Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) 9 September 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)

9 September 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – EU figurative mark MOOVA AlmavivA Group – Earlier EU word mark MOOVIT – Relative ground for invalidity – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) and Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑495/25,

Almaviva – The Italian Innovation SpA, established in Rome (Italy), represented by F. Celluprica, F. Fischetti and F. De Bono, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by E. Lobotková and R. Raponi, acting as Agents,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO being

Moovit App Global Ltd, established in Ness Ziona (Israel),

THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber),

composed of K. Kecsmár, President, P. Nihoul and U. Öberg (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Almaviva – The Italian Innovation SpA, seeks the annulment and alteration of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 27 May 2025 (Case R 1891/2024-5) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 16 May 2023, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, Moovit App Global Ltd, lodged an application with EUIPO for a declaration of invalidity of the EU trade mark registered following an application lodged on 17 February 2022, pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), for the following figurative sign:

3 The goods and services covered by the contested mark in respect of which a declaration of invalidity was sought were in Classes 9, 41 and 42 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and corresponded, for each of those classes, to the following description:

– Class 9: ‘Software; Computer programs, downloadable; Computer operating programs, recorded; Computer programs, recorded; Computer software, recorded; Navigational instruments; Computer software for mobile applications that enable interaction and interface between vehicles and mobile devices; Application software for mobile devices; Digital solutions provider [DSP] software; Computer software platforms; Computer software platforms, recorded or downloadable; Computer application software for use in implementing the Internet of Things [IoT]; Assistive software; Interfaces for computers; Signalling apparatus; Intercommunication apparatus; Navigation apparatus for vehicles [on-board computers]; Satellite navigational apparatus; Global Positioning System [GPS] apparatus; Data processing apparatus; Railway traffic safety appliances; Electronic data processing equipment; Computers; Interfaces for computers; Interactive computer software that provides navigational and travel information; Computer software and platforms for manipulating, processing, transmitting, disseminating and displaying data and information relating to transit, transport, travel, tracking, positioning, navigation, routing, location information and points of geographical interest; software for calculating and displaying travel routes; software for use as an application programming interface (API); Planning, programming, control, management and analysis software relating to transportation and logistical operations; Planning, programming, control, management and analysis software relating to the maintenance of infrastructure, means of transport and goods handling equipment; Sales software relating to transportation and logistics, customer relationship management, passenger information and communications’;

– Class 41: ‘Teaching; Training; Organization of exhibitions for cultural or educational purposes; Arranging and conducting of conferences; Arranging and conducting of congresses; Arranging and conducting of colloquiums; Arranging and conducting of seminars; Arranging and conducting of workshops [training]’;

– Class 42: ‘Software design and development; Computer software consultancy; Computer software design; Software as a service [SaaS]; Design of information systems; Computer analysis; Software engineering; Installation of computer software; Rental of computer software; Maintenance of computer software; Creation, maintenance and adaptation of software; Rental of computer software; Monitoring of computer systems by remote access; Computer programming; Recovery of computer data; Research and development of new products for others; Development of computer platforms; Platform as a service [PaaS]; Computer software services for manipulating, processing, transmitting, disseminating and displaying data and information relating to transit, transport, travel, tracking, positioning, navigation, routing, location information and points of geographical interest; Providing of online software for calculating and displaying travel routes’.

4 The application for a declaration of invalidity was based, inter alia, on the earlier EU word mark MOOVIT, registered on 11 June 2016 under No 13 678 081 and covering, inter alia, the goods and services in Classes 9 and 42, including the following goods and services:

– Class 9: ‘Computer programs and software for the collection, compilation, processing, transmission and dissemination of Global Positioning System (GPS) data for use in fixed, mobile and handheld devices; electronic databases featuring roadway, geographic, map, public transit lines information, public transit route information, public transit timetables and schedules and other public transit information recorded on computer media; navigation software for calculating and displaying routes; public transit navigation systems featuring interactive digital map displays, interactive instructions and user generated information; interactive social computer software for the retrieval and display of public transit, navigation, geographic, map and travel information; interactive social computer software to enable the transmission of public transit information, mapping, navigation, traffic, routes and point-of-interest information to telecommunication networks, cellular phones, navigation devices and other mobile and hand-held devices; interactive social computer software that enables the exchange of information among users’;

– Class 42: ‘Development of algorithms and computing methods for the processing and optimization of navigation and travel data; development of algorithms and computing methods for processing and optimization of data received from global positioning systems (GPS) and communication networks; computer software development in the field of navigation and route planning; hosting online facilities for others for conducting interactive discussions; scientific and technological research and design services in the field of telecommunication and navigation signals’.

5 The ground relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity was that relating to the existence of a likelihood of confusion referred to in Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) of that regulation.

