Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) 2 September 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)

2 September 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the EU figurative mark Aipix – Earlier international word mark VAPIX – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Obligation to state reasons – Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑632/25,

Xaipix sp. z o.o., established in Warsaw (Poland), represented by K. Pyszków, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by J. Ivanauskas, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

Axis AB, established in Lund (Sweden), represented by J. Norderyd and T. Carlsson, lawyers,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber),

composed of M. Sampol Pucurull, President, M. Stancu (Rapporteur) and W. Valasidis, Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Xaipix sp. z o.o., seeks the annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 17 July 2025 (Case R 161/2025-1) (‘the contested decision’).

I. Background to the dispute

2 On 24 February 2023, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the following figurative sign:

3 The mark applied for covers goods in Class 9 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding to the following description: ‘Video surveillance systems; Downloadable video recordings; Interactive video software’.

4 On 14 September 2023, the intervener, Axis AB, filed a notice of opposition to registration of the trade mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5 The opposition was based, inter alia, on the international registration designating the European Union in respect of the earlier word mark VAPIX, filed and registered on 12 May 2021 under No 1 618 680, covering, inter alia, goods in Class 9 corresponding to the following description: ‘Interface for cinematographic, optic apparatus and instruments; interface for apparatus and instruments for measuring, signaling and control (surveillance); interface for apparatus for recording, receiving, transmitting or reproducing sound and images; interface (for computers); computer application software for use as an application programming interface (API); application programming interfaces (API) for surveillance systems, cameras, access control, audio and visual intercoms, radars and speakers; security surveillance apparatus; video surveillance apparatus; electric and electronic video surveillance installations, cameras, including but not limited to digital cameras, network cameras, web cameras, IP cameras, thermal cameras; access control apparatus; access control installations; intercom apparatus; intercom installations; video intercom systems; audio intercom systems; software for video surveillance apparatus, access control apparatus and intercom apparatus; accessories, parts and components for video surveillance apparatus, access control apparatus and intercom apparatus; computer software; computer application software for mobile devices and handheld personal computers; cloud servers; radars; microphones; speakers.’

6 The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

7 On 27 November 2024, the Opposition Division rejected the opposition in its entirety.

8 On 22 January 2025, the intervener filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.

9 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal upheld the appeal on the ground that, having regard to the below-average visual similarity and the average phonetic similarity of the signs at issue, the normal degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark and the identity and strong similarity of the goods covered by the marks at issue, there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of at least the Spanish general public displaying an average level of attention.

II. Forms of order sought

10 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision and declare that the registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods in question should proceed;

– order that the intervener pay the costs, including those incurred in the proceedings before the Opposition Division and the Board of Appeal, and that EUIPO pay the costs incurred in the proceedings before the General Court;

– in the alternative, annul the contested decision and order that EUIPO and the intervener pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court.

11 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.

12 The intervener claims that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

III. Law

A. The jurisdiction of the Court

13 As regards the second part of the applicant’s first principal head of claim requesting the Court to declare that the registration of the mark applied for should proceed, it is sufficient to note that, when exercising judicial review of lawfulness under Article 263 TFEU, the Court has no jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgments (see, to that effect, order of 9 December 2003, Italy v Commission , C‑224/03, not published, EU:C:2003:658, paragraphs 20 and 21, and judgment of 4 February 2009, Omya v Commission , T‑145/06, EU:T:2009:27, paragraph 23). It follows that that part of the applicant’s first head of claim must be rejected on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.

B. Substance

14 In support of its heads of claim seeking the annulment of the contested decision, the applicant formally raises four pleas in law, which may be grouped as follows: in the first place, in its first to third pleas, the applicant alleges, in essence, infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 in that the Board of Appeal found, incorrectly, that there was a likelihood of confusion; in the second place, in its fourth plea, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal infringed Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 by failing, in the contested decision, to comply with its obligation to state reasons.

15 The Court considers it appropriate to begin by examining the fourth plea before examining, together, the first to third pleas.

1. The fourth plea in law, alleging that the statement of reasons in the contested decision is insufficient

16 In its fourth plea, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal infringed its obligation to state reasons under Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 by repeatedly making arbitrary and unsubstantiated assertions in the contested decision.

17 In the first place, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal did not sufficiently and adequately substantiate a number of the assessments made in its analysis of the similarity of the signs at issue. Accordingly, it maintains that, first, the Board of Appeal did not sufficiently explain why the differences in the initial parts of the marks at issue and their limited length had to be regarded as insufficient to rule out any similarity among the relevant public. Secondly, the Board of Appeal did not substantiate to the requisite legal standard its finding that the figurative element of the mark applied for was merely decorative and of no real relevance for the purposes of the comparison with the earlier mark.

