Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) 7 October 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

7 October 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the EU figurative mark dentix – Earlier EU word marks DENTEK and earlier EU figurative marks DenTek – Relative ground for refusal – No likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑371/25,

Dentek Oral Care, Inc., established in Tarrytown, New York (United States), represented by M. Maier, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by T. Frydendahl, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

Jeronimo Martins Polska S.A., established in Kostrzyn (Poland), represented by P. Jędrysiak, lawyer,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),

composed of E. Buttigieg, President, E. Tichy-Fisslberger and F. Bestagno (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: G. Mitrev, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 24 March 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Dentek Oral Care, Inc., seeks the annulment of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 26 March 2025 (Case R 1922/2024‑2) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 14 June 2023, the intervener, Jeronimo Martins Polska S.A., filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the following figurative sign:

3 The mark applied for covered goods in Classes 3 and 21 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:

– Class 3: ‘Toothpaste; teeth cleaning lotions’;

– Class 21: ‘Floss for dental purposes; toothbrushes’.

4 On 13 November 2023, the applicant filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5 The opposition was based on the following earlier marks:

– the EU word mark DENTEK, registered on 22 May 2021 under number 18 316 630, covering, inter alia, goods in Class 3 corresponding to the following description: ‘Non-medicated toothpaste; non-medicated toothpaste in tubes; non medicated toothpaste in dispensers; mouth rinse, non-medicated, being a part of toothache kits; tongue spray, non-medicated, being a part of toothache kits; tooth whitening formulations, being a part of toothache kits; material for polishing teeth’;

– the EU word mark DENTEK, registered on 11 April 2015 under No 13 670 617, covering goods corresponding to the following description: ‘Dental care products for consumer use, namely, dental mirrors, dental night guards, dental picks, dental scalers, handles for holding disposable flossers, handles for holding interdental brushes, interdental brushes; soft dental picks, tongue cleaners, tongue spray, tooth whitening formulations’ in Class 10 and ‘Dental floss picks, dental floss threaders, dental floss’ in Class 21;

– the EU figurative mark, registered on 10 June 2017 under No 15 703 961, covering, inter alia, goods in Class 21 corresponding to the following description: ‘Dental cleaning articles; dental flossers; dental floss; dental floss picks; dental picks with floss; dental floss dispensers; dental floss threaders; toothbrush containers; toothbrush covers; oral care kits comprising floss; tooth polishers; dental care products for consumer use, namely, dental floss picks, dental floss threaders and dental floss; handles for holding disposable flossers, being a part of toothache kits; handles for holding interdental brushes, being a part of toothache kits; interdental brushes, being a part of toothache kits; soft dental picks, being a part of toothache kits’, reproduced below:

– the EU figurative mark, registered on 26 June 2024 under No 18 316 632, covering, inter alia, goods corresponding to the following description: ‘Non-medicated toothpaste; non-medicated toothpaste in tubes; non medicated toothpaste in dispensers; mouth rinse, non-medicated, being a part of toothache kits; tongue spray, non-medicated, being a part of toothache kits; tooth whitening formulations, being a part of toothache kits; material for polishing teeth’ in Class 3 and ‘Dental cleaning articles; dental flossers; dental floss; dental floss picks; dental picks with floss; dental floss dispensers; dental floss threaders; toothbrushes; toothbrush containers; toothbrush covers; oral care kits comprising toothbrushes and floss; dispensers for toothpaste; covers for toothpaste; tooth polishers; dental care products for consumer use, namely, dental floss picks, dental floss threaders and dental floss; handles for holding disposable flossers, being a part of toothache kits; handles for holding interdental brushes, being a part of toothache kits; interdental brushes, being a part of toothache kits; oral irrigators, being a part of toothache kits; soft dental picks, being a part of toothache kits; toothbrushes, being a part of toothache kits’ in Class 21, reproduced below:

6 The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

7 By decision of 6 August 2024, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition based on the earlier EU word mark described in the first indent of paragraph 5 above (‘the earlier word mark’), on the ground that there was a likelihood of confusion for a part of the Bulgarian- or Greek-speaking public, and rejected the application for registration of the mark applied for.

8 On 1 October 2024, the intervener lodged an appeal with EUIPO against that decision.

9 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal upheld the appeal on the ground that there was no likelihood of confusion with regard to any of the earlier rights relied on, basing its reasoning primarily on the comparison between the mark applied for and the earlier word mark.

10 In particular, first, it found, as did the Opposition Division, that the goods covered by the marks at issue were identical or similar. Second, it found that the relevant public consisted of the general public and professionals, and that account had to be taken of the level of attention of the general public, which was average. Third, as regards the comparison of the signs at issue, the Board of Appeal found (i) that it was a well-known fact that the relevant public throughout the European Union would be able to recognise the element ‘dent’, common to both of the signs at issue, and (ii) that that element had a weak distinctive character for all the contested goods, which were all related to dentistry, with the final parts ‘ix’ and ‘ek’ of those signs being meaningless. Accordingly, it found that the signs at issue were visually similar to a low degree, that they were, in essence, slightly more similar phonetically than visually, and that they were conceptually similar to a low degree. Fourth, the Board of Appeal found that the earlier word mark had a very low degree of inherent distinctive character for dental-related products. Fifth, it concluded, as part of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, that, in view of all those factors and having regard to the weak distinctive character of the earlier word mark, taken as a whole as conveying the message ‘dental technology’, there was no likelihood of confusion, even for identical goods and including for the Bulgarian- and Greek-speaking parts of the public. Sixth, as regards the other earlier word and figurative marks, described in the second to fourth indents of paragraph 5 above, the Board of Appeal found that, even assuming that all the goods in question were identical, there was still no likelihood of confusion, particularly as the visual elements of the figurative marks were to be regarded as banal.

