Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) 30 September 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)

30 September 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the EU figurative mark T-HEAD – Earlier national figurative mark and earlier international registration of figurative mark HEAD – Earlier national word marks HEAD – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Obligation to state reasons – Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑477/25,

T-Head (Shanghai) Semiconductor Co. Ltd, established in Shanghai (China), represented by V. Franchini and D. Petraz, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by J. Ivanauskas and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO being

Head Technology GmbH, established in Kennelbach (Austria),

THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber),

composed of I. Gâlea, President, T. Tóth (Rapporteur) and L. Spangsberg Grønfeldt, Judges,

Registrar: J. Čuboň, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 17 March 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, T-Head (Shanghai) Semiconductor Co. Ltd, seeks the annulment of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 21 May 2025 (Case R 2098/2024-2) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 27 February 2023, Alibaba Singapore Holding Private Limited, the applicant’s predecessor, filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the following figurative sign:

3 The mark applied for covered, inter alia, goods and services in Classes 9, 35, 41, 42 and 45 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:

– Class 9: ‘Downloadable cloud-computing software; downloadable cloud-based software; computer software; computer software (including software downloadable from the Internet); computer chips; reduced instruction set computer architecture computer chips and central processing units; computer chips and central processing units with instruction set architecture; computer chips and central processing units adapted for artificial intelligence, voice recognition, audio-visual input for machines, wireless connectivity, operation of machine and equipment, automobile electronics and automobiles; computer servers; computer and telecommunications networking hardware; computer network adaptors, switches, routers and hubs; computer software applications, downloadable; computer hardware and firmware; downloadable computer software which allows users to participate in web-based meetings and classes, with access to data, documents, images and software applications through a web browser; hard disk’;

– Class 35: ‘Advertising; business management; business administration; office functions; business consultancy services relating to providing a web site on a global computer network by which third parties can offer and source goods and services, place, determine the status of and fulfil trade leads and orders, enter into contracts and transact business; providing computerized online ordering services; business consultancy services relating to operating an electronic marketplace for the buyers and sellers of goods and/or services on a global computer network; business assistance relating to facilitating business transaction via local and global computer networks; provision of sales, business, advertising and promotional information through a global computer network and via the Internet; business administration services for the processing of sales made on the Internet; data processing; provision of business information; advertising agency services; database management; compilation of information into computer databases; business consulting services; business project management services; market research services; international import and export agency services; rental of advertising space on communication media; providing a directory of third party web sites to facilitate business transactions; commercial administration of the licensing of the goods and services of others; computer data processing; sales, business and promotional information services; personnel management; presentation of goods on communication media for retail purposes; buying and selling agency services; selection of goods and procurement of goods for individuals and businesses; ordering services (for others); search engine optimization; web site traffic optimization; updating and maintenance of data in computer databases; retail and wholesale services, all in relation to software for electronically exchanging and sharing data, audio, video, images and graphics via computer, mobile, wireless, and telecommunication networks, computer software for processing images, graphics, audio, video, and text, downloadable computer software which allows users to participate in web-based meetings and classes, computer software for accessing, viewing, and controlling remote computers and computer networks, cloud-computing software; retail and wholesale services, all in relation to computer peripherals; retail and wholesale services, all in relation to computer chips, reduced instruction set computer architecture computer chips and central processing units, computer chips and central processing units with instruction set architecture, computer chips and central processing units adapted for artificial intelligence, voice recognition, audio-visual input for machines, wireless connectivity, operation of machine and equipment, automobile electronics and automobiles; retail and wholesale services, all in relation to personal digital assistants, personal media players, mobile telephones, smart phones, digital cameras, batteries, battery chargers, computer servers, computer and telecommunications networking hardware, computer network adaptors, switches, routers and hubs, laptop holders, computer bags, compact discs, digital music (downloadable), telecommunications apparatus; retail and wholesale services, all in relation to mechanisms for data processing equipment and computers, computer software, software applications for mobile devices and computers, software applications for use with mobile devices, software for processing electronic payments, authentication software, electronic publications (downloadable), instant messaging software, file sharing software’;

