Judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) 9 September 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber)

9 September 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the EU word mark NEA – Earlier EU figurative mark NEAM – Relative grounds for refusal – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – No genuine use of the earlier mark – Article 47(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑351/25,

Nord Est Asset Management SA, established in Luxembourg (Luxembourg), represented by J. Graffer, A. Ottolini and F. Chierichetti, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by T. Klee, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

New Enterprise Associates, Inc., established in Timonium, Maryland (United States), represented by P. Olson, lawyer,

THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber),

composed of S. Kingston (Rapporteur), President, A. Marcoulli and J. Hettne, Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Nord Est Asset Management SA, seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 28 March 2025 (Case R 970/2024-5) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 18 October 2022, the intervener, New Enterprise Associates, Inc., filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the word sign NEA.

3 Following the restriction made in the course of the proceedings before EUIPO, the mark applied for covered services in, inter alia, Class 36 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding to the following description: ‘Investment of funds for others; all of the above being in the nature of or related to venture capital, and none of the above related to provision of guaranteeing credit facilities’.

4 On 16 February 2023, the applicant filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the services referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5 The opposition was based on the earlier EU figurative mark, registered on 12 May 2011, and duly renewed, under number 9632894, designating ‘financial affairs; monetary affairs’ in Class 36, reproduced below:

6 The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

7 Following a request made by the intervener on 3 May 2023, EUIPO invited the applicant to adduce proof of genuine use of the earlier mark which had been relied on in support of the opposition in accordance with Article 47(2) of Regulation 2017/1001. The applicant complied with that request within the time limit set.

8 On 16 April 2024, the Opposition Division rejected the opposition on the ground that the applicant had not demonstrated genuine use of the earlier mark in the European Union during the five-year period preceding the application for registration of the mark applied for.

9 On 9 May 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.

10 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that the applicant had not adduced proof of genuine use of the earlier mark in the European Union in connection with the services in respect of which it was registered, in accordance with Article 18(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, since the evidence in the file showed only that that mark had been used as a company name.

Forms of order sought

11 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision and declare that the evidence adduced by the applicant is sufficient to demonstrate that the earlier mark has been put to genuine use in connection with the relevant services in the territory during the relevant period;

– consequently, remit the decision on the likelihood of confusion to the Board of Appeal;

– order EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs.

12 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action in its entirety;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.

13 The intervener contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the applicant’s action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs incurred by the intervener.

Law

Preliminary observations on some of the applicant ’ s heads of claim

14 In the first place, it should be noted that, by the second part of the applicant’s first head of claim, the applicant asks the Court to declare that, on the basis of the evidence in the file, the earlier mark has been put to genuine use in connection with the services at issue.

15 EUIPO contends that such a request is inadmissible.

16 In that regard, it should be noted that that request, in reality, overlaps with the first part of the applicant’s first head of claim, seeking annulment of the contested decision. The applicant requests the Court to annul the contested decision by finding that genuine use of the earlier mark has been established. There is therefore no need to rule on the second part of the applicant’s first head of claim (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 December 2016, Intesa Sanpaolo v EUIPO (START UP INITIATIVE) , T‑529/15, EU:T:2016:747, paragraph 11, and of 28 September 2017, Bodegas Verdúguez v EUIPO (TRES TOROS 3) , T‑206/16, not published, EU:T:2017:673, paragraphs 17 and 18).

17 In the second place, by the second head of claim, the applicant claims that, as a result of the annulment of the contested decision sought under the first head of claim, the Court should remit the decision on the likelihood of confusion to the Board of Appeal of EUIPO.

18 EUIPO contends that the applicant’s second head of claim is inadmissible.

19 It should be noted that such a referral would be the consequence of the annulment of the contested decision referred to in the first head of claim, should the Court uphold that head of claim. In that regard, it is sufficient to recall that, in an action before the EU judicature against the decision of a Board of Appeal of EUIPO, EUIPO is required, under Article 72(6) of Regulation 2017/1001, to take the measures necessary to comply with judgments of that judicature. It is therefore for EUIPO to draw the appropriate inferences from the operative part and grounds of the judgments of the EU judicature (see judgment of 31 January 2019, Pear Technologies v EUIPO – Apple (PEAR) , T‑215/17, not published, EU:T:2019:45, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited).

