Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) 9 September 2026
JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)
9 September 2026 ( * )
( EU trade mark – Revocation proceedings – EU figurative mark NUTRISTAR – Genuine use of the trade mark – Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Declaration of revocation – Assessment of the evidence – Unreasonable or excessive burden of proof )
In Case T‑574/25,
Nutristar SpA, established in Reggio Emilia (Italy), represented by M. Gómez Calvo and E. Cebollero González, lawyers,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by E. Lobotková, R. Raponi and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents,
defendant,
the other parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO being
Agnieszka Anielska and Bartosz Tyrawski, residing in Warsaw (Poland),
THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber),
composed of N. Półtorak, President, G. Hesse and I. Dimitrakopoulos (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: G. Mitrev, administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
further to the hearing on 29 April 2026,
gives the following
Judgment
1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Nutristar SpA, seeks the annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 20 June 2025 (Case R 1846/2024-1) (‘the contested decision’).
Background to the dispute
2 On 4 August 2023, Ms Agnieszka Anielska and Mr Bartosz Tyrawski filed with EUIPO an application for revocation of the EU trade mark registered on 2 August 2018, further to an application filed by the applicant on 21 April 2009, for the following figurative mark:
3 The goods and services covered by the contested mark in respect of which revocation was sought were in Classes 5, 9, 31, 42 and 44 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and corresponded, in so far as is relevant to the present case, to the following description:
– Class 5: ‘Zootechnical integrators, in particular zootechnical integrators for bovine feeding; integrators for animal feed based on proteins, amino acids, fats, fatty acids, carbohydrates, vitamins, mineral salts, mineral nutrients and/or trace elements, additives for animal feed; diet integrators for animals; feed integrators and vitamin preparations for animals, in particular for bovine feeding’;
– Class 31: ‘Zootechnical feed, in particular zootechnical feed for bovine feeding; feedstuff and additives for feedstuff (not for medical use), feedstuff in tablets, stable feed, wet feedstuff, dry feedstuff, litter, long-stalk litter/straw, hay, silage and water-soluble feedstuff; compound feedstuff, reconstituent forages, feedstuff for breeding, feedstuff based on mineral nutrients, complementary feedstuff and forage additives, supplementary feedstuff based on mineral nutrients for animals; additives and additive substances for feedstuff and forages not for medical use, in particular for bovine feeding; meal for animals, non-medicated integrators for animal feed’.
4 The application for revocation was based on Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), on the ground that no genuine use had been made of the mark at issue for an uninterrupted period of five years.
5 By decision of 24 July 2024, the Cancellation Division granted in part the application for revocation of the contested mark. On the one hand, it revoked the mark in question for all the goods and services in Classes 5, 9, 42 and 44, and for the following goods in Class 31: ‘Zootechnical feed; feedstuff (not for medical use), dry feedstuff; compound feedstuff, reconstituent forages, feedstuff for breeding, feedstuff based on mineral nutrients, complementary feedstuff, supplementary feedstuff based on mineral nutrients for animals; meal for animals; all the aforementioned goods except those for livestock feeding; additives for feedstuff (not for medical use), feedstuff in tablets, stable feed, wet feedstuff, litter, long-stalk litter/straw, hay, silage and water-soluble feedstuff; forage additives; additives and additive substances for feedstuff and forages not for medical use, in particular for bovine feeding; non-medicated integrators for animal feed’.
6 On the other hand, the Cancellation Division allowed the mark to remain in the register for the following goods in Class 31: ‘Zootechnical feed; feedstuff (not for medical use), dry feedstuff; compound feedstuff, reconstituent forages, feedstuff for breeding, feedstuff based on mineral nutrients, complementary feedstuff, supplementary feedstuff based on mineral nutrients for animals; meal for animals; all the above-mentioned goods for livestock feeding’.
7 On 19 September 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Cancellation Division, seeking the annulment of that decision to the extent that it had revoked the contested mark in part. On 22 January 2025, Ms Anielska and Mr Tyrawski filed a cross-appeal, seeking the annulment of the Cancellation Division’s decision in relation to the goods in Class 31 in respect of which the contested mark had been maintained in the register to the extent that the application for revocation had been dismissed.
8 By the contested decision, the First Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the cross appeal, finding that no genuine use of the contested mark had been established. It thus concluded that the contested mark had to be revoked for all of the goods and services at issue.