– Class 41: ‘Education, training and instruction services relating to telecommunications, computers, computer programs, cloud computing, web site design, e-commerce, business management, financial management and advertising; provision of education, tuition and training both interactive and non-interactive; design of educational courses, examinations and qualifications; arranging, conducting and provision of conferences, conventions, congresses, seminars and training workshops; arranging, conducting and provision of conferences, conventions, congresses, seminars and training workshops in relation to telecommunications, computers, computer programs, cloud computing, web site design, e-commerce, business management, financial management and advertising; providing education information about research materials and agency thereof; arranging, organizing, planning and management of seminars; education; providing of training’;

– Class 42: ‘Scientific and technological services and research and design relating thereto, industrial analysis and research services; design and development of computer hardware and software; research and development relating to computer chips, reduced instruction set computer architecture computer chips and central processing units, computer chips and central processing units with instruction set architecture, computer chips and central processing units adapted for artificial intelligence, voice recognition, audio-visual input for machines, wireless connectivity, operation of machine and equipment, automobile electronics and automobiles; software as a service (SaaS); application service provider (ASP) services, namely, hosting computer software applications of others; providing online non-downloadable software for facilitating the interoperability of multiple software applications; computer system software services; computer software design; computer system design; consultancy services in relation to computer software; providing information on computer technology and programming via a web site; cloud computing; providing temporary use of non-downloadable cloud-based software and cloud computing software; consultancy, information and advisory services relating to the aforesaid services’;

– Class 45: ‘Licensing of intellectual property; consultancy relating to licensing of intellectual property; licensing of the use of computer software and computer programs; consultancy, information and advisory services relating to the aforesaid services’.

4 On 18 July 2023, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, Head Technology GmbH, filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for inter alia in respect of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5 The opposition was based, inter alia, on the earlier trade marks reproduced below:

– international registration No 1 435 193 designating the European Union for the figurative mark , registered on 27 July 2018 inter alia for services in Class 35 corresponding to the following description: ‘Retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to shoes, particularly sports shoes; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to tennis shoes; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to hiking boots; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to bags, particularly ski and/or tennis bags; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to lifestyle bags and/or rucksacks; retail, wholesale and /or online trade services related to suitcases and/or purses; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to belts; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to watches and/or sun glasses; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to chemist’s articles, namely, perfumes and/or deodorants; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to shower gels; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to sun creams and/or massage creams for sports; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to headphones and/or loudspeakers; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to electric chargers and/or batteries; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to headlamps; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to music players; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to sporting articles, particularly rackets/bats for ball games and skis; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to apparatus for scuba diving and/or golf; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to fitness equipment; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to roller skates, particularly in-line skates; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to scooters and/or kickboards; retail, wholesale and online trade services related to skateboards and surfboards; retail, wholesale and/or online trade services related to bicycles’;

– Austrian registration No 303 962 of the word mark HEAD, registered on 12 July 2019 for goods and services in Classes 9, 28, 41 and 42 corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:

– Class 9: ‘Computer programs, recorded or downloadable; computer operating programs, recorded; computer game programs; video games (computer games) in the form of computer programs recorded on data carriers; software programs for video games’;

– Class 28: ‘Electronic games’;

– Class 41: ‘Entertainment; electronic games services, including provision of computer games on-line or by means of a global computer network’;

– Class 42: ‘Developing webpages on the Internet’,

– Austrian registration No 303 628 of the word mark HEAD, registered on 25 June 2019 for goods in Class 9 corresponding to the following description: ‘Computer programs (recorded and/or downloadable); computer game software; computer operating programs, recorded’,

– Austrian registration No 297 612 of the figurative mark , registered on 19 April 2018 for services in Class 35 corresponding to the following description: ‘Advertising; business management; business administration; office functions’.

6 The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

7 On 30 August 2024, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition in part, namely in respect of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above, with the exception of ‘retail and wholesale services, all in relation to fire-extinguishing apparatus’ in Class 35, on the grounds that there was a likelihood of confusion.

8 On 28 October 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.

9 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal annulled the decision of the Opposition Division in part, dismissed the opposition as regards certain goods and services and dismissed the appeal as to the remainder, namely in respect of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above.

Forms of order sought

10 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision in so far as it dismissed the appeal;

– order EUIPO to pay the costs, including those incurred before the Opposition Division and the Board of Appeal.

11 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened.

Law

12 In support of the action, the applicant raises, in essence, two pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 and, secondly, infringement of the obligation to state reasons concerning the assessment of the similarity of the goods in question in Class 9.