6 On 31 July 2024, the Cancellation Division upheld the application for a declaration of invalidity. It concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion between the earlier mark and the contested mark for the relevant public in respect of all the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above.

7 On 26 September 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Cancellation Division’s decision.

8 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It confirmed the existence of a likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, between the earlier mark and the contested mark in respect of all the goods and services covered by the latter mark, with the exception of the services in Class 41, having regard to the identity or similarity, to varying degrees, of the goods and services covered by the marks at issue, the average degree of visual and phonetic similarity of those marks and the average degree of inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark.

Forms of order sought

9 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– declare the contested mark valid in respect of all the remaining goods in Classes 9 and 42;

– order EUIPO to pay the costs, including the costs of the earlier stages of these proceedings.

10 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.

11 In paragraph 9 of the application, the applicant stated that its first head of claim had to be interpreted as seeking the annulment of the contested decision only in so far as the Board of Appeal had found that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue.

Law

The applicant’s first head of claim, seeking annulment of the contested decision

12 The applicant relies, in essence, on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 on the ground that there is no likelihood of confusion between the signs at issue.

13 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.

14 The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS) , T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 33 and the case-law cited).

15 In addition, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel) , T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

16 It is in the light of those considerations that it must be examined whether the Board of Appeal was right in finding that there was, in the present case, a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

The relevant public

17 In the present case, in the first place, the Board of Appeal noted that the relevant territory was that of the European Union, given that the earlier mark was an EU trade mark. However, in accordance with the case-law establishing that it is sufficient for the likelihood of confusion to exist in part of the European Union, the Board of Appeal decided, like the Cancellation Division, to focus on the Spanish- and French-speaking public.

18 In the second place, as regards the relevant public and its level of attention, the Board of Appeal found that the goods in Class 9 and the services in Class 42 covered by the earlier mark all fell within the field of navigation and transportation. As regards the goods in Class 9 covered by the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal found that they were directed primarily at professionals displaying a higher-than-average level of attention and, to a lesser extent, at the general public displaying an average level of attention. As regards the services in Class 42 covered by the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal found that they were directed at professionals displaying a higher-than-average level of attention.

19 The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the relevant public also included the general public as regards the goods in Class 9. According to the applicant, it is clear from the descriptions of those goods that they are directed solely at professionals.

20 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

21 According to EUIPO, although a professional public specialising in navigation and transportation is undoubtedly relevant, that does not preclude the general public from also being included as end users of the goods in Class 9.

22 As regards, in the first place, the Board of Appeal’s choice to focus on the Spanish- and French-speaking public, as noted in paragraph 17 above, for an EU trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union.

23 Consequently, since, in the present case, the Board of Appeal concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion, it could, without erring in law, for reasons of procedural economy, rely on the perception of the Spanish- and French-speaking public of the European Union, which the applicant does not dispute.

24 As regards, in the second place, the public targeted by the goods and services at issue and its level of attention, with respect to the services in Class 42 covered by the earlier mark, there is no reason to call into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment – which, moreover, is not disputed by the applicant – that the level of attention of the relevant public in the navigation and transportation sector is higher than average.

25 By contrast, as regards the goods in Class 9 covered by the earlier mark, the applicant submits that the relevant public included only the professional public.

26 In that regard, the Board of Appeal rightly found that the goods in Class 9 covered by the earlier mark all fell within the field of navigation and transportation.

27 It is true that the public concerned by navigation and transportation is primarily a public of professionals and businesses. Nevertheless, as stated in paragraph 61 of the contested decision, the goods in Class 9 covered by the earlier mark may also target the general public (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2025, Abacus Research v EUIPO – American Bar Association (Aba) , T‑553/24, not published, EU:T:2025:726, paragraphs 21 and 22).

28 The Board of Appeal therefore did not make an error of assessment in concluding that the level of attention of the relevant public varied between average and higher than average as regards the goods in Class 9.

Comparison of the goods and services

29 The Board of Appeal found that the goods at issue in Class 9 were partially identical and partially similar to a high degree, whereas the services in Class 42 were partially identical and partially similar to an average degree.

30 As regards the goods in Class 9, the applicant submits that they must be regarded as similar to an average degree. The goods in Class 9 covered by the earlier mark are all specifically related to computer programs intended for the mobility sector, whereas the goods in Class 9 covered by the contested mark consist of more generic types of software.

31 As regards the services in Class 42, the applicant submits that those covered by the contested mark can only be deemed dissimilar or, at the very most, similar to a low degree to those covered by the earlier mark in Classes 9 and 42. In that regard, the applicant submits that those goods and services are neither complementary nor in competition with each other, since they differ in their nature and intended purpose.