Forms of order sought
9 The applicant claims that the Court should:
– annul the contested decision;
– order EUIPO to pay the costs;
– order Ms Anielska and Mr Tyrawski to pay the costs of the proceedings before EUIPO.
10 EUIPO contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action;
– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.
Law
The subject matter of the action
11 Although the applicant’s first head of claim is worded as an application for annulment of the contested decision in its entirety, it is apparent from the application, and it was also expressly confirmed by the applicant at the hearing, that that application is in fact seeking the annulment of the contested decision only in part, in so far as it upheld the application for revocation of the contested mark in respect of the goods in Classes 5 and 31 mentioned in paragraph 3 above (‘the contested goods’) (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2024, Sta Grupa v EUIPO – Axis (VAPIX) , T‑207/23, not published, EU:T:2024:290, paragraph 15).
12 Accordingly, the claim for annulment made by the applicant in its action must be read as being directed against the contested decision only is so far as concerns the abovementioned goods in Classes 5 and 31.
Substance
13 In support of its action, the applicant raises, in essence, a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001.
14 In the context of that plea in law, the applicant puts forward a number of complaints. More specifically, it argues, in the first place, that EUIPO disregarded numerous documents which it produced in support of its action; in the second place, that EUIPO wrongly assessed the nature of the uses made of the contested mark, mistakenly characterising the use of the mark as merely that of a business name rather than use of a trade mark; in the third place, that the Board of Appeal misinterpreted the nature and classification of the contested goods; in the fourth place, that EUIPO ignored the promotional use that was made of the contested mark at trade fairs; in the fifth place, that EUIPO was mistaken to conclude that the photographs which it produced were of little probative value; and in the last place, that the Board of Appeal made manifest errors in its analysis of the applicant’s Vetibed and Nutrimilk ranges of products.
15 In that regard, it should be noted that, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 and Article 58(1)(a) of that regulation, the rights of the proprietor of an EU trade mark are to be declared revoked on application to EUIPO if, within a continuous period of five years, the trade mark has not been put to genuine use in the European Union in connection with the goods or services in respect of which it is registered and there are no proper reasons for non-use.
16 According to settled case-law, there is genuine use of a trade mark where the mark is used in accordance with its essential function, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services for which it is registered, in order to create or preserve an outlet for those goods or services; genuine use does not include token use for the sole purpose of preserving the rights conferred by the mark (judgment of 21 November 2013, Recaro v OHIM – Certino Mode (RECARO) , T‑524/12, not published, EU:T:2013:604, paragraph 19; see also, by analogy, judgment of 11 March 2003, Ansul , C‑40/01, EU:C:2003:145, paragraph 43, and order of 27 January 2004, La Mer Technology , C‑259/02, EU:C:2004:50, paragraph 27). Genuine use is therefore to be regarded as excluding minimal or insufficient use for the purpose of determining that a mark is being put to real, effective use on a given market. Thus, even if it is the proprietor’s intention to make real, effective use of the trade mark, if the trade mark is not objectively present on the market in a manner that is effective and stable in terms of the configuration of the sign, with the result that it cannot be perceived by consumers as an indication of the origin of the goods or services in question, then there is no genuine use of the trade mark (see judgment of 29 June 2017, Martín Osete v EUIPO – Rey (AN IDEAL WIFE and Others) , T‑427/16 to T‑429/16, not published, EU:T:2017:455, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
17 In proceedings for revocation of a mark, it is, in principle, for the proprietor of the mark to establish genuine use of that mark (see judgment of 23 January 2019, Klement v EUIPO , C‑698/17 P, not published, EU:C:2019:48, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
18 In so far as concerns the criteria for assessing genuine use, Article 10(3) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625 of 5 March 2018 supplementing Regulation 2017/1001 and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430 (OJ 2018 L 104, p. 1), which concerns proof of use, is applicable mutatis mutandis to revocation proceedings, pursuant to Article 19(1) of that regulation. Article 10(3) of that delegated regulation provides that the evidence of use must establish the place, time, extent and nature of the use that has been made of the contested mark.
