Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) 2 September 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

2 September 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the EU figurative mark newblue – Earlier EU word marks JETBLUE and BYBLUE – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑481/25,

World 2 Meet Travel, SL, established in Palma de Mallorca (Spain), represented by P. Merino Baylos and J. Gracia Albero, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by R. Raponi, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO being

JetBlue Airways Corp., established in Long Island City, New York (United States),

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),

composed of E. Buttigieg, President, M. Kancheva and E. Tichy-Fisslberger (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, World 2 Meet Travel, SL, seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 19 May 2025 (Case R 1735/2024-4) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 19 February 2021, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the following figurative sign:

3 The mark applied for covered goods and services in Classes 16, 35, 39, 41 and 43 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended.

4 On 26 May 2021, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, JetBlue Airways Corp., filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5 The opposition was based, inter alia, on the following three earlier marks:

– the EU word mark JETBLUE, covering goods and services in Classes 3, 9, 12, 16, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39 and 43 (‘earlier mark 1’);

– the EU word mark BYBLUE, covering services in Classes 35, 39, 42, 43 and 45 (‘earlier mark 2’), and

– the EU word mark JETBLUE, covering services in Class 41 (‘earlier mark 3’).

6 In relation to those three earlier marks, the grounds relied on in support of the opposition included that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

7 On 9 July 2024, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition.

8 On 3 September 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.

9 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In particular, it held that, given that the goods and services covered by the marks at issue were identical or similar and that the signs were visually, phonetically and conceptually similar to an average degree, there was, in the present case, a likelihood of confusion on the part of the English-speaking section of the relevant public.

Forms of order sought

10 The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– order EUIPO to pay the costs.

11 EUIPO contends, in essence, that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs incurred by EUIPO, in the event that a hearing is convened.

Law

12 In support of its action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, and argues, in essence, that the Board of Appeal was wrong to find, as the Opposition Division had found, that there was a likelihood of confusion in the present case.

13 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments and submits that the Board of Appeal was correct to find that there was a likelihood of confusion in the present case.

14 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. A likelihood of confusion includes a likelihood of association with the earlier mark.

15 The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS) , T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).

16 For the purposes of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel) , T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

17 Where the protection of the earlier trade mark extends to the entirety of the European Union, it is necessary to take into account the perception of the marks at issue by the consumer of the goods and services in question in that territory. However, it must be borne in mind that, for an EU trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others) , T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).

Relevant public

18 In the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, account should be taken of the average consumer of the category of goods concerned, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question (see judgment of 13 February 2007, Mundipharma v OHIM – Altana Pharma (RESPICUR) , T‑256/04, EU:T:2007:46, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

19 In the present case, in paragraph 32 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal endorsed the Opposition Division’s assessment that the goods and services at issue were aimed both at the general public and at business customers with specific professional knowledge or expertise, whose level of attention would vary from average to high depending on the price, sophistication or terms and conditions applicable to the goods and services purchased.

20 As EUIPO correctly points out, the applicant does not challenge the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the relevant public and its level of attention. Consequently, there is no reason to call it into question.

21 Furthermore, in paragraphs 35 and 36 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated that, even though the relevant public was that in the European Union as a whole, it would follow the Opposition Division in assessing the likelihood of confusion from the perspective of the English-speaking section of the relevant public, given that the signs at issue were composed of English words.

22 In the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 17 above, that approach – which, moreover, has not been challenged by the applicant – does not involve any error of law or assessment.

Comparison of the goods and services

23 In assessing the similarity of the goods or services, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, inter alia, their nature, their intended purpose and their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account, such as the distribution channels of the goods concerned (see judgment of 14 May 2013, Sanco v OHIM – Marsalman (Representation of a chicken) , T‑249/11, EU:T:2013:238, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

24 In the present case, in paragraphs 37 to 39 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal confirmed the Opposition Division’s findings that the goods and services covered by the trade mark applied for are identical or similar to the goods and services for which earlier marks 1, 2 and 3 are registered.

25 As EUIPO correctly points out, the applicant does not challenge the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the similarity of the goods and services in question. Consequently, there is no reason to call it into question.