32 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

33 In that regard, EUIPO submits that all the goods in Class 9 fall within a broader category of goods covered by the earlier mark. The Board of Appeal therefore did not err in finding that they were identical.

34 As regards the services in Class 42 covered by the contested mark, EUIPO submits that the applicant’s premiss that the Board of Appeal equated all the goods and services is incorrect. EUIPO submits that the appellant misinterprets paragraphs 56 to 58 of the contested decision.

35 According to settled case-law, in assessing the similarity of the goods or services at issue, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, inter alia, their nature, their intended purpose and their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account such as the distribution channels of the goods concerned (see judgment of 14 May 2013, Sanco v OHIM – Marsalman (Representation of a chicken) , T‑249/11, EU:T:2013:238, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

36 In the present case, it is not disputed that the goods in Class 9 covered by the earlier mark, namely specialised software for digital mapping, navigation and location services, fall within the broader category of software and computer programmes covered by the contested mark, which includes those specialised types of software. It follows that those goods designated by the earlier mark are included within those designated by the contested mark, so that the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that those goods were identical (see judgment of 7 July 2005, Miles International v OHIM – Biker Miles (Biker Miles) , T‑385/03, EU:T:2005:276, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

37 As regards the services in Class 42 covered by the contested mark, it must be stated that the Board of Appeal noted, in paragraph 56 of the contested decision, that the services covered by the contested mark corresponding to ‘computer software services for manipulating, processing, transmitting, disseminating and displaying data and information relating to transit, transport, travel, tracking, positioning, navigation, routing, location information and points of geographical interest’ and to ‘providing of online software for calculating and displaying travel routes’ were similar to the services covered by the earlier mark corresponding to ‘computer software … in the field of navigation and route planning’ in Class 42.

38 In paragraph 57 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, for the sake of completeness, that the services covered by the contested mark which were referred to in paragraph 37 above were complementary to the goods in Class 9 covered by the earlier mark.

39 The applicant’s argument that the services in Class 42 covered by the contested mark and the goods in Class 9 covered by the earlier mark differ in their nature and intended purpose therefore cannot call into question the conclusion set out in paragraph 56 of the contested decision that the services covered by the contested mark which were referred to in paragraph 37 above are similar to the services covered by the earlier mark which were referred to in that paragraph.

40 Furthermore, and in any event, the services in Class 42 covered by the contested mark which were referred to in paragraph 37 above are technical, operational and continuous functions that are directly involved in managing the life cycle of software products. The Board of Appeal therefore did not err in finding, in paragraph 57 of the contested decision, that those services were complementary to the goods corresponding to software covered by the earlier mark.

41 It must therefore be concluded that the Board of Appeal was entitled to find, first, that the goods in Class 9 covered by the marks at issue were either identical or similar to a high degree and, second, that the services in Class 42 covered by those marks were either identical or similar to an average degree.

Comparison of the marks at issue

42 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, in relation to the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in question, must be based on the overall impression given by the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global appreciation of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

43 Assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 42). That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (judgment of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM , C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43).

– The distinctive and dominant elements of the marks at issue

44 The Board of Appeal found that the contested mark was a figurative mark with the sequence of letters ‘m’, ‘o’ and ‘o’ in white upper-case letters, followed by an element composed of the upper-case letters ‘v’ and ‘a’ in a darker shade, with a white dot between those two letters. That point could be perceived either as forming the letter ‘i’ with the right leg of the letter ‘v’ or as a decorative symbol. Under the element ‘moov(i)a’, the element ‘almaviva group’ is depicted in a regular white font and in a much smaller size. The two word elements, namely ‘moov(i)a’ and ‘almaviva group’, are also enclosed in a black, rectangular shape.

45 According to the Board of Appeal, the element consisting of the upper-case letters ‘v’ and ‘a’ and a dot constitutes a figurative element which has its own distinctive character. However, given that that figurative element is positioned towards the end of the main word element and is depicted in a significantly darker shade than the latter, its visibility is limited and, consequently, so is its impact on the overall impression of the contested sign.

46 As regards the word element ‘almaviva group’, the Board of Appeal noted that the size and position of that element made it a secondary component within the mark. That element is clearly subordinate to the significantly larger, centric and promoted element ‘moov(i)a’.

47 Thus, the Board of Appeal concluded that the word element ‘moov(i)a’ was the visually dominant element of the contested sign due to its size and central position.

48 As regards the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal found that the word element ‘moovit’ of that mark would be perceived as meaningless by the relevant public. In that regard, according to the Board of Appeal, there is nothing to indicate that the relevant public would break down the earlier mark into the elements ‘moov’ and ‘it’.

49 In the first place, the applicant submits that the element ‘almaviva’ of the contested mark has a high degree of distinctiveness and should have been given greater weight in its assessment, even though it occupies a less dominant position than the element ‘moov(i)a’.

