Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) 23 September 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)

23 September 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for EU word mark ANTMINER – Earlier EU word mark ANTCHAIN – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Identity of the goods – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Suspension of proceedings – Article 71(1)(b) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625 )

In Case T‑409/25,

Bitmain Technologies Inc., established in Beijing (China), represented by J. Wernicke, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by E. Lobotková and D. Hanf, acting as Agents,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

Advanced New Technologies Co. Ltd, established in George Town (Cayman Islands), represented by C. Saettel and L. Jund, lawyers,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber),

composed of M. Sampol Pucurull (Rapporteur), President, T. Pynnä and J. Laitenberger, Judges,

Registrar: J. Čuboň, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 22 April 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Bitmain Technologies Inc., seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 22 April 2025 (Case R 2071/2023‑5) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 12 October 2021, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the word sign ANTMINER.

3 The mark applied for covered goods in Class 9 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding to the following description: ‘Computer hardware for mining cryptocurrency; integrated circuit boards; integrated circuit modules; application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) for mining cryptocurrency; cryptocurrency hardware wallets; downloadable computer software for mining cryptocurrency; downloadable computer software for blockchain technology; downloadable cryptographic keys for receiving and spending cryptocurrency’.

4 On 27 January 2022, the intervener, Advanced New Technologies Co. Ltd, filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5 The opposition was based on a number of earlier marks, including, in particular:

– the EU word mark ANT, filed on 14 January 2014 and registered on 7 September 2018 under number 12 499 968 for goods, inter alia, in Class 9 (‘the earlier mark ANT’);

– the EU word mark ANTCHAIN, filed on 16 April 2020 and registered on 5 August 2020 under number 18 226 795 for goods, inter alia, in Class 9 corresponding to the following description: ‘Computer software; computer programs; computer and telecommunications networking hardware; computer hardware and firmware; data storage programs’ (‘the earlier mark ANTCHAIN’).

6 The grounds relied on in support of the opposition were those set out in Article 8(1)(b) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

7 On 10 August 2023, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition on the basis of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, taking account of the earlier mark ANT.

8 On 9 October 2023, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.

9 On 17 October 2023, the applicant filed an application with EUIPO for revocation on the basis of Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, in respect of the earlier mark ANT.

10 On 11 December 2023, the applicant requested that the appeal proceedings be suspended, on the basis of Article 71(1)(b) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625 of 5 March 2018 supplementing Regulation 2017/1001, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430 (OJ 2018 L 104, p. 1), until a final decision had been given in the revocation proceedings.

11 By decision of 12 January 2024, the Board of Appeal rejected the request for suspension of the appeal proceedings following the intervener’s objection the previous day.

12 By communication of 23 January 2025, the rapporteur of the Board of Appeal informed the parties that it could not be ruled out prima facie that the conditions for refusing registration of the mark on the basis of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 might be fulfilled in respect of the earlier mark ANTCHAIN. The rapporteur considered that the possibility for the Board of Appeal to base its decision on another earlier right, the validity of which is not being contested and which is different from that examined by the Opposition Division, justified the decision not to grant the request for suspension of the appeal proceedings.

13 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal, on the basis of the earlier mark ANTCHAIN, dismissed the appeal on the ground that there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, in respect of the goods in Class 9 listed in paragraph 3 above. It dismissed the appeal on account, inter alia, of the identity of the goods and the average visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the marks at issue, which resulted in particular from the presence of the common word element ‘ant’, which it considered to be the most distinctive element.

Form of orders sought

14 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– order EUIPO to pay the costs.

15 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened.

16 The intervener contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs of the procedure before the General Court and of the procedure before EUIPO.

Law

17 The applicant relies on two pleas in law. The first plea alleges, in essence, infringement of Article 71(1)(b) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625 and breach of the principles of equality before the law and impartiality. The second plea alleges infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

The first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 71(1)(b) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625 and breach of the principle s of equality before the law and impartiality

18 The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal was wrong to reject its request to suspend proceedings on the sole basis of the intervener’s objection. It argues that the Board of Appeal only later justified the rejection of the request for suspension, on the ground that the dismissal of the action could also be based on the earlier mark ANTCHAIN. However, in its view, the Board of Appeal failed to take into account the arguments which it submitted in its request for suspension. The Board of Appeal thus failed to take into account the interests of the parties, contrary to Article 71(1)(b) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625. The applicant submits that the suspension of proceedings was appropriate since the opposition had been filed in bad faith, on the basis of trade marks which were not put to genuine use in the European Union and which were not intended for use there. The applicant states that it had therefore filed an application for revocation and subsequently a request for suspension. Accordingly, the applicant submits that EUIPO acted in breach of the principles of equality before the law and impartiality.

