Judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) 14 October 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

14 October 2026 ( * )

( Civil service – Members of the temporary staff – Remuneration – Family allowances – Household allowance – Dependent child allowance – Education allowance – Conditions for granting – Withdrawal of entitlement to the allowance – Recovery of overpayments – Article 85 of the Staff Regulations – Manifest error of assessment – Right to receive social security benefits and social advantages – Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights – Principle of good administration – Duty of care – Legal certainty – Misuse of powers )

In Case T‑506/25,

GY, represented by S. Rodrigues and A. Champetier, lawyers

applicant,

v

European Commission, represented by B.-R. Killmann and M. Brauhoff, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber),

composed of S.L. Kalėda, President, M. Jaeger (Rapporteur) and T. Perišin, Judges,

Registrar: T. Henze, Acting Registrar,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By his action under Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, GY, seeks annulment of the decision of the Office for the Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements (PMO) of the European Commission of 23 October 2024 to cancel the entitlement to family allowances connected with his children and the benefits related to those family allowances, with retroactive effect from 16 September 2021, and annulment of the decision of the PMO of 25 October 2024 determining the amounts unduly paid and informing him of the recovery of the balance remaining due (‘the recovery decision’) (together, ‘the contested decisions’).

Background to the dispute

2 The applicant is the father of two children who were born during his marriage with his former spouse. The marriage was dissolved with effect from 10 July 2015. According to the certificate of divorce, the parents agreed, as part of their divorce agreement, to exercise joint parental authority over their children and to establish their residence with their mother.

3 The applicant entered into the service of the Commission on 16 September 2021 as a temporary agent.

4 The PMO determined the applicant’s financial entitlements in accordance with Annex VII to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) by decision of 27 September 2021, from which it was apparent that his two children lived with their mother in Romania, that a custody statement had been received and that a decision on the payment of family allowances was pending (‘the decision of 27 September 2021’).

5 On 17 December 2021, the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations on the ground that the family allowances had not been paid to him and that no decision in relation to those allowances had been taken.

6 By email of 13 April 2022, the PMO informed the applicant that his complaint had been closed on the ground that a decision on the payment of family allowances was about to be adopted.

7 By decision of 19 April 2022, the PMO informed the applicant that since, in accordance with the certificate of divorce, his two children resided exclusively with their mother in Romania, the family allowances (namely the household allowance, the dependent child allowance and the school allowance, if any) were to be paid to his former spouse, effective from 16 September 2021, in accordance with Article 1(5), Article 2(7) and the fifth subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations (‘the decision of 19 April 2022’). The PMO also asked the applicant to provide it with various documents, duly completed and signed by his former spouse, and a copy of her identity card, in order to make the payment of the family allowances in accordance with that decision.

8 In May 2022, the applicant noticed that the dependent child allowance and the household allowance had been paid to him, with retroactive effect from September 2021.

9 By email of 29 September 2022, the PMO informed the applicant that the family allowances related to his youngest son had been paid to him, even though, under the decision of 19 April 2022, they should have been paid to his former spouse, and that the unduly paid sums would be recovered, which would appear on his November 2022 salary statement. The PMO also reminded the applicant that he should provide it with the necessary documents to enable payment of the family allowances to his former spouse.

10 Pending receipt of the documents needed to carry out the actual payment of the family allowances to the applicant’s former spouse, the Commission transferred them into a blocked account as a protective measure.

11 On 11 November 2022, the applicant lodged a complaint, in which he contested the deductions made from his November 2022 salary statement and requested the re-instatement of his entitlements.

12 By decision of 15 February 2023, the PMO provided an explanation to the applicant about the calculation of the deductions from his November 2022 salary statement and about the balance of the debt still to be recovered. It also proposed ways for making the repayment and reiterated that, in accordance with the decision of 19 April 2022, the family allowances due for his children were to be paid to his former spouse. The PMO also repeated its request for financial documents duly signed by her. By email of 6 March 2023, the PMO informed the applicant that it had closed his complaint of 11 November 2022, with no further action to be taken, since it had become devoid of purpose.