18 In the second place, the applicant alleges that the analysis of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion is vitiated by several inaccuracies. First, the Board of Appeal found, incorrectly and without justification, that the proprietors of the marks at issue are direct competitors and, therefore, that the signs at issue should have maintained a sufficient distance from each other in order to avoid any likelihood of confusion. Secondly, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal’s analysis concerning the first letters ‘ai’ in the mark applied for is unclear. In that regard, it was claimed that, even if the relevant public were to understand those first letters as referring to artificial intelligence, that would not be sufficient for a finding that the marks at issue are conceptually dissimilar since such an element is descriptive and can have only a limited impact on the comparison of those signs. The applicant submits, on the contrary, that the clear meaning of a mark may influence the comparison of marks even if that meaning is descriptive.

19 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

20 According to Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, decisions of EUIPO are to state the reasons on which they are based. The obligation to state reasons, as thus laid down, has the same scope as that which arises from Article 296 TFEU. It is settled case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must disclose in a clear and unequivocal manner the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent EU Court to exercise its power of review. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (judgments of 21 October 2004, KWS Saat v OHIM , C‑447/02 P, EU:C:2004:649, paragraphs 63 to 65, and of 13 February 2020, Repsol v EUIPO (INVENTEMOS EL FUTURO) , T‑8/19, not published, EU:T:2020:66, paragraph 34).

21 Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the obligation to state reasons is an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question of the merits of those reasons, which concern the substantive legality of the contested measure. The reasoning of a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. If those grounds are vitiated by errors, those errors will vitiate the substantive legality of the decision, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 September 2018, Volkswagen v EUIPO – Paalupaikka (MAIN AUTO WHEELS) , T‑623/16, not published, EU:T:2018:561, paragraph 71, and of 14 September 2022, Lotion v EUIPO (BLACK IRISH) , T‑498/21, not published, EU:T:2022:543, paragraph 63).

22 In the present case, it is apparent from paragraphs 21 to 30 and 32 to 35 of the contested decision that, contrary to the assertions made by the applicant, the Board of Appeal’s analysis concerning, respectively, the similarity of the signs at issue and the global assessment of whether there is a likelihood of confusion was reasoned to the requisite legal standard. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal made it possible for the applicant to ascertain the grounds for the contested decision in those respects so that it could defend its rights and made it possible for the Court, when hearing the present case, to exercise its power to review the lawfulness of those aspects of the contested decision.

23 As regards, in the first place, the similarity of the signs at issue, the Court notes that, in paragraphs 21 to 30 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal carried out a detailed visual, phonetic and conceptual comparison of those signs.

24 It is clear, first, that, when it did so, the Board of Appeal explained, inter alia, the reasons why, despite the differences in their initial parts, those signs had to be regarded as being visually similar to a below-average degree and phonetically similar to an average degree. Thus, the Board of Appeal stated, in paragraph 28 of the contested decision, that, from a visual perspective, even if consumers were to notice the differences in the initial parts of the signs at issue, the fact that their last syllable, ‘pix’, coincides cannot be overlooked by the Spanish relevant public, especially since the letter ‘x’ is visually striking and not widely used in Spanish. The Board of Appeal, after finding that the figurative element of the contested sign is not meant to be pronounced, noted, in paragraph 29 of the contested decision, that from a phonetic perspective the signs at issue coincide in the pronunciation of their last syllable, ‘pix’, which is, moreover, the syllable which Spanish consumers will stress according to Spanish pronunciation rules.

25 Secondly, the Court notes that, in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated that the word element ‘aipix’ of the figurative mark applied for is to be regarded as the most distinctive element of that mark, given that the figurative element of that sign, in so far as it consists of the representation of four slightly curved turquoise lines arranged in pairs, is purely decorative. The Board of Appeal also stated, in that regard, that consumers generally focus their attention on the word elements of a composite mark rather than on its figurative elements.

26 It therefore follows that, contrary to the assertions made by the applicant, the Board of Appeal set out to the requisite legal standard, in its analysis of the comparison of the signs at issue, not only the reasons why those signs had to be regarded as being visually similar to a below-average degree and phonetically similar to an average degree, despite the differences in their initial parts, but also the reasons why it found that the figurative element of the sign applied for was, above all, purely decorative.

27 As regards the question whether such assessments are justified, that question relates to the merits of the statement of reasons for the contested decision and not to the existence or adequacy thereof, with the result that it is irrelevant in the context of the present plea in law (see paragraph 21 above).