13 It is appropriate to begin by analysing the second plea in law.

The second plea, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons

14 The applicant claims, in the first place, that the contested decision contains no statement of reasons concerning the finding that the following goods included in Class 9 and covered by the mark applied for are similar to those covered by the earlier marks: ‘downloadable cloud-computing software; downloadable cloud-based software; computer software; computer software (including software downloadable from the Internet); computer software applications, downloadable; computer hardware and firmware; downloadable computer software which allows users to participate in web-based meetings and classes, with access to data, documents, images and software applications through a web browser; hard disk’.

15 The applicant submits, in the second place, that the statement of reasons of the contested decision is contradictory in so far as the Board of Appeal found that the following goods, included in Class 9 and covered by the mark applied for, must be regarded as products in their own right rather than mere computer components: ‘semi-conductors; semi-conductor integrated circuits; semi-conductor memory chips; semi-conductor memory controllers; semi-conductor memory integrated circuits; semi-conductor processor chips; semi-conductor processors; microcontrollers; microcontroller units; low power microcontrollers; circuit chips; CPU (central processing unit); wireless and wired modems and communication cards and devices’. It highlights that, by contrast, the Board of Appeal found that the following goods, included in the same class and covered by the mark applied for, were computer components: ‘computer chips; reduced instruction set computer architecture computer chips and central processing units; computer chips and central processing units with instruction set architecture; computer chips and central processing units adapted for artificial intelligence, voice recognition, audio-visual input for machines, wireless connectivity, operation of machine and equipment, automobile electronics and automobiles; computer and telecommunications networking hardware; computer network adaptors, switches, routers and hubs’.

16 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

17 The first sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that decisions of EUIPO must state the reasons on which they are based. That obligation has the same scope as that which derives from the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU, which requires that the statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal manner the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question, without it being necessary for that reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets those requirements must, nonetheless, be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 28 June 2018, EUIPO v Puma , C‑564/16 P, EU:C:2018:509, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

18 The obligation to state reasons in decisions is an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, which is concerned with the substantive legality of the measure at issue. The reasoning of a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. If those grounds are vitiated by errors, those errors will vitiate the substantive legality of the decision, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect (see judgment of 20 February 2013, Langguth Erben v OHIM (MEDINET) , T‑378/11, EU:T:2013:83, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).

19 In the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument that there was no statement of reasons concerning the goods referred to in paragraph 14 above, it is clear that, before the Board of Appeal, the applicant did not put forward arguments to dispute the similarity of those goods. Therefore, the Board of Appeal correctly stated, in paragraph 30 of the contested decision, that the examination of the appeal was limited to the grounds set out in the statement of grounds (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 June 2020, Primart v EUIPO , C‑702/18 P, EU:C:2020:489, paragraph 41) and that it was not required to respond to the arguments that were not raised in that statement (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 June 2024, Hofstede Insights v EUIPO – Geert Hofstede (HOFSTEDE INSIGHTS) , T‑429/23, not published, EU:T:2024:349, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, while it assessed the lawfulness of the contested decision in its entirety, it did not carry out, in accordance with the case-law above, a thorough analysis of the comparison of the goods expressly referred to in the statement of grounds of the appeal.

20 In addition, in the absence of any challenge by the applicant concerning the goods referred to in paragraph 14 above, the Board of Appeal was able to state that it agreed with the reasoning in the Opposition Division’s decision and to refer to it in order to avoid repetition, since it could adopt the grounds of that decision which would thus make up an integral part of the reasons for the contested decision (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 September 2010, Inditex v OHIM – Marín Díaz de Cerio (OFTEN) , T‑292/08, EU:T:2010:399, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited, and of 11 September 2014, Galileo International Technology v OHIM – ESA and Commission (GALILEO) , T‑450/11, not published, EU:T:2014:771, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). Therefore, the Board of Appeal adopted the findings of the Opposition Division, solely as regards the issues not disputed before it by the applicant.

21 Consequently, the applicant cannot complain that the Board of Appeal failed to provide a statement of reasons regarding the comparison of the goods referred to in paragraph 14 above.