19 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

20 Under Article 71(1)(b) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625, as regards opposition, revocation and declaration of invalidity and appeal proceedings, the competent department or Board of Appeal may suspend proceedings at the reasoned request of one of the parties in inter partes proceedings where a suspension is appropriate under the circumstances of the case, taking into account the interests of the parties and the stage of the proceedings.

21 According to case-law, the Board of Appeal’s discretion as to whether or not to suspend proceedings is broad. Suspending proceedings remains optional for the Board of Appeal, which will do so only if it considers it appropriate. Proceedings before the Board of Appeal are therefore not automatically suspended as a result of a request for suspension made by a party before it (see judgment of 1 December 2021, Team Beverage v EUIPO – Zurich Deutscher Herold Lebensversicherung (Team Beverage) , T‑359/20, not published, EU:T:2021:841, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

22 However, the fact that the Board of Appeal has broad discretion to suspend proceedings before it does not mean that its assessment falls outside the scope of judicial review by the Courts of the European Union. That fact does, however, restrict judicial review on the merits to ensuring that there is no manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers (see judgment of 4 May 2022, PricewaterhouseCoopers Belastingadviseurs v EUIPO – Haufe-Lexware (TAXMARC) , T‑619/21, not published, EU:T:2022:270, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

23 In addition, the existence of parallel proceedings, the outcome of which is liable to have an impact on that of the appeal proceedings, does not result in the appeal proceedings being automatically suspended and, accordingly, is not a sufficient basis, in itself, for categorising the fact that the Board of Appeal refrained from suspending the proceedings as a manifest error (see judgment of 28 May 2020, Cinkciarz.pl v EUIPO – MasterCard International (We IntelliGence the World and Others) , T‑84/19 and T‑88/19 to T‑98/19, EU:T:2020:231, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

24 There is no interest in suspending the proceedings if analysis shows that the outcome of the parallel proceedings would have no impact on the outcome of the opposition, which would be the case if the opposition had to be upheld on the basis of another earlier right that was not contested or, on the contrary, if the opposition in any event had to be dismissed, for example where there is no similarity between the signs at issue (see judgment of 28 May 2020, We IntelliGence the World and Others , T‑84/19 and T ‑88/19 to T‑98/19, EU:T:2020:231, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

25 It is apparent from paragraphs 9 and 12 above that the applicant submitted a request for suspension of the appeal proceedings on account of its application for revocation of the earlier mark ANT, which was the subject of the Opposition Division’s decision. Following the Board of Appeal’s decision rejecting the request for suspension of proceedings, the rapporteur of that Board stated that it could not be ruled out prima facie that the conditions for refusing registration of the mark on the basis of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 might be fulfilled in respect of the earlier mark ANTCHAIN. He added that the possibility for the Board of Appeal to base its decision on an earlier right other than that examined by the Opposition Division, the validity of which was not being contested, justified the decision not to grant the request for suspension of proceedings.

26 In so far as the opposition could be upheld on the basis of another earlier right that is not contested, namely the earlier mark ANTCHAIN, the existence of an application for revocation of the earlier mark ANT is not a sufficient basis, in itself, for categorising as a manifest error the decision of the Board of Appeal not to suspend it, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 23 and 24 above.

27 Moreover, the applicant has not presented any evidence to establish that the Board of Appeal committed a manifest error of assessment. It merely claimed that the Board of Appeal had failed to take into account the arguments put forward in its request for suspension, without setting out the substance of those arguments.

28 As EUIPO submits, in essence, an applicant cannot validly refer the Court to all the arguments which it put forward in the proceedings before EUIPO. It is not for the Court to take on the role of the parties by seeking to identify the relevant material in the documents to which they refer (see judgment of 22 March 2023, adp Merkur v EUIPO – psmtec (SEVEN 7) , T‑408/22, not published, EU:T:2023:157, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

29 In those circumstances, and in view of the broad discretion which the Board of Appeal enjoys as to whether or not to suspend proceedings, the applicant, which has not substantiated its plea to the requisite legal standard, cannot justifiably claim that the Board of Appeal committed a manifest error of assessment. Consequently, it is also necessary to reject the applicant’s argument, which, moreover, is not substantiated, that EUIPO acted in breach of the principles of equality before the law and impartiality by rejecting the request for suspension.

30 The first plea must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

The second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001

31 The applicant disputes the existence of a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public on the ground, in essence, that the Board of Appeal committed errors in the assessment of the level of attention of the relevant public, the degree of similarity between the goods, the degree of similarity between the signs at issue and, in particular, the distinctive elements of those signs.

32 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

33 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.

34 The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS) , T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).

35 For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel) , T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

36 Where the protection of the earlier trade mark extends to the entirety of the European Union, it is necessary to take into account the perception of the marks at issue by the consumer of the goods or services in question in that territory. However, it must be borne in mind that, for an EU trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others) , T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).