28 As regards, in the second place, the global assessment of whether there is a likelihood of confusion, the Court notes that, in paragraphs 32 to 35 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal also set out in a precise and comprehensible manner the reasons why, in its view, there was a likelihood of confusion at least on the part of the Spanish general public.

29 Thus, in paragraph 34 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal applied the principle of interdependence and found that, having regard to the similar overall impression created by the signs at issue, the identity or strong similarity of the goods in question, the normal degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark and the fact that the proprietors of the marks at issue were direct competitors, the differences between those signs were not significant enough to rule out any likelihood of confusion. For the sake of completeness, the Board of Appeal also added, in paragraph 35 of the contested decision, that, even if the Spanish public were to understand the initial part, ‘ai’, of the contested sign as the English abbreviation for ‘artificial intelligence’, and therefore as a descriptive indication of the goods in question, that would not be sufficient to conclude that the trade marks at issue were conceptually dissimilar, since a descriptive element could have only a limited impact on the comparison of the signs.

30 In the light, first, of the finding that the proprietors of the marks at issue were direct competitors, which was disputed by the applicant, the Court notes that such a finding follows the analysis set out in paragraphs 16 to 20 of the contested decision by which the Board of Appeal established that the goods covered by the marks at issue were identical or very similar. Having regard to that identical or highly similar nature of the goods covered by the marks at issue, which, moreover, is not disputed by the applicant in the present action, the applicant was therefore in a position to understand why it was found to be a direct competitor of the intervener by the Board of Appeal.

31 As regards, secondly, the allegedly unclear analysis of the initial part of the sign applied for – ‘ai’ – it is sufficient to note that the applicant’s line of argument seeks in reality to challenge the merits of the statement of reasons for the contested decision, with the result that it bears no relevance in the context of the present plea in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 21 above. In any event, the wording of that part of the analysis in the contested decision, referred to in paragraph 29 above, enabled the applicant to understand the grounds for that decision and to put forward an argument in that regard, as is apparent from paragraph 18 above.

32 It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the applicant is therefore not justified in claiming that the Board of Appeal provided insufficient or incomprehensible reasoning with regard to the basis for the contested decision.

33 Consequently, the plea alleging that the statement of reasons in the contested decision is insufficient must be rejected.

2. The first to third pleas in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001

34 In its first to third pleas, which it is appropriate to examine together, the applicant relies, in essence, on infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, in that the Board of Appeal incorrectly found that there was a likelihood of confusion.

35 In that regard, by its first plea, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal incorrectly assessed the level of attention of the relevant public. By its second plea, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal erred in its assessment of the similarity of the signs at issue. By its third plea, the applicant alleges that the Board of Appeal misapplied the principle of interdependence and, consequently, incorrectly assessed the likelihood of confusion.

36 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark. Furthermore, under Article 8(2)(a)(iv) of Regulation 2017/1001, ‘earlier trade marks’ means trade marks registered under international arrangements which have effect in the European Union with a date of application for registration which is earlier than the date of application for registration of the EU trade mark.

37 The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS) , T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).

38 For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel) , T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

39 Where the protection of the earlier trade mark extends to the entirety of the European Union, it is necessary to take into account the perception of the marks at issue by the consumer of the goods and services in question in that territory. However, it must be borne in mind that, for an EU trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others) , T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).

40 It is in the light of those considerations that it is necessary to examine whether the Board of Appeal correctly held that, in the present case, there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

(a) The relevant public and its level of attention

41 In paragraphs 13 to 15 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the relevant territory was the territory of the European Union and endorsed the approach adopted by the Opposition Division, assessing the likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue in relation to the Spanish public, after stating that registration of the mark applied for had to be refused even where the likelihood of confusion existed only in part of the European Union. It also found that the goods in question targeted both the general public with an average level of attention and professionals with an enhanced level of attention. Furthermore, applying the principle that, where the relevant public is composed of both end consumers and professionals, the public with the lowest level of attention must be taken into consideration, it inferred that, as regards the marks at issue, the relevant public for the assessment of the likelihood of confusion was the general public with an average level of attention.

42 In its first plea, the applicant disputes the average level of attention of the relevant public found by the Board of Appeal, claiming that potential purchasers of the goods in question display a high level of attention, even when they belong to the general public.

43 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s line of argument.

44 As regards the definition of the relevant public to be taken into account in order to assess whether there is a likelihood of confusion, it must be borne in mind that that public is composed of users likely to use both the goods or services covered by the earlier mark and those covered by the mark applied for. Thus, as a general rule, where goods or services covered by one of the marks at issue are included in the broader designation covered by the other mark, the relevant public is defined by reference to the more specific wording (see judgment of 24 May 2011, ancotel v OHIM – Acotel (ancotel.) , T‑408/09, not published, EU:T:2011:241, paragraphs 38 and 39 and the case-law cited).