Forms of order sought

11 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– order EUIPO to pay the costs.

12 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened.

13 The intervener contends, in essence, that the Court should dismiss the action.

Law

14 In support of its action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, in that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there was no likelihood of confusion.

15 In essence, it submits that the Board of Appeal erred in its assessment of the perception of the marks at issue and their distinctive elements, and in determining the distinctive character of the earlier word mark from the perspective of the Bulgarian or Greek public. Furthermore, it submits that the Board of Appeal erred in its visual and phonetic comparison and in its global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, in respect of both the earlier word mark and the figurative marks relied on by the applicant.

16 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

17 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.

18 According to settled case-law, the risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS) , T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).

19 For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel) , T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

20 Where the protection of the earlier trade mark extends to the entirety of the European Union, it is necessary to take into account the perception of the marks at issue by the consumer of the goods in question in that territory. However, it must be borne in mind that, in order for an EU trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others) , T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).

21 It is in the light of those considerations that the Court must examine whether the Board of Appeal was correct in concluding that there was no likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

22 Since the Board of Appeal began its examination of the likelihood of confusion with regard to the earlier word mark, it is necessary to analyse, first of all, the findings relating to that mark.

The relevant public and territory

23 In paragraphs 23 to 29 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal noted that the goods in question were aimed at the general public and at professionals with specific professional knowledge or expertise. It stated, as did the Opposition Division, that the level of attention to be taken into account was that of the general public, displaying an average degree of attention. The Board of Appeal also specified that the relevant territory was that of the European Union, in so far as the opposition was based on EU trade marks.

24 The applicant expressly states that it does not dispute those findings of the Board of Appeal.

The comparison of the goods

25 As regards the comparison of the goods in question, it is apparent from paragraph 22 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal upheld the Opposition Division’s conclusion that the goods covered by the mark applied for were either identical, as regards the goods in Class 3, or similar, as regards the goods in Class 21, to the goods covered by the earlier word mark.

26 The applicant expressly states that it does not dispute that finding of the Board of Appeal.

The comparison of the signs at issue

27 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, in relation to the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, inter alia, their distinctive and dominant components. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global appreciation of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). In addition, the average consumer only rarely has the chance to make a direct comparison between the different marks but must place his or her trust in the imperfect picture of them that he or she has kept in his or her mind (judgment of 22 June 1999, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer , C‑342/97, EU:C:1999:323, paragraph 26).

28 In the present case, the signs to be compared are the figurative sign dentix, written in italics and in a bold, black, lower-case font, as regards the mark applied for, and the word sign DENTEK, as regards the earlier word mark.

29 It is apparent from paragraphs 35 to 37 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal noted that it was a well-known fact that the relevant public throughout the European Union would be able to recognise and distinguish the element ‘dent’, which is common to the signs at issue, as a common word used in the field of dentistry constituting a reference to the concept of ‘dental’, with the result that it had a weak distinctive character in relation to the goods in question, which are all related to dental care. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal found, first, that the endings ‘ix’ and ‘ek’ of the signs at issue had no particular meaning for the relevant public and, second, that the letter combination ‘tek’ appearing at the end of the earlier word mark was widely interpreted as meaning ‘technology’, with the result that the relevant public could understand the earlier word mark as an indivisible whole, namely ‘dental technology’, in which neither the reference to the concept of ‘dental’ nor the reference to technology would be attributed more weight.

30 In the first place, the applicant criticises the Board of Appeal for basing its reasoning on the incorrect premiss that the element ‘dent’ derives from Latin and means ‘tooth’, whereas, in that language, the word for ‘tooth’ is ‘dens’ with the genitive form being ‘dentis’. In the second place, it submits that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the word ‘dent’ had a concrete meaning and could be understood by the Bulgarian or Greek public. The Board of Appeal was therefore incorrect in assuming that the root ‘dent’ would convey a specific meaning for that public or evoke familiar words, with the result that that public would be led to analyse the signs at issue by breaking them down into the word elements ‘dent-ix’ and ‘dent-ek’. In the third place, the applicant submits that, irrespective of their contradictory nature, the Board of Appeal’s findings regarding the ‘rather weak’ or ‘weak’ distinctive character of the element ‘dent’ are incorrect in relation to the Bulgarian or Greek public, for whom that word has no direct meaning and does not evoke any particular association. On the contrary, for that public, that element has, at the very least, an average degree of distinctiveness.

31 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

32 In the present case, in the light of the applicant’s arguments, before addressing the question of the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, it is necessary to examine the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the distinctive elements of those signs.

The distinctive elements of the signs at issue

33 In order to determine the distinctive character of an element making up a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods or services for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the element in question in the light of whether it is at all descriptive of the goods or services for which the mark has been registered (see judgments of 13 December 2007, Cabrera Sánchez v OHIM – Industrias Cárnicas Valle (el charcutero artesano) , T‑242/06, not published, EU:T:2007:391, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited, and of 5 October 2020, Eugène Perma France v EUIPO – SPI Investments Group (NATURANOVE) , T‑602/19, not published, EU:T:2020:463, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

34 Next, it should be noted that, when the element appearing in the initial part has a weak distinctive character in relation to the goods covered by the marks at issue, the relevant public will attach more importance to their final part, which is the most distinctive (see judgment of 13 March 2024, Laboratorios Ern v EUIPO – Cannabinoids Spain (Sanoid) , T‑206/23, not published, EU:T:2024:164, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited).