19 As regards the criteria for assessment mentioned in paragraph 18 above, it should be borne in mind that, in the assessment, regard must be had to all the facts and circumstances relevant to establishing whether the commercial use of the contested mark is real, particularly the practices regarded as warranted in the relevant economic sector as a means of maintaining or creating market shares for the goods or services protected by the mark, the nature of those goods or services, the characteristics of the market and the scale and frequency of use of the mark (see judgment of 15 July 2015, Deutsche Rockwool Mineralwoll v OHIM – Recticel (λ) , T‑215/13, not published, EU:T:2015:518, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
20 In addition, under Article 10(4) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625, the evidence of use is to be limited to the submission of supporting documents and items such as packages, labels, price lists, catalogues, invoices, photographs and newspaper advertisements, and statements in writing as referred to in Article 97(1)(f) of Regulation 2017/1001.
21 Genuine use of a trade mark cannot be proved by means of probabilities or presumptions, but must be demonstrated by solid and objective evidence of effective and sufficient use of the trade mark on the market concerned. It is therefore necessary to carry out a global assessment which takes into account all the relevant factors of the particular case and entails a degree of interdependence between the factors taken into account (see judgment of 8 July 2020, Euroapotheca v EUIPO – General Nutrition Investment (GNC LIVE WELL) , T‑686/19, not published, EU:T:2020:320, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
22 It is not necessary for each item of evidence to give information about all four elements to which the proof of genuine use must relate, namely the place, time, nature and extent of use. An accumulation of items of evidence may allow the necessary facts to be established, even though each of those items of evidence, taken individually, would be insufficient to constitute proof of the accuracy of those facts. Furthermore, the question whether a trade mark has been put to genuine use requires that an overall assessment be carried out, taking into account all the relevant factors. Thus, each piece of evidence is not to be analysed separately, but rather together, in order to determine the most likely and coherent meaning (see judgment of 19 November 2025, Gürok v EUIPO – Olav (Làv) , T‑563/24, EU:T:2025:1048, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
23 It is in the light of those considerations that the applicant’s complaints must be examined.
24 In the present case, it should be borne in mind that, in order to furnish proof of genuine use of the contested mark, the applicant provided, in the course of the administrative proceedings, the following items of evidence, first to the Cancellation Division (the annexes produced to it are identified by the letters ‘CD’ preceding the number of each annex) and, subsequently, to the Board of Appel (these annexes being identified by the letters ‘SoG’ preceding the number of each annex):
– a selection of invoices covering the period from 2018 to 2023 and relating to various types of the applicant’s goods and services, issued to customers in the European Union, and also relating to activities performed by the applicant’s technicians (Annexes CD1, CD8, SoG4, SoG7, SoG8, SoG16, SoG17, SoG20, SoG22, SoG27 and SoG29);
– international consignment notes (Annex CD2);
– a selection of undated photographs of packed goods and photographs showing the applicant’s wet feedstuffs (Annexes CD3, SoG18, SoG23 and SoG26);
– communications between the applicant and distributors or customers in the European Union (Annexes CD4 and SoG28);
– a selection of catalogues and brochures distributed to various customers in the European Union, particularly in 2019 and 2023 (Annexes CD5, SoG6, SoG9, SoG19, SoG21, SoG24 and SoG25);
– technical data sheets for some sample products of the applicant’s (Annex CD6);
– professional consultancy contracts between the applicant and specialists in zootechnical consultancy (Annex CD7);
– screenshots of a software programme developed for the applicant (Annex CD9);
– a diagram setting out the applicant’s turnover for the period 2011 to 2022 (Annex CD10);
– extracts from the online directory Whois and from the online database Way Back Machine, evidencing the creation of the ‘nutristar.it’ website in 1997 and the scale of activity on that website, in particular since 2017, along with extracts from the applicant’s website (Annexes CD11 and SoG30);
– documents highlighting the applicant’s participation in national and international trade fairs, in particular in Italy in 2019 and 2023 (Annex CD12);
– screenshots of the applicant’s social network pages (Annexes CD13 and SoG34);
– YouTube videos published on the applicant’s YouTube channel, relating to Rumilab, the applicant’s technical laboratory, presenting a talk given by the applicant’s General Manager (Annexes SoG11, SoG31, SoG32, SoG33 and SoG37);
– a selection of the applicant’s product labels (Annexes SoG5, SoG10 and SoG15);
– publications in magazines concerning the applicant’s activities and in a magazine on animal nutrition (Annexes SoG12, SoG13 and SoG14);
– statements from customers of the applicant’s concerning analysis and consultancy services received (Annex SoG35);
– documents relating to meetings, conferences and courses on animal breeding, agriculture and farming, in particular in 2018, 2020, 2022 and 2023 (Annex SoG36).