37 In the light of all of the foregoing, it is necessary to examine whether, as the applicant submits, the Board of Appeal erred in taking the view that there was a likelihood of confusion in accordance with Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

The relevant public

38 The applicant submits that the general public’s level of attention is high with regard to ‘cryptocurrency hardware wallets’ and ‘downloadable cryptographic keys for receiving and spending cryptocurrency’ in Class 9, and not average to high, contrary to the view taken by the Board of Appeal. That is because they are technologically complex goods which are not cheap or for everyday consumption. In its view, the relevant public will analyse carefully the various functions of those goods since they have an impact on the financial safety of cryptocurrency assets.

39 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

40 In the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, account should be taken of the average consumer of the category of goods concerned, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question (see judgment of 13 February 2007, Mundipharma v OHIM – Altana Pharma (RESPICUR) , T‑256/04, EU:T:2007:46, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

41 As a preliminary point, there is no need to call into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment, which, moreover, is not disputed by the applicant, that the relevant territory is the entire European Union, but account must be taken of the perspective of the English-speaking part of the public in the European Union, in particular the Irish and Maltese public, in so far as the word elements consist of English words.

42 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated, first, that some of the goods covered by the sign applied for, namely ‘computer hardware for mining cryptocurrency’, ‘integrated circuit boards; integrated circuit modules; application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) for mining cryptocurrency; downloadable computer software for mining cryptocurrency’, were targeted at both large-scale industrial mining operations and private cryptocurrency miners using small-scale mining rigs, all of whom possessed an in-depth knowledge of cryptocurrency mining and mined for financial gain. It considered that consumers’ level of attention would vary from heightened to high depending on price, technical sophistication and the potential impact of the goods on the mining operation.

43 The Board of Appeal held, second, that the remainder of the goods covered by the mark applied for, namely ‘cryptocurrency hardware wallets; downloadable computer software for blockchain technology; downloadable cryptographic keys for receiving and spending cryptocurrency’, concerned the safe controlling of cryptocurrency funds. They are targeted at professional and private cryptocurrency owners and, in general, are not expensive. The Board of Appeal concluded that, in respect of those goods, the level of attention of the professional public would vary from higher than average to high and that of the general public from average to high, depending on their technical sophistication.

44 It should be noted, first of all, that the applicant does not dispute in its written pleadings the Board of Appeal’s assessment as to the average to high level of attention of the general public as regards ‘downloadable computer software for blockchain technology’. Moreover, there is nothing in the file capable of calling it into question.

45 Next, it must be pointed out that, although ‘cryptocurrency hardware wallets’ and ‘downloadable cryptographic keys for receiving and spending cryptocurrency’, as observed by the Board of Appeal, are not particularly expensive goods, they are nevertheless goods the purchase of which is normally preceded by some reflection. Those goods are intended to ensure the safe controlling of cryptocurrencies, the amounts of which may be significant even in respect of the general public consisting of private cryptocurrency owners.

46 Therefore, it must be held that, contrary to what the Board of Appeal found, the general public will pay a high level of attention when buying ‘cryptocurrency hardware wallets’ and ‘downloadable cryptographic keys for receiving and spending cryptocurrency’, and not average to high.

47 Accordingly, in respect of all the goods in Class 9 covered by the mark applied for, the relevant public will display a high level of attention, as the applicant claims, with the exception of ‘downloadable computer software for blockchain technology’ (see paragraph 44 above). As regards that software, it is necessary to take into account, first, the average to high level of attention of the general public and, second, the high level of attention of the professional public.

The comparison of the goods

48 The applicant claims that there is at most an average degree of similarity between the computer hardware and software for cryptocurrency covered by the mark applied for and the computer goods and software covered by the earlier mark ANTCHAIN. It submits, in essence, that the goods at issue have different intended purposes and distribution channels, require different expertise to use and are also aimed at different customers. It explains in particular that the computer goods covered by the mark applied for are used in the field of cryptocurrency, whereas the goods covered by the earlier mark ANTCHAIN are used in the field of blockchain.

49 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

50 According to case-law, in assessing the similarity of the goods at issue, all the relevant factors relating to those goods should be taken into account. Those factors include, inter alia, their nature, their intended purpose and their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account such as the distribution channels of the goods concerned (judgment of 11 July 2007, El Corte Inglés v OHIM – Bolaños Sabri (PiraÑAM diseño original Juan Bolaños) , T‑443/05, EU:T:2007:219, paragraph 37).

51 Where the goods or services covered by an earlier mark include the goods covered by the mark applied for, those goods or services are considered to be identical. The same is true where the goods or services covered by the earlier mark are included in a more general category covered by the mark applied for (see judgment of 14 May 2025, Biogena v EUIPO – ACRAF (BIOGENA MOMENTS) , T‑418/24, not published, EU:T:2025:491, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

52 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the goods covered by the mark applied for were identical to the goods covered by the earlier mark ANTCHAIN.