35 Lastly, it is apparent from the case-law that, although the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details, the fact remains that, when perceiving a word sign, he or she will break it down into word elements which, for him or her, suggest a concrete meaning or resemble words known to him or her (see judgment of 13 March 2024, Sanoid , T‑206/23, not published, EU:T:2024:164, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).

36 As a preliminary point, it must be noted that the Board of Appeal, in paragraphs 32 and 33 of the contested decision, assessed the mark applied for as if it were a mere word sign, whereas it was a figurative sign consisting of a slightly stylised word element.

37 However, it should be stated that the applicant did not dispute paragraphs 32 and 33 of the contested decision and that, in any event, in paragraph 43 thereof, the Board of Appeal took account of the slight stylisation of the mark applied for.

38 In the present case, after recalling, in paragraph 34 of the contested decision, that the Opposition Division had found that the Bulgarian- or Greek-speaking part of the public did not understand the element ‘dent’ of the earlier word mark as an abbreviation of ‘dental’ or ‘dentistry’, the Board of Appeal, in paragraph 35 of the contested decision, relied on the concept of a well-known fact in order to find that that element was contained in several commonly used words in the field of dentistry relating to the goods in question and that it would therefore be universally understood, with the result that it had a weak distinctive character throughout the European Union in respect of those goods.

39 The applicant disputes whether that is indeed a well-known fact, calling into question the fact that the Bulgarian or Greek parts of the relevant public have sufficient knowledge of words derived from Latin and, more generally, of other foreign languages, including English, to understand the meaning of the element ‘dent’ and, therefore, to distinguish it within the signs at issue.

40 As is clear from the case-law, it may be assumed that a sign will be understood if the sign is applied for in respect of a territory in which the language of the sign is the native language of the population of the territory. However, that understanding has to be proved in territories in which the relevant language is not the native language of the population, unless it is a well-known fact that the target public in those territories has a sufficient knowledge of the language of the sign (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 June 2024, Google v EUIPO – EPay (GPAY) , T‑78/23, not published, EU:T:2024:378, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

41 According to settled case-law, well-known facts are defined as facts which are likely to be known by anyone or which may be learnt from generally accessible sources (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 June 2022, Hijos de Moisés Rodríguez González v EUIPO – Ireland and Ornua (La Irlandesa 1943) , T‑306/20, EU:T:2022:404, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

42 It is also settled case-law that the Boards of Appeal, when determining the relevant public’s perception of the marks at issue, can rely on well-known facts which were not relied on before the bodies of EUIPO, subject to the adversely affected party’s proving an error of assessment in respect of whether those facts are well known (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 June 2015, La Rioja Alta v OHIM – Aldi Einkauf (VIÑA ALBERDI) , T‑489/13, EU:T:2015:446, paragraph 56 (not published) and the case-law cited). Furthermore, when the Boards of Appeal decide to take well-known facts into account, they are not obliged to establish, in their decisions, the accuracy of such facts; this does not prevent the party against whom they are relied upon from challenging, in a detailed manner, their accuracy before the General Court and from submitting documents to it in support of such a challenge (see, to that effect, order of 3 June 2015, The Sunrider Corporation v OHIM , C‑142/14 P, not published, EU:C:2015:371, paragraphs 65 and 66 and the case-law cited; judgments of 9 July 2025, Target Brands v EUIPO – Polipol Polstermöbel (Representation of red and white concentric rings) , T‑347/24, not published, EU:T:2025:687, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited, and of 9 July 2025, AirPlus International v EUIPO – Alpian (+a) , T‑407/24, not published, EU:T:2025:685, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

43 In the present case, as has been recalled in paragraph 38 above, the Board of Appeal found that it was a well-known fact that the element ‘dent’, which derives from Latin, was contained in several commonly used words in the field relating to the goods in question and understood throughout the European Union as a reference to the concept of ‘dental’. In support of such a finding, it refers, by way of example, to several English words, namely ‘dental’, ‘dentifrice’, ‘dentist’, ‘dentistry’ and ‘denture’, all of which have the element ‘dent’ as a prefix, as well as to the decision of the Board of Appeal of 18 November 2019 concerning the opposition to registration of the word sign Dentaq (R 1047/2019‑5), which refers to several examples of words that include the element ‘dent’ used in the various languages of the European Union. It inferred from this that the element ‘dent’ had a weak distinctive character throughout the European Union for all the goods covered by the signs at issue, which are all related to dentistry.

44 In such circumstances, contrary to what the applicant claims, it was for the applicant, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 42 above, to challenge in detail the Board of Appeal’s findings and to provide specific and substantiated information or even, where appropriate, to produce before the General Court, documents capable of calling into question the accuracy of the well-known facts relied on in paragraph 35 of the contested decision.

45 Yet the applicant merely denied that the Bulgarian or Greek public would have the linguistic knowledge enabling it to distinguish and understand the meaning of the element ‘dent’, by relying in essence on the Opposition Division’s findings and by including, in its application, a table containing the literal translations of the English words referred to in paragraph 43 above into Bulgarian and Greek, without even indicating the source of those translations or confirming their accuracy and completeness. In addition, in that regard, it should be noted that the element ‘δόντ’ (dont) in Greek, which appears in all the words listed in the table, is very similar to the element ‘dent’ and, like that element, recalls the concept of ‘dental’. It must therefore be held that the applicant has in no way substantiated its reasoning, nor has it submitted, beyond that table, any specific evidence capable of calling into question the accuracy of the well-known facts relied on by the Board of Appeal and thus of demonstrating that the contested decision was vitiated by an error of assessment as regards the well-known nature of those facts.