25 It should be pointed out, first of all, that, in paragraph 42 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal rightly found that the period in respect of which the applicant needed to demonstrate genuine use of the contested mark was, in this case, the five-year period preceding the lodging of the application for revocation, being from 4 August 2018 to 3 August 2023 inclusive.
26 In addition, in paragraphs 46 to 51 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal examined, in a separate section of the decision headed ‘General remarks concerning some evidence’, the probative value of certain annexes produced by the applicant in the course of the administrative proceedings. In that context, the Board of Appeal set out the reasons for which it had concluded that certain items of evidence, in particular Annexes CD8 (invoices for activities performed by the applicant’s technicians), CD10 (the diagram setting out the applicant’s turnover), CD11 (extracts from the online directory Whois and from the online database Way Back Machine) and CD12 (documents highlighting the applicant’s participation in trade fairs), were not relevant or could not contribute to establishing genuine use of the contested mark. In that context, in paragraphs 50 and 51 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated that it had been unable to link the product codes set out in the invoices produced by the applicant with those set out in the technical data sheets and offers produced. The Board of Appeal also noted that the photographs produced by the applicant were undated and that the applicant had not referred to any specific product line in the invoices which it produced as evidence.
27 In so far as concerns the assessment to determine whether the contested mark had been put to genuine use in connection with the contested goods, the Board of Appeal carried out that analysis in paragraphs 56 to 63 of the contested decision. It concluded that the applicant had not established genuine use of the contested mark with respect to any of the goods in Classes 5 and 31.
28 More specifically, in paragraph 56 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal noted that most of the photographs produced by the applicant were undated and, in its view, therefore had little probative value. It gave Annex SoG21 as an example, stating that it related to a period prior to that mentioned in paragraph 25 above.
29 Next, in paragraphs 57 to 59 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated that, after assessing the evidence adduced by the applicant, it remained unclear whether the product lines concerned supplements, classified in Class 5, or fodder, to be classified in Class 31. It noted in that connection that that imprecision led to ambiguity as to the correct classification of each product in one or other class under the classification mentioned in paragraph 3 above.
30 In paragraph 60 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal concluded that the contested mark had never been used in connection with the applicant’s Nutrimilk product line (which comprises soluble feedstuffs), after examining, in particular, Annexes SoG24, SoG25 and SoG27, which contained invoices. According to the Board of Appeal, the contested mark appeared, both in the invoices and in a leaflet of the applicant’s, only as a business name and not as a distinctive sign.
31 In addition, in paragraph 61 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal noted that many other product lines were mentioned in the evidence produced by the applicant (citing Annexes SoG9 and SoG10 as examples), but that it had been unable to link them to any invoice.
32 Lastly, in paragraph 62 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal considered whether litter had been placed on the market under the contested mark, together with a different mark (Vetibed), and concluded that neither the invoices produced by the applicant nor the photograph it had produced under Annex SoG23 could establish genuine use of the mark in that regard.
33 By its first complaint, the applicant argues, in essence, that the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the evidence which it had put before it was partial or selective. More specifically, the applicant maintains that the Board of Appeal overlooked some of the evidence that it had produced, out of the total of 37 annexes which it had submitted to the Board of Appeal, given that the contested decision (and paragraph 9 thereof in particular) refers exclusively to Annexes SoG14 to SoG37, to the exclusion of the other items of evidence it produced before the Board of Appeal. It therefore argues that the Board of Appeal’s assessment of genuine use was based on incomplete evidence selectively truncated, and thus vitiates the legal basis of the contested decision. At the hearing, the applicant stated that this complaint went to the merits of the contested decision, and not to the statement of reasons for that decision.
34 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. In its view, the Board of Appeal conducted an assessment of the evidence as a whole, which necessarily included Annexes 1 to 13, as is confirmed by paragraphs 32 and 33 of the contested decision. EUIPO submits that it is evident from paragraphs 32, 33, 47 to 51, 56 to 63 and 75 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal carried out an overall assessment of the evidence adduced by the applicant in the course of the administrative proceedings.
35 In the present case, it is clear from the case file that the applicant produced before the Board of Appeal a total of 37 items of evidence (Annexes SoG1 to SoG37) together with its written statement setting out the grounds of appeal.