53 First, the Board of Appeal held that ‘computer hardware for mining cryptocurrency’, ‘cryptocurrency hardware wallets’, ‘application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) for mining cryptocurrency’, ‘integrated circuit boards’ and ‘integrated circuit modules’, covered by the mark applied for, were included in the broad category of ‘computer hardware’ covered by the earlier mark ANTCHAIN, or overlapped with it, and that those goods were therefore identical.

54 Second, the Board of Appeal held that ‘downloadable computer software for mining cryptocurrency’, ‘downloadable computer software for blockchain technology’ and ‘downloadable cryptographic keys for receiving and spending cryptocurrency’, covered by the mark applied for, were included in the broad categories of ‘software’ and ‘firmware’ covered by the earlier mark ANTCHAIN, or at least overlapped with them, and that the goods were therefore identical.

55 To begin with, it should be noted, as the Board of Appeal has done, that some of the goods covered by the mark applied for are included in the broad category of ‘computer hardware’ covered by the earlier mark ANTCHAIN, whereas the others are included in the broad category of ‘software’ and ‘firmware’ also covered by that mark.

56 First, ‘computer hardware for mining cryptocurrency’, ‘cryptocurrency hardware wallets’ and ‘application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) for mining cryptocurrency’ are types of computer hardware used in particular in the field of cryptocurrency. ‘Integrated circuit boards’ and ‘integrated circuit modules’ are also types of computer hardware.

57 Second, ‘downloadable computer software for mining cryptocurrency’, ‘downloadable computer software for blockchain technology’ and ‘downloadable cryptographic keys for receiving and spending cryptocurrency’ are subcategories of software designed for cryptocurrency owners, some of them precisely for cryptocurrency mining.

58 In that regard, the applicant acknowledged in paragraph 34 of the application that those goods could be of the same nature.

59 Since the goods covered by the earlier mark ANTCHAIN include the goods covered by the mark applied for, those goods must be considered to be identical, in accordance with the case-law recalled in paragraph 51 above.

60 Moreover, the applicant has not adduced any evidence to establish that the goods at issue have different intended purposes or distribution channels, or a different public, or require different expertise for their method of use. In that regard, the applicant’s line of argument, recalled in paragraph 48 above, is contradictory as it is a well-known fact that cryptocurrencies generally rely on blockchain technology.

The comparison of the signs

61 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

– The distinctive elements of the signs

62 First, the applicant disputes the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the element ‘ant’ has an average degree of distinctiveness. It claims that it is a common English word with a clear meaning, frequently used in technical fields, for example to describe small, networked or division-of-labour systems.

63 Second, the applicant claims that the word elements ‘miner’ and ‘chain’ have an average degree of distinctiveness. It acknowledges that the relevant public will associate the words ‘miner’ and ‘chain’ with some of the goods in Class 9. However, in its view, that association is not direct enough, so that those terms are not descriptive of the goods at issue. It argues, inter alia, that the word element ‘miner’ only suggests the function and intended purpose of the crypto-related goods in Class 9. The applicant submits, in particular, that some of the goods in that class have no direct connection to cryptocurrency mining, in particular ‘integrated circuit boards’ and ‘integrated circuit modules’. Moreover, while ‘cryptocurrency hardware wallets’ can store previously mined cryptocurrencies, the wallet itself only has an indirect connection to the word ‘miner’. It also submits that the word ‘chain’ will not be directly and immediately understood by the relevant public as being descriptive of the goods in Class 9 that are related to blockchain technology.

64 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

65 In order to determine the distinctive character of an element of a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods or services for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, it is necessary to take into account, in particular, the inherent characteristics of that element and to ask whether it is at all descriptive of the goods or services for which the mark has been registered (see judgment of 3 September 2010, Companhia Muller de Bebidas v OHIM – Missiato Industria e Comercio (61 A NOSSA ALEGRIA) , T‑472/08, EU:T:2010:347, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

66 According to case-law, a word possessing a clear meaning is deemed descriptive only if there is a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between the word and the goods and services in question to enable the public concerned immediately to perceive, without further thought, a description of the goods and services in question or of one of their characteristics (see judgment of 10 September 2025, KHG v EUIPO – Panther Deutschland (Baltic Breeze) , T‑299/24, not published, EU:T:2025:853, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

67 The absence of a direct link between the word element at issue and the goods covered by the marks at issue confers on that element an average distinctive character (see judgment of 14 May 2025, BIOGENA MOMENTS , T‑418/24, not published, EU:T:2025:491, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

68 As a preliminary point, there is no need to call into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment, which, moreover, is not disputed by the applicant, that the English-speaking part of the relevant public will easily identify the word elements ‘ant’, ‘miner’ and ‘chain’ in the signs at issue.

69 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal also held that the common word element ‘ant’ will be perceived in each of the signs at issue as referring to a type of insect and that it therefore has no specific meaning in respect of the goods at issue. It concluded that that word element had a normal degree of distinctiveness.

