Judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) 7 October 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber)

7 October 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – EU figurative mark lightoptics – Absolute ground for invalidity – Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Absence of bad faith – Relative ground for invalidity – Article 60(2)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 – No earlier copyright acquired under national law )

In Case T‑631/25,

Salumanus sp. z o.o., established in Kraków (Poland), represented by K. Stolarski, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by D. Gája, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO being

Heyoptics Co. Ltd, established in Tsuen Wan, Hong Kong (China),

THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber),

composed of S. Kingston, President, A. Marcoulli and J. Hettne (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: G. Mitrev, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 3 June 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Salumanus Sp. z o.o., seeks the annulment and alteration of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 10 July 2025 (Case R 2242/2024‑2) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 8 September 2023, the applicant applied to EUIPO for a declaration of invalidity of the EU trade mark which had been registered following an application filed by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, Heyoptics Co. Ltd, on 1 November 2021 in respect of the following figurative sign:

3 The goods and services covered by the contested mark in respect of which a declaration of invalidity was sought were in Classes 9 and 35 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and corresponded, for each of those classes, to the following description:

– Class 9: ‘Fiber optic cables; junction boxes [electricity]; switches, electric; radios; modems; signal tuners; electrical connectors; computer software applications, downloadable; transmitting and receiving apparatus for television broadcasting; wide area network (WAN) routers’;

– Class 35: ‘Online advertising on a computer network; advertising; assistance in franchised commercial business management; commercial information agencies; business management consultancy; provision of commercial and business contact information; import-export agencies; sales promotion for others; marketing; promoting the goods and services of others over the internet; business organization consultancy’.

4 The grounds relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity were, in essence, specifically those set out in Article 59(1)(b) and Article 60(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1). In particular, the application for a declaration of invalidity was based on the following sign (‘the sign at issue’):

5 On 25 September 2024, the Cancellation Division dismissed the application for a declaration of invalidity.

6 On 20 November 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Cancellation Division.

7 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In the first place, as concerns the relative ground for invalidity based on Article 60(2)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, the Board of Appeal found that the applicant had not shown that it could benefit from protection under Polish copyright law with regard to the sign at issue. In the second place, as concerns the absolute ground for invalidity based on Article 59(1)(b) of that regulation, the Board of Appeal found that the arguments and evidence presented by the applicant were insufficient to prove bad faith on the part of Heyoptics on the date of the application for registration of the contested mark.

Forms of order sought

8 The applicant contends that the Court should:

– alter the contested decision and declare the contested mark invalid;

– alternatively, annul the contested decision;

– order EUIPO to pay the costs.

9 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened.

Law

The interpretation of the applicant’s principal head of claim

10 At the outset it should be noted that the applicant’s principal application for alteration necessarily entails the annulment of the contested decision, requested in the alternative, since annulment of all or part of a decision constitutes a prerequisite to its alteration. In those circumstances, it should be understood that the applicant seeks, principally, both the annulment and the alteration of the contested decision, the alteration being a precondition for the annulment (see judgment of 23 July 2025, Glaxo Group v EUIPO – Cipla Europe (Shape of an inhaler) , T‑432/24, not published, EU:T:2025:745, paragraphs 16 and 17 and the case-law cited).

The claim for annulment and alteration

11 In support of its action, the applicant puts forward two pleas in law, alleging, first, an infringement of Article 60(2)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 and, secondly, an infringement of Article 59(1)(b) of that regulation.

Admissibility of the evidence adduced for the first time before the Court

12 EUIPO maintains that the documents constituting Annexes A.5 to A.9 to the application were not produced in the proceedings before EUIPO and are therefore inadmissible.

13 Annexes A.5 to A.8 show internal emails of the applicant from 2018 and 2021, to which images are attached. According to the applicant, that evidence confirms that work on the sign at issue had commenced in 2018. Annex A.9 moreover shows an email of one of the applicant’s representatives of 3 September 2025, sent to Ms Kamil Stolarski, the applicant’s representative in the present case, regarding additional evidence.