36 In that regard, it must be noted that paragraph 9 of the contested decision indeed makes no reference to Annexes SoG1 to SoG13. In that paragraph, the Board of Appeal supposedly listed the items of evidence which the applicant had submitted together with its written statement setting out the grounds of appeal. That paragraph, however, sets out a list that includes only Annexes SoG14 to SoG37 and makes no mention of the 13 other documents that were also produced by the applicant before the Board of Appeal.
37 Moreover, it must be observed that, in the remainder of the contested decision, reference is made to only two of those 13 documents. More precisely, in the context of its assessment to determine whether the contested mark had been put to genuine use in relation to the contested goods, the Board of Appeal referred to Annexes SoG9 and SoG10, in paragraph 61 of the contested decision.
38 It follows from the foregoing considerations that it does not appear from the contested decision that the Board of Appeal did in fact make a complete, overall assessment, taking into account all of the available evidence, including Annexes SoG1 to SoG8 and SoG11 to SoG13, contrary to the principles laid down in the case-law referred to in paragraph 22 above. Consequently, the applicant’s first complaint is well founded.
39 The applicant also argues that the Board of Appeal misconstrued the arguments and misread the evidence which it had put forward regarding the genuine nature of the use made of the contested mark.
40 More specifically, by its second complaint, the applicant essentially disputes the finding made by the Board of Appeal in paragraph 60 of the contested decision that ‘the contested [mark] is depicted in both the invoices and the leaflet only as a business name and not as a badge to distinguish the commercial origin of a product from [that of] another undertaking’. In that context, the applicant’s main argument is that the evidence it produced in the course of the administrative proceedings shows that the contested mark is used as a ‘house mark’, which is to say as a badge to designate the commercial origin of all of its products. It notes, with reference to several examples taken from the case file, that several items of evidence demonstrate the use of the contested mark in association with a given product line or with a particular product in a given product line.
41 Moreover, by its third complaint, the applicant primarily challenges the finding made by the Board of Appeal in paragraph 59 of the contested decision that ‘it remains unclear whether [the contested] product lines concern supplements, which are classified in Class 5, or fodder, to be classified in Class 31’. In that context, the applicant submits that it explained on numerous occasions, both before the Cancellation Division and before the Board of Appeal, the nature of the products in Classes 5 and 31 to which the evidence adduced related.
42 EUIPO disputes the merits of those complaints. In its view, the items of evidence produced by the applicant do not confirm the applicant’s assertion that the contested mark itself functions as a guarantee of origin, since the public would not perceive it as designating the undertaking responsible for the goods. EUIPO states that the word ‘Nutristar’ was used in a corporate context, but was not used autonomously to distinguish products, and that the structure ‘Nutristar SpA’ identifies a legal entity, not a product brand. It adds that the applicant’s contention that the mark was used as a ‘house mark’ is unsubstantiated. According to EUIPO, the photographs of packaging relied on by the applicant are of insufficient quality, such that it is impossible to confirm that the contested mark appears on the goods. Moreover, some photographs show that several product lines identify manufacturers other than the applicant, which undermines the assertion that the contested mark itself functions as a guarantee of origin. It adds that the mere inclusion of the phrase ‘engineered by Nutristar’ on product packaging is insufficient to demonstrate use of the sign as a trade mark. As regards the applicant’s arguments concerning the nature of the use and the classification of the goods, EUIPO submits that the Board of Appeal’s reasoning did not turn on a formal misclassification of goods, but on the fundamental deficiencies common to the entire body of evidence, which failed to show genuine use of the trade mark for those goods.
