Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) 4 November 2026
JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)
4 November 2026 ( * )
( EU trade mark – Opposition procedure – Application for EU word mark BMV – Earlier EU word mark BMW – Relative ground for refusal – Detriment to reputation – Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Similarity of signs – Proximity or connection between the goods – Risk of unfair advantage being taken of the reputation of the earlier mark – Due cause for the use of the mark applied for )
In Case T‑468/25,
Victron Energy BV, established in Almere (Netherlands), represented by Q. Meijnen, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by D. Gája, acting as Agent,
defendant,
the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, established in Munich (Germany), represented by C. Onken, lawyer,
THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber),
composed of N. Półtorak, President, G. Hesse (Rapporteur) and G. Steinfatt, Judges,
Registrar: G. Mitrev, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
further to the hearing on 7 May 2026,
gives the following
Judgment
1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Victron Energy BV, seeks the annulment and alteration of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 19 May 2025 (Case R 1831/2024‑5) (‘the contested decision’).
Background to the dispute
2 On 31 March 2020, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the word sign BMV.
3 Following the restriction made in the course of the proceedings before EUIPO, the mark applied for covered goods, inter alia, in Class 9 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding to the following description: ‘Battery monitors’.
4 On 16 July 2020, the intervener, Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.
5 The opposition was based, inter alia, on the earlier EU word mark BMW, which covers, in particular, goods in Classes 9 and 12 corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:
– Class 9: ‘Scientific, nautical, surveying, photographic, cinematographic, optical, weighing, measuring, signaling, checking (supervision), life-saving and teaching apparatus and instruments; electric apparatus and instruments (included in Class 9); electric cigar and cigarette lighters for automobiles; electrically heated clothing; clothing for protection against fire and accidents, including shoes, boots, protective helmets, goggles, sunglasses; apparatus for recording, transmission or reproduction of sound or images; magnetic data carriers, recording discs; automatic vending machines and mechanisms for coin-operated apparatus; cash registers, calculating machines and data-processing equipment; data processing programs and computer software (included in Class 9), storage mediums of every kind provided with programs; fire-extinguishing apparatus, warning signs, hazard lights; intercom systems being motorcycle accessories; data processing programs and computer software in the form of leaflets’;
– Class 12: ‘Vehicles and parts therefor; motors for land vehicles; machine couplings and transmission components for land vehicles; automobile accessories, namely towing ropes and bars, trailer couplings, anti-burglar and anti-theft security devices, bicycle holders and bicycle lifts, roof racks, anti-skid chains, straps and clamps, head rests, air pumps, mudguards, safety belts and air bags, safety seats for children, ski carriers, sun screens and blinds, surfboard holders, tanks, wind deflectors, decorative trimming and stripes, luggage trunks; motorcycle accessories, namely anti-theft devices, repair outfits for inner tubes, luggage containers, luggage racks, air pumps, pack bags, roll bars, tank rucksacks and bags, cladding; apparatus for locomotion by land, air or water.’
6 The grounds relied on in support of the opposition were those provided in Article 8(1)(b) and Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).
7 Following a request made by the applicant, EUIPO invited the intervener to furnish proof of genuine use of the earlier mark which had been relied on in support of the opposition. The intervener complied with that request within the time limit set.
8 On 24 July 2024, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition on the basis of Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001.
9 On 17 September 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.
10 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that the conditions laid down in Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001 were not satisfied.
Forms of order sought
11 The applicant claims that the Court should:
– annul the contested decision;
– order that the opposition be rejected in its entirety;
– order EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs.
12 EUIPO contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action in its entirety;
– order the applicant to pay the costs incurred by EUIPO, in the event that a hearing is convened.
13 The intervener claims that the Court should:
– dismiss the application;
– order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
14 The applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001. That plea is divided, in essence, into six parts, alleging errors of law and fact on the part of the Board of Appeal in its assessment of, first, the public targeted by the goods covered by the mark applied for, second, the reputation of the earlier mark, third, the similarity between the signs at issue, fourth, the connection between the marks at issue, including the proximity or connection between the goods covered by those marks, fifth, the unfair advantage taken of the reputation of the earlier mark and, sixth, the lack of due cause.
15 Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of a registered earlier trade mark within the meaning of paragraph 2, the trade mark applied for is not to be registered where it is identical with, or similar to, an earlier trade mark, irrespective of whether the goods or services for which it is applied are identical with, similar to or not similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is registered, where, in the case of an earlier EU trade mark, the trade mark has a reputation in the European Union or, in the case of an earlier national trade mark, the trade mark has a reputation in the Member State concerned, and where the use without due cause of the trade mark applied for would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark.
16 For an earlier trade mark to be afforded the broader protection under Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001, a number of conditions must, therefore, be satisfied. First, the earlier trade mark which is claimed to have a reputation must be registered. Second, that mark and the mark applied for must be identical or similar. Third, the earlier trade mark must have a reputation in the European Union, in the case of an earlier EU trade mark, or in the Member State concerned, in the case of an earlier national trade mark. Fourth, the use without due cause of the mark applied for must lead to the risk that unfair advantage might be taken of the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark or that it might be detrimental to the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark. As those conditions are cumulative, failure to satisfy one of them is sufficient to render that provision inapplicable (judgment of 22 March 2007, Sigla v OHIM – Elleni Holding (VIPS) , T‑215/03, EU:T:2007:93, paragraphs 34 and 35; see judgment of 31 May 2017, Alma-The Soul of Italian Wine v EUIPO – Miguel Torres (SOTTO IL SOLE ITALIANO SOTTO il SOLE) , T‑637/15, EU:T:2017:371, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
17 More specifically, the fourth of the conditions for the application of Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001 refers to three distinct and alternative types of risk, namely the fact that use of the trade mark applied for without due cause would (i) be detrimental to the distinctive character of the earlier mark, (ii) be detrimental to the repute of the earlier mark, or (iii) take unfair advantage of the distinctive character or repute of the earlier mark. The first type of risk referred to in that provision arises where the earlier mark is no longer capable of arousing immediate association with the goods for which it is registered and used. That risk thus refers to the dilution of the earlier mark through the dispersion of its identity and its hold upon the public mind. The second type of risk occurs where the goods or services covered by the mark applied for may be perceived by the public in such a way that the earlier mark’s power of attraction is diminished. The third type of risk concerns the risk that the image of the mark with a reputation or the characteristics which it projects are transferred to the goods covered by the mark applied for, with the result that the marketing of those goods is made easier by that association with the earlier mark with a reputation. It should, however, be emphasised that in none of those cases is it necessary that there be a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue; the relevant public only has to be able to establish a link between them and does not necessarily have to confuse them (see judgment of 22 March 2007, VIPS , T‑215/03, EU:T:2007:93, paragraphs 36 to 42 and the case-law cited).
