows from the case-law that the relevant public is likely to understand a term in a foreign language where the term in question has an equivalent in the language of the relevant public and a link may be made by that public between that term and its translation in the language concerned (see judgment of 19 November 2025, Vassilev & Chisuse v EUIPO – Vayanos Kostopoulos (VC LAW) , T‑524/24, not published, EU:T:2025:1045, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

68 However, the Court has already held, in relation to marks containing the word element ‘le sac’ which are identical or similar to the earlier mark, that the Spanish public will not understand that element as referring to a bag or garment, even though the applicant before the Court had raised the fact that the word ‘ saco ’ existed in Spanish (judgment of 26 March 2020, Armani v EUIPO – Asunción (GIORGIO ARMANI le Sac 11) , T‑653/18, not published, EU:T:2020:121, paragraphs 80 and 85).

69 Such a conclusion applies all the more with regard to the word element ‘lesac’ of the earlier mark. As that word element begins with a capital letter and the word elements ‘le’ and ‘sac’ are not separated by a space, the relevant Spanish public will not break down the word element ‘lesac’ into two French words. On the contrary, it will perceive it as a single word which begins with a capital letter and is without any meaning.

70 Furthermore, although it is apparent from the dictionary extract provided by the applicant that the Spanish word ‘ saco ’ means, inter alia, ‘receptacle made of cloth, leather, paper etc., usually rectangular or cylindrical in shape, open on one side’, it is also apparent that that Spanish word has numerous other meanings. In addition, despite the similarity between the French expression ‘ le sac ’ and the Spanish expression ‘ el saco ’, there remain, on account of the difference between ‘ le ’ and ‘ el ’, and the additional letter ‘o’, differences between those expressions which prevent a direct conceptual link between those expressions in the perception of the relevant Spanish public (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 September 2012, LE LANCIER , T‑265/09, not published, EU:T:2012:472, paragraphs 65 and 66).

71 Moreover, although it is apparent from the extract from the TMclass data base, submitted by the applicant, that the words ‘ bolsos-saco ’ are translated in that data base into French as ‘ sac fourre-tout à bandoulière ’ (shoulder tote bag) and that the Spanish term ‘ sacos de lona ’ (canvas bag) is translated into French as ‘ sac de paquetage ’(duffle bag), that extract does not give any indication as to the translation of the word ‘ saco ’ on its own, let alone as to how the relevant Spanish public would understand the word element ‘lesac’ or ‘le sac’. It should also be noted that, in that data base, the goods in Class 18 called ‘ sacs ’ in French are called ‘ bolsas ’ in Spanish and not ‘ saco ’ or ‘ sacos ’. Consequently, that data base also is not capable of establishing that the relevant Spanish public will immediately understand the word element ‘lesac’ as meaning ‘ saco ’ in Spanish, in relation to the goods and services in question.

72 It follows from the foregoing that it is likely that a significant part of the relevant public will not make a link between the expressions ‘lesac’ and ‘le sac’, and the translation ‘ el saco ’ in Spanish.

73 Secondly, the fact, relied on by the applicant, that the word ‘ sac ’ exists in Catalan, which is the official language of Catalonia, whose population accounts for approximately 16% of the total population of Spain, does not cast doubt on the Board of Appeal’s finding that the word element ‘lesac’ or ‘le sac’ will not be understood by a significant part of the relevant Spanish public.

74 Thirdly, although the data regarding teaching of French in Spain, which were provided by the applicant, show that part of the relevant Spanish public has some knowledge of French, they do not support the finding that the part of that public which does not understand that language is negligible.

75 Furthermore, as pointed out by the Board of Appeal, the fact, relied on by the applicant, that Spanish tourists visit France does not mean that all those tourists understand the meaning of the French words ‘ le sac ’.

76 Fourthly, as concerns the applicant’s argument that it is likely that the Spanish public would understand the highly similar Italian word ‘ sacco ’, which means ‘ sac ’ in French, in relation to the goods and services in question, it should be noted that it follows from the case-law cited in paragraph 63 above that knowledge of a foreign language cannot, in general, be assumed. Moreover, even if the relevant Spanish public understands the Italian word ‘ sacco ’ (‘ sac ’ in French), that does not mean that they will understand the word element ‘lesac’ or ‘le sac’ as meaning ‘the bag’.

