Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) 14 October 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)

14 October 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for EU word mark MAGORA – Earlier EU figurative mark GRUPO AGORA – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑814/25,

Holding Tourisme, established in Boulogne-Billancourt (France), represented by X. Carbasse, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by J. Ivanauskas, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO being

Agora, SA, established in Zaragoza (Spain),

THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber),

composed of P. Škvařilová-Pelzl, President, I. Nõmm and R. Pezzuto (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: T. Henze, Acting Registrar,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Holding Tourisme, seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 25 September 2025 (Case R 2376/2024‑4) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 4 October 2023, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the word sign MAGORA.

3 The mark applied for covered services in Classes 36 and 43 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:

– Class 36: ‘Real estate affairs and valuation of property, financial and monetary affairs; insurance underwriting; real estate renting, administering real estates, real estate management; management of real estate, business assets or corporate securities; management of tourist, business and student residences; leasing of real estate, rent collecting, rental (tertiary premises), leasing of real estate, real estate agencies; accommodation bureaux (real estate property); rental of offices [real estate]; rental of apartments; housing agents, mutual funds and capital investments, financial services for the purchasing and financing of real estate, providing financial guarantees for real estate, management services for real estate investments, acquisition of real estate and business premises for others; financial evaluation (insurance, banking, real estate); financial analysis, hire-purchase financing, surety services, mutual funds and investment of funds, administration of shares, planning and providing of insurance for real estate; travel insurance, cancellation insurance relating to travel or trips; housing management; real estate time-sharing; apartment house management leasing; administration of financial affairs relating to real estate; real estate management services relating to office premises; wealth management; financial management of real estate projects and building projects; financial management of tourist, business and student residences; financial management of building renovation projects; financial services relating to wealth management; providing student loan information; financial consultancy relating to student loan services; providing student loans’;

– Class 43: ‘Restaurant services; temporary accommodation; accommodation bureaux (hotels, boarding houses), hotel reservations, hotels; bar services; cafés, cafeterias, snack-bars; providing campground facilities; holiday camp services [lodging]; hotel services; rental of chairs, tables, table linen, glassware; retirement home services, temporary accommodation.’

4 On 25 January 2024, Agora, SA filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the services referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5 The opposition was based on the earlier EU figurative mark reproduced below, covering services in Classes 35 and 36 and corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following descriptions:

– Class 35: ‘Wholesale and retail services in relation to alcoholic beverages, pre-mixed alcoholic beverages, beer and brewery products, soft drinks and non-alcoholic preparations for making beverages; advertising; business management; business administration; business administration; management of commercial business on behalf of others; business management; business administration, management and assistance in the field of food and beverage processing, supply and promotion; provision of market analysis, in particular in the field of food and beverage processing, supply and promotion; business assistance in operational management and administration; organisational and business economics consultancy; provision of business information, including through databases; organisation of trade fairs and exhibitions for commercial or advertising purposes; all the abovementioned services are also provided via internet, telecommunication networks and electronic means, none of the above services provided in connection with logistics and freight forwarding services provided to third parties, including those provided through management consultancy software provided to third parties’;

– Class 36: ‘Insurance; financial activities; banking activities; real estate activities; financial services; financial administration; financial sponsoring; provision of financial and stock exchange information, in particular for the press and investors; provision of financial analysis and related consultancy; capital investment; lending; rental and leasing of real estate; leasing of real estate; provision of advice and information on the aforementioned services; the aforementioned services are also provided via internet, telecommunications networks and other electronic means; none of the above services provided in connection with logistics and freight forwarding services provided to third parties, including those provided via management consultancy software provided to third parties’:

6 The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

7 On 25 November 2024, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition in part on the basis of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 and rejected the application for registration of the mark applied for for all services covered by the contested mark, except for ‘restaurant services; bar services; cafés, cafeterias, snack-bars; rental of chairs, tables, table linen, glassware; retirement home services’ in Class 43.

8 On 10 December 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Opposition Division in so far as the opposition had been upheld and the application for the mark applied for had been rejected for all services covered by the contested mark, except for ‘restaurant services; bar services; cafés, cafeterias, snack-bars; rental of chairs, tables, table linen, glassware; retirement home services’ in Class 43.