43 Those two complaints should be addressed together.
44 In that regard, it is clear from settled case-law that there is no precept in the EU trade mark system that obliges a trade mark proprietor to prove the use of its mark on its own, independently of any other mark or any other sign. Therefore, two or more marks may be used together in an autonomous way, with or without the name of the manufacturer’s company (see judgments of 6 November 2014, Popp and Zech v OHIM – Müller-Boré & Partner (MB) , T‑463/12, not published, EU:T:2014:935, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited, and of 14 July 2021, Fashioneast and AM.VI. v EUIPO – Moschillo (RICH JOHN RICHMOND) , T‑297/20, not published, EU:T:2021:432, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
45 Thus, the joint use of another mark with the contested mark cannot, in itself, undermine the function of that other mark as a means of identifying the goods concerned (see judgment of 8 June 2022, Apple v EUIPO – Swatch (THINK DIFFERENT) , T‑26/21 to T‑28/21, not published, EU:T:2022:350, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited). Moreover, the condition of genuine use of a trade mark may be satisfied where a trade mark is used in conjunction with another mark, provided that the trade mark continues to be perceived as indicative of the origin of the product concerned (see judgments of 23 September 2020, CEDC International v EUIPO – Underberg (Shape of a blade of grass in a bottle) , T‑796/16, EU:T:2020:439, paragraph 142 and the case-law cited, and of 2 July 2025, Ferrari v EUIPO – Hesse (TESTAROSSA) , T‑1103/23, EU:T:2025:659, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
46 Such a practice of designating goods both by a ‘house mark’ or ‘umbrella mark’ and by a sub-brand identifying a specific product line is not uncommon in the business world (see, for examples of that type of practice, judgments of 11 November 2020, EUIPO v John Mills , C‑809/18 P, EU:C:2020:902, paragraph 23, and of 8 May 2024, VAPIX , T‑207/23, not published, EU:T:2024:290, paragraph 57).
47 In the present case, it must be observed that, as stated in paragraph 24 above, in order to prove genuine use of the contested mark, the applicant provided a considerable body of evidence during the administrative proceedings, including several examples showing the contested mark prominently displayed on its goods as a ‘house mark’ or ‘umbrella mark’, accompanied by a sub-brand identifying a specific product line.
48 In the first place, the applicant produced numerous invoices relating to its products on which the contested mark is visible, as a figurative sign, at the top of each page (Annexes CD1, SoG4, SoG7, SoG8, SoG16, SoG17, SoG20, SoG22 and SoG27). In the second place, it made available photographs of products or product packages (Annexes CD3 and SoG26) showing the joint use of the contested mark with the names of specific product lines (such as the product line names DETIC, LACTA and JUNIA). In the third place, it provided product labels mentioning the brand NUTRISTAR, accompanied by the name of a specific product or product line (Annex SoG15). In the fourth place, it presented brochures, catalogues and price lists, in which the contested mark is similarly visible as an ‘umbrella mark’, accompanied in each instance by a sub-brand identifying a line of products (Annexes CD5, SoG19 and SoG21). In the fifth place, it produced some press articles which referred to NUTRISTAR products (Annexes SoG12 and SoG19).
49 As regards, more specifically, the invoices produced by the applicant, it should be observed that the contested mark is fully visible on those invoices, in a prominent position, and in the form of the contested figurative sign. It does not appear as a mere textual reference to the business name of the undertaking Nutristar SpA, contrary to the Board of Appeal’s argument in paragraph 60 of the contested decision. The sub-brands and details of the products sold appear next to the invoiced price. Such a layout confirms that the use made of the sign NUTRISTAR goes beyond merely identifying the company and also indicates, as a trade mark, the commercial origin of the goods in question, thus creating an additional, clearly perceptible link between the contested mark and those goods (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 October 2019, 6Minutes Media v EUIPO – ad pepper media International (ad pepper) , T‑666/18, not published, EU:T:2019:720, paragraphs 82 and 83).
50 In that regard, it should be observed that, as the applicant has stated, the fact that an undertaking’s business name or company name may coincide with the contested mark does not mean that there can be no genuine use of the contested mark, in particular where the sign constituting the company name is affixed to goods or where a third party uses that sign in such a way as to establish a link between the sign constituting the company name and the goods marketed (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 September 2007, La Mer Technology v OHIM – Laboratoires Goëmar (LA MER) , T‑418/03, not published, EU:T:2007:299, paragraph 74, and of 26 April 2023, Rochem Group v EUIPO – Rochem Marine (R.T.S. ROCHEM Technical Services) , T‑546/21, not published, EU:T:2023:221, paragraph 61).
51 Furthermore, contrary to the Board of Appeal’s argument in paragraph 59 of the contested decision, the applicant did put forward in the course of the administrative proceedings arguments and evidence concerning the type of products it marketed and the class in which those products belong.
52 First, the applicant stated, in its observations before the Board of Appeal, for example, that invoice no 7035/IT, produced as Annex SoG4, clearly referred to its product Modular Oriente, included in Class 5. In its observations before the Board of Appeal, the applicant pointed out that the description of the products given in that invoice mentioned ‘mineral feedstuff’ or ‘complementary mineral feedstuff’, which are additives for feed, and explained clearly that that product was composed of ingredients described in Class 5. Moreover, the product name Modular Oriente also appears in upper-case, bold letters, just beside the applicant’s figurative sign, in the top left corner of the technical data sheet for the product, which the applicant produced before the Board of Appeal as Annex SoG5.