18 As is apparent from paragraph 14 above, with the exception of the first condition relating to the registration of the earlier mark, which took place on 25 February 2000, the applicant disputes the findings of the Board of Appeal concerning each of the cumulative conditions of Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001.
The public targeted by the goods covered by the mark applied for
19 In paragraphs 73 and 74 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the goods covered by the mark applied for, namely battery monitors falling within Class 9, targeted both the general public and professionals, whose level of attention was high. According to the Board of Appeal, the applicant did not show that those goods targeted only a specialised technically skilled public, since the owner of a boat or a recreational vehicle might look at a specialised website or ask for advice from an expert on the purchase of a battery monitor.
20 Although the applicant does not dispute the level of attention applied by the Board of Appeal, it submits, however, that the Board of Appeal’s finding that battery monitors are also aimed at the general public is flawed and insufficiently reasoned.
21 In that regard, the applicant argues that battery monitors are specialised diagnostic instruments aimed at a public with specialised power management needs and with technical skills which enable it to evaluate those goods. It emphasises, in particular, that the goods covered by the mark applied for differ from a voltmeter, since those goods make it possible to measure current flow and voltage, and to accurately track the charge rate, battery health and the remaining capacity of the battery, whereas voltmeters simply measure the instantaneous voltage across a battery’s terminals. As for the use of specialised websites or expert advice, that is not in keeping with the behaviour of the general consumer.
22 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s line of argument.
23 That line of argument cannot succeed.
24 Registration of the mark applied for was sought in respect of ‘battery monitors’ in Class 9.
25 According to the case-law, in order to interpret the terms used in the list of goods and services for which a mark is registered, it is necessary to examine the scope of each of those terms taken individually, taking into account their customary and ordinary meaning. Furthermore, the use of general terms, including the general indications of the class headings of the Nice Classification, are to be interpreted as including all the goods or services clearly covered by the literal meaning of the indication or term (judgment of 4 September 2024, Tertianum v EUIPO – DPF (TERTIANUM) , T‑73/23, not published, EU:T:2024:578, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
26 In the present case, since a ‘monitor’ is, inter alia, a device or programme for monitoring and control, a ‘battery monitor’ must be defined as a device which makes it possible to monitor a battery, that is to say, to measure its state of charge and to ensure that it functions properly. However, a ‘voltmeter’, which is used to measure voltage, also makes it possible to monitor the state of charge of a battery. The fact that a battery monitor equipped with a shunt resistor enables not only the measurement of the state of charge of a battery, but also the calculation of its state of health and its energy consumption, does not detract from the fact that, like a voltmeter, that monitor has the function of monitoring that battery.
27 Nothing in the description of the goods covered by the mark applied for, which was chosen by the applicant itself and does not reproduce the wording of Class 9 covering, inter alia, ‘apparatus and instruments for conducting, switching, transforming, accumulating, regulating or controlling’ electricity, indicates that the protection is sought only in respect of instruments that make it possible to carry out measurements other than simply measuring voltage across the battery’s terminals. In that regard, as EUIPO submits, the applicant could have specified, in its application for registration, the precise function of the devices covered by that application.
28 It follows that the goods covered by the mark applied for include simple voltage indicators. However, it is not disputed that voltage indicators do not require specialised skills and that they are aimed at the general public. Therefore, it must be held that the goods covered by the mark applied for are not aimed exclusively at professionals.
29 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that the use of expert advice or technical sources is not in keeping with the behaviour of the general consumer. It must be noted that the applicant merely makes an assertion in that regard without developing that argument or providing any evidence in support. In any event, it does not appear that at least consulting websites, even if they are ‘specialised’, as stated in paragraph 73 of the contested decision, must be regarded as behaviour uncharacteristic of a consumer seeking information.
30 Lastly, in so far as the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal’s finding that the goods covered by the mark applied for also concern the general public is insufficiently reasoned, suffice it to note that the criticisms which it raises in support of its complaint alleging a failure to state reasons are indissociable from its complaints regarding the merits of the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the relevant public. No infringement of the obligation to state reasons can therefore be held to exist in that regard.
31 Consequently, the applicant is wrong to claim that the Board of Appeal’s finding, set out in paragraphs 73 and 74 of the contested decision, that the goods covered by the mark applied for also target the general public, is flawed and insufficiently reasoned.
Reputation of the earlier trade mark
32 The applicant submits that, in paragraphs 40 and 65 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal erred in law and in fact by extending the scope of the reputation of the earlier mark for ‘cars’, which was the subject of the Opposition Division’s assessment, to the ‘car industry’, which is an undefined concept.
33 EUIPO and the intervener dispute that argument put forward by the applicant.
34 Having noted, in paragraphs 37 to 39 of the contested decision, that the Opposition Division concluded that the earlier mark has a considerable degree of reputation in, at least, Germany, and at least for cars, that that conclusion was not disputed by the parties and that there was no obvious reason to reverse it, the Board of Appeal confirmed, in paragraph 40 of that decision, that the earlier mark had been subject to long-standing and intensive use and that it enjoyed a considerable level of reputation in the relevant market (namely the car industry). The Board of Appeal also noted, in paragraph 65 of the contested decision, that the earlier mark enjoyed a considerable reputation, at least in Germany, for cars and that it was generally known in the relevant market (the car industry).
35 In so doing, the Board of Appeal did not assert that the earlier mark enjoyed a considerable reputation for the car industry, which, as EUIPO argues, would not have made any sense, since the car industry is not a product or a service covered by the Nice Classification. It merely stated that the earlier mark enjoyed a considerable reputation in, and not for, that industry, which was the market in which the intervener operated. Moreover, it is clear from paragraph 65 of the contested decision, and from a combined reading of paragraphs 37 to 39 thereof, that the Board of Appeal considered that the earlier mark enjoyed a considerable reputation at least for cars.
36 The applicant is therefore wrong to claim that the Board of Appeal extended the scope of the earlier mark’s reputation to the car industry.
The similarity between the signs at issue
37 In paragraphs 55, 57 and 58 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the marks at issue were visually similar to an above average degree, that the difference between them resulting from the German pronunciation of the letters ‘w’ and ‘v’ was not sufficiently significant to counteract the phonetic similarity resulting from the letters ‘bm’, which were common to both marks, and that, since neither of the marks at issue had any meaning, it was impossible to compare them conceptually. In paragraph 59 of that decision, the Board of Appeal concluded that, taken as a whole, those marks displayed an average degree of similarity.
38 The applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s assessment relating to the visual and phonetic similarity of the signs at issue. However, it disputes the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the conceptual similarity of those marks. It also disputes the Board of Appeal’s finding that, taken as a whole, the marks at issue display an average degree of similarity.