14 While acknowledging, in essence, that the emails in Annexes A.5 to A.8 were not produced in the course of the proceedings before EUIPO, the applicant submits that that omission is due to objective reasons. According to the applicant, it was not possible to obtain those annexes within the prescribed time limit since the correspondence had been archived and retrieving it required significant time, effort and technical resources. As shown by the content of Annex A.9, the emails were finally found in the course of preparing the application. According to the applicant, the new evidence has the purpose of providing a more complete view of the circumstances of the present case, complementing the material already produced in the administrative procedure before EUIPO. It should therefore be considered in the case evaluation.

15 The purpose of actions before the Court under Article 72(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 is to obtain a review of the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal. In the context of that regulation, Article 95 thereof requires that that review must be carried out in the light of the factual and legal context of the dispute as it was brought before the Board of Appeal (see judgment of 1 February 2005, SPAG v OHIM – Dann and Backer (HOOLIGAN) , T‑57/03, EU:T:2005:29, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).

16 Therefore, it is not the Court’s function to review the facts in the light of documents adduced for the first time before it. To allow the examination of such evidence would be contrary to Article 188 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, according to which the parties’ submissions may not alter the subject matter of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal. Accordingly, the evidence submitted for the first time before the Court must be declared inadmissible and there is no need to examine it (see judgment of 14 May 2009, Fiorucci v OHIM – Edwin (ELIO FIORUCCI) , T‑165/06, EU:T:2009:157, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

17 In that regard, neither the complementary nature of new evidence nor the circumstance, supposing that it is true, that the applicant was not able to produce certain archived emails in the course of the proceedings before EUIPO can allow the Court to review the facts in the light of evidence adduced for the first time before it, since the legality of a decision taken by a Board of Appeal must be assessed in the light of the information available to it (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 July 2017, Staatliche Porzellan-Manufaktur Meissen v EUIPO , C‑471/16 P, not published, EU:C:2017:602, paragraphs 26 and 27, and of 18 November 2014, Conrad Electronic v OHIM – British Sky Broadcasting Group and Sky IP International (EuroSky) , T‑510/12, not published, EU:T:2014:966, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

18 Consequently, the emails in Annexes A.5 to A.9 to the application and the images annexed to the emails in Annexes A.5, A.7 and A.8, which were not adduced in the course of the proceedings before EUIPO, are inadmissible. By contrast, the images in Annex A.6 are admissible since they are already part of the EUIPO case file.

The first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 60(2)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001

19 By the present plea in law, the applicant alleges that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the existence of a copyright pre-dating the contested mark had not been demonstrated.

20 Article 60(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides as follows:

‘An EU trade mark shall … be declared invalid on application to [EUIPO] or on the basis of a counterclaim in infringement proceedings where the use of such trade mark may be prohibited pursuant to another earlier right under the Union legislation or national law governing its protection, and in particular:

(a) a right to a name;

(b) a right of personal portrayal;

(c) a copyright;

(d) an industrial property right.’

21 It is clear from Article 16(1)(c) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625 of 5 March 2018 supplementing Regulation 2017/1001, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430 (OJ 2018 L 104, p. 1), that, in the case of an application for a declaration of invalidity pursuant to Article 60(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, the applicant must provide, in particular, evidence of acquisition, continued existence and scope of protection of the relevant earlier right as well as evidence proving that the applicant is entitled to file the application, including, where the earlier right is invoked pursuant to the law of a Member State, a clear identification of the content of the national law relied upon by adducing publications of the relevant provisions or jurisprudence.

22 The applicant is required to provide EUIPO not only with particulars showing that it satisfies the necessary conditions, in accordance with the national law of which it is seeking application, in order to be able to have the use of an EU trade mark prohibited by virtue of an earlier right, but also particulars establishing the content of that law (see judgment of 14 January 2026, Leone and Others v EUIPO – Incom (Leone) , T‑64/25, EU:T:2026:10, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).

