Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) 30 September 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)

30 September 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – International registration designating the European Union – Word mark MARKETVECTOR – Earlier EU word mark VECTOR FUND – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Genuine use of the earlier mark – Article 47(2) and (3) of Regulation 2017/1001 – Form differing in elements which do not alter the distinctive character – Article 18(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑494/25,

Van Eck Associates Corp., established in New York, New York (United States), represented by M. Groebl, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by A. Ringelhann, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

Vector S.A., established in Luxembourg (Luxembourg), represented by K. Neefs and L. De Meese, lawyers,

THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber),

composed of P. Škvařilová-Pelzl (Rapporteur), President, D. Kukovec and R. Pezzuto, Judges,

Registrar: G. Mitrev, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 18 March 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Van Eck Associates Corp., seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 23 May 2025 (Case R 77/2025-4) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 20 May 2022, the applicant designated the European Union for the international registration of the word sign MARKETVECTOR, with a date of priority of 29 March 2022 based on United States trade mark No 97 336 094.

3 The mark applied for covers services in Class 36 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding to the following description: ‘Development and issuance of financial instruments, namely, exchange traded funds and exchange traded notes; providing financial indices based upon selected groups of securities and other assets’.

4 On 26 October 2022, the intervener, Vector S.A., filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the services referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5 The opposition was based on the earlier EU word mark VECTOR FUND, filed on 3 June 2015 and registered on 18 September 2015 under No 14 190 805 in respect of services in Class 36 corresponding to the following description: ‘Insurance underwriting; banking; monetary affairs; real estate brokerage; real estate services; real estate acquisition services; real estate appraisal; capital investment brokerage; mutual funds; trust investment services’.

6 The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1). In the context of that opposition, the applicant requested that the intervener furnish proof of use of its earlier mark.

7 The intervener furnished the following evidence in order to prove genuine use of the earlier mark:

– Annex 1: statement of operations and changes in net assets in respect of the years 2017 to 2022;

– Annex 2: screenshots from the intervener’s website;

– Annex 3: a sworn statement signed by the President of the Board of the intervener in relation to the newsletters sent by the intervener to clients;

– Annex 4: blog posts and newsletters dated from 2017 to 2022, published by the intervener;

– Annex 5: articles dated from 2017 to 2022, published in connection with the intervener’s activity under the trade mark VECTOR;

– Annex 6: overview of fund registration by Morningstar in Luxembourg, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden.

8 By decision of 14 November 2024, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition, finding, first, that there had been genuine use of the earlier mark and, second, that there was a likelihood of confusion.

9 On 13 January 2025, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.

10 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal. First, it considered that the use of the element ‘vector’ was sufficient to demonstrate use of the earlier mark as a trade mark. Furthermore, it found that the use of that element in forms different from that in which the earlier mark had been registered, with additional elements such as ‘flexible’, ‘navigator’ or ‘top managers mixed’, did not alter its distinctive character. Second, the Board of Appeal found that there was a likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. More specifically, it considered that the earlier mark had an average degree of distinctiveness and that the signs at issue had an average degree of phonetic, visual and conceptual similarity, with the result that the relevant public might make a connection between the marks, despite the addition of other non-distinctive elements during use of the earlier mark.

Forms of order sought

11 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– order EUIPO to pay the costs, including those incurred for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.

12 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.

13 The intervener contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

Subject matter of the proceedings

14 By letter of 12 May 2025, the applicant filed an application with EUIPO to restrict the list of services covered by the mark applied for, in accordance with Article 49(1) of Regulation 2017/1001. In that regard, the applicant waives registration of the mark applied for in respect of the services ‘Development and issuance of financial instruments, namely, exchange traded funds and exchange traded notes’ in Class 36.

15 In principle, a restriction, within the meaning of Article 49(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, made to the list of goods or services contained in an EU trade mark application after the adoption of the decision of the Board of Appeal challenged before the Court cannot affect the legality of that decision, which is the only decision being challenged before the Court (see judgment of 9 July 2008, Reber v OHIM – Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli (Mozart) , T‑304/06, EU:T:2008:268, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

16 Thus, where the restriction of the list of goods or services covered by the mark applied for has the object of changing, in whole or in part, the description of those goods or services, it cannot be ruled out that that alteration might have had an effect on the examination of the trade mark in question carried out at various stages by EUIPO in the course of the administrative procedure. Accordingly, to allow that alteration at the stage of the action before the Court would amount to changing the subject matter of pending proceedings, which is prohibited by Article 188 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court (see judgment of 9 July 2008, Mozart , T‑304/06, EU:T:2008:268, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

17 Therefore, since the application to restrict the list of services covered by the mark applied for was filed after the adoption of the contested decision, it cannot be taken into account by the Court and must be rejected as inadmissible.

Substance

18 In support of its action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law, alleging, first, in essence, infringement of Article 47(2) and (3) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 18(1)(a) of that regulation, and, second, infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of that regulation.