20 Accordingly, the second head of claim has no specific purpose in so far as it relates only to a consequence of the first head of claim – seeking annulment of the contested decision – being upheld. Accordingly, there is no need to adjudicate on the second head of claim.

Substance

21 In support of its action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging, in essence, that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there had been no genuine use of the earlier mark, in breach of Article 47(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 10(2) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625 of 5 March 2018 supplementing Regulation 2017/1001, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430 (OJ 2018 L 104, p. 1).

22 Under Article 47(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, if the applicant so requests, the proprietor of an earlier EU trade mark who has given notice of opposition is to furnish proof that, during the five-year period preceding the date of filing or the date of priority of the EU trade mark application, the earlier EU trade mark has been put to genuine use in the European Union in connection with the goods or services in respect of which it is registered and which he or she cites as justification for his or her opposition, or that there are proper reasons for non-use, provided that the earlier EU trade mark has at that date been registered for not less than five years. In the absence of proof to that effect, the opposition must be rejected.

23 It is apparent from Article 10(3) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625 that evidence of use must establish the place, time, extent and nature of use of the earlier mark for the goods or services in respect of which it is registered and on which the opposition is based.

24 For the purpose of interpreting the concept of ‘genuine use’, account must be taken of the fact that the ratio legis of the requirement that the earlier mark must have been put to genuine use if it is to be capable of being used in opposition to an EU trade mark application is to restrict the number of conflicts between two marks, unless there is a good commercial justification for the lack of genuine use of the earlier mark deriving from an actual function of the mark on the market. However, the purpose of the provisions set out in paragraphs 21 to 23 above is not to assess commercial success or to review the economic strategy of an undertaking, nor are they intended to restrict trade-mark protection to the case where large-scale commercial use has been made of the marks (judgment of 8 July 2004, Sunrider v OHIM – Espadafor Caba (VITAFRUIT) , T‑203/02, EU:T:2004:225, paragraph 38).

25 There is genuine use of a trade mark where the mark is used in accordance with its essential function, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services for which it is registered, in order to create or preserve an outlet for those goods or services; genuine use does not include token use for the sole purpose of preserving the rights conferred by the mark (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 March 2003, Ansul , C‑40/01, EU:C:2003:145, paragraph 43). Moreover, the condition relating to genuine use of the trade mark requires that the mark, as protected in the relevant territory, be used publicly and outwardly (judgment of 8 July 2004, VITAFRUIT , T‑203/02, EU:T:2004:225, paragraph 39; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 11 March 2003, Ansul , C‑40/01, EU:C:2003:145, paragraph 37).

26 When assessing whether use of the trade mark is genuine, regard must be had to all the facts and circumstances relevant to establishing whether the commercial use of the mark is real, particularly the practices regarded as warranted in the relevant economic sector as a means of maintaining or creating market shares for the goods or services protected by the mark, the nature of those goods or services, the characteristics of the market and the scale and frequency of use of the mark (judgments of 8 July 2004, MFE Marienfelde v OHIM – Vétoquinol (HIPOVITON) , T‑334/01, EU:T:2004:223, paragraph 34, and of 8 July 2004, VITAFRUIT , T‑203/02, EU:T:2004:225, paragraph 40; see also, by analogy, judgment of 11 March 2003, Ansul , C‑40/01, EU:C:2003:145, paragraph 43).

27 Genuine use of a trade mark cannot be proved by means of probabilities or presumptions, but must be demonstrated by solid and objective evidence of actual and sufficient use of the trade mark on the market concerned (judgments of 12 December 2002, Kabushiki Kaisha Fernandes v OHIM – Harrison (HIWATT) , T‑39/01, EU:T:2002:316, paragraph 47, and of 6 October 2004, Vitakraft-Werke Wührmann v OHIM – Krafft (VITAKRAFT) , T‑356/02, EU:T:2004:292, paragraph 28).

28 It is in the light of those considerations that it must be assessed whether the Board of Appeal infringed Article 47(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 10(2) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625, by finding that the evidence adduced by the applicant before the Opposition Division and the Board of Appeal did not demonstrate genuine use of the earlier mark in connection with the services at issue. It must be observed that, in the contested decision, the Board of Appeal carried out its examination of the evidence adduced by the applicant in relation to the nature of the use of the earlier mark. It is therefore necessary to examine, in the light of the applicant’s arguments, whether the Board of Appeal erred in that assessment.