The interpretation of the letter combination ‘bm’ as an abbreviation of the English, German or Dutch expressions ‘battery monitor’, ‘Batteriemonitor’ or ‘batterijmonitor’ and the meaning of the mark applied for.
39 In paragraphs 50 and 112 to 114 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, in essence, that it was unlikely that the letter combination ‘bm’ would be perceived by the relevant public as the abbreviation of the English, German or Dutch expressions ‘battery monitor’, ‘Batteriemonitor’ or ‘batterijmonitor’. The printouts of websites of retailers offering battery monitors, produced by the applicant in Annexes 6, 9 and 10 to the statement of grounds of the appeal, consistently displayed in the product name, alongside the letter combination ‘bm’, an expression explaining that letter combination, that is to say, the English, German or Dutch expressions mentioned above. According to the Board of Appeal, if the descriptive nature of the letter combination ‘bm’ as an abbreviation of the term ‘battery monitor’ had been obvious on the market concerned, the descriptions of the goods in the items in question would not have been accompanied by an explanatory text. Furthermore, the terms that were allegedly linked to the acronym used in the marks at issue were not present in those marks to support the relevant public’s perception. The Board of Appeal also noted that it was unlikely that the relevant public would interpret the earlier mark as meaning ‘battery monitor of W’ and the mark applied for as ‘battery monitor of Victron’, since, inter alia, there was nothing to suggest that the relevant public would separate the first two letters of each mark from their third letter. As stated in paragraph 37 above, the Board of Appeal inferred, in paragraph 58 of the contested decision, that neither of the marks at issue had any meaning for the relevant public, in particular the German public, even if that public perceived the marks at issue as abbreviations, with the result that a conceptual comparison of the marks at issue was not possible.
40 The applicant submits that, in paragraphs 48 to 50 and 58 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal ignored market reality and misapplied the test laid down in the case-law and in the EUIPO Trade Mark and Design Guidelines. According to the applicant, the evidence in Annex 6 to its submissions before the Opposition Division, in Annexes 9 to 11 to the statement of grounds of appeal and in Annexes A.2 to A.4 and A.6 to A.9 to the application establishes that the letter combination ‘bm’ is commonly perceived by the specialist public as an abbreviation of the English expression ‘battery monitor’ and that it is therefore commonly used in the power electronics sector to designate battery monitors. The applicant concludes from this that the relevant public is likely to interpret the mark applied for as meaning ‘battery monitor Victron’ or, at least, ‘battery monitor of V’.
41 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s line of argument.
42 In the first place, the applicant’s argument that the letter combination ‘bm’ will be perceived by the relevant public as the abbreviation of the English expression ‘battery monitor’, on account of the widespread use made of that abbreviation in the economic sector in question, namely power electronics, must be rejected.
43 In that regard, although the EUIPO Trade Mark and Design Guidelines, to which the applicant refers, are not binding legal acts for the purpose of interpreting provisions of EU law (judgment of 23 July 2025, Impossible Foods v EUIPO – Impossible Foods (IMPOSSIBLE BAKERS) , T‑67/24, not published, EU:T:2025:755, paragraph 41), the fact remains that, in order to establish the descriptive character of a letter combination, the Court has previously taken account of the use which was made of the sequence in question in the economic sector concerned as an abbreviation of a term which is itself descriptive (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2017, LG Electronics v EUIPO (QD) , T‑650/16, not published, EU:T:2017:489, paragraphs 19 to 23).
44 First, the applicant submits that Annex 6 to its observations before the Opposition Division, and Annexes 9 to 11 to the statement of grounds of appeal, show that the letter combination ‘bm’ is used by various traders to denote battery monitors.
45 As regards Annex 6 to the applicant’s observations before the Opposition Division, which contains printouts of websites of retailers offering battery monitors from various brands and which show the image, the name and a short presentation of those goods, it must be noted that, although the letter combination ‘bm’ does indeed form part of the name of the product, it is always accompanied by the expressions ‘battery monitor’, ‘Batteriemonitor’ or ‘batterijmonitor’, which appear on the image of the product in question, in its name or in the short text presenting that product. The same applies to Annexes 9 to 11 to the statement of grounds of the appeal, which contain other printouts from websites of retailers offering battery monitors and, in the case of Annex 11, printouts of an online retail website. Consequently, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in paragraphs 50 and 113 of the contested decision when it stated that the examples provided by the applicant in Annexes 6, 9 and 10 all contain an expression explaining the abbreviation ‘bm’ and that none of those examples displayed that group of letters without being accompanied by one of the three expressions mentioned above.
46 Second, the applicant submits that the results of various searches carried out on Google for the English and German expressions ‘battery monitor’/‘batterie monitor’ and for the English expressions ‘top battery monitor’ and ‘best battery monitor’, produced in Annexes A.6 to A.8 to the application, respectively, use the letter combination ‘bm’ to designate battery monitors from different marks, which, according to the applicant, shows that that group of letters generally designates a battery monitor.
47 Without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of Annexes A.6 to A.8 to the application, which is contested by the intervener, it must be noted that those annexes do not demonstrate widespread use of the letter combination ‘bm’ as an abbreviation of the English or German expressions ‘battery monitor’ or ‘Batteriemonitor’.
48 As regards Annex A.6 to the application, although the results of the search carried out on Google for the English and German terms ‘battery monitor’ and ‘batterie monitor’ showed, inter alia, images of battery monitors manufactured by the applicant bearing the alphanumeric references ‘BMV-712’, ‘BMV 700’, ‘BMV-702’, ‘BMV-700H’ and ‘BMV-710H’, it is nevertheless difficult to draw a conclusion as to the use of the letter combination ‘bm’ to refer, generally, to battery monitors. The product names resulting from the search in question are sometimes accompanied, even where they include the letter combination ‘bm’, by the term ‘battery monitor’, for example: ‘Victron Battery Monitor BMV 700’ or ‘Victron Battery Monitor BMV-710H’. Furthermore, the results of that search also include names of battery monitors which not only do not include the letter combination ‘bm’, but include the English or Dutch expressions ‘battery monitor’ or ‘batterijmonitor’, for example: ‘JMP Battery Monitor II’, ‘Batterij monitor BW04’, ‘Compass Batterijen Monitor Smart’ or ‘GYS Battery monitor’. Finally, where the results of the search in question consist of links to websites of manufacturers or retailers, those results frequently include the term ‘battery monitor’ and never the letter combination ‘bm’, for example: ‘the Victron Energy battery monitors monitor the charge status of your battery and ensure a uniform charge status’, ‘the most beautiful and powerful battery monitor for Android!’ or ‘ein Batteriemonitor ist ein unverzichtbares Gerät für jedes Fahrzeug – egal ob Boot, Wohnwagen oder Wohnmobil’ (a battery monitor is an indispensable tool for any vehicle, be it a boat, a caravan, or a camper van).