The first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 47(2) and (3) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 18(1)(a) of that regulation

19 By its first plea, alleging, in essence, infringement of Article 47 of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 18(1)(a) of that regulation, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal found, first, that the earlier mark had been put to genuine use as a trade mark during the relevant period and, second, that that mark had been used in a form differing in elements which did not alter the distinctive character of the mark in the form in which it had been registered.

20 In the first place, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal considered, in paragraph 47 of the contested decision, that the earlier mark had been used as a trade mark on the ground that there was no doubt that that mark operated as a link between the services at issue and the undertaking which provided them. According to the applicant, the Board of Appeal based its reasoning on evidence relating solely to the use of the single element ‘vector’ as a trade name or company name of the intervener, or as an element combined with other word elements which, taken as a whole, designate other financial products, with the result that it cannot be concluded that the earlier mark has been used as a trade mark.

21 In the second place, as regards the nature of the use, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in finding that the use of the element ‘vector’, combined with other elements such as ‘navigator’, ‘flexible’, ‘top managers mixed’ and ‘SICAV’, did not alter the distinctive character of the earlier mark. It submits, in that regard, that those additional word elements could not be regarded as negligible since they identified separate funds. Furthermore, the applicant maintains that the use of the element ‘vector’ together with a figurative element, as represented below, also infringes Article 18(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001:

22 The applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s finding, in paragraph 53 of the contested decision, that the element ‘fund’ is non-distinctive, such that its omission does not alter the distinctive character of the earlier mark. However, it does dispute the application of that approach, as set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the contested decision, to the elements ‘flexible’, ‘navigator’ and ‘top managers mixed’ and to use in combination with the figurative element reproduced in paragraph 21 above. Moreover, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in relation to the distinctive character attributed to the word element ‘vector’, which is common to the signs at issue, in view of its meaning and use in the financial markets industry.

23 According to the applicant, first, the use of the element ‘vector’, together with a figurative element, constitutes use as a trade name and cannot therefore be taken into consideration regarding use as a trade mark.

24 Second, the applicant maintains that the word elements added to the element ‘vector’ are not descriptive, contrary to the conclusions drawn by the Board of Appeal in paragraph 55 of the contested decision, and are distinctive, since they refer to separate funds and are not descriptive of the services covered. In addition, the applicant argues that, contrary to the Board of Appeal’s findings in paragraph 58 of the contested decision, the element ‘vector’ was not used on its own as a trade mark but as a company name or as a trade name, and that it is used in conjunction with other word elements, as is apparent from Annexes 1.11, 1.12, 4.4 and 4.5 produced before EUIPO.

25 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes the applicant’s arguments.

26 Article 47(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, if the applicant so requests, the proprietor of an earlier EU trade mark who has given notice of opposition is to furnish proof that, during the five-year period preceding the date of filing or the date of priority of the EU trade mark application, the earlier EU trade mark has been put to genuine use in the European Union in connection with the goods or services in respect of which it is registered and which he or she cites as justification for his or her opposition, or that there are proper reasons for non-use, provided that the earlier EU trade mark has at that date been registered for not less than five years. In the absence of proof to this effect, the opposition is to be rejected. Paragraph 3 of Article 47 of Regulation 2017/1001 states that paragraph 2 of that article is to apply to earlier national trade marks referred to in Article 8(2)(a) of that regulation, by substituting use in the Member State in which the earlier national trade mark is protected for use in the European Union.

27 Such a request therefore has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the opponent to demonstrate genuine use of his or her mark, or the existence of proper reasons for non-use, if he or she is not to have his or her opposition rejected (see judgment of 22 March 2007, Saint-Gobain Pam v OHIM – Propamsa (PAM PLUVIAL) , T‑364/05, EU:T:2007:96, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

28 For the purpose of interpreting the concept of ‘genuine use’, account must be taken of the fact that the ratio legis of the requirement that the earlier mark must have been put to genuine use if it is to be capable of being used in opposition to an EU trade mark application is to restrict the number of conflicts between two marks, unless there is a good commercial justification for the lack of genuine use of the earlier mark deriving from an actual function of the mark on the market. However, the purpose of the provisions recalled in paragraph 26 above is not to assess commercial success or to review the economic strategy of an undertaking, nor are they intended to restrict trade-mark protection to the case where large-scale commercial use has been made of the marks (see judgment of 12 November 2025, Centex v EUIPO – Adler Modemärkte (OWN) , T‑34/25, not published, EU:T:2025:1019, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

29 There is genuine use of a trade mark where the mark is used in accordance with its essential function, which is to guarantee the identity of origin of the goods or services for which it is registered, in order to create or preserve an outlet for those goods or services; genuine use does not include token use for the sole purpose of preserving the rights conferred by the mark (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 March 2003, Ansul , C‑40/01, EU:C:2003:145, paragraph 43).