29 In the present case, since the earlier mark was registered in 2011, more than five years before the date of filing of the application for the EU trade mark at issue, namely 18 October 2022, the relevant period for the purposes of assessing proof of genuine use of the earlier mark extends, in accordance with Article 47(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, from 18 October 2017 to 17 October 2022 inclusive (‘the relevant period’), as the Board of Appeal correctly pointed out in paragraph 30 of the contested decision, without being challenged by the applicant.

30 Moreover, since the earlier mark was registered in the European Union, it is with regard to that territory that the genuine use of the earlier mark relied on by the applicant in the present case must be examined.

31 In that regard, it should be noted, as is apparent from paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 of the contested decision, that the evidence adduced by the applicant, initially before the Opposition Division (including Annexes 1 to 14 to the reply submitted to the Opposition Division) (‘the annexes before the Opposition Division’), and subsequently before the Board of Appeal (including, inter alia, Annexes C to F to the statement setting out the grounds of appeal before the Board of Appeal) (‘the annexes before the Board of Appeal’), in support of proof of genuine use of the earlier mark, was as follows:

– an internal presentation of the applicant’s company explaining its organisation and detailing the company’s internal structure, its delegated functions, and the various companies with which it works (Annex 1 before the Opposition Division);

– an extract from the WHOIS DNS Luxembourg website for the domain name ‘http://neam.lu’ dated 21 September 2023 (Annex 2 before the Opposition Division);

– 15 screenshots of the homepage of the website ‘http://neam.lu’, captured with the Wayback Machine website, dating from the period between 5 June 2015 and 18 September 2023 (Annex 3 before the Opposition Division);

– the applicant’s audited financial statements for the financial years 2017 to 2022, prepared by several independent audit companies (Annex 4 before the Opposition Division);

– the distribution agreement between the applicant and an Italian bank, dated 2018 (Annex 5 before the Opposition Division);

– a press release, dated 5 June 2018, published on the website ‘www.la-francaise.com’ (Annexes 6 and 12 before the Opposition Division);

– the minutes of the approval issued by the committee responsible for approving the applicant’s new investors, concerning the opening of the Clearstream Banking S.A. account, dated 12 May 2020 (Annex 7 before the Opposition Division);

– an internal document on the applicant’s ‘Transparency of Sustainability Risk Policy pursuant to EU Regulation 2019/2088’ (Annex 8 before the Opposition Division);

– several extracts from the website ‘www.nef.lu’ relating to certain awards presented to the applicant (Annexes 9 and 13 before the Opposition Division);

– copies of two agreements concluded, on the one hand, between the applicant and a bank in Italy, concerning the bank’s participation in information events in 2018, and, on the other hand, between the applicant and another company, concerning a marketing partnership for the year 2022 (Annex 10 before the Opposition Division);

– several articles relating to various solidarity initiatives, including internal documents from the applicant’s company, entitled ‘NEF Notizie’, containing company news and describing several solidarity initiatives dating from July 2018 and May 2019 (Annex 11 before the Opposition Division);

– a press release published on the website ‘www.nef.lu’ concerning a donation of EUR 50 000 made by the applicant to a non-governmental organisation (NGO) in Ukraine in 2022 (Annex 14 before the Opposition Division);

– six screenshots of the applicant’s website, provided by the Wayback Machine website, dating from the period between 2017 and 2020 (Annex C before the Board of Appeal);

– the applicant’s tax returns in Luxembourg for the years 2016 and 2020 (Annexes D and E before the Board of Appeal);

– a press release concerning the certification of NEF funds by the applicant, published by an advertising and marketing company (Annex F before the Board of Appeal).

32 In support of its single plea in law, in the first place, the applicant submits that it cannot be ruled out, according to the case-law, that the company name or trade name of a company may be used as a trade mark to designate goods or services, and that, in the present case, the acronym of the applicant’s company name coincides with the earlier mark. The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal did not take account of the fact that its company had been operating under the name ‘NEAM’ since 1999 and had among its customers institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance companies and banks. In addition, it provided several financial services, and as part of that managed 18 investment funds called ‘NEF’, which is, in itself, a separate trade mark.

33 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

34 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, where a mark also constitutes a company name, it cannot be ruled out that the company name may be used as a trade mark (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 September 2007, LA MER Technology v OHIM – Laboratories Goëmar (LA MER) , T‑418/03, not published, EU:T:2007:299, paragraph 74, and of 15 July 2015, Cactus v OHIM – Del Rio Rodríguez (CACTUS OF PEACE CACTUS DE LA PAZ) , T‑24/13, not published, EU:T:2015:494, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).