Comparison of the signs

26 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global appreciation of that likelihood of confusion. In this regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

27 Assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 42). That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (judgment of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM , C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43).

28 As a preliminary point, in so far as the applicant submits, in essence, that the Board of Appeal based its comparison of the signs at issue solely on the common word element ‘blue’, and disregarded the remainder of those signs, namely the word elements ‘new’ and ‘jet’, as well as ‘by’, and the figurative element and stylisation of the sign applied for, it suffices to observe that, as EUIPO submits, those criticisms stem from a misreading of the contested decision. It is clear from paragraphs 62, 66, 69 and 80 of the contested decision that, in carrying out the visual, phonetic and conceptual comparison of the signs at issue, and in carrying out the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the Board of Appeal did take into account the differences between those signs arising from the different initial word elements and from the stylisation of the sign applied for, including its figurative element and its colours. It follows that, contrary to the applicant’s contention, the Board of Appeal did in fact have regard to the other elements of the signs at issue, apart from the word element ‘blue’.

The elements constituting the signs at issue

29 In the present case, before proceeding with a more detailed examination of the signs at issue with respect, first of all, to their distinctive and dominant elements (see paragraphs 49 to 61 of the contested decision and paragraphs 38 to 55 below), and then to their visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity (see paragraphs 62 to 71 of the contested decision and paragraphs 56 to 75 below), the Board of Appeal held, in paragraphs 46 to 48 of the contested decision, that the English-speaking section of the relevant public would understand the word element ‘jet’ in earlier signs 1 and 3 as referring to an aircraft, the word element ‘by’ in earlier sign 2 as an indication of the undertaking or the name of the person producing or offering the goods and services in question, the word element ‘new’ in the sign applied for as ‘something novel’, and the word element ‘blue’, which appears in second position in all the signs at issue, as the colour blue. That section of the relevant public would therefore break down the signs at issue into those different elements, which would suggest a concrete meaning or would resemble words known to that section of the public, despite the absence of a clear visual separation between them in the respective signs.

30 The applicant criticises the approach thus taken by the Board of Appeal as an ‘artificial’ dissection of the signs at issue, given that the relevant public would perceive them as a whole. It submits that both the word element of the sign applied for and the earlier word signs should be interpreted as complete phrases, such that the visual, phonetic and conceptual comparison should be carried out between the word element of the sign applied for, ‘newblue’, on the one hand, and the earlier word signs JETBLUE and BYBLUE, on the other.

31 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

32 It should be recalled that, as is apparent from settled case-law, cited by the Board of Appeal in paragraph 46 of the contested decision, even though the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details, that does not prevent that consumer, when faced with a word sign even within a composite mark, from breaking it down into verbal elements which, for him or her, suggest a concrete meaning or which resemble words known to him or her (see judgment of 12 July 2019, Audimas v EUIPO – Audi (AUDIMAS) , T‑467/18, not published, EU:T:2019:513, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

33 The Board of Appeal was therefore correct in seeking to identify, within the signs at issue, word elements which suggest a concrete meaning to the English-speaking section of the relevant public or resemble words known to that section of the relevant public.

34 In that context, the parties do not challenge the Board of Appeal’s finding, in paragraph 47 of the contested decision, that the English-speaking section of the relevant public will recognise the word elements ‘new’ and ‘blue’ in the sign applied for, and the elements ‘jet’, ‘by’ and ‘blue’ in the earlier signs. These are common English words which the English-speaking section of the relevant public will easily recognise. Consequently, contrary to the applicant’s argument, the breakdown of the signs carried out by the Board of Appeal in the present case is in no way ‘artificial’.

35 As EUIPO correctly maintains, and contrary to the applicant’s submission, the unusual combination of the letters ‘w’ and ‘b’ in the sign applied for draws the attention of the relevant public to that particular point, thereby emphasising that that combination joins two everyday English words, namely ‘new’ and ‘blue’. The applicant is therefore wrong to argue that that combination contributes to the perception of the sign applied for as a single unit.