45 Similarly, in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, account should be taken of the average consumer of the category of products concerned, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question (see judgment of 13 February 2007, Mundipharma v OHIM – Altana Pharma (RESPICUR) , T‑256/04, EU:T:2007:46, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

46 Where the services covered by the two marks at issue are intended for the same relevant public, which comprises both the general public and professionals, the public with the lowest level of attention must be taken into consideration (see judgment of 20 May 2014, Argo Group International Holdings v OHIM – Arisa Assurances (ARIS) , T‑247/12, EU:T:2014:258, paragraphs 27 to 29 and the case-law cited).

47 In the present case, a preliminary point to be borne in mind is that the goods covered by the marks at issue that were found to be identical or similar by the Board of Appeal correspond, in essence, to computer hardware and computer products in Class 9, relating in particular to video surveillance.

48 Furthermore, the Court notes that, by its line of argument, the applicant does not call into question either the Board of Appeal’s finding that the relevant territory in the present case is the territory of the European Union or the approach aimed at assessing the likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue from the perspective of the Spanish public. Nor does it dispute the assessment that, taken as a whole, the goods covered by the marks at issue are aimed at both the general public and professionals.

49 However, the applicant does dispute the level of attention of the relevant public found by the Board of Appeal, namely an average level of attention, taking the view that the technicality, nature and intended purpose of the goods in question and the fact that they are not purchased on a daily basis result in potential purchasers displaying a high level of attention, even when those purchasers belong to the general public.

50 In that regard, it is apparent from case-law that, within the European Union, computer hardware and computer products, such as those in Class 9, correspond, for the most part, to standardised goods that are easy to use, are not highly technical and are widely distributed in all types of stores at affordable prices (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 November 2020, LG Electronics v EUIPO – Staszewski (K7) , T‑21/20, not published, EU:T:2020:550, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited). Thus, although the purchase price of some of the goods in Class 9 may be relatively high and those goods may be subject to a period of use spanning several years, the majority of those goods are electronics aimed at the general public, which, nowadays, are relatively inexpensive, have a relatively short lifespan and do not require any particular technical knowledge (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 November 2020, K7 , T‑21/20, not published, EU:T:2020:550, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited). It follows that it cannot be held that the general public necessarily displays a high level of attention with regard to the goods in question simply because they constitute computer hardware and computer products in Class 9.

51 In addition, it must be stated that the applicant does no more than allege, first, that the goods covered by the marks at issue constitute, as a whole, goods whose nature and intended purpose are technical and, second, that such goods are not purchased on a daily basis, with the result that purchasing them requires a higher level of attention, but without substantiating those claims with facts and evidence. However, had the applicant intended to maintain that the level of attention was higher than that found by the Board of Appeal in respect of certain goods, it was incumbent on it to substantiate that claim with facts and evidence for each of those goods (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 October 2017, Hello Media Group v EUIPO – Hola (#hello media group) , T‑331/16, not published, EU:T:2017:760, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited), which it failed to do.

52 Therefore, contrary to what is claimed by the applicant, it cannot be held that the goods covered by the marks at issue that were found to be identical or similar by the Board of Appeal, simply because they are in Class 9, are so technical that they give rise, as a whole, to a high level of attention in potential purchasers, even where those purchasers belong to the general public.

53 It follows that, in the present case, there is no reason to call into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment as regards the relevant public and its level of attention.

(b) Comparison of the goods in question

54 It is apparent from paragraphs 16 to 20 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal found that the goods covered by the mark applied for were either identical or very similar to the goods covered by the earlier mark.

55 There is no need to call into question those assessments, which, moreover, have not been disputed by the applicant.

(c) The comparison of the signs

56 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

57 In the present case, before addressing the question of the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, it is necessary to examine the assessment carried out by the Board of Appeal of the distinctive and dominant elements of those signs.

(1) The distinctive and dominant elements of the signs at issue

58 In paragraphs 23 and 24 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal endorsed the findings of the Opposition Division, concluding that the earlier sign was perceived as a whole by the Spanish relevant public who did not break it down into its two word elements ‘va’ and ‘pix’, since neither of those elements had any meaning in Spanish. The Board of Appeal stated, inter alia, that it had not been demonstrated that the abbreviation ‘pix’ was part of common English vocabulary and could be understood throughout the European Union as designating ‘pictures’. Consequently, the Board of Appeal found that no element of the earlier sign was more distinctive or dominant than another.