22 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument relating to the contradiction in the reasoning concerning the goods referred to in paragraph 15 above, it is clearly apparent from paragraphs 42 to 50 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal found that, in accordance with judgments of 13 October 2011, NEC Display Solutions Europe v OHIM – Nokia (NaViKey) (T‑393/09, not published, EU:T:2011:593, paragraphs 30 and 31) and of 20 October 2021, Intis v EUIPO – Televes (TELEVEND) (T‑112/20, not published, EU:T:2021:710, paragraph 42), computer hardware and computer software were, in principle, similar to a certain degree, since they were designed to work together and often originated from the same undertakings. In that context, it found that specialised technological components suitable for use as components of computers could fall within the broad category of computer hardware. However, in the present case, it considered it necessary to distinguish between the goods which were likely to have multiple technological uses and those specifically designated as computer parts in the application for registration. In that regard, it found that, even if some of those goods, namely semi-conductors and their derivatives referred to in paragraph 15 above, could be used as computer hardware, those goods were highly technical and targeted very specialised IT professionals. Therefore, those goods had an overall purpose distinct from that of software products included in Class 9 and covered by the earlier marks, and must, accordingly, be regarded as different from the latter. It stated, however, that the other part of those goods, inter alia computer chips, central processing units and processor architecture, and networking hardware intended for computers and telecommunications referred to in paragraph 15 above, in the light of their current designation, had to be classified as computer hardware. Those goods were therefore similar to a low degree to the software covered by the earlier marks.

23 It follows that the Board of Appeal explained the reasons for which the comparison of the goods referred to in paragraph 15 above with software in Class 9 that was covered by the earlier marks had to lead to different results and, consequently, why the goods classified as computer hardware were regarded as similar to the software products covered by those marks.

24 In the light of the foregoing, the second plea in law must be rejected.

The first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001

25 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.

26 The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS) , T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraph 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).

27 For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel) , T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

28 In the light of those considerations, it is necessary to examine whether the Board of Appeal was correct in concluding that there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public concerning the goods and services at issue.

The relevant public

29 The Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 66 to 68 of the contested decision, that the relevant public consisted of both the general public and professional consumers, be it in the territory of the European Union or solely that of Austria, whose level of attention varied from average to above average. It stated, in paragraphs 74 to 76 of that decision, that its assessment relating to the meaning of the common word element ‘head’ of the signs at issue had regard to the part of the relevant public in the European Union and Austria which is not proficient in English, but is deemed to be familiar with the basic vocabulary of that language, and which, therefore, would perceive that term exclusively as meaning ‘head’, that is to say a part of the human body, and not as having another meaning, such as ‘person in a leading position’.

30 The applicant merely submits that the Board of Appeal erred in basing its assessment relating to the meaning of the common word element ‘head’ of the signs at issue on the part of the relevant public in the European Union and Austria which is not proficient in English, but is deemed to be familiar with the basic vocabulary of that language.

31 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

32 In that regard, it is sufficient to recall that it does not follow from Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 that, for an EU trade mark to be refused registration under that provision, the likelihood of confusion must exist in all Member States and in all linguistic areas of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 September 2008, Armacell v OHIM , C‑514/06 P, not published, EU:C:2008:511, paragraph 56). Therefore, for an EU trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union (judgment of 11 February 2020, Dalasa v EUIPO – Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin (charantea) , T‑732/18, not published, EU:T:2020:43, paragraph 16).

33 Consequently, the applicant’s argument must be rejected.

The comparison of the goods and services at issue

34 In assessing the similarity of the goods or services at issue, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, in particular, their nature, their intended purpose, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account such as the distribution channels of the goods concerned (see judgment of 14 May 2013, Sanco v OHIM – Marsalman (Representation of a chicken) , T‑249/11, EU:T:2013:238, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

– Comparison of the goods in Class 9

35 The Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 44 to 50 of the contested decision, that the following specialised goods included in Class 9 and covered by the mark applied for differed from ‘computer programs’ covered by the earlier marks, since they were components which could have multiple technological uses and must be regarded as products in their own right: ‘semi-conductors; semi-conductor integrated circuits; semi-conductor memory chips; semi-conductor memory controllers; semi-conductor memory integrated circuits; semi-conductor processor chips; semi-conductor processors; microcontrollers; microcontroller units; low power microcontrollers; circuit chips; CPU (central processing unit); wireless and wired modems and communication cards and devices’.

36 By contrast, the Board of Appeal found that the following goods, included in Class 9 and covered by the mark applied for, which, according to their description, were computer parts, had to be classified as computer hardware: ‘computer chips; reduced instruction set computer architecture computer chips and central processing units; computer chips and central processing units with instruction set architecture; computer chips and central processing units adapted for artificial intelligence, voice recognition, audio-visual input for machines, wireless connectivity, operation of machine and equipment, automobile electronics and automobiles; computer and telecommunications networking hardware; computer network adaptors, switches, routers and hubs’. Therefore, according to the Board of Appeal, those goods, which were covered by the mark applied for, were similar to at least a low degree to the ‘software’ covered by the earlier marks.