30 When assessing whether use of the trade mark is genuine, regard must be had to all the facts and circumstances relevant to establishing whether the commercial use of the mark is real, particularly the practices regarded as warranted in the relevant economic sector as a means of maintaining or creating market shares for the goods or services protected by the mark, the nature of those goods or services, the characteristics of the market and the scale and frequency of use of the mark (judgment of 8 July 2004, Sunrider v OHIM – Espadafor Caba (VITAFRUIT) , T‑203/02, EU:T:2004:225, paragraph 40; see also, by analogy, judgment of 11 March 2003, Ansul , C‑40/01, EU:C:2003:145, paragraph 43).

31 In addition, it should be noted that, according to Article 18(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, proof of genuine use of a trade mark also includes proof of its use in a form differing in elements which do not alter the distinctive character of the mark in the form in which it was registered.

32 The purpose of that provision, which avoids imposing strict conformity between the form of the trade mark as used and the form in which the mark was registered, is to allow its proprietor, in the commercial exploitation of the sign, to make variations which, without altering its distinctive character, enable it to be better adapted to the marketing and promotion requirements of the goods or services concerned. In accordance with its purpose, the material scope of that provision must be regarded as limited to situations in which the sign actually used by the proprietor of a trade mark to identify the goods or services in respect of which the mark was registered constitutes the form in which that same mark is commercially exploited. In such situations, where the sign used in trade differs from the form in which it was registered only in insignificant respects, and the two signs can therefore be regarded as broadly equivalent, Article 18(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001 envisages that the obligation to use the trade mark which was registered may be fulfilled by furnishing proof of use of the sign which constitutes the form in which it is used in trade (see judgment of 19 March 2025, Asaş Alüminyum v EUIPO – Asfaltos del Sureste (ASAŞ) , T‑172/24, not published, EU:T:2025:313, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

33 Thus, a finding that the distinctive character of the mark as registered has been altered requires an assessment of the distinctive and dominant character of the elements added, carried out on the basis of the intrinsic qualities of each of those elements and of the relative position of the different elements within the arrangement of the trade mark (see judgment of 10 June 2010, Atlas Transport v OHIM – Hartmann (ATLAS TRANSPORT) , T‑482/08, not published, EU:T:2010:229, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

34 In that regard, it is settled case-law that, for the purpose of assessing the distinctive character of an element making up a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods or services for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the element in question in the light of whether it is at all descriptive of the goods or services for which the mark has been registered (see judgment of 21 December 2021, Dr. Spiller v EUIPO – Rausch (Alpenrausch Dr. Spiller) , T‑6/20, not published, EU:T:2021:920, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).

35 In addition, where a mark is constituted or composed of a number of elements and one or more of them is not distinctive, the alteration of those elements or their omission is not such as to alter the distinctive character of that trade mark as a whole (see judgment of 10 September 2025, Vintae Luxury Wine Specialists v EUIPO – R. López de Heredia Viña Tondonia (LOPEZ DE HEREDIA) , T‑516/24, not published, EU:T:2025:856, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).

36 As a preliminary point, it must be observed that, in essence, the applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s assessments relating to the time, place and extent of use of the earlier mark. Moreover, it must also be borne in mind, as was confirmed at the hearing, that the file relating to the proceedings before EUIPO does not contain any evidence capable of demonstrating use of the earlier mark in the exact form in which it was registered.

37 In the first place, as regards the distinctive character of the earlier mark, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law, although the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details, the fact remains that, when perceiving a word sign, the average consumer will break it down into word elements which, for him or her, suggest a concrete and immediately understandable meaning or which resemble words known to him or her (see judgment of 1 February 2023, NFL Properties Europe v EUIPO – Groupe Duval (DUUUVAL) , T‑671/21, not published, EU:T:2023:33, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

38 Furthermore, according to settled case-law, a term with a clear meaning is considered to be descriptive only if there is a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between that term and the goods and services at issue to enable the public concerned immediately to perceive, without further thought, a description of the goods and services at issue or one of their characteristics (see judgment of 24 February 2016, Tayto Group v OHIM – MIP Metro (REAL HAND COOKED) , T‑816/14, not published, EU:T:2016:93, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

39 In the present case, first, the Board of Appeal correctly observes, in paragraph 52 of the contested decision, that the earlier mark is a word mark composed of the elements ‘vector’ and ‘fund’. It also correctly confirms the definition taken from the Collins Dictionary , which is an online source that is generally accessible to the general public (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 June 2024, Amstel Brouwerij v EUIPO – Anheuser-Busch (ULTRA) , T‑170/23, not published, EU:T:2024:375, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited), according to which the term ‘vector’ refers to a mathematical or scientific concept denoting a variable quantity, such as force, that has magnitude and direction and can be resolved into components that are odd functions of the coordinates.