23 In paragraph 27 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, in essence, that the information submitted by the applicant on Polish copyright law was not sufficient to enable it to examine whether the requirements of that law were fulfilled in the present case. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal found that the evidence submitted did not permit a clear and unequivocal conclusion that the applicant had created the sign at issue, reproduced in paragraph 4 above, before the date of the application for registration of the contested mark and that it therefore could not benefit from the copyright protection alleged.

24 It is appropriate to examine first of all the applicant’s arguments challenging the Board of Appeal’s finding that the evidence submitted by it in the proceedings before EUIPO were not capable of showing that the applicant had created the sign at issue before the date of the application for registration of the contested mark. It is undisputed that evidence of the creation of the sign at issue before that point in time is a precondition for claiming copyright in respect of that sign. Thus, only where the Board of Appeal’s assessment in that regard was vitiated by an illegality would it be necessary to examine subsequently the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the information provided on Polish copyright law was insufficient to determine whether the requirements of that law were met in the present case.

25 It must be noted at the outset that the registered EU trade mark enjoys a presumption of validity, with the result that it is for the person who has filed the application for a declaration of invalidity to invoke before EUIPO the specific facts which call that validity into question (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2013, Fürstlich Castell’sches Domänenamt v OHIM – Castel Frères (CASTEL) , T‑320/10, EU:T:2013:424, paragraphs 27 and 28).

26 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal conducted a fragmentary and selective analysis of the evidence adduced by it. In the applicant’s view, the documents submitted in the proceedings before EUIPO, assessed as a whole, clearly indicate, in essence, that the applicant is the author of the sign at issue. In that regard, the applicant refers to the following evidence, provided in support of its appeal against the decision of the Cancellation Division:

– Attachment 1: an email of 15 June 2011 to one of the applicant’s customers;

– Attachments 2 to 4: coloured variations of the sign at issue;

– Attachment 5: a service contract with the graphic designer hired by the applicant of 1 October 2014;

– Attachment 6: a screenshot of a group message of 21 December 2018;

– Attachment 7: an email exchange with a business partner of 20 February 2019;

– Attachments 8 to 10: emails from 2018 and 2020 containing product orders and invoices;

– Attachments 11 and 12: photographs from 2020 and 2022 showing optical modules;

– Attachments 13 and 14: notarised photographs from the websites ‘www.lightoptics.co.uk’ and ‘fibermarkt.com’;

– Attachment 15: two photographs from a YouTube channel linked to the online sales platform Fibermarkt;

– Attachment 16: a photograph from the applicant’s enova365 system;

– Attachment 17: three images showing an ISO 9001:2015 certification and the presentation of two awards to the applicant.

27 Specifically, the applicant maintains that, contrary to the Board of Appeal’s view, the photographs in Attachments 11 and 12 to that appeal are relevant. As shown by Attachments 8 to 10 to the appeal, those photographs are supplemented by invoices, emails and documents relating to the allocation of individual serial numbers to sold products. According to the applicant, that evidence confirms that it actually had products bearing the sign at issue at its disposal and that it had marketed them well before the registration of the contested mark.

28 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

29 As concerns, in the first place, the claim that the Board of Appeal conducted a fragmentary and selective analysis of the evidence adduced by the applicant, it should be stated that the applicant does not specify which evidence the Board of Appeal failed to examine, but merely reiterates almost all the evidence already submitted during the administrative procedure.

30 In that regard, it must also be pointed out that the Board of Appeal is not obliged to express a view on every argument submitted by the parties. The mere fact that the Board of Appeal does not refer to a particular document in the statement of reasons for its decision is not sufficient to establish that it did not take that document into account in its overall examination of the application for a declaration of invalidity (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2017, Tamasu Butterfly Europa v EUIPO – adp Gauselmann (Butterfly) , T‑315/16, not published, EU:T:2017:629, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).

31 Moreover, although the Board of Appeal did not expressly refer to all the evidence in its statement of reasons, in paragraph 27 of the contested decision, it stated that it had arrived at its finding after having assessed all the evidence adduced by the applicant, which furthermore was listed in the contested decision.