37 In the applicant’s view, the goods covered by the mark applied for and referred to in paragraph 36 above cannot be regarded as computer hardware, the sale and use of which also do not require specialised knowledge.

38 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

39 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, there is, in principle, a similarity between ‘computer hardware’ and ‘computer software’, since those goods are designed to work together, with the result that consumers may think that the same undertaking is responsible for the production of those goods (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 October 2011, NEC Display Solutions Europe v OHIM – Nokia (NaViKey) , T‑393/09, not published, EU:T:2011:593, paragraphs 30 and 31). However, as the Board of Appeal correctly found in paragraphs 45 to 50 of the contested decision, it is appropriate to distinguish, on the one hand, goods which are likely to have multiple technological uses, in respect of which no similarity to ‘computer software’ can be found, and, on the other, goods specifically designated in the application for registration as computer parts, in respect of which such similarity may be found in accordance with the abovementioned case-law. In the present case, it is apparent from the description of the goods in the application for registration that the goods covered by the mark applied for and referred to in paragraph 36 above are precisely such computer parts.

40 The applicant’s arguments cannot call that finding into question. Those arguments concern the specialised knowledge required to use the goods referred to in paragraph 36 above. That knowledge, however, is not decisive in the assessment of the similarity of the goods, but the wording describing them, which explicitly states that they are computer parts, is. Accordingly, the applicant’s arguments must be rejected.

– Comparison of the services in Class 35

41 The Board of Appeal found in paragraph 51 of the contested decision that there was a low degree of similarity between retail services concerning specific goods and other goods that are either highly similar or similar to those specific goods. However, it concluded that, since the goods referred to in paragraph 35 above, included in Class 9 and covered by the mark applied for, had to be regarded as different from those covered by the earlier marks, retail and wholesale services for those goods covered by that mark also had to be regarded as different from the services covered by the earlier marks.

42 The applicant submits that the retail and wholesale services concerning the goods referred to in paragraph 36 above, which are included in Class 9 and were covered by the mark applied for, in respect of which it disputes the assessments of the contested decision concerning the similarity of the goods, likewise cannot be regarded as similar.

43 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

44 In that regard, as is apparent from paragraphs 39 and 40 above, the applicant has not succeeded in calling into question the Board of Appeal’s findings concerning the similarity of the goods referred to in paragraph 36 above, which are included in Class 9 and were covered by the mark applied for. Accordingly, the applicant’s argument relating to the services in Class 35 and concerning the goods referred to in paragraph 36 above must be rejected.

– Comparison of the services in Class 41

45 In the absence of any specific arguments capable of challenging the findings of the Opposition Division relating to the services in Class 41, the Board of Appeal adopted those findings, according to which the services in Class 41 covered by the mark applied for were similar to a low degree to the entertainment services covered by earlier Austrian mark No 303 962.

46 The applicant does not dispute those findings.

– Comparison of the services in Class 42

47 The Board of Appeal adopted, in paragraphs 53 and 54 of the contested decision, the Opposition Division’s finding that the ‘cloud computing’ services covered by the mark applied for were similar to ‘computer game programs’ and ‘computer game software’ covered by the earlier marks since there was a clear relationship of complementarity between those services. It also concluded that the ‘cloud computing’ services covered by the mark applied for were in direct competition with ‘computer programs, downloadable’, covered by the earlier marks.

48 The applicant submits that the ‘cloud computing’ services covered by the mark applied for differ from ‘computer game programs’ and ‘computer game software’ since the services covered by the mark applied for are highly specialised and target the business market, whereas computer games target the general public for entertainment purposes.

49 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

50 It should be observed that, as EUIPO correctly found, the applicant merely argues that ‘cloud computing’ services covered by the mark applied for and ‘computer game programs’, and ‘computer game software’, covered by the earlier marks, differ in respect of their nature and purpose, their providers, targeted public and marketing channels.

51 In that regard, it must be found that the Board of Appeal was correct to base its decision on the existence of a relationship of complementarity between the services at issue. Accordingly, it is necessary to find, as the Board of Appeal did, that the functioning of video games often depends on ‘cloud computing’ services. That is the case in particular as regards cloud-based games which run on remote services, or which allow several players to face each other. In addition, those games use ‘cloud computing’ services to save the settings and preferences of players and their progress in a given game.