70 Furthermore, the Board of Appeal found that the term ‘miner’ was associated with crypto mining and therefore attributed to it a weak distinctive character in respect of all the goods covered by the mark applied for.

71 The Board of Appeal then stated that the term ‘chain’ in the earlier mark ANTCHAIN was descriptive of ‘computer software; computer and telecommunications networking hardware; computer hardware and firmware; data storage programs’. In the field of information technology, it noted that the relevant public, namely IT professionals and the general public with an average level of technical awareness, would understand the word element ‘chain’ as referring to a blockchain. It stated that it is known to the relevant public that cryptocurrency is created and stored electronically using blockchain technology. It therefore held that the word element ‘chain’ merely described a characteristic or intended purpose of the goods concerned and was therefore devoid of distinctive character.

72 In the first place, the applicant disputes the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the word ‘ant’, which is common to the signs at issue, has an average degree of distinctiveness.

73 It should be noted in that regard that the Board of Appeal was correct to find, on the basis of the Collins English Dictionary , that that term referred to a type of insect.

74 It is true that the word ‘ant’ has other connotations, linked, for example, to organisation, division of labour, networking or smallness, as the applicant submits. However, it should be noted that the relevant public will tend more to perceive that term first in its literal meaning, that is to say, as referring to a type of insect, rather than in terms of its more abstract connotations. In that regard, and without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the reference to the website of the Cambridge Dictionary , disputed by the intervener, the applicant itself observes that the first definition of the word ‘ant’ listed in that dictionary refers to ‘a type of small insect, related to bees, wasps etc., thought of as hard-working’.

75 In those circumstances, and in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 67 above, since the common word element ‘ant’ has no direct link to the goods covered by the marks at issue, it must be held that it has an average degree of distinctiveness.

76 In the second place, the applicant claims that the word ‘miner’ has an average degree of distinctiveness in respect of the goods at issue.

77 Among the goods covered by the mark applied for, it is clear that ‘computer hardware for mining cryptocurrency’, ‘application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) for mining cryptocurrency; cryptocurrency hardware wallets; downloadable computer software for mining cryptocurrency; downloadable computer software for blockchain technology; [and] downloadable cryptographic keys for receiving and spending cryptocurrency’ are used in the field of cryptocurrency, and some of them even, more specifically, in the context of crypto mining.

78 It is a well-known fact for the entire relevant public that cryptocurrencies are mined, as the Board of Appeal rightly held. In that context, the word element ‘miner’ thus refers directly to miners of cryptocurrencies, users of the blockchain networks whose role consists, inter alia, in validating transactions and ensuring the integrity and security of the network by using their computing powers. More generally, the term ‘miner’ also evokes cryptocurrency mining operations.

79 It follows that the word element ‘miner’ has a sufficiently direct and specific relationship with the goods cited to enable the public concerned immediately to perceive, without further thought, one of the characteristics of cryptocurrency and therefore alludes to the intended purpose of the goods in question. Accordingly, contrary to what the applicant claims, the term ‘miner’ must be regarded as descriptive of the goods concerned, within the meaning of the case-law recalled in paragraph 66 above.

80 Thus, the Board of Appeal rightly concluded that the word element ‘miner’ had weak distinctive character in relation to those goods. In addition, it must be held that that element is devoid of distinctive character in respect of certain goods used precisely in crypto mining.

81 As regards the other goods covered by the mark applied for, namely ‘integrated circuit boards’ and ‘integrated circuit modules’, it should be noted that they may be used in crypto mining without this being their exclusive method of use. Nevertheless, since mining is a term used in computing, in addition to crypto mining, it must be held that the term ‘miner’ has a direct connection to the goods cited and therefore has weak distinctive character in respect of those goods.

82 In the third place, as regards the word element ‘chain’ in the earlier mark ANTCHAIN, as is apparent from the contested decision, that word may be understood by the relevant public as referring to a blockchain. As the Board of Appeal noted, both the public consisting of IT professionals and the general public with an average level of technical knowledge in computing know well that cryptocurrency is created and stored electronically by means of blockchain technology. Thus, the Board of Appeal did not commit an error in finding that the term ‘chain’ was descriptive of the goods concerned, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 66 above, and was therefore devoid of distinctive character.

83 In conclusion, it must be held that the common word element ‘ant’ in the signs at issue has an average degree of distinctiveness, whereas the word element ‘chain’ constituting the earlier mark ANTCHAIN is devoid of distinctive character. As regards the word element ‘miner’, which makes up the mark applied for, it is weakly distinctive in respect of some of the goods concerned and devoid of distinctive character in respect of those directly connected to crypto mining.

– The visual and phonetic comparison

84 The applicant claims that visually the two signs differ significantly in five out of the eight letters of which they are composed. It therefore asserts that the overall impression of those two words is very different and the tendency of the relevant public to attach greater importance to similarities at the beginning of words cannot lead to a different conclusion.