35 However, the use of a sign exclusively as a company name does not constitute use as a trade mark, as the Board of Appeal correctly observed in paragraph 34 of the contested decision. It is apparent from the case-law that the use of a sign as a company name, business name or trade name can be considered as use as a trade mark, provided that the relevant goods or services themselves are identified and offered on the market under that sign (see judgment of 16 October 2024, Fractal Analytics v EUIPO – FRACTALIA Remote Systems (FRACTALIA) , T‑194/23, not published, EU:T:2024:696, paragraph 101 and the case-law cited).

36 Accordingly, a company name, trade name or shop name is not, of itself, intended to distinguish goods or services. The purpose of a company name is to identify a company, whereas the purpose of a trade name or a shop name is to designate a business which is being carried on. Accordingly, where the use of a company name, trade name or shop name is limited to identifying a company or designating a business which is being carried on, such use cannot be considered as being ‘in relation to goods or services’ (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 September 2007, Céline , C‑17/06, EU:C:2007:497, paragraph 21).

37 By contrast, there is use ‘in relation to goods’ where the proprietor of the mark affixes the sign constituting its company, trade or shop name to the goods which it markets. Furthermore, even where the sign is not affixed, there is use ‘in relation to goods or services’ where the sign is used in such a way that a link is established between the sign which constitutes the company, trade or shop name and the goods marketed or the services provided (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 September 2007, Céline , C‑17/06, EU:C:2007:497, paragraph 22).

38 In the present case, the earlier mark is a figurative mark consisting of the term ‘neam’ and a figurative element. In order to constitute evidence of genuine use of the earlier mark, it is also necessary that the term ‘neam’, which, in the present case, is the acronym of the applicant’s company name, ‘Nord Est Asset Management SA’, has been used in such a way as to establish a link between the earlier mark and the services at issue.

39 In that regard, it is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 25 above that there is genuine use of a mark where the mark is used in accordance with its essential function, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services for which it is registered. Furthermore, it is for the applicant, which bears the burden of proof, to adduce solid and objective evidence of effective and sufficient use of the mark on the market concerned in connection with the services in question (see judgments of 12 December 2002, HIWATT , T‑39/01, EU:T:2002:316, paragraph 47, and of 6 October 2004, VITAKRAFT , T‑356/02, EU:T:2004:292, paragraph 28). Thus, although use of a sign as a company name may be regarded as use as a trade mark, that is to say, as a sign identifying the commercial origin of the goods and services covered, it is also necessary for the proprietor to use the sign in such a way that a link is established between the sign constituting the company name and the goods marketed or the services provided (see the case-law cited in paragraphs 35 to 37 above).

40 However, it must be observed, as done by EUIPO, that, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 35 above, the mere fact that the applicant has carried out its activities under the name NEAM since 1999 is not sufficient to demonstrate genuine use of the earlier mark as a trade mark. As will be illustrated in paragraphs 41 to 61 below, the evidence adduced by the applicant does not establish a link between the earlier mark and the services at issue, so as to guarantee the commercial origin of those services.

41 In the second place, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal made several errors of assessment in finding that there was no genuine use of the earlier mark in connection with the services in Class 36 at issue, namely ‘financial affairs; monetary affairs’. According to the applicant, the annexes in the file demonstrate, to the requisite legal standard, genuine use of the mark in connection with the services in respect of which it was registered.

42 In that regard, the applicant submits, first, that the presentation of its company and the main page of its website, set out in Annex 1 before the Opposition Division, describe that company’s activities in the financial sector and demonstrate the management of financial assets for which it is responsible under the earlier mark. The Board of Appeal ignored the link established by that document between the applicant, the earlier mark, and the services provided. Similarly, Annexes 2 and 3 before the Opposition Division and Annex C before the Board of Appeal, which contain extracts from the applicant’s website, dating from 2016 to 2023, show that the website and the corresponding domain name ‘neam.lu’ have existed and have been active since at least 2016. Thus, according to the applicant, those annexes demonstrate how the applicant had used the earlier mark throughout the relevant period on the homepage of its website. The fact that financial products are not sold directly on that site does not permit the inference that the earlier mark was not put to genuine use in the financial sector.