46 It should also be noted that, in so far as the applicant seeks to rely on the distinctive character of the earlier word mark, with the result that the Bulgarian or Greek public would not understand the meaning of the element ‘dent’, despite EUIPO’s analysis, it is for the applicant to provide specific and substantiated information to show that the distinctive character of that word mark is not weak (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 25 October 2007, Develey v OHIM , C‑238/06 P, EU:C:2007:635, paragraph 50).

47 Contrary to what the applicant claimed at the hearing, those considerations are not called into question by the case-law of the General Court resulting from the judgment of 14 May 2025, Taxolutions v EUIPO – Haufe-Lexware (TAXMARC) (T‑1154/23, not published, EU:T:2025:487, paragraph 51). While it is true, according to that case-law, that linguistic knowledge of a foreign language may only exceptionally be regarded as a well-known fact and must, as to the remainder, be put forward and proved by the party on whom the burden of proof lies, that does not mean that, in the present case, that burden lay with the Board of Appeal, which, on the contrary, in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 42 above, could indeed rely on well-known facts which had not been relied on before the Opposition Division without it being required to establish the accuracy thereof. Moreover, to place the burden of proof on the Board of Appeal would deprive the case-law referred to in paragraph 42 of its substance, whereas that case-law places the burden of challenging before the General Court the accuracy of facts which are well known on the party against whom they are opposed.

48 Furthermore, contrary to what the applicant asserted, in passing, at the hearing, it cannot be regarded as impossible to call into question the facts found by the Board of Appeal. By way of example, opinion polls or statistical surveys on the lack of understanding of the term ‘dent’ by the Bulgarian- or Greek-speaking part of the public could, as the case may be, have discredited the well-known fact on which the Board of Appeal relied in the contested decision (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 16 December 2020, Cinkciarz.pl v EUIPO (€$) , T‑665/19, not published, EU:T:2020:631, paragraph 65).

49 In the light of all of those considerations, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s arguments challenging the Board of Appeal’s finding that it is a well-known fact that the element ‘dent’ will be identified as the initial part of the signs at issue and understood by the relevant public throughout the European Union.

50 That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s other arguments.

51 First, as the EUIPO argues, a mere reference to literal translations of English terms into Bulgarian or Greek is not capable of calling into question the existence of a broader understanding of the element common to the signs at issue as regards the dental care goods in question, particularly as the applicant has not demonstrated the accuracy and completeness of those translations.

52 Even if it were to be considered that there are no close equivalents of the term ‘dent’ at the very least in Bulgarian, as the applicant noted in the table referred to in paragraph 45 above, the fact remains that that term is commonly used within the European Union in an important area of everyday life such as that of dental care. Thus, irrespective of whether or not there are close equivalents in Bulgarian, the term ‘dent’ is likely to be identified and understood by the average consumer of the goods in question (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 18 January 2023, YAplus DBA Yoga Alliance v EUIPO – Vidyanand (YOGA ALLIANCE INDIA INTERNATIONAL) , T‑443/21, not published, EU:T:2023:7, paragraph 75).

53 Second, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Board of Appeal did not state that the element ‘dent’ was the direct and precise translation of the Latin word ‘dens’, but rather that the relevant public would perceive that element as a reference to the concept of ‘dental’. It follows that the applicant’s line of argument that the Bulgarian or Greek public would have no knowledge of the Latin-derived terms must be rejected, as EUIPO states, as ineffective, as must its argument that it is rather the Latin word ‘dens’ and not ‘dent’ which means ‘tooth’, since, even if it were established, that fact has no bearing on the conclusion which the Board of Appeal drew from it as regards that public’s perception of the elements making up the signs at issue.

54 Third and lastly, the applicant cannot criticise the Board of Appeal for having contradicted itself in that it reached the opposite conclusion to that of the Opposition Division as regards the understanding of the word ‘dent’ by the Bulgarian or Greek public. As EUIPO noted, it must be observed that the Opposition Division refers to the decision of the Board of Appeal of 15 December 2010 concerning the opposition to the registration of the word sign Dentitex (R 313/2010-1), in which it had been found that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks Dentitex and Dentifix, even for identical goods in, inter alia, Class 21, only to subsequently, without any reasoning, depart from that finding by asserting that, for the Bulgarian- and Greek-speaking public, the term ‘dent’ would be meaningless. It follows that, contrary to what the applicant claims, it is the Opposition Division’s finding which is contradictory in itself, in so far as it relies on a decision of the Board of Appeal which, subsequently, it does not follow, and not the reasoning set out in the contested decision. In paragraph 35 of that decision, the Board of Appeal bases its reasoning on the decision referred to in paragraph 43 above, in which it was held that the element ‘dent’ was perceived as a weakly distinctive reference to the concept of ‘dental’ throughout the European Union, which is not inconsistent with the decision of the Board of Appeal of 15 December 2010 (Case R 313/2010-1), in which it was held that the common element ‘dent’ was perceived by the relevant public as an abbreviation of the English word ‘dental’.

55 It follows from the foregoing that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the word element ‘dent’, common to the signs at issue, was weakly distinctive for the relevant public throughout the European Union in that it was closely linked to the goods in question.

56 In the light of all of those considerations, it must be concluded that, in accordance with the principle affirmed by the case-law cited in paragraph 35 above, the Board of Appeal was correct to find, first, that the relevant public would tend to break down the marks at issue by distinguishing their initial element ‘dent’ from the endings ‘ek’, as regards the earlier word mark, and ‘ix’, as regards the mark applied for, and, second, that those endings were meaningless.

57 It is in the light of the foregoing considerations that it is necessary to examine whether the visual, phonetic and conceptual comparison of the marks at issue carried out by the Board of Appeal is vitiated by any errors of assessment.