49 The same is true of Annex A.7 to the application, which shows the result of a search carried out on Google for the expression ‘top battery monitor’. In particular, that annex contains an article entitled ‘Battery Monitors Buying Guide’, which the applicant refers to in order to assert that, of the nine products examined in that article, five – three manufactured by the applicant and two by the company Battery Monitor Pro – contain the letter combination ‘bm’ in their names. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, although five of the nine products mentioned in that article do indeed contain the letters ‘bm’ in their names, the fact remains that the names of two of the five products contain the expression ‘battery monitor’ and the short texts presenting and evaluating each of the five products state that they are ‘battery monitors’. Furthermore, the other four battery monitors examined in the article in question do not include the letter combination ‘bm’ in their names. Finally, in so far as the applicant makes a general reference to Annex A.7 to the application in order to demonstrate that the letter combination ‘bm’ is in ‘standard’ use in the power electronics sector, it must be borne in mind that it is not for the Court to seek out and identify in the annexes the relevant evidence to which the parties’ pleadings refer (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 September 2025, Tamasu Butterfly Europa v EUIPO – Domu Brands (BTFY) , T‑326/24, not published, EU:T:2025:892, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).
50 As regards Annex A.8 to the application, which shows the results of a search carried out on Google for the expression ‘best battery monitor’, the applicant argues that one of the first results of that search, namely a user’s post on the discussion forum Reddit, stating that ‘I like either the Victron Smartshunt or their BMV-712’, demonstrates that the letter combination ‘bm’ refers to a battery monitor and that the letter combination ‘bmv’ is used to identify the product.
51 That line of argument cannot be accepted. The sentence cited in paragraph 50 above does not use the letter combination ‘bm’ in isolation to refer, in a general sense, to a battery monitor. That sentence uses it as a component of an alphanumeric reference designating a particular product of the applicant. In addition, account must be taken of the reference, in that sentence, to the name of the applicant, by means of the reference to ‘Victron Smartshunt’, and of the context in which that alphanumeric reference is used, which is to say, the subject matter of the ongoing discussion on Reddit, namely ‘which battery monitor?’, and the question to which the sentence in question is responding, namely ‘what battery monitor would you recommend for my lifepo4 solar setup?’. Consequently, the sentence cited in paragraph 50 above does not demonstrate that, in the absence of any mention of the applicant’s name and outside of such a context, the alphanumeric reference ‘BMV 712’ will be understood as a reference to a battery monitor model produced by the applicant, or that the letter combination ‘bm’ will be understood as denoting a battery monitor.
52 Third, relying on various documents produced in Annex A.9 to the application, the applicant submits, in essence, that a product which infringes the applicant’s own product was launched on the market under the name ‘bmv’, and that marketing a counterfeit product under the same name as the original product is relevant only where that name is recognised by the relevant public as meaning ‘Battery Monitor Victron’.
53 That line of argument cannot be accepted. Although it is apparent from Annex A.9 to the application that a Chinese undertaking, namely Fangpusun, marketed, under the names ‘BMV 700’ and ‘BMV 702’, products infringing those manufactured and sold under the same names by the applicant, that circumstance only demonstrates that a competitor of the applicant considers it beneficial to use the names of the applicant’s model. It does not demonstrate that those names are in fact recognised by the relevant public as relating to the two models of battery monitor manufactured by the applicant. Moreover, the press release from the manufacturer of the infringing product mentions the alphanumeric references ‘BMV 700’ and ‘BMV 702’ only after stating that they are battery monitors, since it states the following: ‘now Fangpusun has launched a low-cost monitoring battery pack – BMV 700 and BMV 702’. Lastly, the website of the manufacturer of the counterfeit product simply lists the name of the product as ‘Fangpusun battery monitor’ and it is only in the product’s technical description that the terms ‘BMV 700’ and ‘BMV 702’ appear, alongside the expression ‘battery monitor’. Therefore, the use by the infringing manufacturer of the names ‘BMV 700’ and ‘BMV 702’ does not establish either that the relevant public associates those names with the two specific models of the applicant, or that that public understands the letter combination ‘bm’ as denoting a battery monitor.
54 Fourth, in order to demonstrate that the letter combination ‘bm’ is in standard use in the power electronics sector, the applicant relies on Annexes A.2 to A.4 to the application, which contain several articles describing the functioning of the applicant’s products, several of the applicant’s brochures presenting its products, a blog article entitled ‘The RV battery monitor is the most important part’ and messages published on an online discussion forum concerning the difference between a battery monitor and a voltmeter. In that regard, without there being a need to examine whether, as the intervener argues, Annexes A.2 to A.4 to the application are being produced for the first time before the Court, suffice it to note that the applicant merely makes a general reference to those annexes and to recall that, as stated in paragraph 49 above, it is not for the Court to seek out and identify the relevant evidence in the annexes to the application.
55 Accordingly, the applicant has not shown that the letter combination ‘bm’ is in common use as an abbreviation of the English, German or Dutch expressions ‘battery monitor’, ‘Batteriemonitor’ or ‘batterijmonitor’ and that it would therefore be understood by the relevant public as denoting battery monitors.
56 In the second place, the applicant’s argument that the mark applied for will be understood by the relevant public as an abbreviation of the expression ‘battery monitor Victron’ or, at least, the expression ‘battery monitor of V’ must be rejected.
57 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, as stated in paragraph 55 above, it has not been established that the letter combination ‘bm’ will be understood by the relevant public as an abbreviation of the English, German or Dutch expressions ‘battery monitor’, ‘Batteriemonitor’ or ‘batterijmonitor’. Therefore, it has also not been established that that public will identify that letter combination within the mark applied for, of which it constitutes the first two letters, and that it will separate it from the third letter of that mark, namely ‘v’. In that regard, it should be noted, in particular, that, as stated in paragraphs 48 to 51 above, the letter combination ‘bmv’ may be preceded by the words ‘Victron Battery Monitor’, for example in the expressions ‘Victron Battery Monitor BMV-700’ or ‘Victron Battery Monitor BMV-710H’, or simply the term ‘Victron’, for example in the expressions ‘Victron BMV-702’ or ‘their BMV-712’, which suggests that, in the absence of an express reference to the term ‘Victron’, the letter ‘v’ will not be understood as referring to the applicant. That is all the more so since, in the expressions mentioned above, the term ‘Victron’ precedes the expression ‘battery monitor’, so that the corresponding abbreviation should be ‘vbm’ and not ‘bmv’.