50 In the second place, as regards the earlier mark, the applicant submits that the term ‘moovit’ in that mark will be understood by the relevant public as meaning ‘move it’.

51 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

52 EUIPO argues that the word element of the contested mark ‘almaviva group’ occupies a clearly secondary position within that mark and is subordinate to the visually dominant and central element ‘moov(i)a’.

53 Furthermore, according to EUIPO, the relevant public will perceive the element ‘moovit’ of the earlier mark as a fanciful element.

54 According to the case-law, in order to determine the distinctive character of an element making up a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods or services for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the element in question in the light of whether it is at all descriptive of the goods or services for which the mark has been registered (judgments of 13 June 2006, Inex v OHIM – Wiseman (Representation of a cowhide) , T‑153/03, EU:T:2006:157, paragraph 35, and of 17 January 2024, Ona Investigación v EUIPO – Formdiet (BIOPÔLE) , T‑61/23, not published, EU:T:2024:10, paragraph 34).

55 As regards the contested mark, like the Board of Appeal, the Court finds that, within the word element ‘almaviva group’, the term ‘almaviva’ has distinctive character and the word ‘group’ has only an inherently weak distinctive character because of its generally recognised meaning as referring to a ‘conglomerate of undertakings’ or to a ‘group of undertakings’ (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 July 2011, Ergo Versicherungsgruppe v OHIM – Société de développement et de recherche industrielle (ERGO Group) , T‑221/09, not published, EU:T:2011:393, paragraph 29, and of 31 January 2012, Spar v OHIM – Spa Group Europe (SPA GROUP) , T‑378/09, not published, EU:T:2012:34, paragraphs 32 and 33).

56 In view of its small size, the element ‘almaviva group’ does not in fact have a dominant character. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal’s conclusion that the element ‘moov(i)a’ is the visually dominant element of the contested mark must be upheld.

57 However, the element ‘almaviva group’ is not negligible in the present case, since it clearly indicates the commercial origin of the goods and services, and must therefore, as a secondary element, be taken into account both in the assessment of the comparison of the signs at issue and in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion for the relevant public.

58 As regards the earlier mark, according to the case-law, word marks consist entirely of letters, words or associations of words which are written in printed characters in a normal font without any specific graphic element. Such marks therefore do not have a dominant element since, by their nature, none of the constituent elements has a particular graphic or stylistic aspect which is capable of giving it such a character (see judgment of 2 March 2022, UGA Nutraceuticals v EUIPO – Vitae Health Innovation (VITADHA) , T‑149/21, not published, EU:T:2022:103, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited).

59 For the purposes of assessing the distinctive character of an element of a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods or services for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, it is necessary to take into account, in particular, the inherent characteristics of that element and to ask whether it is at all descriptive of the goods or services for which the mark has been registered (see judgment of 21 December 2021, Dr. Spiller v EUIPO – Rausch (Alpenrausch Dr. Spiller) , T‑6/20, not published, EU:T:2021:920, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).

60 According to settled case-law, a term with a clear meaning is considered to be descriptive only if there is a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between that term and the goods or services in question to enable the public concerned immediately to perceive, without further thought, a description of the goods and services in question or of one of their characteristics (see judgment of 24 February 2016, Tayto Group v OHIM – MIP Metro (REAL HAND COOKED) , T‑816/14, not published, EU:T:2016:93, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

61 In the present case, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 84 of the contested decision, that there was nothing to suggest that the word element ‘moovit’ of the earlier mark was in fact perceived by the relevant French- and Spanish-speaking public as alluding to the English expression ‘move it’.

62 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, an understanding of a foreign language may not, in general, be presumed (judgments of 25 June 2008, Zipcar v OHIM – Canary Islands Car (ZIPCAR) , T‑36/07, not published, EU:T:2008:223, paragraph 45; of 24 May 2011, Space Beach Club v OHIM – Flores Gómez (SpS space of sound) , T‑144/10, not published, EU:T:2011:243, paragraph 63; and of 21 May 2015, Nutrexpa v OHIM – Kraft Foods Italia Intellectual Property (Cuétara MARÍA ORO) , T‑271/13, not published, EU:T:2015:308, paragraph 35).

63 Nevertheless, in the present case, the goods and services covered by the signs at issue fall within the field of electronics and computing. According to the case-law, in those fields, the use of English is very common (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 May 2009, CFCMCEE v OHIM (P@YWEB CARD and PAYWEB CARD ), T‑405/07 and T‑406/07, EU:T:2009:164, paragraph 35).

64 Accordingly, it must be held that it can be presumed that the relevant Spanish- or French-speaking public has at least some knowledge of the English used in the field of electronics and computing.