85 The applicant also disputes the Board of Appeal’s assessment that there is an average degree of phonetic similarity, and claims that the overall pronunciation of the two marks is dissimilar.

86 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

87 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue coincided in the first word element ‘ant’, composed of three readily identifiable letters. The Board of Appeal also found that the signs differed in the second, five-letter word, namely ‘chain’ in the earlier mark ANTCHAIN and ‘miner’ in the mark applied for. The Board of Appeal held that, since the element ‘ant’ was the most distinctive in the two signs and was placed at the beginning of the two marks, the signs were visually and phonetically similar to an average degree, despite the differences between ‘chain’ and ‘miner’, which were longer than the shared element ‘ant’.

88 In the present case, it should be noted that both visually and phonetically the signs at issue share the word element ‘ant’, placed at the beginning. By contrast, they differ in the presence of the word element ‘miner’ in the mark applied for and the word element ‘chain’ in the earlier mark ANTCHAIN, which are the longest elements of those signs, as the applicant correctly stated.

89 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the common first part of the signs at issue is more likely to hold the relevant public’s attention. For the reasons set out in paragraphs 75 to 82 above, the word element ‘ant’ is the most distinctive word element of the signs at issue, whereas the word element ‘miner’, which makes up the mark applied for, and the word element ‘chain’, which constitutes the earlier mark ANTCHAIN, are weakly distinctive, or even devoid of distinctive character in respect of some of the goods concerned.

90 According to case-law, the greater or lesser degree of distinctiveness of the elements common to the mark applied for and an earlier mark is one of the relevant factors in assessing the similarity of those signs (see judgment of 26 March 2015, Royal County of Berkshire Polo Club v OHIM – Lifestyle Equities (Royal County of Berkshire POLO CLUB) , T‑581/13, not published, EU:T:2015:192, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

91 Consequently, first, contrary to the applicant’s assertions, the difference created by the presence of the word elements ‘miner’ and ‘chain’, which are weakly distinctive or even devoid of distinctive character in respect of some of the goods concerned, is not sufficiently significant to remove the visual similarity produced by the coincidence in the weakly distinctive element ‘ant’, placed at the beginning.

92 It is only when the differences between those signs can lead to different overall impressions that the similarity between them is appreciably reduced (see judgment of 11 June 2025, Nio v EUIPO – Audi (ES6) , T‑598/23, not published, EU:T:2025:588, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited).

93 In the light of the foregoing and of the fact that the average consumer only rarely has the chance to make a direct comparison between the different marks but must place his or her trust in the imperfect picture of them that he or she has kept in his or her mind (judgment of 22 June 1999, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer , C‑342/97, EU:C:1999:323, paragraph 26), it must be held that, taken as a whole, the mark applied for gives a visual impression that is similar to an average degree to that given by the earlier mark.

94 Second, as regards the phonetic comparison, it is appropriate to note the case-law according to which, in essence, where a word element is descriptive and plays only a secondary role in the mark applied for, it may be presumed that the relevant public will not even pronounce it (see judgment of 10 March 2021, Hauz 1929 v EUIPO – Houzz (HAUZ LONDON) , T‑66/20, not published, EU:T:2021:125, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

95 In the present case, it is likely that the word elements ‘miner’ in the mark applied for and ‘chain’ in the earlier mark ANTCHAIN will not be pronounced by the relevant public when it refers to those marks. That public will focus on the element ‘ant’, which is the distinctive element of those marks, placed at the beginning of those marks.

96 In those circumstances, it must be noted that the signs at issue have an average degree of phonetic similarity for the part of the public which will not pronounce them in their entirety.

97 Nevertheless, for the part of the relevant public liable to pronounce the marks at issue in full and not only the initial part ‘ant’, they have a low degree of phonetic similarity.

98 In the light of the foregoing, it should be noted that the signs at issue are visually and phonetically similar to an average degree and phonetically similar to a low degree for the part of the public liable to pronounce them in their entirety.

– The conceptual comparison

99 The applicant claims that the signs are conceptually dissimilar or at least only similar to a below-average degree. It states, first, that the term ‘chain’ likely evokes associations with ‘blockchain’, a recognised term in digital and financial technology sectors, connected to networks and systems used for secure transactions or data storage. The applicant states, second, that the element ‘miner’ is associated with cryptocurrency mining. However, in its view, the evocation of associations does not amount to an immediate and direct meaning descriptive of goods. It adds that the two marks evoke different conceptual ideas and concludes that any visual and phonetic similarities would, in any event, be neutralised by the conceptual differences.

100 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

101 According to settled case-law, in order to be conceptually similar, the signs at issue must coincide as to their semantic content (see judgment of 28 January 2026, Montepelayo v EUIPO – TRON (TELOTRÓN) , T‑203/25, not published, EU:T:2026:50, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).