40 According to the Board of Appeal, in the light of that definition, the element ‘vector’ is the most distinctive element of the earlier mark inasmuch as it does not refer directly to any characteristics of the services concerned. In its view, that element does not immediately suggest financial activities, portfolio management or capital markets. It found, in addition, that, despite the possibility of it being used in a metaphorical sense which could suggest direction or movement in investment, the relevant public would need to go through several mental steps in order to establish a link between that term and the nature, quality, purpose or other characteristics of those services. Those findings, which are free from error, must be upheld.

41 More specifically, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in considering that, in the field of financial services, the expression ‘vector’ is not capable of being laudatory, since it has a neutral connotation which, in the sense of mathematical directional movement, can indicate any direction, including downward trends.

42 Second, as regards the applicant’s arguments alleging failure by the Board of Appeal to take into account other registrations in the financial industry which include the element ‘vector’ in their company name, it should be borne in mind that the relevant factor for the purpose of disputing the distinctive character of an element is its actual use on the market and not in registers or databases (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 8 March 2013, Mayer Naman v OHIM – Daniel e Mayer (David Mayer) , T‑498/10, not published, EU:T:2013:117, paragraph 77, and of 2 December 2014, Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma v OHIM – Nepentes Pharma (Momarid) , T‑75/13, not published, EU:T:2014:1017, paragraph 85).

43 It suffices to observe that the applicant has not furnished any evidence, apart from screenshots showing an internet search engine, which would demonstrate actual use of those registrations on the market concerned and that, therefore, the references to existing trade mark registrations are not capable of establishing the actual circumstances of use, on the relevant market, of the element ‘vector’ as contained in those marks.

44 Accordingly, the Board of Appeal was correct in finding, in essence, in paragraph 85 of the contested decision, that the applicant had not furnished sufficient evidence to show that the distinctive character of the element ‘vector’ was weakened as a result of its frequent use on the relevant market.

45 Third, as regards the element ‘fund’, the Board of Appeal notes, in paragraph 53 of the contested decision, in the light of the definition taken from the Cambridge Dictionary , that it refers to an amount of money saved, collected or provided for a particular purpose. It was therefore correct to find, in the same paragraph of the contested decision – and, moreover, without this being disputed by the parties in the present action – that the omission of that element during the use of the earlier mark is not such as to alter the distinctive character of that mark, given its descriptive and insignificant nature, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraphs 32 and 35 above.

46 In the light of the foregoing, the Board of Appeal correctly concluded, in paragraph 100 of the contested decision, that the earlier mark, as a whole, had no meaning for the services in respect of which genuine use had been proved, from the point of view of the relevant public, and that it therefore had an average degree of distinctiveness despite the presence of the descriptive element ‘fund’.

47 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s arguments relating to the use of the earlier mark as a trade mark, the Board of Appeal was correct in considering, in paragraph 47 of the contested decision, that there was no doubt that the earlier mark operated as a link between the services at issue and the undertaking responsible for their provision, such that the relevant public could recognise the origin of those services and distinguish it from the origin of other services coming from other undertakings.

48 Indeed, part of the evidence demonstrates use of the element ‘vector’ as a company name, as the applicant claims. Moreover, numerous items of evidence in the file show that the element ‘vector’ is also used to designate the name of the services at issue, thereby demonstrating its use as a trade mark.

49 It is true that not every use of the mark necessarily amounts to use as a trade mark (judgment of 22 June 2006, Storck v OHIM , C‑24/05 P, EU:C:2006:421, paragraph 62). Nevertheless, the use of a sign as a company name, business name or trade name may be regarded as use as a trade mark, provided that the goods or services concerned are themselves identified and offered on the market under that sign (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 April 2011, Alder Capital v OHIM – Gimv Nederland (ALDER CAPITAL) , T‑209/09, not published, EU:T:2011:169, paragraph 56). That condition is satisfied where the sign used as a company, trade or shop name is used in such a way that a link is established between that sign and the goods marketed or the services provided (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 11 September 2007, Céline , C‑17/06, EU:C:2007:497, paragraphs 21 to 23). For example, the use of a sign as a company name in the header of order forms or invoices may, depending on the form in which the sign appears on them, be sufficient to substantiate genuine use of the mark concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 November 2014, Popp and Zech v OHIM – Müller-Boré & Partner (MB) , T‑463/12, not published, EU:T:2014:935, paragraphs 44 and 45).

50 In that regard, the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that it was apparent from Annexes 2.3, 2.10, 2.13, 5.1, 5.5 and 5.6 that the intervener had, on numerous occasions, made use of its full company name, namely ‘Vector Asset Management’, in certain types of documents such as articles, press releases and financial statements. It also observed that, in those instances, the company name was often followed by its legal form, as is apparent from Annex 5.10, where the form of the company Vector is referred to as a public limited company through the use of the name ‘Vector Asset Management S.A.’, or through the reference to its address and other contact details, as is apparent from Annexes 4.1 to 4.10, in which the intervener reproduces the figurative elements used to refer to the undertaking Vector under its company name ‘Vector Asset Management’. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal was justified in finding that use as a company name of the company Vector Asset Management had been demonstrated by the various items of evidence.