59 As regards the sign applied for, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the contested decision, that that sign consisted of a stylised word element, ‘aipix’, preceded by a figurative element in the form of four curved turquoise lines arranged in pairs. The Board of Appeal also stated that, since the figurative element would be perceived above all as serving merely decorative purposes and since, moreover, consumers generally focused their attention on the word elements of a composite sign rather than on its figurative elements, the most distinctive element of the sign applied for was its word element ‘aipix’.

60 In its second plea, the applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s analysis regarding the absence of a more distinctive or dominant element in the earlier sign. By contrast, as for the sign applied for, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal failed to give due weight to its figurative element by classifying it as purely decorative.

61 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s line of argument.

62 In that regard, when assessing whether one or more given components of a composite trade mark is dominant, account must be taken, in particular, of the intrinsic qualities of each of those components by comparing them with those of other components (judgment of 23 October 2002, Matratzen Concord v OHIM – Hukla Germany (MATRATZEN) , T‑6/01, EU:T:2002:261, paragraph 35).

63 Furthermore, according to case-law, where a trade mark is composed of word and figurative elements, the former are, in principle, more distinctive than the latter, since the average consumer will more easily refer to the goods in question by citing the name of the trade mark than by describing its figurative element (see judgment of 28 September 2022, Copal Tree Brands v EUIPO – Sumol + Compal Marcas (COPAL TREE) , T‑572/21, not published, EU:T:2022:594, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

64 In the present case, there is no reason to depart from that case-law and the consequence arising therefrom, namely that the word element of the sign applied for is the most distinctive element of that sign, whereas the figurative element of that sign is purely decorative.

65 It is not in dispute that the figurative element of the sign applied for consists of four turquoise curved lines arranged in pairs and depicted identically side by side. That configuration is neither particularly fanciful nor particularly stylised and does not enable the relevant public to identify written characters, with the result that the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that that public will perceive the figurative element of the sign applied for as a purely graphic representation without any specific meaning.

66 It follows that the Board of Appeal’s assessment relating to the distinctive and dominant elements of the sign applied for is free from error.

(2) The visual and phonetic comparison of the signs at issue

67 The Board of Appeal took the view, in paragraphs 28 and 29 of the contested decision, that the signs at issue were visually similar to a below-average degree and phonetically similar to an average degree. In that regard, it stated, in essence, that even though the signs at issue differed in their initial part, the word element of the sign applied for, which was the most distinctive element of that sign, was of the same length as the earlier sign and four of the five letters of the sign applied for were the same as those of the earlier sign, three of which, namely the sequence of letters ‘pix’, occupied exactly the same position. It held that from a visual perspective, that coinciding last syllable ‘pix’ would not go unnoticed by Spanish consumers, particularly since the letter ‘x’, placed at the end of a word, was visually striking and not widely used in Spanish. Similarly, from a phonetic perspective, the Board of Appeal found that the figurative element of the sign applied for was not intended to be pronounced and that the signs at issue coincided in the pronunciation of their final syllable, ‘pix’, which would, moreover, be the syllable stressed by the Spanish relevant public according to Spanish pronunciation rules.

68 In its second plea, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal erred in its assessment of the similarity of the signs at issue and submits that those signs cannot be regarded as creating a similar overall impression. In that regard, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal did not take sufficient account of: (i) the difference between the first parts of the signs at issue and the difference resulting from the figurative element of the mark applied for; (ii) the fact that the signs at issue are rather short and that, consequently, even slight differences are likely to produce a different overall impression; and (iii) the fact that the visual differences between the marks at issue carry greater weight than their phonetic similarities since the goods in question will normally be purchased after a visual inspection.

69 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

70 According to case-law, there is nothing preventing a determination as to whether there is any visual similarity between a word mark and a figurative mark, since the two types of mark have graphic form capable of creating a visual impression (see judgment of 26 September 2014, Koscher + Würtz v OHIM – Kirchner & Wilhelm (KW SURGICAL INSTRUMENTS) , T‑445/12, EU:T:2014:829, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

71 Furthermore, it is apparent from case-law that, where a figurative mark containing word elements is compared visually to a word mark, the marks are held to be visually similar if they have a significant number of letters in the same position in common and if the word element of the figurative sign is not highly stylised, notwithstanding the graphic representation of the letters in different fonts, in italics or bold, in lower case or upper case, or in colour (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 September 2019, SLL Service v EUIPO – Elfa International (LUMIN8) , T‑680/18, not published, EU:T:2019:565, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

72 Moreover, according to case-law, where a visual similarity between the word elements of the signs at issue is found, it must be ascertained whether the additional graphic or figurative element, specific to the mark applied for, is capable of constituting a distinguishing feature sufficient to preclude any visual similarity between the signs at issue in the eyes of the relevant public (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 April 2005, Faber Chimica v OHIM – Industrias Quimicas Naber (Faber) , T‑211/03, EU:T:2005:135, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

73 In the present case, as regards, in the first place, the visual comparison of the signs at issue, the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that, notwithstanding the differences in their initial parts, those signs had a below-average degree of similarity.