65 The English words ‘move’ and ‘it’ must be regarded as forming part of basic English vocabulary. Those two words are classified in the Oxford Learner’s Dictionary in Category A1/A2 corresponding to the basic level of English in accordance with the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 May 2025, Karneolis v EUIPO – Match Group (KinkySwipe) , T‑332/24, not published, EU:T:2025:489, paragraph 45).

66 Furthermore, where an English term has an equivalent in the language of the non-English-speaking public and a link may be established by that public between that term and its translation into the language concerned, then that public must be held to understand its meaning (judgment of 29 April 2020, Kerry Luxembourg v EUIPO – Döhler (TasteSense By Kerry ), T‑108/19, not published, EU:T:2020:161, paragraph 68).

67 In the present case, as the applicant has stated, without being contested by EUIPO, the English word ‘move’ has its roots in the Latin word ‘ movere ’, which evokes movement and can easily be associated by part of the relevant public with the Spanish word ‘ mover ’ and the French word ‘ mouvoir ’, which are equivalent to that English term.

68 In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the relevant Spanish- and French-speaking public will understand the English term ‘move’, which forms part of common vocabulary in English. Moreover, the relevant public with some knowledge of the English language will be able to understand that the word element of the earlier mark ‘moov’ is an orthographic variant of the English word ‘move’, given the lexical proximity of those two words.

69 Furthermore, the relevant public with some knowledge of the English language will also recognise the basic English word ‘it’ in the earlier mark.

70 Accordingly, as argued by the applicant, the word element ‘moovit’ in the earlier mark will be broken down by the relevant public into two elements, namely ‘move’ and ‘it’. Although the consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details, the fact remains that, when perceiving a word sign, that consumer will break it down into elements which, for him or her, have a concrete meaning or which resemble words known to him or her (see judgment of 20 September 2017, Jordi Nogues v EUIPO – Grupo Osborne (BADTORO) , T‑350/13, EU:T:2017:633, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

71 Accordingly, it must be held that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the term ‘moovit’ in the earlier mark would be understood as a fanciful element devoid of meaning by the relevant French- and Spanish-speaking public. That public will recognise the English words ‘move’ and ‘it’ in the earlier mark and will therefore perceive that mark as the command ‘move it’, with which it will associate the concept of movement.

72 The element ‘moov’ in the earlier mark is evocative of the goods and services in Classes 9 and 42, namely the goods and services to be used in the mobility sector, and therefore has a weak inherent distinctive character, whereas the element ‘it’, taken in isolation, is not evocative of those goods and services. The relevant public will, however, perceive the word ‘it’ in conjunction with the word ‘moov’ in such a way that neither of those words can be regarded as the most distinctive element of the earlier mark, a point which moreover is not disputed by the applicant.

– The visual comparison

73 The Board of Appeal found that the marks at issue coincided as regards their first four or even five letters, namely ‘m’, ‘o’, ‘o’ and ‘v’, or even ‘i’, and differed in their endings – namely their respective final letters, ‘t’ for one and ‘a’ for the other – and in the presence of the word element ‘almaviva group’ in the contested mark. According to the Board of Appeal, those differences between the marks at issue are not sufficient to prevent a certain degree of similarity between the signs, given that the identical beginnings of the signs are eye-catching. In that regard, the Board of Appeal maintained that the double vowel ‘o’ is very eye-catching because ‘o’, due to its round shape, is one of the bulkier letters and because words containing a double ‘o’ are rather unusual in French and Spanish. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal found that the marks at issue are visually similar to an average degree.

74 The applicant disputes that analysis, arguing that the marks at issue are visually different on the ground that the word elements ‘moovit’ and ‘moova’ are different, that the figurative element of the contested mark is read as ‘moova’ rather than ‘moovia’ and that the contested mark also contains the distinctive element ‘almaviva’. Furthermore, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal’s assertion that the double ‘o’ is visually very eye-catching has no legal basis.

75 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

76 According to EUIPO, the Board of Appeal rightly found that the marks at issue began with the same sequence of letters ‘m’, ‘o’, ‘o’, ‘v’, ‘(i)’, which occupied the initial position visually. In that regard, EUIPO submits that the question whether the word element of the contested mark reads ‘moovia’ or ‘moova’ is immaterial since the Board of Appeal expressly assessed both possible perceptions.

77 As a preliminary point, the Court notes that it follows from the case-law that there is nothing to prevent a determination as to whether there is any visual similarity between a word mark and a figurative mark, since the two types of mark have graphic form capable of creating a visual impression (see judgment of 4 May 2005, Chum v OHIM – Star TV (STAR TV) , T‑359/02, EU:T:2005:156, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

78 In that regard, it must be noted that the marks at issue both contain the letters ‘m’, ‘o’, ‘o’ and ‘v’, which implies a certain degree of similarity between them.