52 One of the conditions for goods being complementary is that they can be used together, which presupposes that they are intended for the same public (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel) , T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 58). As regards that condition, and contrary to the applicant’s arguments, consumers of ‘computer games’ also use ‘cloud computing’ services when they save information relating to the game or when they access a game via a server. Accordingly, the applicant’s argument must be rejected.

– Comparison of the services in Class 45

53 The Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 63 to 65 of the contested decision, that services involving the ‘exploitation and licensing of intellectual property rights’, specifically relating to the goods in Class 9 referred to in paragraphs 35 and 36 above, differed from the business management services covered by the earlier marks. It stated, in that regard, that the intellectual property rights relating to those highly technical goods were generally managed by specialised firms which employed patent lawyers with backgrounds in science and technology, or by specialised technology transfer offices.

54 The applicant does not dispute the above finding. It does however complain that the Board of Appeal’s assessment was contradictory since it did not conclude that all the other services in Class 45 covered by the mark applied for were dissimilar. In particular, the applicant submits that, in general, the licensing of intellectual property is very technical and specialised in nature and is managed by specialised intellectual property firms employing patent lawyers, whereas the service of business management covered by the earlier marks is more of an all-round service.

55 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

56 In that regard, it is clear that the applicant has not put forward any argument capable of substantiating how intellectual property licencing services, in a general sense, are as technical or specialised in nature as those same services when they concern goods in Class 9. The applicant merely emphasises the particularly technical and specialised nature of the services involving the exploitation and licensing of intellectual property rights. Its arguments, however, presented in general and unsupported terms, are not capable of demonstrating any contradiction in the contested decision. Therefore, the Board of Appeal was able to find, without contradicting itself, that the assessment relating to services involving the ‘exploitation and licensing of intellectual property rights’ specifically concerning goods in Class 9, referred to in paragraphs 35 and 36 above, did not necessarily extend to the other services of the mark applied for and included in Class 45, which are described in broader and more general terms. Accordingly, the applicant’s argument must be rejected.

The comparison of the signs

57 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

58 In the present case, before addressing the question of the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the marks at issue, it is necessary to examine the Board of Appeal’s assessment of their distinctive and dominant elements.

– The distinctive and dominant elements of the marks at issue

59 The Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 73 to 76 of the contested decision, that the marks at issue contained the English word ‘head’, which is understood by the relevant public in the European Union and Austria as meaning ‘[the] part of the body above the neck’. Therefore, that element will be perceived as meaningful, but distinctive to an average degree for all the goods and services covered by those marks.

60 As regards the earlier marks, the Board of Appeal found in paragraph 77 of the contested decision – without it being disputed by the applicant – that they consisted of the term ‘head’ both as a word mark and as a word element of a figurative sign with very basic stylisation, limited to standard, dark, bold letters.

61 As for the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 78 to 80 of the contested decision, that it consisted of a word element ‘head’, written in standard, dark, bold lettering, preceded, first, by the letter ‘t’, separated from that word element by a hyphen, and, secondly, by a figurative element which represents a highly stylised head – possibly that of an animal – within a circle. It considered that the mark applied for was dominated by the word element ‘head’, since the impact of the letter ‘t’ and of the figurative element on the overall impression given by that mark would be perceived as limited.

62 The applicant argues that the distinctive and dominant elements of the mark applied for are, first, the figurative element and, secondly, the letter ‘t’ followed by a hyphen. It complained that the Board of Appeal had ignored those elements, which contribute, in a non-negligible manner, to differentiating the signs at issue. It states, in that regard, that the figurative element, which is placed at the beginning of the mark applied for, where consumers tend to focus, serves to alter the impression given by that mark to such a degree that consumers would readily differentiate the signs at issue.

63 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

64 According to the case-law, for the purpose of assessing the distinctive character of an element of a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, it is necessary to take into account, in particular, the inherent characteristics of that element and to ask whether it is at all descriptive of the goods for which the mark has been registered (see judgment of 3 September 2010, Companhia Muller de Bebidas v OHIM – Missiato Industria e Comercio (61 A NOSSA ALEGRIA) , T‑472/08, EU:T:2010:347, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

65 More specifically, where a trade mark consists of word and figurative elements, the former are, in principle, more distinctive than the latter, because the average consumer will more readily refer to the goods in question by quoting the name of the mark than by describing the figurative element of that mark (judgment of 14 July 2005, Wassen International v OHIM – Stroschein Gesundkost (SELENIUM- ACE) , T‑312/03, EU:T:2005:289, paragraph 37).