74 It must be stated, first, that the word elements of the signs at issue have the same length and that four of their five letters are the same, three of which, namely those forming the sequence of letters ‘pix’, are placed in the same order and occupy the final position of each of those word elements. Thus, the majority of the letters which make up the word elements of the signs at issue are identical.

75 It should be noted, secondly, that none of the word elements of the signs at issue can be classified as highly stylised. Their dissimilarity resulting from the lower-case and upper-case letters used in each of those signs is irrelevant since the protection which results from registration of a word mark concerns the word mentioned in the application for registration and not the specific graphic or stylistic elements accompanying that mark (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 May 2008, Radio Regenbogen Hörfunk in Baden v OHIM (RadioCom) , T‑254/06, not published, EU:T:2008:165, paragraph 43).

76 Having regard to the additional figurative element, specific to the sign applied for, it is sufficient to note, thirdly, that that element is not capable of constituting a differentiating factor sufficient to rule out the existence of any visual similarity between the signs at issue in the eyes of the relevant public; that is because, having regard to its appearance in the sign applied for, that figurative element serves rather as a decorative feature vis-à-vis the word element ‘aipix’ and is therefore secondary to that word element, which is the most distinctive element in the sign applied for (see paragraphs 64 and 65 above).

77 Thus, the fact that there is a certain degree of visual similarity between the signs at issue on account of their word elements cannot be entirely neutralised by the presence, in the sign applied for, of a figurative element that is not very distinctive.

78 In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal did not err in finding that, notwithstanding the differences in their initial parts, those signs had a below-average degree of visual similarity.

79 As regards, in the second place, the phonetic comparison of the signs at issue, the Board of Appeal was also correct in concluding that those signs had an average degree of similarity.

80 In that regard, it should be noted, first, that, since the figurative element of the sign applied for is not intended to be pronounced by the relevant public given its purely decorative nature, the only relevant element of that sign – which must be taken into consideration for the purposes of the phonetic comparison of the signs at issue – is its word element ‘aipix’.

81 The Court notes, secondly, that the word element of the sign applied for and the earlier sign have the same structure and rhythm, since they both consist of two syllables, namely ‘va’ and ‘pix’, in the case of the earlier sign, and ‘ai’ and ‘pix’, in the case of the sign applied for. In addition, those signs coincide in the pronunciation of their last syllable, ‘pix’.

82 Thirdly, as noted by the Board of Appeal, it should be added that the Spanish relevant public will place the stress on the final syllable, ‘pix’, according to Spanish pronunciation rules, with the result that the signs at issue also coincide in their intonation.

83 In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal was therefore entitled to find that the signs at issue have an average degree of phonetic similarity.

84 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that the Board of Appeal did not err in its assessment of the visual and phonetic similarity of the signs at issue.

85 That conclusion cannot be invalidated by the applicant’s arguments.

86 First, in so far as the applicant relies on the greater attention paid to the beginning of the signs at issue, it must be borne in mind that the rule that greater attention is paid to the beginning of signs cannot apply in all cases and cannot call into question the general principle that the assessment of the similarity of marks must take account of the overall impression produced by those marks, since the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details. The Court may thus hold that the end of signs which are the subject of opposition proceedings is more distinctive or dominant than the beginning of those signs or even that one of the elements in those signs is not more distinctive or dominant than the other (see judgment of 2 July 2025, Camilla and Marc Operations v EUIPO – C&A (C&M) , T‑380/24, not published, EU:T:2025:648, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

87 In the present case, it must be borne in mind, in particular, that the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that the figurative element at the beginning of the sign applied for occupied a secondary position vis-à-vis the word element ‘aipix’ (see paragraph 76 above).

88 As regards the differences in the initial parts of the word elements of the signs at issue, it should be borne in mind that the earlier sign and the word element ‘aipix’ of the sign applied for are perceived, first and foremost, as a whole by the Spanish relevant public, who will not break them down into the two syllables they are made up of, namely ‘va’ and ‘pix’, on the one hand, and ‘ai’ and ‘pix’, on the other (see paragraphs 58 to 66 above).