13 On 27 February 2023, the applicant lodged a complaint against the decision of the PMO of 15 February 2023, arguing that the Commission had based its decision solely on the residence of the children, taking no account of custody, which the parents shared.

14 By decision of 30 June 2023, the PMO rejected the applicant’s complaint of 27 February 2023 (‘the decision of 30 June 2023’). It found that, in reality, the applicant was contesting the decision that the family allowances were to be paid directly to his former spouse. After stating that that decision had been taken on 19 April 2022 and that its decision of 15 February 2023 had merely confirmed it, the PMO found that the complaint, inasmuch as it was directed, in essence, against the decision of 19 April 2022, was time-barred. Nevertheless, it referred to the reasons which had led it to decide that the family allowances should be paid directly to the applicant’s former spouse.

15 On 28 May 2024, the PMO sent a letter to the applicant’s former spouse, informing her that she could receive the family allowances for her children and asking her to provide various items of information and documents. The letter was returned to the PMO as ‘unclaimed’. A copy of the letter was sent to the applicant for his information.

16 On 16 October 2024, the applicant resigned from his duties as a temporary agent of the Commission, effective from 15 November 2024. The following day, he made enquiries with the PMO as to what was planned for the amounts paid into the blocked account following his resignation.

17 On 23 October 2024, the PMO adopted the decision to cancel the entitlement to family allowances connected with the applicant’s children along with all the benefits related to those allowances (namely the tax abatement, part of the expatriation allowance and annual travel costs), with retroactive effect from 16 September 2021, owing to failure to provide the contact information and bank details of the applicant’s former spouse.

18 On 25 October 2024, the PMO adopted the recovery decision, by which it informed the applicant of the amount remaining due, which corresponded to the benefits related to the family allowances, and of its intention to recover that amount.

19 By email of 7 January 2025, the PMO informed the applicant that his debt had been reduced by an amount equal to the annual indexation and by a sum relating to untaken annual leave; it also informed him of possible arrangements for repayment.

20 On 17 January 2025, the applicant lodged a complaint against the contested decisions (‘the complaint of 17 January 2025’).

21 Since no decision on the complaint of 17 January 2025 was notified to the applicant by the expiry of the four-month time period laid down in Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, an implied decision arose (‘the implied decision rejecting the complaint’).

22 By decision adopted on 24 July 2025, notified to the applicant by email on 25 July 2025, namely the date the present action was lodged, the Commission expressly rejected the complaint of 17 January 2025 (‘the express decision rejecting the complaint’).

Forms of order sought

23 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decisions;

– annul, in so far as necessary, the implied decision rejecting the complaint;

– order the Commission to pay the costs.

24 The Commission contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

The s ubject matter of the dispute

25 As a preliminary point, it should be observed that, by his second head of claim, the applicant seeks the annulment, in so far as necessary, of the implied decision rejecting the complaint.

26 In that context, it should be pointed out that the Commission adopted the express decision rejecting the complaint on 24 July 2025, which was notified to the applicant on 25 July 2025. Consequently, it is not necessary to rule on the form of order sought for annulment of the implied decision rejecting the complaint since the express decision has replaced it (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 March 2021, BK v EASO, T‑277/19, not published, EU:T:2021:161, paragraph 45). However, the Court notes that, in the reply, the applicant did not make any observations on the express decision rejecting the complaint, which was produced as an annex to the defence, and has not sought to adapt his action in the light of that decision. In those circumstances, it must be found that the present action is directed solely against the contested decisions.

Substance

27 In support of his action, the applicant raises four pleas in law, claiming, first, a manifest error of assessment and erroneous reasoning; second, infringement of Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), of Article 67 of the Staff Regulations, and of Article 2 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations; third, infringement of Article 85 of the Staff Regulations; and, fourth, breach of the principle of good administration, of the duty of care and of the principle of legal certainty, and also misuse of powers.

The first plea: manifest error of assessment and erroneous reasoning

28 By his first plea, the applicant submits, in essence, that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment by finding incorrectly that he had failed to reply to the PMO’s request for the bank and contact information of his former spouse. In that regard, he denies any failure to act and states that he informed the PMO of the fact that he was unable to pass on the requested information since he did not have it and could not force his former spouse to provide it.