58 The applicant has therefore not shown that the relevant public will perceive the mark applied for as meaning ‘battery monitor Victron’, or, a fortiori, that it will perceive it as meaning ‘battery monitor of V’, since the letter ‘v’, in the second scenario, has no meaning because it is not understood as referring to the applicant. The Board of Appeal was therefore right to find, in paragraph 50 of the contested decision, that it was unlikely that the relevant public would perceive the mark applied for as meaning ‘battery monitor of V’.
59 Since the applicant has not established that the letter combination ‘bm’ will be understood by the relevant public as an abbreviation of the English, German or Dutch expressions ‘battery monitor’, ‘Batteriemonitor’ or ‘batterijmonitor’, or that the mark applied for will be understood as meaning ‘battery monitor Victron’, ‘battery monitor of V’ or ‘battery monitor V’, it must be held that that mark has no meaning.
The meaning of the mark applied for
60 As stated in paragraph 39 above, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 50 of the contested decision, that it was unlikely that the relevant public would interpret the earlier mark as an abbreviation of the English expression ‘battery monitor of W’.
61 The applicant alleges that the Board of Appeal misrepresented its position by stating that it had argued that the earlier mark would be understood as meaning ‘battery monitor of W’. The applicant raised that argument before the Opposition Division, but subsequently withdrew it before the Board of Appeal. Furthermore, the applicant submits that, according to an extract from the German dictionary Duden , the term ‘BMW’ no longer merely denotes the company Bayerische Motoren Werke, but will immediately be understood by the relevant public as referring to German cars.
62 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s line of argument.
63 In that regard, it is sufficient to note, first, that the applicant has not established that the letter combination ‘bmw’ refers to German cars. The extract from the German dictionary Duden , submitted as an annex to the intervener’s observations before the Opposition Division, states that the term ‘BMW’ is the abbreviation of the name of the German company Bayerische Motoren Werke and defines that term as a ‘German motor vehicle brand’. That extract does not therefore show that the term ‘BMW’ denotes a German motor vehicle.
64 Second, as stated in paragraph 55 above, the applicant has not established that the letter combination ‘bm’ will be understood by the relevant public as the abbreviation of the English or German expressions ‘battery monitor’ or ‘Batteriemonitor’. Consequently, it cannot be held that the earlier mark will be understood as the abbreviation of the expression ‘battery monitor of W’. The Board of Appeal did not therefore make an error of assessment when, in paragraph 50 of the contested decision, it found that, in essence, it was unlikely that the relevant public would interpret the earlier mark in that sense.
65 Since, as EUIPO argues, the fact that the dictionary Duden contains an entry for the term ‘BMW’ does not imply that that term has a meaning of its own, other than that which is conferred on it by the reputation of the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal likewise did not make an error of assessment in finding, in paragraph 58 of the contested decision, that the earlier mark had no meaning.
The conceptual comparison
66 As stated in paragraph 39 above, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 58 of the contested decision, that, since none of the marks at issue had any meaning for the relevant public, it was not possible to compare them conceptually. According to the Board of Appeal, even if those marks were understood by the relevant public as abbreviations, that fact would not, in itself, have made it possible to compare them.
67 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal was wrong to conclude that it was impossible to make a conceptual comparison of the marks at issue. It argues that each of the marks at issue has a meaning: the earlier mark designates German cars and the mark applied for means ‘battery monitor Victron’ or, at least, ‘battery monitor of V’. The applicant claims that, consequently, the marks are conceptually dissimilar. In the applicant’s view, even if the mark applied for had no meaning, a conceptual comparison would nevertheless be possible, since one of the marks – the earlier mark – has a clear and specific meaning. In such a case as in the case, previously mentioned, in which the mark applied for also has a meaning, the marks at issue would have been considered to be conceptually different.
68 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s line of argument.
69 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, as stated in paragraphs 59 and 65 above, neither the mark applied for nor the earlier mark has any meaning. Where neither of the signs at issue has any meaning taken as a whole, it must be held that a conceptual comparison is not possible (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 September 2017, Novartis v EUIPO – Meda (Zymara) , T‑214/15, not published, EU:T:2017:637, paragraph 149, and of 5 October 2017, Forest Pharma v EUIPO – Ipsen Pharma (COLINEB) , T‑36/17, not published, EU:T:2017:690, paragraph 96). The Board of Appeal was therefore correct in finding, in paragraph 58 of the contested decision, that it was impossible to compare the marks at issue conceptually.
Similarity of Signs at issue
70 As stated in paragraph 37 above, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 59 of the contested decision, that, taken as a whole, the marks at issue displayed an average degree of similarity, since, in particular, the earlier mark was almost entirely reproduced in the mark applied for and that the only slight difference between those marks arose from their final letter.
71 As is apparent from paragraph 38 above, the applicant disputes that assessment of the Board of Appeal and submits that, taken as a whole, the marks at issue are different or, even if a certain degree of similarity must be acknowledged, that they display a lower degree of similarity than the average degree found by the Board of Appeal. In that regard, the applicant submits that the difference of a single letter between the marks at issue is particularly striking in the case of marks composed of three letters.
72 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s line of argument.
73 Although it is true that, when faced with short signs, the relevant public is likely to perceive more clearly what differentiates them, the fact remains that it is appropriate to ascertain, in each case, by an actual assessment, whether such differences lead to different overall impressions of the signs at issue and whether they are therefore sufficient to rule out any similarity between them (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 December 2024, Birių Krovinių Terminalas v EUIPO – BTK (BKT) , T‑56/24, not published, EU:T:2024:878, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
74 In the present case, given that the marks at issue share their first two letters, that, as the Board of Appeal noted in paragraph 55 of the contested decision, their third letters, ‘w’ and ‘v’ respectively, differ only very slightly from a visual perspective, since the letter ‘v’ resembles a half-‘w’, and that, as the Board of Appeal indicated in paragraph 57 of that decision, the letter combination ‘bm’ is pronounced in the same way throughout the European Union, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the difference between the marks at issue resulting from their third and final letter was ‘slight’.
75 Consequently, having regard to, first, the above-average degree of visual similarity between the marks at issue, which the applicant does not dispute, second, the degree of phonetic similarity of those marks resulting from the identity of their first two letters, which the difference in the pronunciation of their respective third letters fails to counteract, and which the applicant does not contest either, and, third, the fact that it is impossible to compare those marks conceptually, as found in paragraph 69 above, the Board of Appeal’s conclusion that there is an average degree of similarity between the marks at issue, taken as a whole, must be upheld.