43 As regards the internal presentation of the applicant’s company set out in Annex 1 before the Opposition Division, it must be stated, first, that the purpose of that document is to demonstrate the organisation of the applicant’s company, as the Board of Appeal noted in paragraph 39 of the contested decision. On each page of that presentation (on the header or in the bottom-left corner), the sign NEAM appears in its figurative form, as the applicant correctly points out, with the words ‘asset management’ placed below that sign.

44 Second, according to page 10 of the internal presentation of the applicant’s company, entitled ‘Internal organisation’, the financial services referred to therein, including ‘asset management’ and ‘investments’, are managed by other third-party companies and are outsourced to other undertakings. In addition, at page 11 of that presentation, it is stated that ‘delegated functions’ to other undertakings include ‘administration’, ‘distribution’ and ‘asset management’.

45 Thus, Annex 1 before the Opposition Division does not establish a link between the sign at issue and the services at issue, so as to guarantee the commercial origin of the latter, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 25 above.

46 As regards Annex 2 before the Opposition Division, containing an extract from the WHOIS DNS Luxembourg website, indicating the domain name ‘http://neam.lu’, and Annex 3 before the Opposition Division and Annex C before the Board of Appeal, containing extracts from the applicant’s website, it is sufficient to note that that evidence does not demonstrate any link between the name NEAM and the services at issue. As the Board of Appeal correctly observed in paragraph 40 of the contested decision, the disclaimer in the screenshots of the applicant’s website refers to ‘products offered by the Luxembourg domiciled Fund NEF’ indicating that the funds and sub-funds referred to are linked to the separate sign NEF. Moreover, it is stated in the extract from the applicant’s website dated 16 July 2018 (Annex C before the Board of Appeal) that ‘NEAM does not manage directly the NEF sub-funds assets as it has chosen to entrust this role to the leading asset management companies’, which tends rather to establish that monetary and financial services are not offered by the applicant under the earlier mark.

47 Rather, that evidence indicates that the representations of the earlier mark in Annexes 2 and 3 before the Opposition Division and in Annex C before the Board of Appeal serve to identify the applicant’s company name in that context and are not intended to identify the commercial origin of the services at issue. It follows that the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that the extracts from the applicant’s website and the internal presentation of its company (Annexes 1 to 3 and C) contained no relevant information establishing a link between the applicant’s company name, or the sign NEAM, and the services at issue.

48 Second, as regards the applicant’s audited financial statements, adduced as Annex 4 before the Opposition Division, the applicant submits that those documents demonstrate that the earlier mark identified, over the years, the services at issue, and that the target public recognised the activities of its company by means of the earlier mark. The relevance of the applicant’s financial documents for the purpose of demonstrating use of the earlier mark is also illustrated by the applicant’s Annexes D and E before the Board of Appeal, which contain the tax returns for 2016 and 2020 on which the earlier mark appears, associated with the services in respect of which tax was paid by the applicant.

49 As regards the financial statements in Annex 4 before the Opposition Division, it must be observed that there is nothing in those documents to show that the earlier mark was used in such a way as to establish a link between the sign NEAM and the services at issue. It is true that the applicant’s company name, Nord Est Asset Management SA, appears frequently among those documents, as the name of the audited company, and that the figures provided indicate a certain degree of commercial success. However, apart from the fact that those documents refer to the applicant’s full company name rather than to the sign NEAM, the use made of the applicant’s trade name on those documents serves solely to identify its company, which does not make it possible to identify the commercial origin of the services at issue. In addition, the information relating to turnover and asset management in those documents frequently relates to transactions relating to NEF funds, provided under the separate sign NEF. Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s line of argument that the target public may recognise the services and activities of its company by means of the earlier mark, it should be noted that genuine use of a trade mark cannot be proved by means of probabilities or presumptions, but must be demonstrated by solid and objective evidence, as is apparent from the case-law referred to in paragraph 27 above. Accordingly, that line of argument must be rejected.

50 The same is true of the applicant’s tax returns for 2016 and 2020, set out in Annexes D and E before the Board of Appeal, on which the applicant’s company name and the acronym NEAM appear, which make no mention of the services offered by the applicant. It is sufficient to note, as the Board of Appeal did in paragraph 52 of the contested decision, that those documents also do not contain any indication that the earlier mark was used outwardly in such a way as to distinguish the commercial origin of the services at issue, but merely indicate the applicant’s name.