29 In the reply, first of all, the applicant denies receiving the decision of 27 September 2021. Further, he raises a plea of illegality against the interpretation of the concept of ‘custody’ applied by the PMO in the decision of 19 April 2022. Lastly, he submits that the Commission, in the decision of 30 June 2023, incorrectly assessed his contribution to the maintenance of his children by finding that it was not sufficient, whereas the Commission should have found that he had proved that he did actually contribute and that he met the conditions for receiving the family allowances himself. By means of those various criticisms, the applicant is in essence arguing that the Commission, in the contested decisions, should have reassessed its previous stance on the custody of his children and on his contribution to their maintenance so as to find that the family allowances, instead of being cancelled, should be paid directly to him.

30 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments.

31 As a preliminary point, it should be observed that Article 67 of the Staff Regulations provides that family allowances are to comprise the household allowance, dependent child allowance and the education allowance.

32 Article 2(2) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations defines a dependent child as ‘the legitimate, natural or adopted child of an official, or of his spouse, who is actually being maintained by the official’.

33 In addition, under Article 1(5), Article 2(7) and the fifth subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, if custody of a child has been entrusted to another person, the household allowance, the dependent child allowance and the education allowance are to be paid to that person in the name and on behalf of the official.

34 Article 3 of the General Implementing Provisions for giving effect to Articles 67 and 68 of the Staff Regulations and Articles 1, 2 and 3 of Annex VII thereto, adopted by the Commission on 15 April 2004, provides that ‘payment of family allowances shall automatically be made in the name and on behalf of the official to a person other than the official who has custody of the child; that other person may also assert his or her right to be paid the family allowances direct by producing appropriate documentary evidence.’

35 Furthermore, point 44 of Conclusion No 283/20, adopted by the College of Heads of Administration of the Commission on 24 March 2021, concerning the determination and payment of financial entitlements under the Staff Regulations in the event of dissolution of a marriage or partnership, or termination of a de facto relationship (‘Conclusion 283/20’), provides that ‘the staff member shall be responsible for providing the administration with the information required for the correct determination and payment of the family allowances in respect of dependent children, such as information on allowances received from other sources, the child’s education or changes of address.’

36 In the present case, in the first place, even though the applicant refers in the title of the first plea to both a manifest error of assessment and erroneous reasoning, he is in fact contesting the Commission’s assessment that he failed to respond to its requests to provide it with various items of information. In those circumstances, it need only be found that the applicant, by his first plea, is raising a manifest error of assessment.

37 In the second place, it should be borne in mind that the applicant’s financial entitlements were determined by the decision of 27 September 2021, which was limited to referring to the fact that the children lived with their mother in Romania, that a custody statement had been received, and that a decision on the payment of family allowances was pending; it did not take any position on who the actual recipient of the family allowances would be.

38 Accordingly, even assuming that the applicant did not in fact receive the decision of 27 September 2021 before bringing the action, an argument he raised for the first time in the reply, that argument must be rejected as ineffective. Indeed, the applicant does not contest the determination by the PMO of his financial entitlements, but confines himself to a challenge as to the recipient of the actual payment of the family allowances, an issue not finally settled by the decision of 27 September 2021.

39 In the third place, the PMO considered, in the decision of 19 April 2022, that, since the applicant’s children resided exclusively with their mother in Romania, the family allowances should be paid directly to her, in the name and on behalf of the applicant. It explained that it required the bank and personal information of the person having custody of the children in order to permit payment of those allowances in accordance with their purpose, namely to contribute to the maintenance of the children, and with the applicable provisions of the Staff Regulations.