The visual comparison

58 As regards the visual comparison of the signs, in paragraphs 43 to 45 of the contested decision, after finding that the very slight stylisation of the mark applied for and the difference in the use of upper-case and lower-case letters between the signs at issue had no impact on the final comparison, the Board of Appeal stated that, despite the fact that the common element ‘dent’ appeared at the beginning of the signs at issue, given its weak distinctive character and the differences in the last two letters, the relevant public would not attribute any greater importance to that element than to the final part of the signs at issue. It therefore concluded that the signs at issue were visually similar to a low degree.

59 The applicant disputes that analysis, stating, as did the Opposition Division, that the signs at issue are visually highly similar. More specifically, it submits that the Board of Appeal did not take sufficient account of the fact that the first four of the six letters making up the signs at issue were identical and produced an overall highly similar visual impression. Furthermore, it disputes the Board of Appeal’s conclusion regarding the weak distinctive character of the common element ‘dent’ for the Bulgarian or Greek public.

60 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

61 As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that it follows from the case-law that there is nothing to prevent a determination as to whether there is any visual similarity between a word mark and a figurative mark, since the two types of mark have graphic form capable of creating a visual impression (see judgment of 4 May 2005, Chum v OHIM – Star TV (STAR TV) , T‑359/02, EU:T:2005:156, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

62 As regards the impact of the typography of the mark applied for, it must be pointed out that that mark is only slightly stylised, since it is represented in a single, relatively standard black font. As regards the earlier word mark, it may be represented in any font, size and colour, including in a version corresponding to that of the mark applied for. It follows that the style in which the word element of the mark applied for is presented is irrelevant for the visual comparison of the signs at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 November 2023, Liquid Advertising v EUIPO – Liqui.do (Liquid+Arcade) , T‑592/22, not published, EU:T:2023:708, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

63 It is common ground that the two marks at issue are identical in their length of six letters, and that four of those letters – ‘d’, ‘e’, ‘n’ and ‘t’ – appear in the same sequence at the beginning of the sign.

64 It is true that, as the applicant submits, in general, consumers attach more importance to the initial part of a sign. However, that is not always the case. The comparison between two signs must be carried out according to the particular circumstances of each case (see judgment of 2 March 2022, Ubisoft Entertainment v EUIPO – Huawei Technologies (FOR HONOR) , T‑171/21, not published, EU:T:2022:104, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited).

65 In the present case, the identical initial letters are those forming the term ‘dent’, which, although present at the beginning of the two signs at issue, is, as has been found in paragraphs 43 to 55 above, weakly distinctive.

66 It is apparent from the case-law that the weakly distinctive character of a word element which is common to two signs reduces the relative weight of such an element in the comparison of those signs, including the visual and phonetic comparisons, even though its presence must be taken into account (see judgment of 13 September 2023, Korres v EUIPO – Naos (EST.KORRES 1996 HYDRA-BIOME) , T‑328/22, not published, EU:T:2023:533, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).

67 It follows that the weak distinctive character of the term ‘dent’ in connection with the goods in question, noted by the Board of Appeal in paragraphs 35 and 37 of the contested decision, considerably mitigates the similarity arising from the common sequence of letters in that term, even though its relative weight must nevertheless be taken into account when comparing the signs at issue. Therefore, whilst the signs at issue do indeed share the initial common element ‘dent’, this cannot give rise to a strong visual similarity between them due to that element’s weak distinctive character. By contrast, the endings ‘ek’ and ‘ix’ of the signs at issue, on which the attention of the relevant public will be focused, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 34 above, are different.

68 In the light of those considerations, the Board of Appeal was correct to conclude that the signs at issue were visually similar to a low degree for the relevant public.

The phonetic comparison

69 As regards the phonetic comparison of the signs at issue, in paragraph 46 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, like the Opposition Division, that they were pronounced in two syllables, respectively, ‘den’ and ‘tek’, in the case of the earlier word mark, and ‘den’ and ‘tix’, in the case of the mark applied for. The Board of Appeal therefore concluded that those signs were identical in their first syllable and similar in their second syllable, the letter ‘x’ having to be pronounced ‘ks’, with the result that they were more similar phonetically than visually. The Board of Appeal nevertheless added, departing in that regard from the Opposition Division’s findings, that their common feature, which constituted a reference to the concept of ‘dental’, as it lay in the entire first syllable and the beginning of the second syllable, also had an impact on the phonetic comparison of the overall impression produced by the signs at issue.

70 The applicant submits that, in so far as the Board of Appeal failed to specify the degree of phonetic similarity and did not expressly reject the Opposition Division’s finding of average similarity, it must be held that the signs at issue are phonetically similar to an average degree.

71 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

72 It is common ground that the signs at issue coincide in the first of their two syllables, including the sound ‘t’ following the ‘n’, and are similar in their last syllable, although their last vowels ‘e’ and ‘i’ differ, since the letter ‘x’ may be pronounced as ‘ks’.

73 However, as the Board of Appeal correctly noted, without its reasoning having been invalidated by the applicant’s arguments, the weak distinctive character of the element ‘dent’ in the signs at issue is of significant importance, with the result that, notwithstanding the length and position of that element, the difference between the additional syllables ‘tek’ and ‘tix’, placed at the end of those signs, is not irrelevant in the global assessment of phonetic similarity.

74 In that regard, it should be noted that the applicant’s line of argument is based on the premiss that the Bulgarian or Greek public as a whole would not understand the element ‘dent’. However, as has already been stated in paragraphs 43 to 55 above, the applicant has not demonstrated that that premiss is well founded, with the result that that line of argument must be rejected.