77 Lastly, as regards the Opposition Division’s decision relied on by the applicant in which EUIPO supposedly confirmed that the English word ‘sack’ is understood on the basis of its similar equivalent ‘ saco ’ in Spanish, it should be noted that neither the Board of Appeal nor the Court can be bound by such a decision. In particular, it would be contrary to the Board of Appeal’s purpose, as defined in Articles 66 to 71 of Regulation 2017/1001, for its jurisdiction to be restricted by the requirement to respect the decisions of the first-instance adjudicating bodies of EUIPO (see judgment of 9 March 2022, Telefónica Germany v EUIPO (LOOP) , T‑132/21, not published, EU:T:2022:124, paragraph 113 and the case-law cited).

78 Therefore, it must be held that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in taking the view that the word element ‘lesac’ of the earlier mark, or ‘le sac’ of the mark applied for, would not be understood by a significant part of the relevant Spanish public and that that element therefore was distinctive.

– The dominant elements of the marks at issue

79 As regards the earlier mark, it should be noted that the mere fact that the first letter of the word element ‘Lesac’ is written in upper case is not sufficient to consider that it is the dominant element of the earlier mark. That element is written in a slightly stylised font which does not particularly highlight the capital ‘L’. The Board of Appeal thus did not make an error of assessment in finding that the earlier mark had no dominant element.

80 As regards the mark applied for, it is undisputed that the word ‘sac’, which is written in bold and is larger in size than the word elements ‘le’ and ‘outlet’, is a dominant element of that mark.

81 By contrast, the applicant mistakenly maintains that the figurative element of the mark applied for is also a dominant element of that mark.

82 It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, where a trade mark consists of both word and figurative elements, the former are, in principle, more distinctive than the latter, because the relevant public will more readily refer to the goods in question by quoting the name of the mark than by describing the figurative element of that mark (see judgment of 5 March 2025, People Against Dirty v EUIPO – Ningbo Future Houseware (ecovie) , T‑278/24, not published, EU:T:2025:212, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

83 In the present case, the figurative element consists of two orange curved lines, one large and framing the word element above and to its right, the other smaller, curved line positioned just above the first curved line. That basic figurative element will be perceived as serving merely to highlight the word element and therefore as purely decorative and not, contrary to what is maintained by the applicant, as a dominant element in the mark applied for.

84 It follows from all of the above that the applicant has not established that the Board of Appeal erred in its assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements of the signs at issue.

Visual similarity

85 The Board of Appeal noted that the earlier mark’s word element ‘lesac’ was identically reproduced at the beginning of the word elements of the mark applied for, although over two lines. It also noted that those word elements differed in the standard fonts used and in the colours, that is, dark red in the case of the earlier mark and black in that of the mark applied for. The Board of Appeal further noted that the signs differed in the additional non-distinctive word ‘outlet’ in the mark applied for and the decorative orange lines. It therefore concluded that the signs at issue were overall visually similar to an average degree.

86 The applicant maintains that, visually, the signs at issue show clear differences. Their different stylisations, layouts, lengths and colours attract the attention of consumers and are sufficient to distinguish them.

87 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

88 In that regard, it should be noted that, admittedly, there are visual differences between the signs at issue, as it also has been noted by the Board of Appeal. The earlier mark consists of a single word element ‘Lesac’, written with a slightly stylised upper-case ‘L’ in red, whereas the mark applied for contains three word elements, ‘le’, ‘sac’ and ‘outlet’, written in black over three lines, in a slightly stylised font, different from that of the word element ‘Lesac’ of the earlier mark. In addition, the signs at issue also differ due to the presence of a figurative element in the mark applied for.

89 That said, the differences arising from the figurative element of the mark applied for, the structure of that mark and the different font used in the signs at issue are not particularly striking. Moreover, the applicant does not dispute that the element ‘outlet’ is not distinctive in relation to the goods and services covered by the mark applied for. It is, furthermore, written in a lighter font than the word elements ‘le’ and ‘sac’ and is placed below the most dominant element of the mark applied for, namely the word element ‘sac’.

90 The relevant public’s attention will focus on the word element ‘sac’, which dominates the overall impression of the mark applied for, as well as on the word element ‘le’ of that mark, given that the latter is positioned above the dominant word element and is written in a rather bold font.

91 Thus, in so far as the visual differences between the signs at issue are not particularly striking, given the similarity between the word element ‘lesac’ of the earlier mark and the word elements ‘le’ and ‘sac’ of the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the signs at issue, overall, were visually similar to an average degree.