51 Furthermore, it is apparent from EUIPO’s file that the intervener also uses the element ‘vector’ in word form or in a figurative form which refers to the trade name of the company Vector Asset Management.

52 The figurative element VECTOR is frequently affixed close to the company name, as is apparent from the annexes referred to in paragraph 50 above. In addition, it is clear from all the screenshots of the intervener’s website, or from the headers of the various financial statements set out in Annex 1, that the intervener uses its trade name regularly and in a figurative form. The use of the trade name Vector alone in the intervener’s written pleadings before the Court or during the opposition proceedings before EUIPO also supports the conclusion that the intervener has used the element ‘vector’ of its earlier mark as a trade name and as a company name.

53 Furthermore, the Board of Appeal was also correct in considering that the element ‘vector’ of the earlier mark VECTOR FUND had been used as a trade mark, for the purposes of the case-law referred to in paragraph 29 above. In particular, in Annex 1, relating to statements of operations and changes in net assets in respect of the years 2017 to 2022, the element ‘vector’ appears in the top-left corner of the document, separately and independently from the title of the fund to which that document refers, such as ‘flexible’, ‘navigator’ or ‘top managers mixed’, and may thus be regarded as both a trade name and a trade mark which identifies the commercial origin of the funds, since that element is linked to the various funds identified.

54 In addition, in Annex 2.1, the element ‘vector’, used in a figurative form, by virtue of its position in the top-left corner in the screenshot of the intervener’s website, may be linked as a trade mark identifying the funds ‘Navigator’, ‘Flexible’ and ‘Top Managers Mixed’. The same is true of Annexes 4.1, 4.4 and 4.5, from which it is apparent that the element ‘vector’, used in isolation to identify the intervener, may be linked to the funds which are the subject of the services provided since those services are identified and are the subject of awards presented to the intervener.

55 Annexes 5.2, 5.6, 5.8, 5.10 and 5.11 also show the figurative element ‘vector’ being used in conjunction with the fund that is the subject of the press article, thus identifying the service to which the mark covering it relates, and operating both as a company name or trade name and as a trade mark enabling the commercial origin of various lines of services in Class 36 to be identified, as the Board of Appeal correctly found in paragraph 58 of the contested decision.

56 It follows that use of the earlier mark has been demonstrated in respect of the services covered by that mark, notwithstanding the omission of the descriptive element ‘fund’, which is not such as to alter the distinctive character of that mark.

57 In the third place, as regards the applicant’s arguments relating to the alteration of the distinctive character of the earlier mark through the addition of a number of elements, namely ‘navigator’, ‘flexible’, ‘top managers mixed’ and ‘SICAV’, it must be observed, first, as the Board of Appeal points out in paragraph 70 of the contested decision, that, in so far as they are relevant factors to be taken into account in the present case, the services covered by the earlier mark all refer to the field of finance and are primarily aimed at the general public and the professional public. Furthermore, given that the services at issue concern consumers’ economic and financial assets and are therefore of some economic importance to the public, the level of attention of that public is relatively high.

58 Second, it is apparent from the evidence submitted by the intervener, inter alia the screenshot of its website contained in Annex 2.6 to EUIPO’s file, that the elements ‘navigator’, ‘flexible’, ‘top managers mixed’ and ‘SICAV’ refer to separate funds or to legal forms of various funds. In carrying out its examination from the point of view of the relevant public whose level of attention is relatively high and, in the light of all the evidence produced by the intervener – in addition to the definitions taken from online dictionaries and a screenshot of a website specialised in financial services, which the intervener produced as an additional item of evidence before the Opposition Division – the Board of Appeal correctly found, in paragraph 55 of the contested decision, that the element ‘navigator’ referred to a fund which was intended to steer investors towards successful outcomes by navigating through market conditions. Next, it also correctly considered that the element ‘flexible’ referred to the concept of a mutual fund or other pooled investment which had flexibility in making investment decisions, and that the element ‘top managers mixed’ referred to a fund allocating a variety of assets based on the strategies of the leading fund managers.

59 As regards the element ‘SICAV’, it must be noted that it refers to a legal form of investment fund, namely an investment company with variable capital under Luxembourg law.

60 In that regard, as the intervener correctly contends, it is true that those elements make it possible to identify distinct funds which constitute different services offered by the undertaking Vector under the trade mark ‘Vector’. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the relevant public, whose level of attention is relatively high, all the elements ‘navigator’, ‘flexible’, ‘top managers mixed’ and ‘SICAV’ are descriptive of the characteristics of the various funds, as is apparent from paragraphs 58 and 59 above, and are therefore descriptive of the services covered by the earlier mark. Consequently, the addition of those descriptive elements to the distinctive element ‘vector’ of the earlier mark is not such as to alter the distinctive character of that mark, inasmuch as the use in those different forms makes it possible to identify the commercial origin of the services at issue and, accordingly, enables the essential functions of a trade mark to be fulfilled.