75 In the light of all of those factors, it must be concluded that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding, in essence, that the signs at issue were phonetically similar to a degree which was slightly higher than that found in respect of the visual similarity.

The conceptual comparison

76 In paragraph 47 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that, conceptually, the signs at issue, by virtue of their common element ‘dent’, conveyed the concept of ‘dental’, but that, because of the weak distinctive character of that concept in relation to the goods in question, the degree of conceptual similarity between those signs had, at most, to be considered as low. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal found that the earlier word mark, as a whole, could be understood as referring to ‘dental technology’, whereas the mark applied for, as a whole, was meaningless.

77 Those findings of the Board of Appeal as regards the low degree of conceptual similarity have not been disputed by the applicant.

The distinctive character of the earlier word mark

78 In paragraphs 53 and 54 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that, in so far as the relevant public would attribute a meaning only to the element ‘dent’, even though it is inherently weak in relation to the goods and public in question, the earlier word mark as a whole had an average degree of inherent distinctive character. It nevertheless added that, given that the element ‘tek’ was a common abbreviation of ‘technology’, the relevant public was likely to perceive the word ‘dentek’ as meaning ‘dental technology’, with the result that, in relation to the goods in question, that word would convey the message that those goods incorporate advanced techniques, materials or innovations designed to improve dental care. From this, the Board of Appeal concluded that the earlier word mark had a low, or even very low degree of inherent distinctive character for dental-related products.

79 The applicant submits, in essence, that the Board of Appeal failed to correctly assess the degree of inherent distinctive character of the earlier word mark, which, as a whole, was meaningless from the perspective of the Bulgarian or Greek public, since the components ‘dent’ and ‘tek’ have no specific meaning. More specifically, given its limited familiarity with English, it would not occur to that public to break down the earlier word mark into ‘dent’ and ‘tek’, since, in the absence of a second ‘t’, it would tend to follow the common grammatical and phonetic rules, by dividing the earlier word mark into the two syllables of which it is composed, namely ‘den’ and ‘tek’, in accordance with their pronunciation. Furthermore, according to the applicant, the element ‘tek’ is neither a standard nor a widely recognised abbreviation for ‘technology’. Therefore, the earlier word mark has a normal degree of distinctiveness.

80 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

81 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that it is not disputed between the parties that, as is apparent from paragraph 52 of the contested decision, the assessment of the distinctiveness of the earlier word mark rests on its inherent distinctive character.

82 In that regard, it is apparent from paragraph 55 above that, in the earlier word mark, the element ‘dent’ is weakly distinctive in relation to the goods in question. It has also been held, in paragraph 56 above, that the ending ‘ek’ is meaningless.

83 In those circumstances, the earlier word mark as a whole could have an average degree of inherent distinctive character. However, in view of the combination of the letters ‘t’, ‘e’ and ‘k’ at the end of that mark, which, as EUIPO emphasises, constitutes, like the combination ‘tec’, an abbreviation of the concept of ‘technology’, the word ‘dentek’ will be perceived by the relevant public as alluding to ‘dental technology’. In that regard, it should be noted, as observed by EUIPO, that the substitution or misspelling of the last letter ‘k’ in ‘tek’, as opposed to the letter ‘c’ in ‘tec’, does not create any meaningful difference in either the pronunciation or the conceptual content between those two abbreviations.

84 Consequently, it is necessary to uphold the Board of Appeal’s assessment, in paragraph 54 of the contested decision, that the combination of the element ‘dent’ and the ending ‘tek’, irrespective of the fact that a single letter ‘t’ is taken into account both as the final part of the element ‘dent’ and the initial part of the element ‘tek’, will be understood by the relevant public as conveying the message that the goods covered by the mark ‘incorporate advanced techniques, materials or innovations designed to improve dental care’.

85 In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal’s finding relating to the weak distinctive character of the earlier word mark for the relevant public must be upheld.

86 That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s arguments that the combination of the two word elements in question is fanciful for the non-English-speaking public. As regards the argument that, in view of the limited familiarity with English amongst the part of the Bulgarian or Greek public, neither the component ‘dent’ nor the element ‘tek’ would have any meaning, with the result that, in the absence of a second ‘t’, that public would not break down the earlier word mark into ‘dent’ and ‘tek’, it is sufficient to note that the Board of Appeal did not err in taking into account the public of the European Union as a whole rather than the part of the public which speaks Bulgarian or Greek (see paragraphs 38 to 54 above). The fact that that part of the public has a limited familiarity with English is therefore irrelevant in the present case.

87 Lastly, it must be noted, as observed by EUIPO, that the applicant has not adduced any evidence from which it may be presumed that the relevant public would not understand the element ‘tek’ as being a direct and unambiguous reference to ‘technology’.

88 As regards the applicant’s argument that the earlier word mark has inherent distinctiveness solely by virtue of the fact that, like all the other earlier marks on which it based its opposition, it was registered, it is sufficient to note that, whilst those marks necessarily had, by virtue of their mere registration, a minimum degree of inherent distinctiveness, it cannot be ruled out that that distinctiveness is, as the Board of Appeal found in the present case, low (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 October 2020, NATURANOVE , T‑602/19, not published, EU:T:2020:463, paragraph 66).

89 Lastly, as regards the applicant’s line of argument that the earlier word mark, taken as a whole, is meaningless for Bulgarian and Greek consumers and should therefore be regarded as having a normal degree of distinctiveness, it must be rejected as unfounded, in the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 38 to 56 above.