79 Furthermore, it must also be noted that the signs at issue exhibit a number of visual differences.

80 In the first place, although the marks at issue have the letters ‘m’, ‘o’, ‘o’ and ‘v’ in common, these appear in significantly different fonts and colours within the contested mark. It is true that, where a trade mark is composed of verbal and figurative elements, the former are, in principle, more distinctive than the latter, because the average consumer will more easily refer to the goods in question by quoting their name than by describing the figurative element of the trade mark (judgment of 14 July 2005, Wassen International v OHIM – Stroschein Gesundkost (SELENIUM-ACE) , T‑312/03, EU:T:2005:289, paragraph 37). Nevertheless, a figurative mark, by definition, includes a specific representation, which, unless it is totally negligible, must, even if it is dominated by word elements, nevertheless be taken into account in the overall assessment of the similarity between the signs at issue (see judgment of 11 December 2024, López-Ibor Aliño v EUIPO – Dimensión Estratégica Quality Research (LOPEZ-IBOR ABOGADOS) , T‑672/22, not published, EU:T:2024:892, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited). In the present case, the figurative elements of the contested mark are not negligible.

81 In the second place, the marks at issue differ in the endings of the elements ‘moovit’ and ‘moov(i)a’, namely the last two respective letters of the latter, ‘i’ and ‘t’ for one, and ‘(i)’ and ‘a’ for the other.

82 In the third place, the contested mark contains additional elements, in particular the word element ‘almaviva group’. As stated in paragraph 57 above, since the distinctive word element ‘almaviva group’ indicates the commercial origin of the goods and services at issue, it is not negligible and must be taken into account in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion.

83 Although it must be acknowledged that the four letters ‘m’, ‘o’, ‘o’ and ‘v’ are present in the marks at issue, the visual similarity between them is limited solely to the presence of that common combination of letters. The differences between the signs at issue, arising from the different graphic representations of the common element ‘moov’, the endings of the elements ‘moovit’ and ‘moov(i)a’ and the presence of additional elements in the contested mark, namely the word element ‘almaviva group’ and the figurative element constituting the straight part of the letter ‘v’, contribute significantly to distinguishing the conflicting trade marks visually.

84 Consequently, it must be concluded, contrary to the decision of the Board of Appeal, that the signs at issue are visually similar only to a low degree.

– The phonetic comparison

85 The Board of Appeal found that the signs were phonetically identical as regards the pronunciation of their common initial element, namely ‘moov(i)’, and differed in the pronunciation of the endings of their respective elements, namely ‘it’ and ‘(i)a’. As regards the word element ‘almaviva group’ in the contested mark, the Board of Appeal concluded that that element might not be pronounced at all because of its position at the end of the sign, its small size and its secondary importance within that sign. Considering that the divergent endings could not offset the identical beginnings, on which attention is usually focused, the Board of Appeal concluded that the marks at issue were phonetically similar to an average degree.

86 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal was wrong to focus on the common sequence of initial letters ‘m’, ‘o’, ‘o’, ‘v’ and to disregard the distinctive element ‘almaviva’ of the contested mark, on the ground that it would probably not be pronounced.

87 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s line of argument and submits that the Board of Appeal correctly found that, in the case of the marks at issue, divergent endings cannot offset identical beginnings. EUIPO adds that the applicant’s assertion that the element ‘almaviva group’ will necessarily be pronounced fails to take account of the factual configuration of the contested mark. That company name would play only a secondary role in the mark in question.

88 In that regard, it must be held, as the Board of Appeal found, that, phonetically, the marks at issue coincide as regards the pronunciation of their common word element ‘moov’.

89 Furthermore, the marks at issue differ in the different endings of the word elements ‘moovit’ and ‘moov(i)a’. In that regard, it must be observed that, in the present case, the sound of the respective final letters of those elements creates an impression of significant dissimilarity.

90 As regards the word element ‘almaviva group’ of the contested mark, it must be held, as stated in paragraph 82 above, that that element is not negligible and must be taken into account in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion. In view of the distinctive character of the element ‘almaviva group’, there is nothing to suggest that, as EUIPO notes, the relevant public will not pronounce that element of the contested mark.

91 Nevertheless, in view of the partial phonetic identity of the signs at issue resulting from the presence of their common word element ‘moov’, the differences noted are not sufficient to prevent the relevant consumer from forming the impression that those marks have a certain degree of phonetic similarity.

92 In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal was entitled to conclude that there was an average degree of phonetic similarity between the signs at issue.

– The conceptual comparison

93 In paragraph 94 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that no conceptual comparison could be conducted since neither of the signs at issue, taken as a whole, had a meaning that was clearly and immediately understood by the consumers concerned.