102 Furthermore, whereas it is true that the assessment of the similarity of signs must be based on the overall impression they produce and that the average consumer normally perceives a trade mark as a whole and does not proceed to examine its various details, it remains the case that the consumer, faced with a word sign, may break it down into elements having a concrete meaning or resembling familiar words, even if only one element is familiar to him or her (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 January 2026, TELOTRÓN , T‑203/25, not published, EU:T:2026:50, paragraph 67).

103 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal held that the signs were conceptually similar to an average degree. It found, first of all, that the impact of the notions of ‘miner’ and ‘chain’ was limited, even though those signs evoke different concepts, in so far as their concepts are not distinctive with respect to the goods at issue. It then found that the signs shared the concept ‘ant’, which has a normal degree of distinctiveness. In the view of the Board of Appeal, the weakly distinctive conceptual differences are not such as to neutralise the similarities between the signs.

104 First, it is clear that the marks at issue coincide in their semantic content at the level of the common initial part, which conveys the concept of the word ‘ant’. Thus, the marks are conceptually similar in that regard.

105 Second, as regards the second part of those marks, the word elements ‘miner’ in the mark applied for and ‘chain’ in the earlier mark ANTCHAIN refer to the IT concepts of ‘mining’ and ‘blockchain’ respectively. Those word elements therefore both refer to IT concepts used in particular in blockchain-based crypto mining and known to the professional public and the general public with minimal technical IT knowledge. It follows that the second part of the signs at issue, composed of the word elements ‘miner’ and ‘chain’, is conceptually similar to an average degree.

106 Taking account of the fact, first, that the semantic identity between the marks at issue concerns the most distinctive word element, which is placed at the beginning of the signs at issue (‘ant’), and, second, that the word elements ‘miner’ and ‘chain’ are two IT concepts commonly used in the field of crypto currency mining, it must be concluded that the Board of Appeal was correct to find that the signs at issue were conceptually similar to an average degree.

The distinctive character of the earlier mark

107 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal held that the inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark ANTCHAIN, taken as a whole, was normal.

108 There is no need to call into question that assessment, which, moreover, is not disputed by the applicant.

The likelihood of confusion

109 In the first place, the applicant claims that, in the absence of similarity between the signs, there is no likelihood of confusion. The applicant relies on the judgment of 26 June 2008, SHS Polar Sistemas Informáticos v OHIM – Polaris Software Lab (POLARIS) (T‑79/07, not published, EU:T:2008:230, paragraphs 48 and 51), in which it claims that the Court found that very attentive consumers may perceive the differences between signs to be more significant than the similarities. It argues that the present case concerns highly specialised technical products that are either expensive or carry a high financial risk. The relevant public will therefore be very attentive to the differences between the marks at issue. In the second place, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal is attempting to grant the intervener a monopoly over the word element ‘ant’, which is liable to hinder competition. It adds that the requirements for the existence of a family of marks containing the word ‘ant’ are not met in the present case. In the third place, the applicant states that the intervener filed the opposition on the basis of eight earlier marks, but does not use any of them in the European Union, nor does it have any intention of using them. In the view of the applicant, the intervener thus secures a blocking position from which the intervener can maliciously take action against it.

110 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

111 The existence of a likelihood of confusion depends on numerous elements, in particular the recognition of the trade mark on the market, the association which can be made with the used or registered sign, and the degree of similarity between the trade mark and the sign and between the goods or services identified. The likelihood of confusion must therefore be assessed globally, taking into account all the relevant factors of the particular case (see judgment of 12 June 2019, Hansson , C‑705/17, EU:C:2019:481, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

112 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon , C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, VENADO with frame and others , T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

113 It is also apparent from the case-law that the average consumer only rarely has the chance to make a direct comparison between the different signs, but must place his or her trust in the imperfect picture of them that he or she has kept in his or her mind. It has been confirmed that that also applies to a public with a high level of attention (see judgment of 11 February 2026, Nutris We care about you v EUIPO – Medis (ProbioDefend) , T‑209/25, not published, EU:T:2026:114, paragraph 88 and the case-law cited).

114 The relevant factors of the particular case also include the distinctiveness of the earlier trade mark, which determines the extent of protection. The Court of Justice has previously stated that the more distinctive the earlier trade mark, the greater the likelihood of confusion will be (see judgment of 12 June 2019, Hansson , C‑705/17, EU:C:2019:481, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

115 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal held that the goods were identical, that the level of attention of the relevant public would vary from average to high in respect of some goods and heightened to high in respect of others, and that the signs were visually, phonetically and conceptually similar to an average degree. It then noted that the similarities between the signs stemmed from the word element ‘ant’, which is the most distinctive in the two signs. It also found that the relevant public would focus on and recall that element, placed at the beginning of both signs. In the view of the applicant, the difference between the signs therefore had a limited impact on the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion since it concerned the less distinctive elements. In particular, the conceptual differences were not such as to neutralise the similarities between the signs. Therefore, the Board of Appeal concluded that a likelihood of confusion could not be excluded from the perspective of the English-speaking part of the relevant public, even though the relevant public is very attentive. In the view of the applicant, it cannot be ruled out that the mark applied for might be perceived by the relevant public as a variant of the earlier mark ANTCHAIN, configured slightly differently in order to highlight particular characteristics and a particular intended purpose of the goods.