40 Furthermore, in the decision of 30 June 2023, the PMO found the applicant’s complaint brought, in essence, against the decision of 19 April 2022 to be inadmissible as time-barred and referred to the reasons that had led it to consider that the family allowances should be paid directly to his former spouse. Accordingly, the PMO stated that, according to the certificate of divorce, the children lived in Romania with their mother, who had custody of them; that, contrary to the applicant’s assertions, the parents had not agreed on joint custody; and that even if the parents had agreed to exercise joint parental authority, that concept was different from the concept of ‘custody’ within the meaning of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, which referred to physical custody of the children, meaning their place of habitual residence and the person taking care of them on a daily basis. Consequently, the PMO found that the joint exercise of parental authority by the parents was of no relevance for determining who had actual custody of the children, which, according to the divorce agreement, was the mother, and that the bank account statements produced by the applicant did not prove an effective contribution by him to the maintenance, even in part, of his children, and did not represent a new substantial element that could justify changing the decision of 19 April 2022.

41 It is settled case-law that the periods for lodging complaints and bringing actions referred to in Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations are matters of public policy and cannot be left to the discretion of the parties or the Court, which must ascertain, of its own motion if need be, whether they have been complied with. Those periods meet the requirement of legal certainty and the need to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice (see judgment of 3 March 2021, Barata v Parliament , T‑723/18, EU:T:2021:113, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, an official or a temporary agent is not allowed to set aside the time limits laid down in Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations for the lodging of a complaint or an action by calling into question, by means of a request, a previous decision which has not been challenged within the prescribed period. Only the existence of new substantial facts may justify the submission of a request for review of a decision which has become final (see judgment of 26 June 2013, Buschak v Commission , F‑56/12, EU:F:2013:96, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

42 Since the decision of 19 April 2022 had become final, and the applicant had not made a request for review based on the existence of new substantial facts, his argument that the Commission should have found that he actually contributed to the maintenance of the children and should thus receive the family allowances directly must be rejected as ineffective. Indeed, that argument seeks to challenge the decision of 19 April 2022 and not the contested decisions.

43 As for the plea of illegality raised by the applicant in the reply, by which he seeks to contest the PMO’s interpretation of the concept of ‘custody’ in the decision of 19 April 2022, it should be observed that the Court of Justice has found that the context of the dispute is determined by the application initiating proceedings and that a plea of illegality is inadmissible at the reply stage (judgment of 11 July 1985, Salerno and Others v Commission and Council , 87/77, 130/77, 22/83, 9/84 and 10/84, not published, EU:C:1985:318, paragraphs 36 and 37). In the present case, that plea is not based on matters of law or fact which came to light after the action was brought. It is therefore inadmissible under Article 84(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, which prohibits the introduction in the course of proceedings of new pleas in law that are not based on such matters (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2018, PH v Commission , T‑613/16, not published, EU:T:2018:529, paragraph 251). In any event, the decision of 19 April 2022 cannot be the object of a plea of illegality as it is not an act of general application (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2020, Commission and Council v Carreras Sequeros and Others , C‑119/19 P and C‑126/19 P, EU:C:2020:676, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited). The applicant’s plea of illegality must be therefore be rejected.

44 In the fourth place, contrary to what is asserted by the applicant, he was obliged to provide the Commission with the necessary information for the payment of the family allowances to his former spouse, as is apparent from Conclusion 283/20. The information requested by the Commission to enable payment of the family allowances to the applicant’s former spouse is required information, for the purposes of point 44 of Conclusion 283/20, read in the light of the first subparagraph of Article 1(5), Article 2(7), and the fifth subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, and in the light of Article 3 of the General Implementing Provisions for giving effect to Articles 67 and 68 of the Staff Regulations and Articles 1, 2 and 3 of Annex VII thereto.

45 In the light of the obligation falling on all officials to provide the administration with the information required for the correct calculation and payment of family allowances, an answer from the applicant that does not contain the information requested and which merely states that he does not have that information at his disposal cannot be considered as satisfying that obligation. The applicant cannot legitimately refer to the fact that he does not know the information required or that it is confidential in order to evade his obligation to communicate the information necessary for the payment of the family allowances to the administration. To allow such an argument would amount to enabling officials or agents to withhold the information needed for the calculation and payment of family allowances, at the risk, first, of those allowances not actually contributing to the maintenance of the children, and, second, of undermining the financial interests of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 November 2014, EH v Commission , F‑42/14, EU:F:2014:250, paragraph 100).