36 Nor is it relevant for the applicant to refer to paragraphs 44 and 45 of the judgment of 12 September 2018, Chefaro Ireland v EUIPO – Laboratoires M&L (NUIT PRECIEUSE ) (T‑905/16, not published, EU:T:2018:527). As is apparent from paragraph 44 of that judgment, in that case the Board of Appeal had held that ‘the relevant French public will immediately understand either of [the signs at issue, namely the signs NUIT PRECIEUSE and EAU PRECIEUSE] as the representation of a noun, respectively “eau” or “nuit”, with an identical qualifying adjective, namely the label “précieuse”’, such that ‘the presence and meaning of that word after the noun which it complements do indeed allow the conclusion to be reached … that the first and second elements of each sign are intrinsically linked and that they will be perceived as a complete phrase …’. However, contrary to what may have been the case in relation to the signs NUIT PRECIEUSE and EAU PRECIEUSE, which the French-speaking section of the relevant public at issue in that case may have perceived as a complete phrase conforming to the standard grammatical rules, any dissection of which could only be artificial, in the present case, the English-speaking section of the relevant public will clearly distinguish the various components of the word elements of the signs at issue, since they are common English words which that section of the public will easily recognise, whereas the expression ‘newblue’ is not an everyday word and is not formed in accordance with the standard grammatical rules, such that it is in no way ‘artificial’, but rather natural, to break down the signs at issue in that way (see paragraph 34 above).

37 It follows that the Board of Appeal did not make any error of law or assessment in confirming, in paragraph 48 of the contested decision, the approach taken by the Opposition Division, which consisted, in essence, in identifying, within the signs at issue, the word elements which suggest a concrete meaning to the English-speaking section of the relevant public or resemble words known to that section of the relevant public.

The distinctive and dominant elements of the signs at issue

38 As regards the distinctive and dominant elements of the signs at issue, the Board of Appeal held, in paragraphs 49 to 61 of the contested decision, that the word element ‘jet’ in earlier signs 1 and 3 was weakly distinctive in relation to certain services at issue falling within Classes 35, 39 and 41, but nevertheless possessed average distinctive character in relation to the other goods and services. Furthermore, the word element ‘by’ of earlier sign 2 was devoid of distinctive character in respect of all the services covered by earlier mark 2. The word element ‘new’ in the sign applied for would be perceived as an indication that a new line of goods and services was being offered, and therefore had only weak distinctive character, if any. The word element ‘blue’, common to the signs at issue, would not be perceived as describing an intrinsic characteristic of the goods or services in question, and therefore possessed average distinctive character. As regards the figurative elements of the sign applied for, the stylisation of the word elements was essentially decorative and therefore possessed only a low degree of distinctive character. The depiction of a splash, although it had no clear meaning in relation to the goods and services at issue, was not likely to retain the attention of the relevant public and would be perceived as decorative. The Board of Appeal acknowledged that the colours and stylisation of the sign applied for would be perceived by the relevant public and would play a role in the overall visual impression produced by the sign applied for, but held that they were neither particularly striking nor unusual, and therefore possessed a low degree of distinctive character. The sign applied for would not give the visual impression of ‘continuity’ claimed by the applicant and would not produce an overall impression distinct from the earlier signs. Taking into account the respective size and position of the components in the sign applied for, it did not contain any single element that could be considered ‘more dominant (visually eye-catching) than other elements’.

39 The applicant argues, in essence, that the Board of Appeal focused each of its arguments on part of the sign applied for, namely the word element ‘blue’, disregarding the other elements and their impact on the overall impression. It submits that the sign applied for consists of the word element ‘newblue’. That coined word constitutes the distinctive and dominant element of the sign applied for. Even supposing a dissection into several different elements to be possible, the word element ‘new’ at the beginning of the sign applied for, which cannot be disregarded, and the figurative element, prevent the word element ‘blue’, which is not distinctive, from dominating that sign.

40 The applicant argues that, since the signs at issue coincide only in the final element, it is necessary to give special relevance to the visually noticeable differences, which influence the overall impression of the sign, especially considering that the first part of a sign tends to have a greater impact than the final part.