51 Third, as regards Annexes 5, 7, 8 and 10 before the Opposition Division, the applicant submits that the earlier mark appeared in the header of each page of those commercial documents. Since the full name of the applicant, Nord Est Asset Management, appeared on the first page of each document, the affixing of the applicant’s earlier mark to the header of each page constitutes genuine use of the earlier mark, according to the applicant. The fact that some of those documents were signed by renowned customers of the applicant demonstrates its intention to use the earlier mark in a distinctive manner.

52 In that regard, it is true that the sign NEAM appears in its figurative form in the header of certain agreements concluded between the applicant and other banking institutions (Annexes 5 and 10 before the Opposition Division), as well as in the documentation relating to the applicant’s approval of a new investor (Annex 7 before the Opposition Division), and in the document on its transparency policy relating to sustainability (Annex 8 before the Opposition Division).

53 However, it should be noted that the mere affixing of the figurative form of the sign NEAM to those documents does not constitute proof of genuine use of the earlier mark as a trade mark.

54 Indeed, the agreement referred to in Annex 5 before the Opposition Division consists of an agreement for the distribution of financial instruments between the applicant and an Italian bank, by which it is agreed that the bank will market and sell the applicant’s financial products, in this case the NEF investment funds. As the Board of Appeal correctly pointed out in paragraph 47 of the contested decision, the agreement does not contain any indication that the sign NEAM was used for any purpose other than to indicate the name of the company which concluded an agreement with a distributor of financial products marketed under the sign NEF. Contrary to what the applicant claims, it is irrelevant that such documents were signed by renowned customers of the applicant.

55 As regards Annex 7 before the Opposition Division, containing the minutes of the applicant’s approval of a new investor, as well as Annex 8 before the Opposition Division, including the transparency policy relating to sustainability, it is sufficient to note that those documents indicate the applicant’s name or the acronym of the applicant’s company name, without, however, establishing any link with one of the services at issue, in such a way as to indicate their commercial origin.

56 Fourth, as regards the applicant’s press releases in Annexes 6 and 9 (and their corresponding translations, reproduced in Annexes 12 and 13) before the Opposition Division, as well as the press articles concerning some of the applicant’s solidarity initiatives, set out in Annexes 11 and 14 before the Opposition Division and in Annex F before the Board of Appeal, the applicant claims that those documents constitute proof of the excellence of the financial services which it provided and of the awards which it received for its work, which demonstrates that the earlier mark has been put to genuine use outwardly.

57 As regards Annex 9 (and its translation in Annex 13) before the Opposition Division, containing the documentation relating to several prizes won by the applicant, it must be noted that it is apparent from that annex that the prizes in question were presented to the NEF funds and sub-funds and that the applicant is referred to, via the acronym of its company name, as an administrative management company for those investment funds. Consequently, that information demonstrates the particular success of the NEF funds and merely refers, to a limited extent, to the acronym of the applicant’s company name. In addition, several of the screenshots in that annex come from the website ‘www.nef.lu’ or show the sign NEF as a logo. It is in no way apparent from that annex that the applicant’s company name was used outwardly as a trade mark in the marketing and advertising of NEF funds.

58 The same applies to the press releases issued by the applicant concerning the transfer of the management of an NEF fund to La Française (Annex 6 and its translation in Annex 12 before the Opposition Division), a donation of EUR 50 000 to an NGO in Ukraine in 2022 (Annex 14 before the Opposition Division), and the certification of an NEF fund (Annex F before the Board of Appeal), in which the acronym of the applicant’s company name is mentioned solely as the name of the management company for the NEF funds, as observed by the Board of Appeal in paragraphs 49 and 53 of the contested decision.

59 Moreover, in the documentation demonstrating various solidarity initiatives by the applicant, reproduced in Annex 11 before the Opposition Division, reference is made to the name NEAM as the applicant’s name in a letter relating to the Save the Children foundation, without any indication of the services and financial products which it claims, and the newsletter ‘NEF’s news’ makes no mention whatsoever of either the earlier mark or the applicant, and is, in any event, a purely internal document.

60 Thus, the documents referred to in paragraphs 57 to 59 do not contain any indication that the earlier mark was used as an indicator of the commercial origin of one of the services at issue.