46 It is therefore clear from the context in which the contested decisions were taken, of which the applicant was aware, that, first, the Commission, lacking the necessary information, was unable for several years to meet its obligation to pay the family allowances to the applicant’s former spouse and, second, the applicant had just resigned from the Commission’s services, such that that situation could not last.

47 Accordingly, the Commission did not commit a manifest error of assessment in finding that, owing to the long-running inability to obtain the requested information, it had no other choice, when the applicant resigned, but to decide to cancel the entitlement to family allowances connected with his children and to recover the unduly received amounts, since the related benefits had been calculated on the basis of allowances that had not been paid. In addition, the Commission is correct in arguing that payment of the family allowances to a person other than the applicant’s former spouse, and thus to a person without custody of the children and who does not actually contribute to their maintenance, is contrary to the very purpose of those allowances.

48 Consequently, the first plea must be rejected.

The second plea: infringement of Article 34 of the Charter, Article 67 of the Staff regulations and Article 2 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations

49 By his second plea, the applicant submits, first of all, that by cancelling the entitlement to family allowances connected with his children and to the benefits related to those allowances, the Commission infringed Article 34 of the Charter, under which every citizen of the European Union is entitled to social security benefits and social advantages.

50 Further, the applicant argues that neither Article 67 of the Staff Regulations nor Article 2 of Annex VII thereto foresees the possibility of cancelling or reducing family allowances and related benefits on the ground that the administration does not have the bank details or contact information of the actual beneficiary of those allowances, such that the contested decisions were adopted in breach of those provisions.

51 Lastly, in the reply, the applicant reiterates his argument that the contested decisions are based on the incorrect premiss that the mother had sole custody of the children. He again submits that he meets the conditions for receiving the family allowances directly since he and his former spouse, according to him, had agreed on shared custody and since he himself actually contributes to the maintenance of the children. He argues that in the absence of his former spouse’s bank details, the Commission should have paid the family allowances directly to him.

52 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

53 It should be observed that Article 34(1) of the Charter states that ‘the Union recognises and respects the entitlement to social security benefits and social services providing protection in cases such as maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and in the case of loss of employment, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices.’ Article 34(2) of the Charter provides that ‘everyone residing and moving legally within the European Union is entitled to social security benefits and social advantages in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices.’

54 Articles 1 to 3 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, to which Article 67 thereof refers, set out the criteria under which an official may receive family allowances.

55 Accordingly, in the first place, it is apparent from the very wording of Article 34(1) and (2) of the Charter that an entitlement to social security benefits is recognised ‘in accordance with’ the rules laid down by EU law and national laws and practices.

56 The entitlement to social security benefits is thus not unconditional, rather it is to be exercised within the legal framework established by the rules laid down by EU law and national laws and practices.

57 Consequently, contrary to what is asserted by the applicant, Article 34 of the Charter cannot be interpreted as obliging the EU institutions to recognise an entitlement on the part of officials to receive family allowances and the related benefits that infringes the rules of the Staff Regulations. The argument claiming an infringement of that article must therefore be rejected.

58 In the second place, it should be observed that Articles 62 and 67 of the Staff Regulations, read in conjunction with Articles 1 to 3 of Annex VII thereto, to which they refer, clearly define the conditions under which EU officials may claim family allowances and the related benefits.

59 In the present case, where the applicant does not meet the requirements laid down by Articles 62 and 67 of the Staff Regulations, read in conjunction with Articles 1 to 3 of Annex VII thereto, he cannot claim payment of the family allowances or the related benefits.

60 As observed in paragraph 42 above, the decision of 19 April 2022, stating that the family allowances should be paid to the applicant’s former spouse, has become final. Consequently, the applicant cannot, in the present action, challenge that decision’s determination as to the recipient. The contested decisions do not in fact make any findings as to who should receive the family allowances, such that the argument that they infringe Article 67 of the Staff Regulations and Article 2 of Annex VII thereto must be rejected as ineffective.