9 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. First, it considered that the relevant public for the services in Class 36 consisted of both the general public and professionals, who had at least a heightened level of attention, and that the temporary accommodation services in Class 43 were intended for the general public, whose degree of attention was at least average. Second, having stated that the earlier mark was a Spanish mark and that the relevant territory for analysing the likelihood of confusion was Spain, the Board of Appeal focused its analysis on the relevant Spanish-speaking public. Third, it took the view that the services covered by the mark applied for were, in some cases, identical to those of the earlier mark as regards the services in Class 36, and in some cases similar to at least a low degree as regards the services in Class 43. Fourth, after stating that at least a non-negligible part of the Spanish public was likely to perceive the word element ‘agora’ of the earlier mark as meaningless and therefore a distinctive term in relation to the services concerned, the Board of Appeal decided to focus its analysis on that part of the relevant Spanish public. It thus stated that the word element ‘agora’ was the dominant and most distinctive element of the earlier mark, whereas the word element ‘magora’, which made up the mark applied for, was distinctive for the relevant Spanish public on which it had focused its analysis, since it is meaningless. Furthermore, it stated that the conflicting signs exhibited an above-average degree of visual similarity and a high degree of phonetic similarity, and that they were conceptually not similar. Fifth, as regards the overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion, in so far as the signs at issue did not convey a different concept for the part of the relevant Spanish public on which the analysis was centred, the principle of neutralisation was not applicable in the case at hand. Thus, the Board of Appeal concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion for a non-negligible part of the Spanish public which did not attribute any meaning to the word element ‘agora’, even taking into account a higher level of attention and a low level of similarity for some of the services covered by the contested mark.

Forms of order sought

10 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– order EUIPO and Agora to bear their own costs and those incurred by the applicant.

11 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the application;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.

Law

12 In support of the action, the applicant relies, in essence, on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

Admissibility of the evidence adduced for the first time before the General Court

13 EUIPO contends that Annexes A.25 to A.27, A.30 and A.31 to the application are inadmissible on the ground that they have been submitted for the first time before the General Court.

14 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the purpose of actions before the Court under Article 72(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 is to review the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal. Pursuant to Article 95 of that regulation, that review must be carried out in the light of the factual and legal context of the dispute as it was brought before the Board of Appeal (see judgment of 1 February 2005, SPAG v OHIM – Dann and Backer (HOOLIGAN) , T‑57/03, EU:T:2005:29, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited). It follows that the Court may not annul or alter the decision against which an action has been brought on grounds which come into existence subsequent to its adoption (judgments of 11 May 2006, Sunrider v OHIM , C‑416/04 P, EU:C:2006:310, paragraph 55, and of 13 March 2007, OHIM v Kaul , C‑29/05 P, EU:C:2007:162, paragraph 53).

15 Therefore, it is not the Court’s function to review the facts in the light of documents adduced for the first time before it. To allow the examination of such evidence would be contrary to Article 188 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, according to which the parties’ pleadings may not change the subject matter of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal. Accordingly, the evidence submitted for the first time before the Court must be declared inadmissible and there is no need to examine it (see judgment of 14 May 2009, Fiorucci v OHIM – Edwin (ELIO FIORUCCI) , T‑165/06, EU:T:2009:157, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

16 In the present case, Annex A.25 to the application contains an extract from the website ‘espanaenlibertad.gob.es’, Annex A.26 to that application contains extracts from the websites ‘agora.es’, ‘valencia-cityguide.com’, ‘Wikipedia.org’, ‘plateamagazine.com’, ‘agorahoteles.com’, ‘hotelportdeselva.com’, ‘agorainternationalschool.es’, ‘agoratravel.net’, ‘lacarte.menu’, ‘instagram.com’ and ‘espanaenlibertad.gob.es’, while Annex A.27 to that application contains an extract from the website ‘Wiktionary.org’. Those annexes were produced by the applicant in order to support the argument that the relevant Spanish public can easily understand the meaning of the word ‘agora’, which is present in the earlier mark.

17 Annex A.30 to the application includes both the list of Spanish and EU trade marks containing the term ‘agora’ extracted from EUIPO’s TM View database and the list of Spanish undertakings whose name contains the word ‘agora’, taken from the website ‘infoempresa.com’. Annex A.31 to the application contains the list of EU trade marks containing the word ‘magora’ extracted from EUIPO’s TM View database. Those annexes were submitted by the applicant in order to prove the weak distinctive character of the word ‘agora’, which is present in the mark applied for, when used in isolation to designate the services at issue.

18 It is apparent from the file relating to the proceedings before EUIPO that, contrary to EUIPO’s contention, Annex A.27 to the application was produced by the applicant in Annex 13 to its appeal before the Board of Appeal. Accordingly, that annex cannot be rejected as inadmissible. By contrast, all the other annexes to the application, namely Annexes A.25, A.26, A.30 and A.31, were submitted for the first time before the General Court.