89 Therefore, it is not necessary, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 86 above, to start from the premiss that the consumer will pay greater attention to the beginning of those word elements rather than to the end, with the result that, as the Board of Appeal pointed out, the fact that the signs at issue coincide in their last syllable, ‘pix’, cannot go unnoticed by the relevant public, whether visually or phonetically.

90 It follows that, contrary to the assertions made by the applicant, the differences between the first parts of the signs at issue, whether resulting from the figurative element of the sign applied for or from the first syllable of the word elements of the signs at issue, cannot be regarded as receiving increased attention on the part of the relevant public.

91 Secondly, as regards the applicant’s argument that, in the case of short signs, even slight differences are likely to produce a different overall impression, it must be noted that it is clear from case-law that, as regards relatively short signs containing word elements such as those in the present case, the elements at the beginning of the signs are as important as the other elements, including those at the end of the signs (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 April 2021, FCA Italy v EUIPO – Bettag (Pandem) , T‑191/20, not published, EU:T:2021:226, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

92 Thus, even in the case of short signs, the presence, in each of the signs, of several letters in the same order is important in the overall assessment of their similarity (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 February 2024, Darila v EUIPO – Original Buff (Buffet) , T‑101/23, not published, EU:T:2024:65, paragraphs 40 and 42 and the case-law cited).

93 In the present case, as the Board of Appeal correctly pointed out, the coinciding three letters which form the sequence of letters ‘pix’ at the end of the signs at issue cannot be disregarded in the overall assessment of the similarity of those signs.

94 Therefore, the Board of Appeal did not err in finding that, notwithstanding the fact that they are short, the signs at issue had a below-average degree of visual similarity and an average degree of phonetic similarity.

95 Thirdly, as regards the applicant’s argument that the visual differences between the signs at issue carry greater weight than their phonetic similarities since the goods in question are normally purchased after a visual inspection, it is sufficient to note that that argument falls within the scope of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, which is examined below (see paragraphs 100 to 117 below).

96 The Board of Appeal’s analysis concerning the visual and phonetic similarities of the signs at issue must therefore be regarded as free from error.

(3) The conceptual comparison

97 The Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 30 of the contested decision, that neither of the signs at issue had a clear meaning for Spanish consumers, with the result that they could not be conceptually compared.

98 According to settled case-law, where none of the signs at issue has meaning taken as a whole, it must be found that a conceptual comparison is not possible (see judgment of 29 January 2025, Atusa Grupo Empresarial v EUIPO – Hans Sasserath (SYC) , T‑21/24, not published, EU:T:2025:111, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

99 It follows that, in the present case, there is no reason to call into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment relating to the impossibility of comparing the signs at issue conceptually, which, moreover, is not disputed by the applicant.

(d) The likelihood of confusion

100 According to settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the existence of a likelihood of confusion depends on numerous elements, in particular the recognition of the trade mark on the market, the association which can be made with the used or registered sign, and the degree of similarity between the trade mark and the sign and between the goods or services identified. The likelihood of confusion must therefore be appreciated globally, taking into account all the relevant factors of the particular case (see judgment of 12 June 2019, Hansson , C‑705/17, EU:C:2019:481, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

101 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a lesser degree of similarity between these goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon , C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, VENADO with frame and others , T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

102 In the present case, having clarified that the distinctive character of the earlier mark had to be regarded as normal, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 34 of the contested decision, that, having regard to that circumstance, the below-average visual similarity of the signs at issue, their average phonetic similarity and the strong similarity or identity of the goods concerned, there was a likelihood of confusion at least on the part of the Spanish general public displaying an average level of attention.

103 In its third plea, the applicant disputes that finding and claims that the Board of Appeal misapplied the principle of interdependence. The applicant claims that that principle cannot be interpreted to the effect that any similarity between trade marks involving identical goods automatically gives rise to a likelihood of confusion. In the present case, there are clear differences between the marks at issue which were underestimated by the Board of Appeal and which should have led it to find that there was no likelihood of confusion between them.

104 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

105 In the present case, it should be borne in mind, first, that, as stated in paragraph 54 above, the goods covered by the mark applied for are either identical or very similar to the goods covered by the earlier mark.

106 Secondly, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 70 to 84 above, the signs at issue have a below-average degree of visual similarity and an average degree of phonetic similarity. Furthermore, they cannot be compared conceptually.

107 Thirdly, it is necessary to uphold the Board of Appeal’s assessment – which, moreover, is not disputed by the applicant – that the earlier mark had a normal degree of distinctiveness.