61 In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument that, in the absence of the information needed to pay the family allowances to his former spouse, the Commission should have paid them directly to him, rather than deciding to cancel the entitlements connected with his children, it should be observed that the applicant, in order to receive the family allowances directly, was required to prove, in accordance with the provisions of the Staff Regulations, that he had custody of his children or that he actually contributed to their maintenance, which he has not demonstrated. The fact that it was impossible to pay the family allowances to his former spouse cannot therefore lead to those allowances being paid to the applicant when he does meet the conditions laid down by the Staff Regulations.

62 Furthermore, the recovery of the benefits related to the unduly received family allowances, as required by the recovery decision, is the inevitable consequence of the failure to provide the administration with the contact and bank information of the person with custody of the children, namely their mother, and, therefore, of the cancellation of the entitlement to family allowances connected with those children. Indeed, inasmuch as those related benefits meet a social objective connected with the actual maintenance of the children, they are not due when that objective cannot be attained. Since, first, the applicant did not provide the information needed for the payment of the family allowances to his former spouse and since, second, he does not actually contribute to the maintenance of his children, as is apparent from the decision of 19 April 2022, which has become final, the benefits related to the family allowances do not fulfil their objective, meaning that they must be recovered.

63 Consequently, the applicant’s argument, based on the erroneous premiss that, since the family allowances could not be paid to his former spouse, they should have been paid to him, must be rejected.

64 Given that the arguments made by the applicant in support of his second plea cannot succeed, that plea must be rejected.

The third plea: infringement of Article 85 of the Staff Regulations

65 By his third plea, the applicant claims an infringement of Article 85 of the Staff Regulations.

66 In that regard, the applicant argues that he satisfies the conditions required for receiving the family allowances and that he has therefore not gained any undue advantage. He states that he was not aware that there was no due reason for the payment of those allowances or that there was any overpayment since, in his view, the amounts paid constituted a correct application of Article 67 of the Staff Regulations and Article 2 of Annex VII thereto. He also observes that the sums corresponding to the family allowances have remained in the blocked account and were never transferred to him or his former spouse.

67 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

68 Article 85 of the Staff Regulations states that any sum overpaid is to be recovered if the recipient was aware that there was no due reason for the payment or if the fact of the overpayment was patently such that he or she could not have been unaware of it.

69 The words ‘patently such’ in Article 85 of the Staff Regulations do not mean that the official in receipt of an undue payment does not need to make any effort to reflect or check, but means that repayment is required where the error is one which would not escape the notice of an official exercising ordinary care, who is deemed to know the rules governing his or her salary (judgment of 27 January 2016, DF v Commission , T‑782/14 P, EU:T:2016:29, paragraph 26).

70 Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that family allowances are intended not for the upkeep of an official, but for that of his or her children (judgment of 14 June 1988, Christianos v Court of Justice , 33/87, EU:C:1988:300, paragraph 15) and that the right to the benefits related to the family allowances is justified for the same reason as that which justifies entitlement to those same allowances, namely the maintenance of the children concerned (judgments of 12 November 2002, López Cejudo v Commission , T‑271/01, EU:T:2002:272, paragraph 35, and of 16 February 2005, Reggimenti v Parliament , T‑354/03, EU:T:2005:54, paragraph 71).

71 Consequently, a benefit related to the family allowances is justified only if it is allowed for social reasons connected with the existence of the child and the cost of maintaining him or her, namely for the person who has assumed the material costs of all of the child’s needs (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 November 1980, Sorasio-Allo and Others v Commission , 81/79, 82/79 and 146/79, EU:C:1980:270, paragraph 15). That benefit becomes devoid of purpose when the costs of maintaining a child no longer fall on the official concerned but fall entirely on another subject of law (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 November 1991, Schwedler v Parliament , C‑132/90 P, EU:C:1991:452, paragraph 22).

72 In the present case, in the first place, it should be borne in mind, as the Commission correctly observes, that the recovery decision concerns solely the recovery of the benefits related to the family allowances and not recovery of the family allowances themselves. It is indeed apparent from that decision that the family allowances that were paid to a blocked account pending the information needed to transfer them to the applicant’s former spouse have already been deducted from his debt to the administration and that only the amounts received by the applicant as related benefits will be subject to recovery.