32 In the light of those considerations, the argument that the Board of Appeal conducted a fragmentary and selective analysis of the evidence is unfounded.

33 As concerns, in the second place, the applicant’s claim that an overall assessment of the evidence adduced in Attachments 1 to 17 to the appeal before the Board of Appeal clearly shows that it is the author of the sign at issue, the following should be observed.

34 First, it should be stated that the applicant has not put forward any concrete argument to call into question the Board of Appeal’s findings in paragraphs 24 and 25 of the contested decision. In particular, the applicant does not challenge the fact that neither the internal group message from 2018, submitted as Attachment 6 to the appeal before the Board of Appeal, nor its external emails, which include Attachments 1 and 7 to that appeal, contained representations of the sign at issue, nor that the images of the variations of that sign, in Attachments 2 to 4 to that appeal, were not dated and did not contain any indication making it possible to identify their author.

35 Furthermore, as the Board of Appeal stated in paragraph 24 of the contested decision, it is not disputed that the service contract with the undertaking’s graphic designer, submitted as Attachment 5 to the appeal before the Board of Appeal, did not mention the development of the sign at issue.

36 Next, as concerns the product photographs, referred to in paragraph 26 of the contested decision (Attachments 11 and 12), the Board of Appeal was correct to emphasise that the author and the circumstances in which they were created could not be determined objectively. In addition, although those photographs represent goods bearing a version of the sign at issue which is identical to the contested mark, they do not reveal who created that sign. Therefore, it cannot be concluded, on the basis of those photographs, that the applicant is the author of the sign at issue.

37 The applicant’s argument that those product photographs are supplemented by other documents (such as invoices and orders), which show the allocation of individual serial numbers to those products, cannot call into question that finding. Indeed, that circumstance does not reveal anything decisive with regard to the origin or the creation of the sign depicted in the photographs in question. In that context, it should also be observed that it is not apparent from the documents to which the applicant refers, contained in Attachments 8 to 10 to its appeal before the Board of Appeal, that the different factories with which it claims to cooperate for the production of its goods manufacture them exclusively for the applicant, using a sign of which the applicant is the author.

38 Lastly, as concerns the other evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, to which the applicant refers, it must be stated that that evidence cannot, either individually or taken together with the other evidence already raised above, demonstrate that the applicant created the sign at issue before the date of the application for registration of the contested mark.

39 First, as concerns the notarised photographs of the websites ‘www.lightoptics.co.uk’ and ‘www.fibermarkt.com’ (Attachments 13 and 14), it suffices to note that those extracts are dated 14 January 2025, well after the contested mark was registered in 2021. Thus, they do not have any evidential value to establish the existence of a copyright pre-dating that mark.

40 Secondly, the applicant claims to have published images of products bearing the sign at issue on its YouTube channel Fibermarkt. In that regard, the applicant has submitted two photographs from that channel (Attachment 15). However, even assuming that that evidence shows that the applicant marketed goods bearing the sign at issue, it cannot establish that the applicant is in fact the author of that sign.

41 Thirdly, as concerns the photograph from the applicant’s enova365 system (Attachment 16), it must be stated that the image does not contain either a representation of the sign at issue or any information on the authorship of that sign.

42 Fourthly, the images showing an ISO 9001:2015 certification and the presentation of the Forbes and Gazele Biznesu awards to the applicant (Attachment 17) do not contain any information on the sign at issue.

43 It is thus necessary to reject the applicant’s argument that the documents presented in the course of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal clearly indicate that the applicant is the author of the sign at issue.

44 In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the Board of Appeal did not err in its assessment by finding that the evidence adduced by the applicant in the course of the administrative procedure did not allow the clear and unequivocal conclusion that the applicant had created the sign at issue, reproduced in paragraph 4 above, before the date of the application for registration of the contested mark.

45 It follows that the applicant’s arguments alleging that the Board of Appeal did not take sufficient account of the content, interpretation and application of Polish copyright law are ineffective. Even if those arguments were well founded, they are not capable of calling into question the Board of Appeal’s finding that the applicant had not demonstrated that it was the author of the sign at issue.