Existence of a connection between the signs at issue
76 In paragraphs 60 to 83 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, first, that, taken as a whole, the marks at issue were similar to an average degree. Second, according to the Board of Appeal, the earlier mark enjoyed a considerable reputation in the European Union, at least in Germany, for cars. Third, the mark applied for was inherently distinctive to an average degree and had acquired a high degree of distinctive character. Fourth, established commercial practice consisted in using the battery monitors in cars, whether as accessories in conventional vehicles or as an indispensable part in electric and hybrid vehicles, recreational vehicles, such as camper vans, and specialised vehicles, such as ambulances and fire trucks. Consequently, there was a proximity or close connection between the battery monitors covered by the mark applied for and the cars covered by the earlier mark. Having regard to those four elements, and to the average degree of similarity between the marks at issue, taken as a whole, the Board of Appeal concluded that there was a connection between the marks at issue.
77 The applicant submits that, in paragraph 80 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal was wrong to find that there was a connection between the marks at issue, since the Board of Appeal erred, inter alia, in its assessment of the connection between the goods covered by those marks.
78 In that regard, first, the applicant challenges the test used by the Board of Appeal to assess whether there is a connection between the goods covered by the marks at issue. The Board was wrong merely to rely on a certain proximity between the goods, understood as a ‘simple connection’, given that, according to the case-law, the proximity between different goods can be found only under exceptional circumstances. Second, the applicant submits that, in the present case, the Board of Appeal was wrong to find that there was a connection between the battery monitors covered by the mark applied for and the cars covered by the earlier mark. In particular, the Board of Appeal made three errors: it confused the battery monitors covered by the mark applied for with mere voltmeters; it assumed that the battery monitors were part of battery management systems for electric or hybrid vehicles, and it found that the post-production installation of battery monitors in specialised vehicles strictly speaking made them car components. The applicant submits that the goods covered by the marks at issue are manifestly different. It infers from this that the relevant public, which consists of technically competent users and is highly attentive, will not establish a connection between the mark applied for and the earlier mark.
79 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s line of argument.
80 According to the case-law, Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001 implies that the types of injury referred to in that provision, where they occur, are the consequence of a certain degree of similarity between the earlier mark and the later mark, on account of which the relevant public makes a connection between those marks, meaning that it establishes a link between them even though it does not confuse them. The existence of such a link between the mark applied for and the earlier mark on the part of the relevant public is therefore an implied essential precondition for the application of Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001 (see judgment of 28 January 2026, Ella Hotels and Resorts v EUIPO – Hachette Filipacchi Presse (ELLA HOTELS AND RESORTS) , T‑245/25, not published, EU:T:2026:51, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
81 Whether such a link exists between the marks at issue must be appreciated globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, such as the degree of similarity between the marks at issue; the nature of the goods or services covered by those marks, including the degree of closeness or dissimilarity between those goods or services, and the relevant section of the public; the strength of the earlier mark’s reputation; the degree of the earlier mark’s distinctive character, whether inherent or acquired through use; and the existence of a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public (see judgment of 28 January 2026, ELLA HOTELS AND RESORTS , T‑245/25, not published, EU:T:2026:51, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
82 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in the first place, as stated in paragraph 75 above, the marks at issue display an average degree of similarity and that, in the second place, the applicant does not dispute that – as the Board of Appeal noted in paragraphs 40 to 67 of the contested decision – the earlier mark enjoys a considerable reputation, is inherently distinctive to an average degree and has acquired a high degree of distinctive character. It is therefore necessary to examine whether, as the applicant submits, in essence, the Board of Appeal committed errors of law or assessment in finding that there was a connection between the goods covered by the marks at issue.
The proximity of the goods covered by the marks at issue
83 In the first place, the applicant’s argument that, by suggesting that a ‘simple connection’ is sufficient to find that there is a connection between the goods covered by the marks at issue, the Board of Appeal applied an incorrect test must be rejected.
84 With regard, in particular, to the criterion of the degree of proximity or dissimilarity between the goods at issue, it must be stated that, according to the case-law, the concepts of ‘similarity’ and ‘proximity’ between the goods in question should not be confused. The similarity between the goods covered by the marks at issue does not constitute a condition for the application of Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001, whereas it does constitute one of the cumulative conditions for the application of Article 8(1) of that regulation. However, in the context of the application of Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001, the proximity between the goods concerned is only one of the factors which must be taken into consideration in order to establish whether there is a risk that the use without due cause of the mark applied for would take advantage of the repute of the earlier mark. The concept of ‘proximity’ between the goods, for the purposes of the application of Article 8(5) of that regulation, must be understood as the existence of a simple connection between those goods (judgment of 29 January 2025, Desimo v EUIPO – Dulces y conservas Helios (ELIOS) , T‑607/23, not published, EU:T:2025:112, paragraph 150).
85 It follows from the case-law cited in paragraphs 80 and 84 above that, far from being, as the applicant claims, a ‘key factor’, the degree of proximity, and not of ‘similarity’, between the goods covered by the marks at issue is only one of the factors which must be taken into account for the purposes of the overall assessment of whether there is a connection between those marks.
86 The Board of Appeal did not therefore err in law in referring, in paragraph 69 of the contested decision, to the case-law cited in paragraph 84 above and, in particular, to the definition of proximity between the goods covered by the marks at issue as a ‘simple connection’.
87 In any event, it should be noted that, in the present case, although, in paragraph 75 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated that there was a ‘connection’ between the battery monitors and the cars, by contrast, in paragraphs 80 and 100 of that decision, it emphasised that there was a proximity or ‘close’ connection between those goods.
88 In the second place, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s argument alleging, in essence, that the Board of Appeal erred in its assessment in finding that there was a connection between the goods covered by the marks at issue.
89 In that regard, it is apparent from the case-law that, in assessing the similarity of the goods or services at issue, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, in particular, their nature, their intended purpose, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary, and their distribution channels (see, to that effect, order of 29 January 2025, Fashion Box v EUIPO – Ghostthinker (RE:PLAY) , T‑164/24, not published, EU:T:2025:123, paragraph 42, and judgment of 11 June 2025, Fattorie Garofalo – Società Cooperativa Agricola v EUIPO – Pastificio Lucio Garofalo (fattorie Garofalo) , T‑1036/23, not published, EU:T:2025:592, paragraph 101).
90 Goods or services which are complementary are those where there is a close connection between them, in the sense that one is indispensable or important for the use of the other in such a way that consumers may think that the responsibility for the production of those goods or provision of those services lies with the same undertaking (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel) , T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 57, and order of 29 January 2025, RE:PLAY , T‑164/24, not published, EU:T:2025:123, paragraph 46).
91 First, the applicant is wrong to claim that battery monitors have no significant connection with ‘conventional’ cars and that they cannot therefore be regarded as automobile accessories.
92 In that regard, in paragraph 79 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that battery monitors were used, inter alia, as automobile accessories in conventional cars, to control the state of charge of the car battery.