73 In the second place, it is apparent from paragraphs 40 to 42 above that the applicant does not have custody of his children and does not contribute to their maintenance, which is provided in full by their mother, with whom they reside in Romania. Since the applicant has taken on neither the custody nor the actual maintenance of his children, he cannot legitimately claim the benefits related to the family allowances. Those benefits, having regard to their purpose, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 71 above, may be granted only to the person who has taken on the actual maintenance of the children, even in part. Allocating them to the applicant would amount to making him the sole beneficiary thereof, counter to their intended purpose. Providing them to the applicant must therefore be considered as unwarranted.

74 In the third place, inasmuch as the PMO, by the decision of 19 April 2022, informed the applicant that it did not consider him as having custody of his children and as contributing to their actual maintenance, and since the applicant did not bring any action against that decision, it must be found that he knew that there was no due reason to receive the benefits related to the family allowances, or that he could not reasonably disregard that circumstance. The link between those benefits and actual participation in the maintenance of children cannot in fact escape the notice of an official exercising ordinary care.

75 It follows that the applicant did not act in compliance with the duty of care falling on all officials, who are deemed to know the rules governing their salaries. The applicant therefore cannot reasonably submit that the condition related to patent overpayment was not satisfied.

76 Consequently, the Commission did not infringe Article 85 of the Staff Regulations in adopting the recovery decision.

77 Accordingly, the third plea must be rejected.

The fourth plea: breach of the principle of good administration, of the duty of care and of the principle of legal certainty, and also misuse of powers

78 By his fourth plea, the applicant argues, first of all, that the Commission infringed the principle of good administration, laid down in Article 41(1) of the Charter, and its duty of care. He submits that the Commission did not act fairly when it cancelled the entitlement to family allowances connected with his children owing to a failure by him to respond to a request for information, even though he did not have the information requested and had informed the Commission of that circumstance. He submits that the Commission did not take account of the fact that he no longer had contact with his former spouse, that he did not know her bank details and that he had no knowledge of whether she had replied to the PMO’s letter. In his view, if those aspects had been taken into consideration, the Commission would have found that he was the legitimate recipient of the family allowances.

79 Further, the applicant argues that the Commission did not observe the principle of good administration when adopting the contested decisions, in particular because it failed to take account of the fact that it had repeatedly changed its position on the payment of the family allowances. He states that the Commission did not at first pay the allowances, then it did pay them, and then it suspended the payments and retroactively cancelled the entitlement to the allowances already paid. He submits that the contested decisions led to him being treated as a person who had no children, which is not true, and that they resulted in a reduction in his salary that was greater than the amount of the family allowances, thus resulting in discrimination in comparison with other parents.

80 The applicant submits that those successive changes in the Commission’s position, which culminated in the adoption of the contested decisions, also infringed the principle of legal certainty.

81 Lastly, the applicant argues that the Commission misused its powers, first, by adopting the contested decisions in breach of the rules laid down in Articles 67 and 85 of the Staff Regulations and in Article 2 of Annex VII thereto and, second, by relying on a ground for cancellation that is not foreseen by those provisions, namely the lack of a response to a request for information.

82 The Commission contests the applicant’s arguments.

83 Article 41(1) of the Charter provides that every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union.

84 First of all, in accordance with the case-law, the administration is required, under the principle of sound administration, to examine with care and impartiality all the relevant aspects of the individual case brought before it and to gather all the factual and legal information necessary to exercise its discretion and to ensure the proper conduct and effectiveness of the procedures which it sets in motion (see judgment of 30 March 2022, KF v EIB , T‑299/20, not published, EU:T:2022:171, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

85 In addition, the administration’s duty to have regard for the welfare of its staff reflects the balance of reciprocal rights and obligations that the Staff Regulations have created in relations between the public authority and public servants. That duty, together with the principle of sound administration, implies in particular that when the competent authority takes a decision concerning the situation of an official, it should take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision and that when doing so it should take into account not only the interests of the service but also those of the official concerned (see judgment of 2 October 2024, PW v EEAS , T‑448/22, EU:T:2024:664, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).