61 In view of all of the foregoing, the Board of Appeal did not make any error of assessment or error of law in finding that the earlier mark had been put to genuine use, within the meaning of Article 47(2) and (3) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 18(1)(a) of that regulation, in connection with the services covered by that mark, notwithstanding the omission of the descriptive element ‘fund’ or the addition of other descriptive elements, such as ‘flexible’, ‘navigator’ or ‘top managers mixed’, which are insignificant.

62 The first plea in law must accordingly be rejected as unfounded.

The second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001

63 By its second plea, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal infringed Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 by finding that there was a likelihood of confusion.

64 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes the applicant’s arguments.

65 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.

66 The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services at issue come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services at issue and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS) , T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).

67 A likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel) , T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

– The relevant public and its level of attention

68 In paragraphs 70 and 71 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal considered, first, that all the services at issue referred to the field of finance and investment, which were aimed primarily at the general public and at financial industry professionals, displaying a relatively high level of attention, and, second, that, since the earlier mark was an EU trade mark, the relevant territory was that of the European Union.

69 Those assessments – which, moreover, are not disputed – are well founded and must be upheld.

– The comparison of the services at issue

70 As a preliminary point, the applicant submits that the services at issue are different following the restriction made by means of the letter of 12 May 2025 (see paragraph 14 above), in so far as the services covered by the mark applied for, following restriction, are aimed at asset managers and/or issuers of investment products, unlike the services offered under the earlier mark, which are aimed in particular at retail, professional and institutional clients.

71 As is apparent from paragraph 17 above, that restriction cannot be taken into account by the Court since it is inadmissible. Accordingly, the applicant’s arguments relating to the comparison of the services following the restriction made after the adoption of the contested decision are also inadmissible, with the result that the Court will examine the legality of that decision as adopted by the Board of Appeal.

72 In assessing the similarity of the goods or services at issue, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, in particular, their nature, their intended purpose, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account such as the distribution channels of the goods concerned (see judgment of 14 May 2013, Sanco v OHIM – Marsalman (Representation of a chicken) , T‑249/11, EU:T:2013:238, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

73 Furthermore, it must be pointed out that goods and services may be regarded as identical where the goods and services covered by the earlier mark are included in a more general category covered by the later mark. Likewise, where the goods and services covered by the earlier mark include the goods and services covered by the mark applied for, those goods and services are considered to be identical (see judgment of 17 April 2024, Unilab v EUIPO – Cofares (Healthily) , T‑288/23, not published, EU:T:2024:241, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

74 In the present case, in paragraphs 74 and 75 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal confirmed in full, by adopting them, the findings of the Opposition Division regarding the similarity of the services at issue, which, moreover, were not disputed by the applicant in the context of its appeal before that Board, in accordance with paragraph 32 of its written statement setting out the grounds of appeal.

75 It must be recalled, in that respect, that a Board of Appeal may lawfully adopt the grounds of a decision taken by the Opposition Division, which thus make up an integral part of the reasons for the Board’s own decision (see judgment of 13 September 2010, Inditex v OHIM – Marín Díaz de Cerio (OFTEN) , T‑292/08, EU:T:2010:399, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

76 In the present case, the Opposition Division found that the services covered by the mark applied for were similar to a high degree to the ‘capital investment brokerage services’ covered by the earlier mark, that they were also services of a financial nature and that, as such, having the same nature and purpose, namely capital growth, they could target the same relevant public, namely investors, and were usually offered by the same undertakings.

77 There is no need to call into question the Opposition Division’s assessments relating to the comparison of the services, which were endorsed by the Board of Appeal and constitute a correct application of the case-law cited in paragraphs 72, 73 and 75 above.

– The comparison of the signs at issue

78 It is apparent from the case-law that two marks are similar, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, where, from the point of view of the relevant public, they are at least partially identical as regards one or more relevant aspects (see judgment of 17 December 2009, Notartel v OHIM – SAT.1 (R.U.N.) , T‑490/07, not published, EU:T:2009:522, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

79 According to settled case-law, the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services at issue plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

80 The question whether the Board of Appeal was correct in considering that there was an average degree of similarity between the signs at issue must be examined in the light of those considerations. Before addressing the question of the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, it is necessary to examine the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements of those signs.

(1) The distinctive and dominant elements of the signs at issue

81 The applicant complains that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in relation to the level of distinctiveness attributed to the word element ‘vector’, which is common to the signs at issue, in view of its meaning and use in the financial markets industry. Furthermore, as regards the word element ‘market’ of which the mark applied for consists, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 89 to 93 of the contested decision, that that element was non-distinctive.

82 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes the applicant’s arguments.