92 That conclusion is not called into question by the applicant’s claims, raised for the first time at the hearing, that the word element ‘sac’ of the mark applied for could be perceived as an acronym and the figurative element of that mark as a shoe or a bag. Those claims must be rejected on the ground that they are not supported by any evidence.

Phonetic similarity

93 The Board of Appeal found, in essence, that, phonetically, the pronunciation of the signs at issue coincided in the element ‘le sac’ which is the only element of the earlier mark and which will be pronounced in the mark applied for. It also took the view that the non-distinctive word ‘outlet’ of the mark applied for was unlikely to be pronounced. It therefore found that, phonetically, the signs at issue were either identical or highly similar for the part of the public which will pronounce the word ‘outlet’ of the mark applied for.

94 The applicant maintains that the signs at issue will be pronounced in a clearly different manner. According to the rules of pronunciation in the Spanish language, the earlier mark, consisting of a single word, is pronounced ‘lèsac’ (with the accent on the first vowel ‘e’), whereas the expression ‘Le sac’ of the mark applied for, consisting of two words, will be pronounced ‘le sàc’ (with the accent on the final vowel ‘a’). According to the applicant, the signs at issue also differ in length, with the mark applied for closing with the pronunciation of the word ‘outlet’. Lastly, the signs at issue are pronounced with a different rhythm. The earlier mark is pronounced as a single word, without a pause, whereas the mark applied for is pronounced with at least two pauses.

95 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

96 In that regard, it should be noted that the word element ‘outlet’, as has been found in paragraph 89 above, is not distinctive. Consequently, and in the light, in particular, of the natural tendency of consumers to abbreviate long signs and not to pronounce all the word elements of which they consist (see judgment of 2 February 2022, Canisius v EUIPO – Beiersdorf (CCLABELLE VIENNA) , T‑694/20, not published, EU:T:2022:45, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited), the Board of Appeal was correct to take the view that the word element ‘outlet’ was unlikely to be pronounced.

97 As regards, further, the applicant’s argument that there is a difference in emphasis between the word element ‘lesac’ of the earlier mark and the word elements ‘le sac’ of the mark applied for if they were pronounced following Spanish rules of pronunciation, it should be pointed out that, as those words are not part of the Spanish vocabulary, it is not possible to determine their rhythm or intonation with absolute certainty (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 July 2015, Knauf Insulation Technology v OHIM – Saint Gobain Cristalería (ECOSE) , T‑323/12, not published, EU:T:2015:510, paragraph 42). In any event, the difference between ‘lésac’ and ‘le sàc’ is not clearly perceptible.

98 Likewise, as the words ‘ le ’ and ‘ sac ’ are monosyllabic, the pause between those words in the mark applied for will not differ from the pause marked between the syllables ‘le’ and ‘sac’ of the earlier mark.

99 Accordingly, it must be observed, as the Board of Appeal did, that the signs at issue coincide in the pronunciation of the word elements ‘lesac’ or ‘le sac’.

100 Consequently, it must be held that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in concluding that the signs at issue were, phonetically, either identical or highly similar for the part of the public which will pronounce the word ‘outlet’ in the mark applied for.

Conceptual similarity

101 The Board of Appeal found that the earlier mark had no meaning for the relevant Spanish public which does not understand the meaning of ‘ le sac ’ and that the sign applied for has the concept of ‘outlet’, namely a point of sale. On that basis, it concluded that the signs at issue were not conceptually similar, which was, however, according to the Board of Appeal, of very limited importance, the term ‘outlet’ being non-distinctive.

102 The applicant maintains that, given that the earlier mark conveys the allusive concept of ‘the bag’, the presence of the additional element ‘outlet’ in the mark applied for adds a different concept to that latter mark. According to the applicant, the element ‘outlet’ clearly means an establishment where goods from different brands are sold at discounted prices.

103 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

104 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, where one of the marks at issue has a meaning from the perspective of the relevant public and the other has no meaning, it must be held that the marks in question are conceptually dissimilar (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2017, RP Technik v EUIPO – Tecnomarmi (RP ROYAL PALLADIUM) , T‑768/15, not published, EU:T:2017:630, paragraphs 88 and 89).

105 It must also be borne in mind that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in taking the view that the word element ‘lesac’ of the earlier mark or ‘le sac’ of the mark applied for will not be understood by a significant part of the relevant Spanish public and that that element was therefore distinctive. Consequently, for that significant part of the relevant public, the earlier mark and the word elements ‘le sac’ of the mark applied for do not convey any concept.