66 As regards the assessment of whether one or more given components of a composite trade mark is dominant, account must be taken, in particular, of the intrinsic qualities of each of those components by comparing them with those of other components. In addition and accessorily, account may be taken of the relative position of the various components within the arrangement of the complex mark (judgment of 23 October 2002, Matratzen Concord v OHIM – Hukla Germany (MATRATZEN) , T‑6/01, EU:T:2002:261, paragraph 35; see also judgment of 13 December 2012, Natura Selection v OHIM – Ménard (natura) , T‑461/11, not published, EU:T:2012:693, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

67 While it is true that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components, it is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element. That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (see judgment of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM , C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraphs 42 and 43 and the case-law cited).

68 However, the fact that an element is not negligible does not mean that it is dominant, just as the fact that an element is not dominant by no means implies that it is negligible (judgment of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM , C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 44).

69 In the present case, it is clear that, contrary to what the applicant claims, it is apparent from the Board of Appeal’s assessment, referred to in paragraph 61 above, that it did not ignore the letter ‘t’ or the figurative element of the mark applied for. On the contrary, it did examine those elements in order to conclude that they had a limited impact on the overall impression given by that mark.

70 As the Board of Appeal correctly found, and in the absence of any argument presented by the applicant to dispute the same, the hyphen that follows the letter ‘t’ simply separates that letter from the word element ‘head’ while indicating that it is linked to it. Therefore, even though that letter has no meaning, its impact on the overall impression given by the mark applied for must be regarded as limited.

71 Similarly, as the Board of Appeal correctly found, since the figurative element represents a head, its meaning reinforces the conceptual content of the word element ‘head’. In that regard, it must be noted that the applicant merely argues, without substantiating its claims, that the representation of the head of an animal serves to alter and not to reinforce the impression given by the mark applied for. Therefore, that argument cannot call into question the reinforcing nature of the figurative element of that mark.

72 Consequently, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the word element was the dominant element of the mark applied for.

– Visual similarity

73 In paragraphs 81 to 83 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal, agreeing with the Opposition Division’s reasoning, concluded that the signs at issue were visually similar to an above-average degree.

74 The applicant submits that, even though the signs at issue coincide in the word element ‘head’, they differ visually on account of the presence of the additional letter ‘t’ and the dominant figurative element in the mark applied for.

75 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

76 In the present case, the signs at issue coincide in the word element ‘head’ which is the only word element of the earlier marks and is the second word element of the mark applied for. The signs at issue differ in the stylisation of the common word element and in the presence of the letter ‘t’ at the beginning of the mark applied for. In addition, the mark applied for includes a hyphen between that letter and the word element ‘head’ and a figurative element which has no equivalent in the earlier marks.

77 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, as is apparent from paragraphs 64 to 72 above, the applicant has not succeeded in calling into question the Board of Appeal’s finding that the word element ‘head’ is the dominant element of the mark applied for, whereas the impact of the letter ‘t’ and the figurative element on the overall impression given by that mark is limited.

78 In so far as the signs at issue coincide in the word element ‘head’ which is the only word element in the earlier marks and the dominant element of the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal was correct to find that the signs at issue were visually similar to an above-average degree.

– Phonetic similarity

79 In paragraphs 81 to 83 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal, agreeing with the Opposition Division’s reasoning, concluded that the signs at issue were phonetically similar to at least an average degree.

80 The applicant submits that the signs at issue differ phonetically since the additional letter ‘t’, which precedes the word element ‘head’ in the mark applied for, creates a clear difference in the rhythm and intonation.

81 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

82 In that regard, it should be recalled that, in the present case, the phonetic difference between the signs at issue concerns only a single letter, namely the letter ‘t’, which precedes the word element ‘head’ in the mark applied for, which is the only word element of the earlier marks. Even though such a difference between those signs may create a difference in the rhythm and the intonation, it cannot suffice, in itself, to make the pronunciation totally different.

83 Therefore, the applicant has not succeeded in calling into question the Board of Appeal’s finding that the signs at issue were phonetically similar to at least an average degree.