108 In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal correctly concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion on account of the principle of interdependence of the various factors which must be taken into account in that context.

109 Such a conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s line of argument that the visual differences between the signs at issue carry greater weight than their phonetic similarities, since the goods in question are normally purchased after a visual inspection (see paragraph 95 above), or that the principle of interdependence cannot be interpreted to the effect that any similarity between trade marks involving identical goods automatically gives rise to a likelihood of confusion.

110 In view of the importance of the visual differences between the signs at issue in relation to the phonetic similarities of those signs, first of all, it should be noted that it is true that the visual, phonetic or conceptual aspects of the signs at issue do not always carry the same weight, and it is therefore appropriate to analyse the objective conditions under which the marks at issue may be present on the market. Thus, if the goods covered by a given mark are only sold on oral request, the phonetic aspects of the sign in question are bound to have greater significance for the relevant public than the visual aspects. Conversely, the degree of phonetic similarity between two marks is of limited significance in the case of goods which are marketed in such a way that, when making a purchase, the relevant public usually perceives visually the mark designating those goods (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 January 2014, Goldsteig Käsereien Bayerwald v OHIM – Vieweg (goldstück) , T‑47/13, not published, EU:T:2014:37, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

111 However, in the present case, it must be noted that the applicant has not adduced any evidence to support its claim that, in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion concerning the signs at issue, the visual differences between those signs are more significant than their possible phonetic similarities, given that the goods in question are normally purchased after a visual inspection.

112 Furthermore, the Court has already held, as regards computers, computer accessories or computer software in Class 9, such as the goods covered by the marks at issue, that although those goods may actually be sold to consumers ‘as seen’ on shelves in self-service, an oral discussion as to the characteristics of the goods and their mark is also likely to take place at the time of purchase. In addition, those goods may be advertised orally on television or on the internet (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 September 2011, NEC Display Solutions Europe v OHIM – C More Entertainment (see more) , T‑501/08, not published, EU:T:2011:527, paragraph 53, and of 13 March 2019, Wirecard Technologies v EUIPO – Striatum Ventures (supr) , T‑297/18, not published, EU:T:2019:160, paragraph 77).

113 It follows that, in the present case, having regard to the goods covered by the marks at issue, the degree of phonetic similarity of those marks carries at least as much weight as their visual similarity in the context of the assessment of the likelihood of confusion. The applicant’s complaint in that regard must therefore be rejected.

114 As regards the applicant’s argument that the principle of interdependence cannot be interpreted to the effect that any similarity between marks involving identical goods automatically means that there is a likelihood of confusion, it should be borne in mind that, admittedly, according to case-law, there can be no question of mechanically applying the principle of interdependence, without taking into account all the relevant factors. In particular, there is nothing to preclude a finding that, in the light of the circumstances of a particular case, there is no likelihood of confusion, even where the goods are identical and there is a low degree of similarity between the marks at issue. The same considerations apply a fortiori, as the case may be, where the goods are similar to an average or a low degree and there is a low degree of similarity between the signs. The analysis of the likelihood of confusion is based on a global assessment of all the relevant factors (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 October 2020, Laboratorios Ern v EUIPO – Bio-tec Biologische Naturverpackungen (BIOPLAST BIOPLASTICS FOR A BETTER LIFE) , T‑2/20, not published, EU:T:2020:493, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited).

115 However, in the present case and contrary to the applicant’s assertions, it is not apparent from the contested decision that the Board of Appeal applied the principle of interdependence in such a way as to consider that the identity or similarity of the goods covered by the marks at issue was sufficient in itself to establish a likelihood of confusion, irrespective of the degree of similarity between those marks.

116 On the contrary, it is in the light of all the considerations set out in paragraphs 105 to 108 above that the Board of Appeal concluded, in accordance with the principle of interdependence, that there was a likelihood of confusion as regards the marks at issue. Thus, the Board of Appeal took into account, in particular, in addition to the identity and high degree of similarity of the goods in question, the normal degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the below-average degree of visual similarity between the signs at issue and their average degree of phonetic similarity, it being understood that the same importance must be attached to the phonetic similarities of the signs at issue as to their visual resemblance.

117 The applicant’s third plea must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

118 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, since none of the pleas in law relied on by the applicant in support of the form of order sought by it is to be upheld, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

IV. Costs

119 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

120 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the intervener, in accordance with the form of order sought by the intervener. By contrast, since EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened, EUIPO must, as a hearing has not been organised, be ordered to bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Xaipix sp. z o.o. to bear, in addition to its own costs, those incurred by Axis AB;

3. Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear its own costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 2 September 2026.

* Language of the case: English.