106 Furthermore, it must be pointed out that it is undisputed between the parties that the word ‘outlet’ in the mark applied for will be understood by the relevant public as clearly referring to an establishment in which goods of various brands are sold at reduced prices. It should be borne in mind that the applicant does not dispute that that word is not distinctive in respect of all the goods and services covered by the mark applied for.

107 Consequently, since the element ‘outlet’ of the mark applied for, from which the conceptual difference between the signs at issue results, is not distinctive, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in taking the view that the signs at issue were not conceptually similar but that that difference was of very limited importance.

The distinctiveness of the earlier mark

108 The Board of Appeal found that the earlier mark, as a whole, had no meaning for a significant part of the Spanish public in relation to the goods and services covered by that mark and, therefore, that its distinctiveness was normal.

109 The applicant maintains that the word element of the earlier mark ‘lesac’ is meaningful and allusive for the relevant Spanish public and that it therefore is weakly distinctive.

110 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

111 In that regard, it should be reiterated that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in taking the view that the word element ‘lesac’ of the earlier mark will not be understood by a significant part of the relevant Spanish public. Consequently, as the earlier mark consists solely of that word element, written in a common font, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the distinctiveness of the earlier mark was normal.

The likelihood of confusion

112 According to settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the existence of a likelihood of confusion depends on numerous elements, in particular the recognition of the trade mark on the market, the association which can be made with the used or registered sign, and the degree of similarity between the trade mark and the sign and between the goods or services identified. The likelihood of confusion must therefore be assessed globally, taking into account all the relevant factors of the particular case (see judgment of 12 June 2019, Hansson , C‑705/17, EU:C:2019:481, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

113 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon , C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others) , T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

114 The applicant maintains that there is no likelihood of confusion as (i) the relevant public will display a high level of attention, (ii) the goods and services in question are not identical, (iii) the earlier mark is weakly distinctive, (iv) the signs at issue present differences under a visual, phonetic and conceptual point of view, and (v) the applicant is a company which has been well established in Italy for more than 30 years. The applicant also submits that, in the light of the marketing circumstances of the goods and services in question which belong to the fashion sector, the visual differences between the signs at issue have greater importance. Lastly, the applicant states that it used the mark applied for well before the earlier mark was registered and that, over three decades, no real likelihood of confusion was found in relation to the signs at issue.

115 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

116 In the present case, in the light of the fact that, for a significant part of the Spanish-speaking public, (i) the signs at issue are visually similar to an average degree and phonetically identical or highly similar, and that their conceptual difference is based on a non-distinctive element, (ii) the goods and services covered by the mark applied for, with the exception of ‘walking staffs’ in Class 18 and ‘wholesaling, retailing and mail order and by communications media and via the internet, in relation the following goods: canes’ in Class 35 and covered by the mark applied for, and those covered by the earlier mark, are partly identical and partly similar to varying degrees, and (iii) the earlier mark is of normal distinctiveness, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in taking the view that a likelihood of confusion could not be excluded for that part of the public, even taking into account a high level of attention of the relevant public with regard to those goods and services covered by the mark applied for.

117 By contrast, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 16 above, given that ‘walking staffs’ in Class 18 and ‘wholesaling, retailing and mail order and by communications media and via the internet, in relation the following goods: canes’ in Class 35 and covered by the mark applied for are dissimilar to the goods and services covered by the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public between the mark applied for and the earlier mark in relation to those goods and services.

118 The finding set out in paragraph 116 above is not called into question by the applicant’s arguments.

119 As regards the applicant’s argument based on the different purposes for which the goods and services compared are purchased (see paragraph 20 above), it must be borne in mind that, in opposition proceedings, the comparison of the goods and services must relate to the description of the goods and services covered by the marks at issue and not to the goods and services for which the marks are actually used (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 April 2025, Porczyńska v EUIPO – Gap (ITM) (gappol) , T‑44/24, not published, EU:T:2025:356, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, the fact that the goods and services to be compared have different purposes for which they are purchased, as maintained by the applicant – assuming that to be established – is irrelevant.