46 The first plea in law must therefore be rejected.

The second plea in law alleging infringement of Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001

47 By the present plea in law, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the proprietor of the contested mark had not acted in bad faith on the date of the application for registration of that mark.

– Preliminary observations

48 It should be noted, at the outset, that the EU trade mark registration system is based on the ‘first-to-file’ principle, laid down in Article 8(2) of Regulation 2017/1001. In accordance with that principle, a sign may be registered as an EU trade mark only in so far as this is not precluded by an earlier mark, whether an EU trade mark, a trade mark registered in a Member State or by the Benelux Office for Intellectual Property, a trade mark registered under international arrangements which have effect in a Member State or a trade mark registered under international arrangements which have effect in the European Union. On the other hand, without prejudice to the possible application of Article 8(4) of Regulation 2017/1001, the mere use by a third party of a non-registered mark does not preclude an identical or similar mark from being registered as an EU trade mark for identical or similar goods or services (judgment of 14 February 2012, Peeters Landbouwmachines v OHIM – Fors MW (BIGAB) , T‑33/11, EU:T:2012:77, paragraph 16).

49 The application of that principle is qualified, inter alia, by Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, under which, following an application to EUIPO or on the basis of a counterclaim in infringement proceedings, an EU trade mark is to be declared invalid where the applicant was acting in bad faith when it filed the application for a trade mark (see judgment of 7 July 2016, Copernicus-Trademarks v EUIPO – Maquet (LUCEO) , T‑82/14, EU:T:2016:396, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

50 The absolute ground for invalidity referred to in Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 applies where it is apparent from relevant and consistent indicia that the proprietor of an EU trade mark has filed the application for registration of that mark not with the aim of engaging fairly in competition but with the intention of undermining, in a manner inconsistent with honest practices, the interests of third parties, or with the intention of obtaining, without even targeting a specific third party, an exclusive right for purposes other than those falling within the functions of a trade mark (judgment of 12 September 2019, Koton Mağazacilik Tekstil Sanayi ve Ticaret v EUIPO , C‑104/18 P, EU:C:2019:724, paragraph 46).

51 In order to determine whether the applicant for registration is acting in bad faith, account must be taken of all the relevant factors specific to the particular case which pertained at the time of filing the application for registration of a sign as an EU trade mark, in particular (i) the fact that the applicant knows or must know that a third party is using an identical or similar sign for an identical or similar product or service capable of being confused with the sign for which registration is sought; (ii) the applicant’s intention to prevent that third party from continuing to use such a sign; and (iii) the degree of legal protection enjoyed by the third party’s sign and by the sign for which registration is sought (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 June 2009, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli , C‑529/07, EU:C:2009:361, paragraphs 37 and 53, and of 27 June 2013, Malaysia Dairy Industries , C‑320/12, EU:C:2013:435, paragraphs 36 and 37).

52 Lastly, it is for the applicant for a declaration of invalidity who intends to rely on Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 to prove the circumstances which make it possible to conclude that an application for registration of an EU trade mark was filed in bad faith, the good faith of the trade mark applicant being presumed until proven otherwise (see judgment of 21 April 2021, Hasbro v EUIPO – Kreativni Dogadaji (MONOPOLY) , T‑663/19, EU:T:2021:211, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

53 It is in the light of those considerations that the present plea in law must be examined.

– Whether there was bad faith

54 In paragraphs 39 to 42 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated at the outset that it could not be clearly and unequivocally determined that the applicant was the author of the sign in question and that that sign had been created prior to the application for registration of the contested mark. Next, the Board of Appeal found that there was no evidence showing that the proprietor of the contested mark had had or should have had knowledge of the sign used by the applicant. In that regard, the applicant had not shown that that sign was reputed or known in the relevant sector. Lastly, the evidence on the alleged use of the sign in question and the applicant’s product images stem from 14 January 2025 while the relevant date is the date of the application for registration of the contested mark, namely 1 November 2021. The Board of Appeal concluded that there was insufficient proof that the proprietor of the contested mark had acted in a way that departs from the accepted principles of honest commercial and business practices at the time of filing the application for registration of that mark.