The likelihood of confusion

90 According to settled case-law, the existence of a likelihood of confusion depends on numerous elements, in particular the recognition of the trade mark on the market, the association which can be made with the used or registered sign, and the degree of similarity between the trade mark and the sign and between the goods or services identified. The likelihood of confusion must therefore be assessed globally, taking into account all the relevant factors of the particular case (see judgment of 12 June 2019, Hansson , C‑705/17, EU:C:2019:481, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

91 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account, and in particular between the similarity of the trade marks and the similarity of the goods or services concerned. Accordingly, a lesser degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon , C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, VENADO with frame and others , T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

92 Furthermore, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the fact that a trade mark is of weak distinctiveness does not exclude a likelihood of confusion, in particular where the signs and the goods or services covered are similar (see judgment of 12 June 2019, Hansson , C‑705/17, EU:C:2019:481, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited). It is also apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, where the earlier mark and the sign for which registration is sought coincide in an element that is weakly distinctive with regard to the goods in question, the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, which must be carried out taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, including the distinctive character of the earlier mark, does not often lead to a finding that such likelihood exists. The fact remains that a finding that there is a likelihood of confusion cannot, because of the interdependence of the relevant factors in that regard, be ruled out in advance and in any event (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 June 2020, Primart v EUIPO , C‑702/18 P, EU:C:2020:489, paragraphs 53 and 55 and the case-law cited).

93 In the present case, the Board of Appeal concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion. That conclusion is based, essentially, on the average level of attention of the relevant public, on the weak distinctive character of the common word element ‘dent’, on the existence of a low degree of visual similarity and of a slightly higher degree of phonetic similarity, with the visual impact, however, being greater than the phonetic impact, having regard to the conditions under which the goods in question are marketed, on the existence of a low degree of conceptual similarity, as well as on the ‘bare minimum’ inherent distinctive character of the earlier word mark, taken as a whole. The Board of Appeal found that, in the light of those factors, the identity or similarity of the goods covered by the marks at issue did not call into question the conclusion that there is no likelihood of confusion.

94 By contrast, the applicant is of the view that there is a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. First, relying on the findings of the Opposition Division, it submits that, for the Bulgarian or Greek public, the earlier word mark must be regarded as having a normal degree of distinctiveness and that the signs at issue must be regarded as having an average degree of visual and phonetic similarity. Second, relying on several judgments of the Court of Justice and of the General Court, given that, in the applicant’s view, the goods in question are in part identical and in part similar, it criticises the Board of Appeal for having placed undue weight on the allegedly weak distinctive character of the earlier word mark. Lastly, it claims that the Board of Appeal failed to take into account all the relevant circumstances of the case, in particular the fact that the signs at issue are visually and phonetically similar to an average degree. In the applicant’s view, the Board of Appeal should have found, as the Opposition Division did, that the Bulgarian or Greek public, relying on its imperfect recollection of the signs at issue, would either confuse the goods in question or assume that those goods originate from the same or economically linked undertakings.

95 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

96 First of all, it must be borne in mind that, where the elements of similarity between two signs arise from the fact that, as in the present case, they share a component which has weak inherent distinctiveness, the impact of such elements of similarity on the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion is itself low (see judgments of 15 October 2020, Decathlon v EUIPO – Athlon Custom Sportswear (athlon custom sportswear) , T‑349/19, not published, EU:T:2020:488, paragraph 90, and of 20 January 2021, Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO – M. J. Dairies (BBQLOUMI) , T‑328/17 RENV, not published, EU:T:2021:16, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

97 That is the case here in respect of the weakly distinctive element of similarity ‘dent’, the presence of which in both signs is not decisive, but must be taken into account in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion in the light of all the relevant circumstances of the case.

98 Next, it follows from the foregoing considerations that the level of attention of the relevant public is average and that the signs at issue have only a low degree of visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity. The similarities relate to the presence of the weakly distinctive element ‘dent’ and are offset by the presence of the meaningless endings ‘ix’ and ‘ek’, which create a difference between the signs at issue, taken as a whole.

99 As regards the argument claiming, in essence, that the Board of Appeal placed undue weight on the visual comparison between the marks at issue, it should be noted that, even if, as the applicant submits, on the one hand, the goods in question may be advertised orally, on the radio or by other consumers, and, on the other hand, the decision to purchase them may be preceded by an oral discussion about their characteristics and their marks, this cannot invalidate the Board of Appeal’s finding that, in view of the way in which the goods in question are marketed, the relevant public will be influenced more by the visual aspect of the marks at issue than by their phonetic aspect.

100 In general, the goods in question are sold in shops that operate on a self-serve basis, even if they employ staff to help customers in their choice, a fact which, moreover, is not disputed by the applicant. Therefore, although oral communication regarding the goods in question and their marks cannot be ruled out, the visual perception of the signs at issue will normally occur prior to the act of purchase and that act will take place almost without interaction with any sales assistants, the consumer having to look for the goods visually. Even assuming that, in some cases, the goods in question may also be sold in response to an oral order or that the selection of goods may require professional advice or consultation or be accompanied by a process of communication with the seller, those aspects cannot be regarded as usual in the purchase of those goods. Thus, in most cases, the phonetic perception of the marks will not precede purchase (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 October 2023, Dr. Rudolf Liebe Nachfolger v EUIPO – Bit Beauty (ayuna LESS IS BEAUTY) , T‑490/22, not published, EU:T:2023:616, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited).

101 Thus, as EUIPO observes, although the phonetic similarity of the signs at issue cannot be ignored, its impact can only be limited, given the ways and conditions under which the goods in question are marketed.

102 Consequently, the Board of Appeal did not err, in its global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, in noting the greater importance of visual similarity in the comparison of the signs at issue.