53 Secondly, the applicant put forward another, similar example before the Board of Appeal, concerning its product Floga, which also comes within Class 5. That product name is clearly stated in invoice no 41/ES, produced before the Cancellation Division as Annex CD1, as well as in the invoices produced before the Board of Appeal as Annex SoG7, which concern, in particular, the sale of samples of that product. The name of that product also appears in the technical data sheets which the applicant produced before the Cancellation Division as Annex CD6. That technical data sheet also shows the contested mark, as a figurative sign, at the foot of each page. It should be observed that the name of the product Floga, along with its product code, SZ N0, also appears in the price list produced as Annex CD5 (which sets out the price list for the applicant’s products for 2022 in Spain), as well as the brochure produced as Annex SoG6, which, although undated, could be examined as additional, corroborating evidence in that regard (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 November 2025, Làv , T‑563/24, EU:T:2025:1048, paragraph 57). In its observations before the Board of Appeal, the applicant explained in detail that the description of the product Floga set out in the abovementioned invoices contained the words ‘additives for feed’, which is the same as ‘additives’ or, in other words, ‘integrators’, which are included in Class 5.
54 Thirdly, the applicant provided a further example, concerning its product Ferment XP, included in Class 31. That product is clearly mentioned in invoice no 31/ES, produced before the Cancellation Division as Annex CD1, and in the technical data sheet produced before the Board of Appeal as Annex SoG15. In its observations before the Board of Appeal, the applicant explained clearly and in detail that that product was an additive for feedstuff included in Class 31.
55 Fourthly, in so far as concerns the applicant’s product Atpure Evo, that product appears in several invoices produced before the Board of Appeal as Annex SoG17. The name of that product also appears in the applicant’s product price list for 2021 and 2022 in Spain, produced as Annex CD5 (which also contains the code for that product, NL 70), as well as in the photographs produced as Annex SoG18.
56 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in concluding, in paragraph 59 of the contested decision, that the applicant had failed to put forward sufficiently clear arguments concerning the types of goods marketed under the contested mark and how they related to the evidence furnished.
57 Furthermore, it should be noted that the invoices produced by the applicant in the course of the administrative proceedings, mentioned in paragraphs 52 to 55 above, appear to attest to the sale of significant quantities of the applicant’s products (hundreds of kilograms thereof) in Classes 5 and 31, at issue in this case, over a large portion of the relevant period, in various countries of the European Union. Therefore, the Board of Appeal erred in dismissing as irrelevant the numerous items of evidence that demonstrated use of the contested mark as an ‘umbrella mark’ affixed directly onto the applicant’s products, and in particular on invoices, technical data sheets, price lists and brochures.
58 Consequently, it must be concluded that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in dismissing those items of evidence as irrelevant for the purpose of demonstrating genuine use of the contested mark. In addition, as already noted in paragraph 38 above, it does not appear from the contested decision that the Board of Appeal did actually take into account all of the available evidence. Therefore, the Board of Appeal erred in concluding, in paragraphs 63 and 76 of the contested decision, that the applicant had not established genuine use of the contested mark with respect to any of the goods in Classes 5 and 31.
59 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the applicant’s single plea in law must be upheld and, consequently, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as concerns the contested products referred to in paragraph 11 above, without it being necessary to examine the other complaints and arguments put forward by the parties.
Costs
60 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
61 Since EUIPO has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant.
62 In addition, the applicant has applied for Ms Anielska and Mr Tyrawski to be ordered to pay the costs which it incurred before EUIPO. In that regard, it is sufficient to note that it will be for the Board of Appeal to decide, in the light of the present judgment, on the costs relating to the proceedings before it (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 May 2018, Uribe-Etxebarría Jiménez v EUIPO – Núcleo de comunicaciones y control (SHERPA) , T‑577/15, EU:T:2018:305, paragraph 94).
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)
hereby:
1. Annuls the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 20 June 2025 (Case R 1846/2024-1) in so far as concerns the products covered by the contested mark in Classes 5 and 31;
2. Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Nutristar SpA.
| Półtorak | Hesse | Dimitrakopoulos |
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 9 September 2026.
| V. Di Bucci | M. van der Woude |
| Registrar | President |
* Language of the case: English.