55 The applicant maintains, in essence, that the proprietor of the contested mark should have had knowledge of the sign at issue, reproduced in paragraph 4 above. The applicant observes in that regard that the sign enjoys a reputation. According to the applicant, it is well known among consumers and is associated with high-quality goods. Moreover, irrespective of the reputation of the sign at issue, the evidence adduced before EUIPO clearly indicates bad faith on the part of the proprietor of the contested mark. In that regard, the applicant submits that the key factor in assessing bad faith is the presence of a dishonest intention on the part of the proprietor of the contested mark. That undertaking not only faithfully copied the sign at issue but also appropriated the applicant’s product photographs. Those actions indicate that the intention was not to create a separate sign but rather to exploit the applicant’s achievements and to hinder competition, inter alia, by cutting off the applicant’s access to the market.

56 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

57 In the first place, it must be stated that it is not apparent from the evidence adduced by the applicant that the proprietor of the contested mark had or should have had knowledge of the use, by the applicant, of a sign identical or similar to the contested mark or, more generally, of a sign with the name ‘lightoptics’.

58 It must be observed that the applicant does not put forward any concrete argument capable of calling into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment, in paragraph 40 of the contested decision, that there was no proof that the proprietor of the contested mark had actual knowledge of any sign used by the applicant before the date of the application for registration of that mark.

59 Moreover, the applicant’s argument that the sign at issue enjoyed a reputation and was known to consumers, and that the proprietor of the contested mark therefore had knowledge of it, is not substantiated.

60 In that regard, it follows from the case-law that a presumption of knowledge, by the applicant, of the use by a third party of an identical or similar sign for an identical or similar product capable of being confused with the sign for which registration is sought may arise, inter alia, from general knowledge in the economic sector concerned of such use, and that knowledge can be inferred, inter alia, from the duration of such use. The more that use is long-standing, the more probable it is that the applicant will, when filing the application for registration, have knowledge of it (judgment of 11 June 2009, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli , C‑529/07, EU:C:2009:361, paragraph 39).

61 In the present case, in order to show such general knowledge in the economic sector concerned by the use of the sign at issue, the applicant maintains, in essence, that the images published on its website showing the awards, certificates and distinctions it has received demonstrate that that sign was present in the public sphere and recognisable before the contested mark was registered (Attachment 17 to the appeal before the Board of Appeal). In addition, according to the applicant, the releases on its YouTube channel supports the argument that the sign at issue had been used consistently and publicly in the applicant’s activities (Attachment 15 to that appeal). Similarly, the applicant claims that the product photographs, taken by an employee, confirm the actual use of that sign (Attachments 11 and 12 to that appeal).

62 It must be stated, first, that the images submitted as Attachment 17 to the appeal before the Board of Appeal do not provide any information on the sign at issue or the general knowledge of that sign in the economic sector concerned. In fact, those images concern an ISO 9001:2015 certification and two awards presented to the applicant which do not mention the sign at issue. That evidence, even though it shows certain general achievements by the applicant, is not capable of establishing the reputation of that sign.

63 Secondly, even though the photographs of the YouTube channel Fibermarkt, submitted as Attachment 15 to the appeal before the Board of Appeal, show the marketing of some of the applicant’s goods in 2020, they do not show long-lasting or far-reaching marketing of goods bearing the sign at issue before the date of the application for registration of the contested mark.

64 Thirdly, as concerns the product photographs from 2020 and 2022 in Attachments 11 and 12 to that appeal, it should be stated that they date either from a period relatively close to the date of the application for registration of the contested mark or from a period thereafter. Moreover, with the exception of one of the photographed products, which seems to correspond to the one in the image taken of the YouTube channel Fibermarkt (Attachment 15), there is nothing to suggest that those products have actually been marketed by the applicant before the date of the application for registration of the contested mark. That evidence therefore is not capable of establishing that the proprietor of the contested mark had knowledge of use of the sign at issue by virtue of the reputation of that sign.