86 Further, the principle of legal certainty requires that EU rules enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations which are imposed on them. Individuals must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly (judgment of 21 June 2007, ROM-projecten , C‑158/06, EU:C:2007:370, paragraph 25).

87 Moreover, according to the case-law, a measure is vitiated by misuse of powers if it is established, by the applicant, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence, that it was adopted with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 October 2006, Nijs v Court of Auditors , T‑171/05, EU:T:2006:288, paragraph 64, and of 17 October 2006, Bonnet v Court of Justice , T‑406/04, EU:T:2006:322, paragraph 112).

88 Lastly, it is clear from the case-law that the protection of the rights and interests of officials is subject to compliance with the rules in force (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 September 2022, WT v Commission , T‑91/20, not published, EU:T:2022:510, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited).

89 In the present case, in the first place, as regards the argument claiming breach of the principle of good administration and of the duty of care, it is apparent from paragraph 40 above that the Commission assessed the requests for family allowances submitted by the applicant in the light of his family situation and by taking the specific circumstances of the case into account. It is thus clear from the decisions of 19 April 2022 and of 30 June 2023, against which the applicant has not brought any action, that the family allowances were to be paid to the applicant’s former spouse since the children lived with her, she had custody of them, and the applicant did not contribute to their maintenance. Consequently, the applicant did not meet the conditions for receiving the direct payment of the family allowances. The fact that the Commission was not in fact able to pay the family allowances to his former spouse does not change that circumstance in any way. Indeed, the family allowances could not be paid because the applicant had failed to meet his obligation to provide the required information, despite the Commission’s efforts, both in relation to him and to his former spouse, actually to carry out the payments in accordance with the legal framework in force. Accordingly, the Commission cannot be accused of infringing the principle of good administration or the duty of care when adopting the contested decisions and the applicant’s argument must be rejected.

90 In the second place, as regards the argument alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty, while it is true that the Commission paid the family allowances directly to the applicant from May 2022, it should be borne in mind that, as of 29 September 2022, it informed him that those payments were a mistake and that the overpaid amounts would be recovered by being withheld from his pay. Since that information was not contested at that time by the applicant, it cannot be challenged in his action against the contested decisions. In any event, those mistaken payments cannot constitute a case of maladministration.

91 Furthermore, those mistaken payments have no bearing on the fact that the Commission, since the decision of 19 April 2022, has been consistent in its stance that the applicant did not meet the conditions for receiving the family allowances on his own behalf and that they should be paid to his former spouse in order actually to contribute to the maintenance of the children.

92 Accordingly, it must be found that the stance taken by the Commission complies with the applicable provisions and the principle of legal certainty. The Commission cannot in fact, in the guise of fairness, referred to by the applicant, depart from the rules in force and it did not, therefore, infringe the principle of legal certainty in adopting the contested decisions.

93 In the third and final place, as regards the argument alleging misuse of powers, it should be found, contrary to what is claimed by the applicant, that the contested decisions do not describe him as having no children. In fact, the decision of 27 September 2021 determined the applicant’s financial entitlements by considering him to be the father of two children. Accordingly, it should be found that the contested decisions are based on the objective finding that the applicant is the parent of two children and that the family allowances related to those children are due, but they could not actually be paid to the person who had custody of them and could not, consequently, contribute to their maintenance.

94 Furthermore, it is clear from paragraphs 64 and 76 above that the contested decisions were not adopted in breach of the rules laid down in Articles 67 and 85 of the Staff Regulations and in Articles 1 to 3 of Annex VII thereto.

95 Since the applicant has not put forward any evidence capable of proving a misuse of powers attributable to the Commission, his argument must be rejected.

96 Since none of the arguments made in support of the fourth plea can succeed, it must also be rejected.

97 Consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

98 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

99 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders GY to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 14 October 2026.

* Language of the case: English.