120 So far as concerns the applicant’s argument that, in the light of the marketing circumstances of the goods and services in question which belong to the fashion sector, the visual differences between the signs at issue have greater importance, it must be borne in mind that, pursuant to case-law, in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the visual, phonetic or conceptual aspects of the signs at issue do not always have the same weight. It is appropriate to examine the objective conditions under which the marks may be present on the market (judgment of 6 October 2004, New Look v OHIM – Naulover (NLSPORT, NLJEANS, NLACTIVE and NLCollection) , T‑117/03 to T‑119/03 and T‑171/03, EU:T:2004:293, paragraph 49). Admittedly, in the present case, the view may be taken that goods and services such as the ones in question are primarily purchased and used online or in self-service stores, which presupposes that visual perception plays an important role in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 2004, NLSPORT, NLJEANS, NLACTIVE and NLCollection , T‑117/03 to T‑119/03 and T‑171/03, EU:T:2004:293, paragraph 49, and of 22 November 2018, TeamBank v EUIPO – Fio Systems (FYYO) , T‑826/17, not published, EU:T:2018:819, paragraph 42).

121 Nevertheless, that fact is not capable of calling into question the Board of Appeal’s finding regarding the likelihood of confusion. First, as has been held in paragraph 91 above, the signs at issue are overall visually similar to an average degree. Secondly, the strong phonetic similarity, or even identity, of the signs at issue cannot be disregarded in the context of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, since it cannot be ruled out that, in certain cases, the goods and services in question may be advertised orally, on the radio or via other consumers (see judgment of 1 March 2023, Crush Series Publishing v EUIPO – Mediaproduccion (The Crush Series) , T‑295/22, not published, EU:T:2023:97, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited).

122 As regards the applicant’s argument that it is a well-established company, known for its goods and services and its marks for several decades, it should be noted that if that argument must be understood as meaning that the applicant relies on the reputation of the mark applied for, it is sufficient to note that, in accordance with settled case-law, only the reputation of the earlier mark, and not that of the mark applied for, is to be taken into account in assessing whether there is a likelihood of confusion (see judgment of 20 November 2024, Qozgar v EUIPO – L’Oréal (CLEOPATRA) , T‑482/23, not published, EU:T:2024:838, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

123 Lastly, as regards the applicant’s claim that it used the mark applied for well before the earlier mark was registered and that, over more than three decades, no real likelihood of confusion has been found in respect of the signs at issue, even if the applicant intends by that claim to rely on the peaceful coexistence of the signs at issue, it should be borne in mind that it is certainly not entirely ruled out that, in certain cases, the coexistence of earlier marks on the market might potentially eliminate the likelihood of confusion between two conflicting marks (see judgment of 12 July 2019, Ogrodnik v EUIPO – Aviário Tropical (Tropical) , T‑276/17, not published, EU:T:2019:525, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited). However, any argument based on coexistence implies a priori that it be established, during the proceedings before EUIPO concerning the examination of relative grounds for refusal, inter alia, that there was genuine use of the mark on which the applicant relies in the relevant territory (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2023, Prolactal v EUIPO – Prolàctea (PROLACTAL) , T‑549/22, not published, EU:T:2023:538, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited). However, in the present case, the applicant neither claims nor, a fortiori, establishes that it provided such evidence in the proceedings before EUIPO.

124 It follows from the above that the single plea in law raised by the applicant in support of its claims must be upheld in respect of ‘walking staffs’ in Class 18 and ‘wholesaling, retailing and mail order and by communications media and via the internet, in relation the following goods: canes’ in Class 35 and covered by the mark applied for.

125 Consequently, the contested decision must be annulled in part for infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, in that the Board of Appeal found that there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public between the mark applied for and the earlier mark in respect of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 124 above.

Costs

126 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Moreover, under Article 134(2) of the Rules of Procedure, where there is more than one unsuccessful party the Court is to decide how the costs are to be shared.

127 In the present case, the applicant and EUIPO have been partially unsuccessful. Consequently, each party must be ordered to bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

hereby:

1. Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 18 December 2024 (Case R 1073/2024 ‑ 4) in that the Board of Appeal found that there was a likelihood of confusion on the basis of the earlier Spanish figurative mark M4 099 063 for ‘walking staffs’ in Class 18 and ‘wholesaling, retailing and mail order and by communications media and via the internet, in relation the following goods: canes’ in Class 35 and covered by the mark applied for;

2. Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3. Orders Le Sac Srl and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) each to bear their own costs.

ButtigiegSchwarczBestagno

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 4 November 2026.

T. HenzeM. J. Costeira
Acting RegistrarPresident

* Language of the case: English.