116 It has been found that the Board of Appeal was right to conclude, first, that the goods covered by the mark applied for are identical to the goods covered by the earlier mark ANTCHAIN and, second, that there is an average degree of visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity between the signs at issue.

117 The Court has also held that the earlier mark ANTCHAIN has a normal inherent distinctiveness.

118 In addition, the Court has held that the level of attention of the relevant public was high in respect of all the goods covered by the mark applied for, with the exception of ‘downloadable computer software for blockchain technology’ (see paragraph 44 above). In respect of that software, it was found that the level of attention of the general public was average to high and that of the professional public was high.

119 Furthermore, although the word elements ‘miner’ in the mark applied for and ‘chain’ in the earlier mark ANTCHAIN must be taken into account in the assessment of the similarity of the signs at issue, it must be held that they do not play a decisive role in the appearance of those marks on account of their weak distinctive character, or even their lack of distinctive character in respect of the goods concerned (see paragraphs 80 to 83 above).

120 First, in view of the fact that the goods are identical, the marks at issue are visually, phonetically and conceptually similar to an average degree, the word element ‘ant’ common to the signs at issue is the most distinctive and, moreover, placed at the beginning, and the distinctive character of the earlier mark ANTCHAIN is normal, a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 cannot be ruled out. That conclusion also applies to the part of the public liable to pronounce the signs at issue in full, for whom those signs have only a low degree of phonetic similarity (see paragraph 97 above).

121 As regards the applicant’s argument concerning the level of attention of the relevant public, namely that consumers would be ‘very attentive’ to the differences between the signs, it is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 113 above that the average consumer only rarely has the chance to make a direct comparison between the various signs and must therefore must place his or her trust in the imperfect picture of them that he or she has kept in his or her mind, even where the public displays a high level of attention.

122 In the present case, although the relevant public displays a high level of attention in respect of most of the goods concerned, it must be pointed out that the word element ‘ant’ is likely to be most memorable on account of its position at the beginning of the signs and its average distinctive character.

123 Second, there is nothing in the case file which makes it possible to call into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the relevant public may perceive the mark applied for as a variant of the earlier mark ANTCHAIN, on account, in particular, of the presence of the word element ‘ant’, which is common to the marks at issue.

124 On the contrary, in so far as consumers keep an imperfect picture of trade marks in their mind, it is likely that, in the light of the presence of that most distinctive element, the relevant public may be led to believe that the mark applied for is a variant of the earlier mark ANTCHAIN and that the goods covered by the mark applied for come from the intervener’s undertaking or from an undertaking with which it is economically linked.

125 In that regard, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s argument that the requirements for the existence of a family of marks were not met in the present case since it is not apparent from the contested decision that the Board of Appeal assessed whether such a family exists. The Board of Appeal merely considered it conceivable that the mark applied for might be perceived as a variant of the earlier mark ANTCHAIN.

126 Third, the applicant’s line of argument based, in essence, on bad faith on the part of the intervener, in that the intervener allegedly does not use the marks which are the subject of the opposition, and in particular the earlier mark ANTCHAIN, must be rejected as ineffective. Any bad faith on the part of the proprietor of the earlier mark is not a factor that must be taken into account in opposition proceedings brought under Article 8 of Regulation 2017/1001 (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 April 2024, Coinbase v EUIPO – Coinbase Global (coinbase) , T‑126/22, not published, EU:T:2024:252, paragraph 78).

127 Accordingly, the second plea must be rejected as unfounded.

128 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, since neither of the pleas relied on by the applicant in support of the form of order sought can be upheld, the action must be dismissed.

Costs

129 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

130 Since a hearing took place on 22 April 2026 and the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the forms of order sought by EUIPO and the intervener.

131 Lastly, as regards the intervener’s request that the applicant be ordered to pay the costs relating to the proceedings before EUIPO, it is sufficient to note that the present judgment dismisses the action brought against the contested decision and that, therefore, it is the operative part of that decision which continues to govern the costs in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 September 2025, Manufaktur Jörg Geiger v EUIPO – Consorzio di Tutela della Denominazione di Origine Controllata ‘Prosecco’ (PriSecco) , T‑406/24, not published, EU:T:2025:893, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber),

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Bitmain Technologies Inc. to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 23 September 2026.

* Language of the case: English.