41 It submits that the additional figurative element, more specifically the depiction of the splash, is as significant as the word element ‘newblue’, and that its position makes it clearly visible. Furthermore, the sign applied for incorporates a specific font, a combination of contrasts, and the use of different colours (blue, purple, and green), none of which was taken into account by the Board of Appeal. The stylisation of the word element contributes to the relevant public perceiving the sign applied for as a unitary sign, and that perception is reinforced by the visual effect produced by the combination of colours and the variation in the letter design, which creates the impression of a single term. The stylisation of the word element goes far beyond its merely ornamental or decorative function, as it impacts the identification of the letters composing the sign applied for and, consequently, its word element ‘newblue’. The joining of the letters ‘w’ and ‘b’ arouses curiosity in the relevant public and contributes to the perception of the sign applied for as a single unit, which mitigates the significance of the common word element ‘blue’, positioned at the end of the sign. The figurative element of the sign applied for, consisting in a representation of a splash with a particular colour combination, is dominant within the sign applied for, given its position immediately above the word element.

42 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

43 In the first place, it follows from the considerations set out in paragraphs 32 to 37 above that the Board of Appeal was justified in identifying, within the signs at issue, those word elements which suggest a concrete meaning to the English-speaking section of the relevant public or resemble words known to that section of the relevant public. Contrary to the applicant’s submission, therefore, the comparison of the signs at issue, including the determination of their distinctive and dominant elements, should not have been limited to the complete word elements ‘newblue’, on the one hand, and ‘jetblue’ or ‘byblue’, on the other.

44 In the second place, the applicant submits that the figurative element of the sign applied for prevents the word element from being regarded as dominant.

45 First of all, as has been observed in paragraph 38 above, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 61 of the contested decision, that the sign applied for did not contain any single element that could be considered ‘more dominant (visually eye-catching) than other elements’.

46 Next, it must be recalled that it is apparent from settled case-law that, where a trade mark is composed of word and figurative elements, the former are, in principle, more distinctive than the latter, since the average consumer will more easily refer to the goods at issue by citing the name of the trade mark than by describing its figurative element (see judgment of 28 September 2022, Copal Tree Brands v EUIPO – Sumol + Compal Marcas (COPAL TREE) , T‑572/21, not published, EU:T:2022:594, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

47 It is of course true that it does not follow that the word elements of a mark must always be regarded as more distinctive than the figurative elements. In the case of a composite mark, the figurative element may rank equally with the word element (see judgment of 20 September 2017, Jordi Nogues v EUIPO – Grupo Osborne (BADTORO) , T‑350/13, EU:T:2017:633, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

48 However, contrary to the applicant’s submission, that is not the case here. First of all, the font used for the word element of the sign applied for is fairly standard. Next, the colours in which the sign applied for is presented are, similarly, not unusual. Essentially, they are different shades of blue. The ‘green’ used in that sign is more akin to turquoise and thus to an intermediate shade between green and blue, whilst the ‘purple’ constitutes a shade between blue and red. Thus, the colours used reflect the semantic content of the word element ‘blue’, which reduces their impact. Finally, the figurative element is depicted in the same colours as the word element and constitutes, according to the applicant itself, a mere ‘splash’. That ‘splash’ is, moreover, placed after the word element, slightly above it, like a footnote reference. Contrary to the applicant’s submission, so simple a shape, fitting perfectly within the colour palette used in the sign applied for and placed in that position, will in fact be perceived by the English-speaking section of the relevant public as a mere decoration and by no means as the dominant element of the sign applied for.

49 The other arguments put forward by the applicant do not lead to a different conclusion.

50 First, in so far as the applicant relies on paragraph 26 of the judgment of 12 July 2012, Pharmazeutische Fabrik Evers v OHIM – Ozone Laboratories Pharma (HYPOCHOL) (T‑517/10, not published, EU:T:2012:372), it must be observed that, in that case, the figurative elements of the sign applied for, namely two Chinese characters, were comparable in size to the letters of the word element of the sign at issue and were placed above that element, which meant that they were not negligible in the overall impression produced by the sign at issue. Since, in the present case, the Board of Appeal did not consider the figurative element to be negligible, but took it into account when comparing the signs and carrying out the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion (see paragraph 28 above), there is nothing to be drawn from that judgment that would have a bearing on the present case.