93 In so far as the applicant claims that conventional cars have no need for battery monitors, since a simple voltmeter is sufficient to monitor the battery of those cars, it was found in paragraph 28 above that simple voltage indicators are included among the goods covered by the mark applied for.
94 In that regard, it is irrelevant that simple voltmeters are not among the goods manufactured by the applicant. According to the case-law, when assessing the degree of proximity between the goods at issue in order to assess whether there is a connection between the marks at issue for the purposes of Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001, account must be taken of the goods in respect of which registration of the mark is sought and not those in respect of which the mark is actually used (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 April 2021, Berebene v EUIPO – Consorzio vino Chianti Classico (GHISU) , T‑201/20, not published, EU:T:2021:192, paragraph 53).
95 Since at least one type of battery monitor, namely simple voltmeters, can be used to check the state of charge of a battery of a conventional car, it must be regarded as complementary to that type of car, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraphs 89 and 90 above.
96 Furthermore, in its written pleadings, the applicant acknowledged that owners of conventional cars could, in the context of a ‘hobby’ or a ‘specialised project’, purchase a battery monitor. It follows that the sections of the public targeted by the goods covered by the marks at issue partially overlap.
97 Second, the applicant is wrong to claim that the goods covered by the mark applied for cannot be integrated into battery management systems for electric or hybrid cars and that they cannot therefore be considered as automobile components.
98 According to the applicant, electric or hybrid cars are equipped with integrated battery management systems, which are closed systems, produced by original equipment manufacturers, and which therefore manage the battery’s charge and discharge status internally. Those integrated battery management systems do not interact with and are not even compatible with standalone battery monitors, such as those covered by the mark applied for, which are specifically designed to be used in modular energy systems which do not have an integrated battery management system.
99 In paragraphs 75 and 79 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, in essence, that battery monitors could be integrated into battery management systems for electric and hybrid cars and recreational vehicles, such as camper vans, in order to ensure that the battery is charged and discharged efficiently and to prevent over-charging, over-discharging or overheating, and that they were therefore automobile components.
100 In that regard, it is not disputed that battery monitors are important, if not indispensable, for the proper functioning of battery management systems used in electric or hybrid car engines and, consequently, for the proper functioning of those cars. They must therefore be regarded as complementary to electric or hybrid cars, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraphs 89 and 90 above.
101 It is irrelevant that the type of battery monitor used for electric or hybrid cars is integrated into such vehicles, rather than being a standalone accessory. It is true that that type of battery monitor will not be purchased directly by the owners of electric or hybrid cars, with the result that the public which it targets is not the same as the public targeted by the cars in question. However, the fact that that type of battery monitor is integrated into electric or hybrid cars at the stage of their production has no bearing on the important, if not indispensable, nature of that product for the proper functioning of those cars and, therefore, on its classification as a product which is complementary to those cars.
102 Nor is it relevant that the applicant does not manufacture that type of battery monitor, since, as stated in paragraph 94 above, for the purposes of examining the degree of proximity between the goods covered by the marks at issue, it is necessary to take into account the goods in respect of which registration of the mark is sought and not those in respect of which it is actually used.
103 Third, the applicant is wrong to claim that the fact that battery monitors may be installed in the battery management systems of specialised vehicles, such as ambulances or fire trucks, post-production and by third parties is not sufficient to make them automobile components.
104 In paragraph 79 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, in essence, that the battery monitors were integrated into battery management systems of specialised vehicles for which a dependable power supply was essential, such as ambulances and fire trucks, and that they were indispensable parts of those vehicles.
105 The applicant itself states that the information provided by a battery monitor is crucial for the reliability and operational efficiency of the auxiliary power supply systems used in specialised vehicles such as ambulances and fire trucks. Therefore, battery monitors must be regarded as important, if not indispensable, to the proper functioning of the battery management systems of those vehicles and, consequently, to the proper functioning of the vehicles themselves. They must therefore be regarded as complementary to those specialised vehicles, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraphs 89 and 90 above.
106 Contrary to what the applicant claims, it is irrelevant that the type of battery monitor intended to be used for specialised vehicles is neither manufactured nor installed by the intervener, or that it is installed post-production in the specialised vehicles in question, rather than being integrated into those vehicles at the stage of their production. The fact that that type of battery monitor does not originate from the same source as the vehicles in question, or that it is integrated into those vehicles post-production and by a third party, does not detract from the fact that it is important, if not indispensable, for those vehicles and is therefore complementary to them.
107 Fourth, as regards the link between battery monitors and recreational vehicles, such as camper vans, the applicant merely claims that they are aimed at a different public and that the type of battery monitor used in those vehicles is installed post-production and by a third party. Since the applicant itself points out that the information provided by a battery monitor is crucial for the proper functioning of recreational vehicles, that product must be regarded as complementary to the vehicles in question, and the fact that the sections of the public at which those goods are aimed are different and that battery monitors are installed post-production and by a third party has no effect whatsoever on that finding.
108 Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding, in essence, in paragraphs 79 and 80 of the contested decision, that the battery monitors were used in the cars, either as accessories for conventional cars or as components of electric or hybrid cars, specialised vehicles, such as ambulances or fire trucks, and recreational vehicles, such as camper vans, and that there is therefore a proximity or close connection between the battery monitors and the cars.
Conclusion on the existence of a connection between the signs at issue
109 As observed in paragraph 80 above, the existence of a link between the marks at issue must be subject to an overall assessment, taking into account all relevant factors. In the present case, in view of the average degree of similarity between the marks at issue, the proximity or close connection between the goods covered by those marks, the considerable reputation of the earlier mark, its average inherent distinctiveness and the high degree of distinctive character which it acquired, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding, in paragraphs 80 to 83 of the contested decision, that there was a link between the marks at issue.
The existence of an unfair advantage being taken of the repute of the earlier mark
110 In paragraphs 95 to 104 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the use of the mark applied for would take unfair advantage of the reputation of the earlier mark. According to the Board of Appeal, the qualities associated by the German public with the cars marketed under the earlier mark and those expected by that same public in respect of battery monitors – namely, inter alia, reliability, high quality standards and efficiency – overlap significantly. There was a proximity or close connection between the cars and battery monitors. Furthermore, the earlier mark had a strong presence in the car industry, such that it was highly likely that the relevant public would expect the intervener to expand its business activities, which were already successful in car manufacturing, to battery monitors. Therefore, the image of reliability and quality associated with the earlier mark would easily be transferred to the mark applied for.
111 The applicant argues that the Board of Appeal erred in its finding that unfair advantage was being taken of the reputation of the earlier mark. It submits, inter alia, that Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001 requires proof of a serious risk of injury arising from a link between the goods covered by the mark at issue and that neither such a risk nor such a link has been demonstrated in the present case. The commercial success of the applicant’s goods is explained by their technical performance and by their compatibility with auxiliary battery systems, not by any supposed connection with the earlier mark.