83 In the first place, as regards possible dominant elements of the signs at issue, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law, word marks consist entirely of letters, words or associations of words which are written in printed characters in a normal font without any specific graphic element. Such marks therefore do not have a dominant element since, by their nature, none of the constituent elements has a particular graphic or stylistic aspect which is capable of giving it such a character (see judgment of 2 March 2022, UGA Nutraceuticals v EUIPO – Vitae Health Innovation (VITADHA) , T‑149/21, not published, EU:T:2022:103, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited).

84 Thus, since the marks at issue are word marks, none of the signs in question contains dominant elements.

85 In the second place, first, as regards the distinctive character of the elements making up the marks at issue, it must be observed, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 34, 37 and 38 above, that the Board of Appeal correctly concluded that the word element ‘vector’ of the earlier mark was distinctive, since it had no direct relationship with the services at issue and, moreover, that the word element ‘fund’ of that mark was descriptive of the services at issue.

86 Second, as regards the element ‘market’ of the mark applied for, it must be borne in mind, in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 37 above, that the average consumer is likely to perceive it as meaning, according to the Collins Dictionary , ‘the trading or selling opportunities provided by a particular group of people’. In that regard, the Board of Appeal correctly concluded, in paragraph 91 of the contested decision, that, having regard to the services covered by the mark applied for, which were, in essence, all related to the financial market, that element was non-distinctive.

87 Third, the applicant complains, in essence, that the Board of Appeal did not take sufficient account of the value of the third-party trade marks containing the element ‘market’ which it had provided in the context of the appeal brought before that Board.

88 The applicant submits that, while it is true that it was difficult to provide third-party trade marks consisting precisely of the single element ‘market’, the fact remains that third-party trade marks containing that element, together with an additional element which is certainly not distinctive, should also be taken into consideration. Moreover, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal erred in rejecting the third-party trade marks which it had provided since they were registered by national authorities outside the European Union, whereas it would have been easy for the Board of Appeal to verify that all those trade marks were in fact EU trade marks or international registrations designating the European Union.

89 In the present case, in paragraph 42 of its written statement setting out the grounds of its appeal before the Board of Appeal, the applicant listed a number of registrations relating to services in Class 36, which contain the element ‘market’, in its singular or plural form, added to other word elements.

90 In that respect, decisions concerning the registration of a sign as an EU trade mark which the Boards of Appeal of EUIPO take under Regulation 2017/1001 are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers and are not a matter of discretion. Accordingly, the legality of those decisions must be assessed solely on the basis of that regulation, as interpreted by the EU judicature, and not on the basis of a previous decision-making practice (see judgment of 26 April 2007, Alcon v OHIM , C‑412/05 P, EU:C:2007:252, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, in its review of legality, the Court is not bound by EUIPO’s decision-making practice (see judgment of 15 December 2015, LTJ Diffusion v OHIM – Arthur et Aston (ARTHUR & ASTON) , T‑83/14, EU:T:2015:974, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

91 It follows that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of law or assessment in finding, in paragraph 92 of the contested decision, that reliance on other EU trade mark registrations, international registrations designating the European Union or national registrations could not have any bearing on the distinctive character of the element ‘market’ of the mark applied for. The Board of Appeal correctly considered that, having regard to the registered forms of the marks relied on containing the term ‘market’, in its singular and plural forms, and combined with other terms or included in word elements, its use was not comparable to that of the element ‘market’ of the mark applied for.

92 Furthermore, it is not for the adjudicating bodies of EUIPO to seek and identify in the evidence provided by the parties the arguments or material which may be regarded as having an evidential and instrumental function (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 May 2024, Penguin Random House v EUIPO – Ediciones Literarias Independientes (PLAN B) , T‑777/22, not published, EU:T:2024:328, paragraph 113). Therefore, by merely listing other trade marks partially composed of the element ‘market’, the applicant has not furnished objective and sufficient evidence that those marks are capable of having any bearing on the distinctive character of that element.

93 It follows that the signs at issue coincide in the distinctive element ‘vector’. The element ‘fund’ of the earlier mark, on the one hand, and the element ‘market’ of the mark applied for, on the other, are descriptive or non-distinctive, with the result that they are secondary, if not insignificant, in the overall impression of the signs at issue.

(2) The visual, phonetic and conceptual comparison

94 Two signs are similar when, from the point of view of the relevant public, they are at least partially identical as regards one or more relevant aspects, namely the visual, phonetic and conceptual aspects (see judgment of 24 September 2019, Volvo Trademark v EUIPO – Paalupaikka (V V-WHEELS) , T‑356/18, EU:T:2019:690, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

95 In the present case, as EUIPO and the intervener correctly contend, the applicant does not expressly dispute the Board of Appeal’s assessments relating to the visual, phonetic and conceptual comparisons.