51 Secondly, in so far as the applicant bases its submissions on paragraphs 44 and 46 of the judgment of 19 June 2018, Damm v EUIPO – Schlossbrauerei Au, Willibald Beck Freiherr von Peccoz (EISKELLER) (T‑859/16, not published, EU:T:2018:352), EUIPO is correct in pointing out that, in the sign applied for in the case giving rise to that judgment, the figurative element occupied a central position and was entirely different from that at issue in the present case. Whereas, in that case, the figurative element consisted of a coat of arms and thus of a design which, historically, served to indicate a specific origin, the figurative element at issue in the present case is, in the applicant’s own words, a mere ‘splash’. Furthermore, that ‘splash’ is positioned like a footnote reference attaching to the word element, namely above and after it, and not above and centred over the word element, as was the case in the sign applied for in the case giving rise to the judgment of 19 June 2018, EISKELLER (T‑859/16, not published, EU:T:2018:352). It follows that the applicant cannot validly base its argument on that case-law either.

52 The Board of Appeal did not, therefore, make any error of law or assessment in holding that the stylisation elements of the sign applied for, including the figurative element, were no more significant in the overall impression produced by that sign than its word element ‘blue’.

53 In the third place, in so far as the applicant insists, in essence, that the initial part of the signs at issue would more strongly attract the attention of the relevant public, whereas the Board of Appeal based its findings of similarity on the common word element ‘blue’, which is the second word element in those signs, it suffices to point out that that cannot call into question the principle that the assessment of the similarity of signs must take account of the overall impression produced by those signs (judgments of 10 October 2006, Armacell v OHIM – nmc (ARMAFOAM) , T‑172/05, EU:T:2006:300, paragraph 65; of 12 November 2009, Spa Monopole v OHIM – De Francesco Import (SpagO) , T‑438/07, EU:T:2009:434, paragraph 23; and of 27 February 2014, Advance Magazine Publishers v OHIM – Nanso Group (TEEN VOGUE) , T‑509/12, EU:T:2014:89, paragraph 40).

54 In the present case, the Board of Appeal found that the initial parts of the signs at issue, namely the word element ‘new’ in the sign applied for and the word elements ‘jet’ and ‘by’ in the earlier signs, possessed only a low degree of distinctiveness or lacked distinctiveness altogether in relation to the goods and services at issue, whereas the word element ‘blue’, placed in second position in the signs at issue, was distinctive in relation to those goods and services (see paragraph 38 above), and the applicant has not made any detailed challenge to that finding. In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal cannot be criticised for having found that the word element ‘blue’, placed in second position in the signs at issue, had a greater impact on the overall perception of those signs than the word elements placed at the beginning of them.

55 In the light of the foregoing, therefore, the Board of Appeal did not make any error of law or assessment in assessing the distinctive character of the various components of the signs at issue or of those signs as a whole.

Visual similarity

56 As regards the visual comparison of the signs at issue, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 62 to 65 of the contested decision, that the signs at issue coincided in the word element ‘blue’, placed in second position, and that they differed in their first word element – ‘new’ in the sign applied for and ‘jet’ or ‘by’ in the earlier signs – as well as in the graphic representation of the sign applied for, including its figurative element and its colours. Although, according to the Board of Appeal, the relevant public generally paid more attention to the beginning of a sign than to its final part, that did not apply here, because the first word elements of the signs at issue were shorter than the second elements and had less distinctive character. The figurative elements and colours of the sign applied for were, according to the Board of Appeal, essentially decorative and therefore of secondary importance with respect to the word elements of that sign. Accordingly, the signs at issue were visually similar to an average degree.

57 The applicant submits, in essence, that the signs at issue are visually dissimilar, and that the Board of Appeal wrongly based its comparison solely on the common word element ‘blue’, disregarding the other elements of the sign applied for.

58 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

59 In the first place, it is apparent from paragraph 28 above that, contrary to the applicant’s submission, the Board of Appeal did in fact take into account both the word elements at the beginning of the signs at issue – namely ‘new’ in the sign applied for and ‘jet’ and ‘by’ in the earlier signs – and the stylisation elements of the sign applied for, including the figurative element. With regard more specifically to the visual aspect, that is clear from paragraphs 62 to 64 of the contested decision.