– Conceptual similarity

84 In paragraphs 73 to 76 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal saw fit to carry out its assessment with regard to the relevant public in the European Union and Austria, which, admittedly, is not proficient in English, but does have a basic knowledge of that language, and which will therefore understand the only word element of the signs at issue, namely the word ‘head’, as meaning ‘part of the body above the neck’. Accordingly, in paragraph 83 of that decision, the Board of Appeal concluded that the signs at issue were conceptually identical.

85 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal should have found that the conceptual comparison remained neutral since the common word element ‘head’ of the signs at issue had no meaning in relation to the goods and services in question.

86 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

87 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s finding that the word element ‘head’ is basic English vocabulary and therefore has a meaning even for the relevant public which is not proficient in English, but merely submits that that word element has no meaning in relation to the goods and services at issue.

88 Since it is not disputed that the common word element ‘head’ conveyed to the relevant public the same meaning in the sign applied for and in the earlier signs, the Board of Appeal did not make any error of assessment in finding that the conceptual comparison of the signs at issue was possible in the present case and that those signs were conceptually identical.

89 That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that the common word element of the signs at issue has no meaning in relation to the goods and services in question. It is sufficient to note that such conditions are taken into account at the stage of the assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements of the signs at issue, which has already been carried out in paragraphs 59 to 72 above, and not the stage of the assessment of the similarity of those signs.

The likelihood of confusion

90 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon , C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others) , T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

91 The Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 85 to 91 of the contested decision, that, since the signs at issue were highly similar overall, even in respect of the goods and services which were similar only to a low degree and those which required an enhanced degree of attention upon purchase, the degree of visual and phonetic similarity and the conceptual identity of those signs would lead consumers to believe that those goods and services found to be similar originate from the same or related commercial undertakings. Furthermore, it added that, due to the presence of the initial letter ‘t’ in the mark applied for, consumers might get the impression that that mark constitutes a sub-brand of the earlier marks, for instance where that letter had a descriptive meaning, such as to indicate that the sub-brand specialised in technological goods. Therefore, it confirmed that there was a likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, in respect of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 89 of the contested decision.

92 The applicant complains, in essence, that the Board of Appeal carried out an incorrect assessment of the likelihood of confusion since it relied, inter alia, on errors in the visual, phonetic and conceptual comparison of the signs at issue. It submits, in particular, that the difference between those signs is such as to rule out there being a likelihood of confusion, even if certain goods and services may be held to be similar. In addition, it adds that the relevant public targeted by the goods and services covered by the mark applied for is highly specialised, which also makes it possible to find that there is no likelihood of confusion. As regards the services in Class 41, it argues that, in the light of the principle of interdependence between the relevant factors, the very low degree of similarity of those services precludes any likelihood of confusion.

93 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

94 In that regard, it is apparent from paragraphs 84 to 88 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal, in its global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, took into account all the relevant factors, including the average inherent distinctive character of the earlier marks – which has not been disputed by the applicant – and the goods and services covered by the marks at issue, the relevant public and its level of attention, and the degree of visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the signs at issue.

95 Moreover, as is apparent from paragraphs 35 to 90 above, the applicant has not succeeded in calling into question the Board of Appeal’s findings relating to the similarity of the goods and services in question, or its findings that the signs at issue were visually similar to an above-average degree, phonetically similar to at least an average degree and conceptually identical.

96 As regards the applicant’s argument concerning account being taken of the low degree of similarity of the services in Class 41, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 91 above, a low degree of similarity between the goods or services in question may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the signs at issue. It is true that the principle of interdependence should not be applied mechanically (see judgment of 19 June 2024, Naturgy Energy Group v EUIPO – Global Power Service (gps global power service) , T‑312/23, not published, EU:T:2024:399, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited). However, given the above-average degree of visual similarity of the signs at issue, their at least average phonetic similarity and their conceptual identity, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that there was a likelihood of confusion as regards the services at issue which are included in Class 41.

97 Consequently, it must be found that, following a global assessment and taking into account all of the factors referred to above, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that there was a likelihood of confusion relating to the goods and services referred to in paragraph 89 of the contested decision.

98 In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, must be rejected and, accordingly, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

99 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

100 Since a hearing has taken place and the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by EUIPO.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders T-Head (Shanghai) Semiconductor Co. Ltd to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 30 September 2026.

* Language of the case: English.