112 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s line of argument.
113 It is clear from the case-law that the concept of the unfair advantage being taken of the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark by the use without due cause of the mark applied for encompasses instances where there is clear exploitation and ‘free-riding on the coat-tails’ of a famous mark or an attempt to trade upon its reputation. In other words, this concerns the risk that the image of the mark with a reputation or the characteristics which it projects will be transferred to the goods covered by the mark applied for, with the result that the marketing of those goods can be made easier by that association with the earlier mark with a reputation (judgments of 22 March 2007, VIPS , T‑215/03, EU:T:2007:93, paragraph 40, and of 17 October 2018, Golden Balls v EUIPO – Les Éditions P. Amaury (GOLDEN BALLS) , T‑8/17, not published, EU:T:2018:692, paragraph 106).
114 The advantage arising from the use by a third party of a sign similar to a mark with a reputation is an advantage taken unfairly by that third party of the distinctive character or the repute of the mark where that party seeks by that use to ride on the coat-tails of the mark with a reputation in order to benefit from the power of attraction, the reputation and the prestige of that mark and to exploit, without paying any financial compensation, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of the mark in order to create and maintain the mark’s image (judgment of 18 June 2009, L’Oréal and Others , C‑487/07, EU:C:2009:378, paragraph 50).
115 In order to determine whether the use of the mark applied for takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark, it is necessary to undertake a global assessment, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, which include the strength of the earlier mark’s reputation and the degree of distinctive character of the earlier mark, the degree of similarity between the marks at issue and the nature and degree of proximity of the goods or services concerned (see judgments of 18 June 2009, L’Oréal and Others , C‑487/07, EU:C:2009:378, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited, and of 14 December 2012, Bimbo v OHIM – Grupo Bimbo (GRUPO BIMBO) , T‑357/11, not published, EU:T:2012:696, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
116 The applicant’s argument that no serious risk of damage or any plausible change in economic behaviour has been demonstrated cannot succeed. The proprietor of the earlier mark is not required to demonstrate actual and present harm to its mark. It must merely adduce prima facie evidence of a future risk, which is not hypothetical, of unfair advantage or detriment. Such a conclusion may be established, in particular, on the basis of logical deductions resulting from an analysis of the probabilities and by taking account of the usual practices in the relevant commercial sector, as well as all the other circumstances of the case (see judgment of 28 April 2021, Asolo v EUIPO – Red Bull (FLÜGEL) , T‑509/19, not published, EU:T:2021:225, paragraph 151 and the case-law cited).
117 In the present case, it is apparent from the contested decision that, although the Board of Appeal considered it likely that the buying patterns of consumers were directed towards the goods marketed under the mark applied for, that is because it found that there was a proximity or close connection between the goods covered by the marks at issue, because of the uncontested and considerable reputation of the earlier mark, and because, on the basis, inter alia, of those two elements, and of the average degree of similarity between the signs at issue, it considered that the relevant public would probably expect that the goods marketed under the mark applied for would possess the characteristics associated with the earlier mark, namely reliability and technical quality. According to the Board of Appeal, that was all the more so since the applicant had begun to market battery monitors under the mark applied for. The Board of Appeal could logically deduce from those factors that there was, prima facie, an actual, future risk that the relevant public would be drawn to the battery monitors marketed under the mark applied for by reason of the link it established between itself and the qualities of reliability and technical quality associated with the earlier mark.
118 The Board of Appeal was therefore right to conclude, in paragraph 104 of the contested decision, that unfair advantage was taken of the reputation of the earlier mark.
The existence of due cause allowing use of the mark applied for
119 In paragraphs 110 to 116 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the applicant had not proven that there was due cause for the use of the mark applied for, such a ground consisting, according to the applicant, in the common commercial use of the letter combination ‘bm’ to denote battery monitors. In the Board of Appeal’s view, it was not likely that the relevant public would perceive that letter combination as an abbreviation of the English or German expressions ‘battery monitor’ or ‘Batteriemonitor’. Therefore, the applicant had not sufficiently established that it could not reasonably be required to refrain from using the mark applied for. In any event, according to the case-law, the fact that a term was very common and frequently used was not such as to establish the existence of due cause.
120 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that, in the present case, there was no due cause. It submits that it could not choose a term other than ‘bmv’, since that term is neither fanciful nor avoidable, but conveys essential information in the form of an acronym widely used on the market. The existence of due cause therefore follows not only from the descriptive character of that term, but also from the prohibition of monopolies on terms which are neutral and functionally necessary.
121 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s line of argument.
122 According to the case-law, where the proprietor of the earlier mark has shown that there is either actual and present injury to its mark or, failing that, a serious risk that such injury will occur in the future, it is for the proprietor of the later mark to establish that there is due cause for the use of that mark (see judgment of 28 January 2026, ELLA HOTELS AND RESORTS , T‑245/25, not published, EU:T:2026:51, paragraph 115 and the case-law cited).
123 It must also be noted that whether there is a due cause which makes it possible to use a mark which adversely affects a mark with a reputation is a matter which must be interpreted restrictively (see judgment of 28 January 2026, ELLA HOTELS AND RESORTS , T‑245/25, not published, EU:T:2026:51, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited).
124 In the present case, as stated in paragraph 55 above, the applicant has not demonstrated that the letter combination ‘bm’ was commonly used as an abbreviation of the English, German or Dutch expressions ‘battery monitor’, ‘Batteriemonitor’ or ‘batterijmonitor’, and that it was frequently used to denote battery monitors. The letter combination ‘bm’ cannot therefore be regarded as descriptive of those goods. Consequently, that letter combination, which, moreover, constitutes only the first two letters of the three that make up the mark applied for, has not become so necessary to the marketing of battery monitors that the applicant cannot be required to refrain from using the mark applied for. The Board of Appeal was therefore right to conclude, in paragraph 115 of the contested decision, that there was no due cause allowing the use of the mark applied for.
125 The single plea in law and, therefore, the application for annulment of the contested decision must therefore be rejected.
126 It follows that the applicant’s second head of claim, which seeks the rejection of the opposition and must be treated in the same way as an application for alteration of the contested decision, must also be rejected.
127 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
128 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
129 Since a hearing has taken place and the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the forms of order sought by EUIPO and the intervener.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)
hereby:
1. Dismisses the action;
2. Orders Victron Energy BV to pay the costs.
| Półtorak | Hesse | Steinfatt |
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 4 November 2026.
| T. Henze | M. J. Costeira |
| Acting Registrar | President |
* Language of the case: English.