60 In the second place, it follows from the considerations set out in paragraphs 32 to 37 above that the Board of Appeal was justified in identifying, within the signs at issue, those word elements which suggest a concrete meaning to the English-speaking section of the relevant public or resemble words known to that section of the relevant public.

61 In the third place, it follows from paragraphs 44 to 52 above that the Board of Appeal was entitled to hold that the stylisation elements of the sign applied for, including the stylisation of the word element, were purely decorative and thus no more significant in the overall impression produced by that sign than its word element ‘blue’.

62 In the fourth place, it has been held in paragraphs 53 and 54 above that the word elements placed in first position in the signs at issue are less distinctive than the word element ‘blue’ which is placed in second position.

63 In the fifth place, in so far as the applicant refers to paragraphs 47 and 49 of the judgment of 13 November 2024, SC Certinvest v EUIPO – Kiddinx Studios (Tina) (T‑444/23, not published, EU:T:2024:826), it suffices to observe that, as EUIPO has stated, the figurative signs at issue in the case giving rise to that judgment contained a common word element represented in substantially different fonts and colours. In the present case, however, the earlier marks are word marks which may be represented in any font, of any size and any colour, including in a version corresponding to that of the mark applied for, which means that no conclusion regarding the visual comparison of the signs at issue can be drawn from the style in which the word element of the mark applied for is presented (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 March 2019, dm-drogerie markt v EUIPO – Albea Services (ALBÉA) , T‑562/17, not published, EU:T:2019:204, paragraph 32, and of 24 October 2019, MSI Svetovanje v EUIPO – Industrial Farmaceutica Cantabria (nume) , T‑41/19, not published, EU:T:2019:764, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).

64 In those circumstances, having regard to the similarities arising from the common word element ‘blue’ and the differences arising from the different beginnings of the signs and the stylisation of the sign applied for, including its figurative element, the Board of Appeal did not make any error of law or assessment in holding that, taken as a whole, and having regard to the greater distinctive character of the common word element ‘blue’, the signs at issue were visually similar to an average degree.

Phonetic similarity

65 As regards the phonetic comparison of the signs at issue, the Board of Appeal held, in paragraphs 66 to 68 of the contested decision, that they coincided in the sound of their common word element, ‘blue’, and differed in their first syllables, corresponding to the word elements ‘new’ in the sign applied for and ‘jet’ or ‘by’ in the earlier signs. According to the Board of Appeal, the signs at issue nevertheless shared the same syllabic rhythm, resulting in a similar pronunciation. Having regard to the distinctive character of each of their components, the Board of Appeal concluded that the signs at issue were phonetically similar to an average degree.

66 The applicant submits that the signs at issue are not phonetically similar. It argues that the Board of Appeal made a mistake in stating that the signs at issue consisted of three syllables, when in reality they consist of two syllables. It states however that that mistake had no impact, because the Board of Appeal focused exclusively on the common word element ‘blue’. Even supposing that it was necessary to break down the word elements of the signs at issue, the pronunciation of their initial parts would be different. As the beginning of the signs has a greater impact in the assessment of their similarity, the signs at issue are, it argues, phonetically dissimilar.

67 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

68 First, the applicant is correct in criticising the Board of Appeal for having stated, in paragraph 67 of the contested decision, that the signs at issue comprised three syllables, when in fact they comprise only two. However, that is clearly a clerical error which does not detract from the finding that the syllabic rhythm of the signs at issue is the same, and that error thus had no impact on the Board of Appeal’s conclusion regarding the phonetic similarity of the signs at issue, as the applicant acknowledges.

69 Secondly, in the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 59 to 62 above, the Board of Appeal did not make any error of law or assessment in finding that, taken as a whole, the signs at issue were phonetically similar to an average degree.

Conceptual similarity

70 As regards the conceptual comparison of the signs at issue, in paragraphs 69 to 71 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal held that they all conveyed the same reference to the colour blue, due to the presence of the common word element, ‘blue’, which was distinctive. According to the Board of Appeal, they differed in the meaning of their first word elements – ‘new’ for the sign applied for and ‘jet’ or ‘by’ for the earlier signs – which referred to different concepts but were weakly distinctive in relation to the goods and services at issue. Their presence was not capable of counteracting the conceptual similarity arising from the common word element ‘blue’. The word elements of the sign applied for, taken as a whole, namely ‘newblue’, did not convey a clear meaning to the relevant public. The signs at issue were therefore conceptually similar to an average degree.