65 In the second place, it is true that bad faith may be established even in the absence of a finding of reputation of the earlier mark, as is claimed by the applicant. Indeed, in order to determine whether there was bad faith, consideration must be given to the applicant’s intention at the time when it files the application for registration of the contested mark (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 June 2009, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli , C‑529/07, EU:C:2009:361, paragraph 41). In that regard, the Court of Justice has held that circumstances, even after the filing of that application for registration, may serve as indicia of the applicant’s intention at that time (judgment of 19 June 2025, CeramTec , C‑17/24, EU:C:2025:455, paragraph 71).

66 However, in the present case, contrary to what is maintained by the applicant, it is not clear from the material in the case file that the proprietor of the contested mark was motivated by dishonest intentions on the date of the application for registration of that mark.

67 First, it follows from the case-law cited in paragraph 48 above, concerning the ‘first-to-file’ principle, that the fact that the signs and goods at issue are identical or similar is not sufficient by itself to establish bad faith (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 March 2024, VF International v EUIPO – Super Brand Licencing (GEOGRAPHICAL NORWAY EXPEDITION) , T‑639/22, not published, EU:T:2024:149, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

68 Furthermore, it follows from the analysis of the first plea in law that the evidence produced by the applicant in the course of the administrative procedure is not capable of establishing clearly and unequivocally that the applicant had created the sign at issue before the date of the application for registration of the contested mark. Contrary to what was submitted by the applicant, it has not shown that it could benefit from legal protection for that sign pursuant to Article 60(2)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001.

69 Consequently, the mere fact that the contested mark and the sign at issue are almost identical, and the fact that the applicant and the proprietor of the contested mark are active in the same sector, are not capable of establishing dishonest intentions on the part of the latter.

70 Secondly, it must be stated that the documents in Attachments 13 and 14 to the appeal before the Board of Appeal, consisting of notarised photographs of websites, by which the applicant intends to show that the proprietor of the contested mark appropriated its images bearing the sign at issue, are dated 14 January 2025.

71 In that regard, as found by the Board of Appeal, in essence, in paragraph 41 of the contested decision, the relevant time for determining whether there was bad faith on the part of the proprietor of the contested mark was the time of filing the application for registration, namely 1 November 2021 (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 June 2009, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli , C‑529/07, EU:C:2009:361, paragraph 35).

72 It must be stated that the applicant does not put forward any argument explaining what the evidential value of those documents, dated 14 January 2025, might be in order to establish bad faith on the date of the application for registration of the contested mark, on 1 November 2021. In addition, the date on which the applicant supposedly published the images in question on its website is not apparent from its written observations and the time when the proprietor of the contested mark could have obtained knowledge thereof is therefore uncertain.

73 Accordingly, that evidence subsequent to the date of the application for registration of the contested mark, which moreover does not corroborate any evidence prior to that date capable of serving as an indication of the dishonest intention of the proprietor of the contested mark at that time, is insufficient to establish such an intention.

74 Thirdly, the applicant’s argument that the proprietor of the contested mark registered that mark in order to exploit the applicant’s achievements and to cut off the applicant’s access to the market is not substantiated and must be rejected. Indeed, as follows from the reasoning set out in paragraphs 59 to 64 above, the applicant has not shown that the sign at issue enjoyed a reputation from which the proprietor of the contested mark could have benefited. Moreover, it is not apparent from the material in the case file that the proprietor of the contested mark tried to prevent the applicant from using the sign at issue or to cut off the applicant’s access to the market in another way.

75 It follows from all of the foregoing that the Board of Appeal did not err in its assessment in finding that the arguments and evidence adduced by the applicant were not sufficient to show that the proprietor of the contested mark had acted in bad faith on the date of the application for registration of that mark.

76 It follows that the pleas put forward by the applicant in support of its claim, both for annulment and for alteration, are not well founded and that the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

77 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

78 Since a hearing has taken place and the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by EUIPO.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Salumanus sp. z o.o. to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 7 October 2026.

* Language of the case: English.