94 The applicant submits that the earlier mark will be understood as the command ‘move it’ and that it therefore has a meaning, unlike the contested mark, which has no meaning. Therefore, according to the applicant, the marks at issue are conceptually dissimilar.

95 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s line of argument and submits that neither of the signs at issue, taken as a whole, conveys a meaning that is clearly and immediately understood by the Spanish- and French-speaking parts of the relevant public.

96 First, as stated in paragraph 71 above, in the present case, the Spanish- and French-speaking parts of the relevant public will break down the earlier mark into two word elements, ‘moov’ and ‘it’, and will therefore perceive that mark as the command ‘move it’, with which they will associate the concept of movement.

97 Second, none of the parties disputes the Board of Appeal’s finding that the contested mark has no meaning.

98 Accordingly, it must be held that the earlier mark has a meaning from the point of view of the relevant public, whereas the contested mark has no meaning.

99 On that basis, it must be held that the marks at issue are conceptually dissimilar.

The inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark

100 The Board of Appeal concluded, in paragraph 99 of the contested decision, that the earlier mark had average distinctiveness, since the word element ‘moovit’ had no connection with the goods and services in Classes 9 and 42.

101 The applicant submits, in the first place, that the element ‘moov’ of the earlier mark is generic and widely used in EU trade marks covering goods in Class 9 and services in Class 42, which results in it having no distinctive character or only a very weak one.

102 In the second place, the applicant submits that the term ‘moovit’ will be understood by the relevant public as the expression ‘move it’. Accordingly, that term is descriptive of services and goods in the mobility sector.

103 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

104 First, as regards the applicant’s first complaint, EUIPO submits that the distinctive character of a mark must be assessed from the point of view of the relevant public, and not by counting the entries in a database.

105 Second, as regards the applicant’s second complaint, EUIPO submits that the relevant public will perceive the element ‘moovit’ of the earlier mark as a fanciful element which has no connection with the goods and services in Classes 9 and 42.

106 It must be borne in mind that, for the purposes of assessing the distinctive character of a mark or an element making up a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the element in question in the light of whether it is at all descriptive of the goods for which the mark has been registered (judgment of 11 November 2020, Deutsche Post v EUIPO – Pošta Slovenije (Representation of a stylised horn) , T‑25/20, not published, EU:T:2020:537, paragraph 38).

107 As regards the applicant’s first complaint that there are numerous EU trade marks which contain the element ‘moov’, it must be pointed out that the relevant factor for the purposes of disputing the distinctive character of an element is its actual presence on the market and not its having been entered in registers or databases (judgment of 8 March 2013, Mayer Naman v OHIM – Daniel e Mayer (David Mayer) , T‑498/10, not published, EU:T:2013:117, paragraph 77). The applicant has not demonstrated the actual presence of the element ‘moov’ on the market for the goods and services in question. Accordingly, the applicant’s argument regarding the existence of other marks which contain the word element ‘moov’ must be rejected.

108 As regards the applicant’s second complaint, it should be noted, as stated in paragraph 71 above, that the relevant public will perceive the earlier mark as consisting of separate words with which it will associate the concept of movement.

109 Therefore, given that all the goods and services covered by the earlier mark are linked to the goods and services relating to the mobility sector, the word element of the earlier mark is descriptive of those goods and services. Consequently, the degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark can only be low.

110 Therefore, the Board of Appeal erred in its assessment in finding that the earlier mark had an average degree of distinctiveness.

Global assessment of the likelihood of confusion

111 In the present case, in paragraphs 95 to 101 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, in essence, that, in view of the identity or similarity of the goods and services at issue, the visual and phonetic similarities between the signs at issue and the average distinctiveness of the earlier mark, there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant French- and Spanish-speaking public.

112 The applicant disputes that finding of the Board of Appeal. It submits, in essence, that there is no likelihood of confusion, given the differences between the signs at issue.

113 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s line of argument, arguing that the applicant has not demonstrated the existence of any error in the Board of Appeal’s global assessment of the likelihood of confusion.

114 The existence of a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public must be appreciated globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, and the distinctive character of an earlier mark is one of those relevant factors (judgment of 18 June 2020, Primart v EUIPO , C‑702/18 P, EU:C:2020:489, paragraph 51; see also judgment of 11 November 2020, Representation of a stylised horn , T‑25/20, not published, EU:T:2020:537, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

115 As has been established above, in the present case, the goods in Class 9 covered by the marks at issue were either identical or similar to a high degree and the services in Class 42 covered by those marks were either identical or similar to an average degree (see paragraph 41 above). Furthermore, the marks at issue are visually similar to a low degree (see paragraph 84 above) and phonetically similar to an average degree (see paragraph 92 above). Conceptually, the signs at issue are dissimilar (see paragraph 99 above) and the earlier mark has a weak inherent distinctive character (see paragraph 109 above).