61 Consequently, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in concluding that the evidence in the file demonstrates only that the earlier mark was used as an acronym for the applicant’s company name, without proving genuine use of the earlier mark as a trade mark in connection with the services in respect of which it is registered. The mere fact that the applicant has carried out its activities under the name NEAM since 1999, manages investment funds under a separate sign NEF and has, among its customers, various investment institutions, does not call that conclusion into question. The use of the acronym of the company name NEAM could not be regarded as use of the earlier mark, in the absence of proof that the services at issue were identified and offered on the market under that sign, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 35 to 37 above.

62 It must be held that the Board of Appeal’s assessment is not called into question by the applicant’s other arguments.

63 First, the applicant submits that the contested decision is contradictory. It argues that the Board of Appeal paradoxically acknowledges, in paragraph 57 of that decision, that the earlier mark was used as a company name by the applicant, while concluding that genuine use of it, as a trade mark, has not been demonstrated. Furthermore, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal acknowledged its commercial success, but failed to recognise the distinctive character of the sign with which that success was obtained.

64 In that regard, it is sufficient to note, as has already been stated in paragraph 61 above, that the Board of Appeal did not err in observing, in the light of the examination of the evidence which it carried out, that the earlier mark was used as a company name for the applicant, but that proof of its genuine use, as a trade mark, was lacking. In addition, as regards the arguments based on the applicant’s commercial success, it is sufficient to note that those aspects are irrelevant in the context of the examination of genuine use of a mark. It is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 24 above that the purpose of the provisions governing the examination of genuine use is not to assess commercial success or to review the economic strategy of an undertaking, nor is it intended to restrict trade mark protection to the case where large-scale commercial use has been made of the marks.

65 Second, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal should have recognised that the earlier mark constituted an ‘umbrella mark’, namely a sign used to identify and encompass the applicant’s commercial identity and its portfolio of services, in that the sign NEF was used simultaneously with the applicant’s company name. According to the applicant, the earlier mark is used as a domain name for the applicant’s website, by which, inter alia, services marketed under the separate mark NEF are promoted.

66 It is sufficient to note that the Board of Appeal was correct to reject that line of argument in paragraphs 42 to 44, 46 and 51 of the contested decision. Although the sign NEAM is used, inter alia, as a domain name to designate the applicant’s website, on which financial services marketed under the sign NEF are presented, it is apparent from the analysis carried out in paragraphs 41 to 61 above that there is no evidence to support the conclusion that the services at issue were identified and supplied on the market under the sign NEAM, so as to establish a link between the earlier mark and those services by indicating their commercial origin, such that it would be perceived as an umbrella mark for the funds at issue.

67 Third, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s line of argument relying on the judgment of 27 September 2007, LA MER (T‑418/03, not published, EU:T:2007:299), and the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 7 March 2025 in Case R 1356/2024-4, which it raises by way of comparison in the present case. As the Board of Appeal observed in paragraph 56 of the contested decision, the judgment of the Court cited above is not comparable to the present case in that, contrary to the situation arising from that judgment, the applicant has not submitted any evidence showing that the earlier mark was used as an indicator of the commercial origin of a specific service.

68 In addition, as regards the line of argument based on the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO in Case R 1356/2024-4, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, the legality of the decisions of the Board of Appeal, which are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers and are not a matter of discretion, must be assessed solely on the basis of Regulation 2017/1001, as interpreted by the Courts of the European Union, and not on the basis of a previous decision-making practice of EUIPO which cannot, in any event, bind those Courts (judgments of 15 September 2005, BioID v OHIM , C‑37/03 P, EU:C:2005:547, paragraph 47, and of 14 May 2025, Karneolis v EUIPO – Match Group (KinkySwipe) , T‑332/24, not published, EU:T:2025:489, paragraph 52). In any event, as EUIPO submits, in that case, and contrary to the present case, the Board of Appeal had multiple invoices and quotations for the services at issue on which the sign at issue had been affixed.

69 It follows from the foregoing that the Board of Appeal was correct to conclude that the evidence in the file did not demonstrate that the earlier mark had been used in accordance with its essential function of identifying the commercial origin of the services provided by the applicant, and that, consequently, the applicant had not succeeded in demonstrating genuine use of the earlier mark, in accordance with Article 47(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 10(2) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625.

70 Accordingly, the single plea in law must be rejected and, therefore, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

71 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

72 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the intervener, in accordance with the form of order sought by the intervener.

73 By contrast, since EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is held, EUIPO must, in the absence of a hearing, be ordered to bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Nord Est Asset Management SA to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by New Enterprise Associates, Inc.;

3. Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear its own costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 9 September 2026.

* Language of the case: English.