103 The circumstances of the present case are therefore such that the relevant public will clearly distinguish between the signs at issue, even if they have a low degree of similarity due to the presence of the common element ‘dent’ and even if the goods in question are identical or similar, as the differences between the signs at issue outweigh, in the context of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the similarities arising from that common element – which has a weak distinctive character – and given that the earlier word mark has a weak distinctive character.

104 It follows that, overall, having regard to the fact that the level of attention of the relevant public is average, that the goods in question are considered to be identical or similar, that the earlier word mark has a weak distinctive character and that the signs at issue are visually similar to a low degree, with a degree of phonetic similarity which is slightly higher than the degree of visual similarity, taking into account, however, that the visual impact is greater than the phonetic impact, and that they are conceptually similar to a low degree, the Board of Appeal was correct to conclude that there was no likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, following a global assessment of all the factors relevant to the present case.

105 Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s remarks relating, in essence, to the likelihood of association between the marks at issue on account of the use of the common element ‘dent’, it must be borne in mind that the likelihood of association is a specific case of the likelihood of confusion, which is characterised by the fact that the signs at issue, while not likely to be confused directly by the target public, could be perceived as being two marks belonging to the same holder. While that may be the case, in particular, where the two marks appear to belong to a series of marks based on a common core element, it must be stated that that cannot be the case here, since the element ‘dent’ has a weak distinctive character which, as a result, is not apt to create, on the part of the target public, a likelihood of association between the signs at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 July 2004, Grupo El Prado Cervera v OHIM – Héritiers Debuschewitz (CHUFAFIT) , T‑117/02, EU:T:2004:208, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

The opposition based on the earlier figurative marks

106 As regards the applicant’s complaint based on the incorrect exclusion of any likelihood of confusion with regard to the earlier figurative marks, the following should be noted. First of all, in so far as the applicant appears to criticise the Board of Appeal for failing to state reasons, on the ground that it did not set out why the Bulgarian or Greek public would break down the earlier figurative marks into the elements ‘dent’ and ‘tek’, despite there being no visual indication in those marks that would lead it to do so, it should be borne in mind that the obligation to state reasons is an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question whether the grounds given are correct, the latter being a matter going to the substantive legality of the contested measure. The reasoning of a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. If those grounds are vitiated by errors, the latter will vitiate the substantive legality of the decision, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect. Claims and arguments intended to deny that the measure at issue is well founded are thus irrelevant in the context of a plea alleging the lack or inadequacy of a statement of reasons (see judgment of 9 November 2022, CB v EUIPO – China Construction Bank (CCB) , T‑639/21, not published, EU:T:2022:698, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

107 In any event, in paragraph 72 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated, first, that it did not attribute any importance to the figurative elements in colour and to the stylisation of the element ‘dentek’ in the two earlier figurative marks and, second, that the use of the letters ‘D’ and ‘T’ in upper case, while the remaining letters were in lower case, did not prevent the relevant public, including consumers who speak Bulgarian or Greek, from perceiving the reference to the terms ‘dental’ and ‘technology’. That statement, whilst brief, is sufficient to enable the applicant and the General Court to understand that that part of the contested decision is based on the Board of Appeal’s global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, like that of the Opposition Division, in relation to the earlier word mark, and that those figurative elements were considered to be banal and, therefore, incapable of calling that assessment into question.

108 Furthermore, it must be noted, as emphasised by the intervener, first, that the earlier figurative marks have a very simple graphic form, such that their visual aspect does not affect their distinctiveness, and, second, that the mark applied for differs from them in terms of its font, colour and shape. Indeed, the font used for the mark applied for is black and slanted to the right, whereas the font used for the earlier figurative marks is white and the letters in it are not slanted. Furthermore, the mark applied for does not have a background, or it appears on a white background, whereas the earlier figurative marks are set within blue or navy-blue oval shapes. Lastly, the mark applied for contains only lower-case letters, whereas the earlier figurative marks contain the upper-case letters ‘D’ and ‘T’, which, moreover, further highlight a visual separation between the two elements ‘dent’ and ‘tek’.

109 Consequently, contrary to the applicant’s claims, the Board of Appeal did not err in its assessment of the likelihood of confusion in relation to the earlier figurative marks, in concluding that the figurative elements in colour and their stylisation were irrelevant, that the presence of the upper-case letters ‘D’ and ‘T’ did not prevent the public from perceiving the allusion to the terms ‘dental’ and ‘technology’ (see paragraphs 83 to 89 above) and that, in any event, on account of the weak distinctive character of the word ‘dentek’ as such, any weight attributable to those figurative elements would only further differentiate the signs visually.

110 As regards the argument based on the alleged error committed by the Board of Appeal in failing to take into account the specific perception that the Bulgarian or Greek public would have had of the stylised rendering of the earlier figurative marks, it must be rejected since, as set out in paragraphs 38 to 54 above, it is based on the unfounded premiss that that public will not understand the common element ‘dent’ in the signs at issue.

111 The conclusions reached by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision concerning the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, having regard to the similarities between the mark applied for and the earlier word mark, are correct, as has been stated in paragraph 104 above, and are equally applicable in the context of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the mark applied for and the earlier figurative marks.

112 The Board of Appeal therefore did not make an error of assessment in finding that there was no likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public also with regard to those figurative marks.

113 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the single plea in law relied on by the applicant in support of its claims must be rejected and, accordingly, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

114 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

115 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful and a hearing has taken place, it must be ordered, in addition to bearing its own costs, to pay those incurred by EUIPO, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter.

116 Since the intervener has not applied for costs against the applicant, it must be ordered to bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Dentek Oral Care, Inc. to pay the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO);

3. Declares that Jeronimo Martins Polska S.A. is to bear its own costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 7 October 2026.

* Language of the case: English.