116 The degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark determines the extent of the protection conferred by it. Where the distinctiveness of the earlier mark is significant, such a circumstance is likely to increase the likelihood of confusion (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 March 2020, Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO , C‑766/18 P, EU:C:2020:170, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited). Conversely, where the distinctiveness of the earlier mark is low, the extent of the protection conferred by that mark is also low, even if the existence of a likelihood of confusion is not precluded in the latter case (judgment of 11 November 2020, Representation of a stylised horn , T‑25/20, not published, EU:T:2020:537, paragraph 49).

117 According to the case-law, with regard to a trade mark with a weak distinctive character, and which thus has a lesser capacity to identify the goods or services for which it has been registered as coming from a particular undertaking, the degree of similarity between the signs should be high to justify a likelihood of confusion, or this would risk granting excessive protection to that trade mark (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 October 2020, Eugène Perma France v EUIPO – SPI Investments Group (NATURANOVE) , T‑602/19, not published, EU:T:2020:463, paragraph 56) and a quasi-monopoly to its proprietor over the very concept of movement.

118 In the present case, first, the average degree of phonetic similarity of the signs at issue is offset by their low visual similarity and by the conceptual differences between them, which makes them similar to a low degree overall. Furthermore, as regards the services in Class 42, the relevant public has a higher-than-average level of attention such as to reduce even further the likelihood of confusion.

119 Thus, in accordance with the principle of interdependence between the factors to be taken into account, which is referred to in paragraph 114 above, and despite the identity or similarity of the goods and services at issue, it must be concluded that no likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public can be found. For those reasons, the applicant’s single plea in law must therefore be upheld and the contested decision annulled in so far as the Board of Appeal found that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue.

The applicant’s second head of claim, seeking a declaration that the contested mark is valid in respect of all the remaining goods in Classes 9 and 42

120 EUIPO disputes the admissibility of the applicant’s second head of claim, requesting the Court to declare the contested mark valid in respect of all the remaining goods in Classes 9 and 42.

121 By this second head of claim, the applicant seeks, in essence, the alteration of the contested decision. This head of claim must be understood as meaning that the applicant wishes to obtain a judgment concluding that the application for a declaration of invalidity against the contested mark must be rejected.

122 In that regard, it is apparent from Article 72(2) and (3) of Regulation 2017/1001 that the General Court is to have jurisdiction to annul or to alter the decision of a Board of Appeal of EUIPO. That power to alter decisions does not have, however, the effect of conferring on the General Court the power to carry out an assessment on which the Board of Appeal has not yet adopted a position. Exercise of the power to alter decisions is thus limited to situations in which the General Court, after reviewing the assessment made by the Board of Appeal, is in a position to determine, on the basis of the matters of law and of fact as established, what decision the Board of Appeal was required to take (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 January 2025, EUIPO v Neoperl , C‑93/23 P, EU:C:2025:33, paragraphs 68 and 69).

123 In the present case, after having reviewed the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the ground relating to the application of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, the Court is in a position to determine the decision which the Board of Appeal was required to take, from which it follows that it has the power to alter the contested decision.

124 Since the single plea in law raised by the applicant has been upheld, it follows that the Board of Appeal should have found that there was no likelihood of confusion in the present case. The Board of Appeal was therefore required to reject the application for a declaration of invalidity filed by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.

125 Consequently, the Court must, by altering the contested decision, reject that application for a declaration of invalidity.

Costs

126 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

127 The applicant claimed that EUIPO should be ordered to pay the costs incurred by it in respect of the proceedings before the Court and those incurred at the earlier stages of the proceedings.

128 In the present case, since EUIPO has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the applicant relating to the proceedings before the Court.

129 As regards the costs relating to the proceedings before the Cancellation Division and before the Board of Appeal, it should be noted that, under Article 190(2) of the Rules of Procedure, costs necessarily incurred by the parties for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal are to be regarded as recoverable costs. However, that does not apply to costs incurred for the purposes of the proceedings before the Cancellation Division (judgment of 13 June 2017, Ball Beverage Packaging Europe v EUIPO – Crown Hellas Can (Cans) , T‑9/15, EU:T:2017:386, paragraph 102).

130 Therefore, the applicant’s request that EUIPO be ordered to pay the costs relating to the proceedings before the Cancellation Division and before the Board of Appeal may be granted only as regards the costs incurred for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)

hereby:

1. Annuls the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 27 May 2025 (Case R 1891/2024-5) in so far as the Board of Appeal found that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue;

2. Rejects the application for a declaration of invalidity lodged by Moovit App Global Ltd;

3. Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Almaviva – The Italian Innovation SpA before the General Court and before the Board of Appeal.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 9 September 2026.

* Language of the case: English.