96 In this instance, the Board of Appeal correctly pointed out, in paragraph 94 of the contested decision, that the signs at issue coincide in the element ‘vector’, which constitutes the most distinctive element. Furthermore, those signs differ in the element ‘fund’ of the earlier mark and in the element ‘market’ of the mark applied for.

97 Although the Board of Appeal considers that, in general, the initial part of a mark normally has a greater impact, both visually and phonetically, than the final part of that mark, it nevertheless correctly pointed out, in paragraph 95 of the contested decision, that that cannot apply in all cases and cannot undermine the general principle that an examination of the similarity between the marks must take account of the overall impression given by those marks, since the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details.

98 It is apparent from the case-law that the Court must not take as its starting point the premiss that consumers pay greater attention to the beginning of a compound word sign than to the end. It may hold that the end of signs which are the subject of opposition proceedings is more distinctive or dominant than the beginning of those signs or even that one of the elements in those signs is not more distinctive or dominant than the other (see judgment of 24 April 2024, Adeva v EUIPO – Sideme (MAISON CAVIST.) , T‑313/23, not published, EU:T:2024:270, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).

99 In that respect, as regards the visual and phonetic similarities, it must be recalled, as the Board of Appeal found in paragraph 95 of the contested decision, that the element ‘fund’ of the earlier mark and the element ‘market’ of the mark applied for are descriptive of the services at issue or non-distinctive. Therefore, the relevant public, which has a relatively high level of attention, will pay greater attention to the distinctive word element ‘vector’, which is common to the signs at issue.

100 In addition, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 102 of the contested decision, that the only distinctive element of the earlier mark, namely the element ‘vector’, was fully reproduced in the mark applied for.

101 According to the case-law, that fact alone is such as to confirm that the signs at issue are partially identical and to create, in the mind of the relevant public, an impression of an average degree of visual and phonetic similarity (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 January 2026, Montepelayo v EUIPO – TRON (TELOTRÓN) , T‑203/25, not published, EU:T:2026:50, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

102 As regards the conceptual similarity, the Board of Appeal correctly found, in paragraph 96 of the contested decision, that the signs at issue were conceptually similar to an average degree, since they were associated with the abstract concept deriving from the common element ‘vector’, namely a mathematical or scientific concept denoting a variable quantity, such as force, that had magnitude and direction and could be resolved into components that were odd functions of the coordinates (see paragraph 39 above). Furthermore, in view of the fact that all the other non-common elements are devoid of distinctive character, they are not capable of creating a decisive conceptual difference between the signs at issue.

103 In the light of all of the foregoing, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of law or assessment in concluding that there was an average degree of visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity between the signs at issue.

– The distinctive character of the earlier mark

104 As has been confirmed in paragraph 46 above, the Board of Appeal correctly concluded, in paragraph 100 of the contested decision, that the earlier mark, as a whole, had no meaning for the services in respect of which genuine use had been proved, from the point of view of the relevant public, and that it therefore had an average degree of distinctiveness despite the presence of the descriptive element ‘fund’.

– The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion

105 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the signs, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon , C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 22 June 1999, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer , C‑342/97, EU:C:1999:323, paragraph 19).

106 The level of attention of the relevant public is unquestionably a factor that has to be taken into consideration in assessing whether there is a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 (judgment of 21 November 2013, Equinix (Germany) v OHIM – Acotel (ancotel.) , T‑443/12, not published, EU:T:2013:605, paragraph 52).

107 The relevant public in the present case consists of both the general public and specialised professionals who, overall, display a relatively high level of attention.

108 First, as is apparent from paragraphs 76 and 77 above, the Board of Appeal was justified in finding that the services covered by the mark applied for and those covered by the earlier mark were similar to a high degree. Second, the signs in question contain the common and distinctive word element ‘vector’ (see paragraph 96 above). Third, the Board of Appeal was also justified in considering that the signs were visually, phonetically and conceptually similar to an average degree (see paragraphs 99 to 103 above). Fourth, the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that the earlier mark had an average degree of inherent distinctiveness (see paragraphs 46 and 104 above). Fifth, the Board of Appeal was also correct in considering that the distinctive element ‘vector’ of the earlier mark was fully reproduced in the mark applied for (see paragraphs 100 and 101 above), that the non-common elements, even if they were not entirely insignificant, played a less important role in the overall impression given by the signs (see paragraph 93 above) and that, therefore, a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 cannot be ruled out, even for a public with a high level of attention.

109 It follows that the relevant public, which has a relatively high level of attention, may reasonably believe, when confronted with the mark applied for, that the services covered by that mark and the services covered by the earlier mark, which are similar to a high degree, have the same commercial origin.

110 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, since the second plea in law put forward by the applicant in support of the form of order sought by it cannot be upheld, it must be rejected as unfounded and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

111 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

112 Since a hearing took place and the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by EUIPO and the intervener, in accordance with the forms of order sought by those parties.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Van Eck Associates Corp. to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and Vector S.A.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 30 September 2026.

* Language of the case: English.