71 According to the applicant, the Board of Appeal acknowledged that the sign applied for has no meaning for the relevant public. The applicant therefore submits that it is not possible to carry out a conceptual comparison of the signs at issue.

72 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

73 In so far as, as the applicant admits, none of the signs at issue, taken as a whole, conveys a clear concept, the Board of Appeal was entitled to base its analysis of conceptual similarity on those components of the word elements of the signs at issue which suggest a concrete meaning to the English-speaking section of the relevant public or resemble words known to that section of the relevant public.

74 As the applicant itself correctly points out, the Board of Appeal concluded that the signs at issue were conceptually similar on the basis of the word element ‘blue’, which refers to the colour blue. In view of the conceptual differences arising from the word elements placed in first position in the signs at issue and the considerations set out in paragraph 62 above, the Board of Appeal did not make any error of law or assessment in finding that, taking each one as a whole, the signs at issue were conceptually similar to an average degree.

75 Having regard to the conceptual similarity thus arising from the meaning of the common word element ‘blue’ in the minds of the English-speaking section of the relevant public, it is inapposite for the applicant to refer to the case-law concerning cases in which the marks at issue, or only one of them, have no semantic meaning.

Likelihood of confusion

76 According to settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the existence of a likelihood of confusion depends on numerous elements, in particular the recognition of the trade mark on the market, the association which can be made with the used or registered sign, and the degree of similarity between the trade mark and the sign and between the goods or services identified. The likelihood of confusion must therefore be appreciated globally, taking into account all the relevant factors of the particular case (see judgment of 12 June 2019, Hansson , C‑705/17, EU:C:2019:481, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

77 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account, and in particular between the similarity of the trade marks and the similarity of the goods or services concerned. Accordingly, a lesser degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon , C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, VENADO with frame and others , T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

78 The Board of Appeal held, in paragraphs 77 to 83 of the contested decision, first, that the earlier marks were inherently distinctive to an average degree, secondly, that the goods and services at issue were either identical or similar to an average degree, thirdly, that the relevant public displayed an average to high level of attention, fourthly, that the signs at issue were visually, phonetically and conceptually similar to an average degree, given that they shared the distinctive word element ‘blue’, that they differed in the additional word elements which were weakly distinctive or non-distinctive, and that the graphical representation of the sign applied for was not sufficient to outweigh the visual similarities, and fifthly, that a likelihood of confusion could not therefore be ruled out, at least as regards the English-speaking section of the relevant public.

79 The applicant submits that, in the overall assessment of the marks, the impact of the non-common elements on the overall impression must also be considered in order to reach a conclusion on similarity. In the present case, the sign applied for consists of highly stylised letters, which create a different visual impression from the earlier signs. The phonetic and word differences occur at the beginning of the signs, which has a greater impact on the comparison. Even if the relevant public detected some similarity between the signs at issue due to the common element ‘blue’, the other components of the signs at issue are such that the relevant public would not be misled as to the commercial origin of the goods and services in question. Those differences will be clearly perceived and are sufficient to rule out any similarity between the signs, such that no likelihood of confusion can exist.

80 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

81 In that regard, it must be observed that the applicant’s arguments do not amount, in essence, to any more than a challenge to the Board of Appeal’s findings regarding the similarity of the signs at issue, and in particular their visual and phonetic similarity. Those arguments have been rejected above, however. Since the applicant has not put forward any other argument seeking to challenge the Board of Appeal’s global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, it must be concluded that the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that, on the whole, even for a relevant public displaying, in part, a high level of attention, there was a likelihood of confusion in the present case, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

82 In the light of all of the foregoing considerations, the single plea in law relied on by the applicant in support of the form of order it seeks must be rejected, and the action must be dismissed.

Costs

83 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

84 Although the applicant has been unsuccessful, EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened. Since no hearing was convened, each party must be ordered to bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders each party to bear its own costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 2 September 2026.

* Language of the case: English.