19 However, in so far as Annexes A.30 and A.31 to the application contain results from a search carried out by the applicant in EUIPO’s TM View database, it must be held that, although they were submitted for the first time before the General Court, they are not strictly evidence, within the meaning, in particular, of Article 85 of the Rules of Procedure, but relate to EUIPO’s registration practice, to which a party has a right to refer (judgment of 12 January 2022, 1031023 B.C. v EUIPO – Bodegas San Valero (Representation of a circle drawn by a brush) , T‑366/20, not published, EU:T:2022:4, paragraph 15). Accordingly, those annexes cannot be rejected as inadmissible.

20 By contrast, as regards Annexes A.25 and A.26 to the application and the section of Annex A.30 of that application containing the list of Spanish undertakings whose names contain the word ‘agora’, extracted from the website ‘infoempresa.com’, in so far as they constitute evidence submitted for the first time before the General Court, they are inadmissible, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 14 and 15 above.

21 Consequently, the applicant’s arguments will be examined below only in so far as they are not based on the abovementioned evidence.

The single plea alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001

22 In support of its single plea in law, after disputing the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the level of attention of the relevant public, the applicant alleges that the Board of Appeal made, first, an error of assessment of the similarities between the services covered by the earlier mark in Classes 35 and 36 and the services covered by the mark applied for in Classes 36 and 43, second, an error of assessment in the visual, phonetic and conceptual comparisons of the marks at issue and, third, an error of assessment as to the overall likelihood of confusion.

23 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.

24 The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS) , T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).

25 For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel) , T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

26 It is in the light of those considerations that it must be examined whether the Board of Appeal was correct in concluding that there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public on which it focused its analysis, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

The relevant public

27 In the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, account should be taken of the average consumer of the category of goods concerned, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of services in question (see judgment of 13 February 2007, Mundipharma v OHIM – Altana Pharma (RESPICUR) , T‑256/04, EU:T:2007:46, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

28 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal considered that, in so far as the earlier mark was a Spanish mark, the relevant territory was that of Spain. As regards the level of attention of that public, the Board of Appeal stated that the relevant public for the services in Class 36 consisted of both the general public and professionals. According to the Board of Appeal, those services are not purchased or contracted on a regular basis, their price is relatively high, they are liable to have a direct impact on the economic and financial assets of consumers, including real estate services, which generally involve substantial sums of money, and the public concerned will have at least a heightened level of attention. By contrast, it considered that the temporary accommodation services in Class 43 were intended for the general public whose degree of attention would be at least average, given that those services were usually not selected on a daily basis and could be relatively expensive. Furthermore, with respect to the services aimed at both the general public and professionals, the Board of Appeal took into account the level of attention of the consumer who is part of the general public.

29 In the present case, it is necessary to uphold the Board of Appeal’s finding that, since the earlier mark was a Spanish mark, the relevant territory for the purposes of assessing the likelihood of confusion is Spain, which, besides, is not called into question by the applicant. However, the applicant does dispute the Board of Appeal’s assessments as regards the level of attention of the relevant public.

30 In that regard, the applicant submits, inter alia, that, as regards the services falling within Classes 35, 36 and 43, the relevant public mainly comprises professional buyers and exhibits an above-average level of attention given the specialised nature of the services. In particular, according to the applicant, purchasing and selling real estate, running retail stores, wholesale outlets, restaurants and bars are all commercial transactions involving risks and the transfer of large sums of money. For that reason, consumers are deemed to have an above-average level of attention, as the consequences of making the wrong choice due to a lack of attention could be very damaging. The relevant public will therefore be attentive and pay closer attention to details, making it unlikely that there will be a likelihood of confusion between two conflicting signs which differ in both structure and meaning.

31 EUIPO contends, inter alia, that the applicant’s claim relating to the level of attention of the relevant public must be rejected as ineffective.

32 In the first place, it should be noted that, as regards the services in Class 36, the Board of Appeal found that the level of attention of the relevant public, which is composed of professionals and the general public, would be above average. It is only in respect of temporary accommodation services in Class 43 that it concluded that those services would be intended for the general public, whose level of attention would be at least average.

33 However, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Board of Appeal did not err in its assessment in reaching the conclusion referred to in paragraph 32 above. Although it is true, as the Board of Appeal observes, that the temporary accommodation services in Class 43 are not generally selected on a daily basis and can be relatively expensive, they are also not intended for a segment of the market with particular characteristics, but are also aimed at the general public (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 June 2012, Hotel Reservation Service Robert Ragge v OHIM – Promotora Imperial (iHotel) , T‑277/11, not published, EU:T:2012:295, paragraph 42), whose level of attention may only be average when purchasing those services (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 January 2015, MEM v OHIM (MONACO) , T‑197/13, EU:T:2015:16, paragraphs 3 and 55, and of 25 May 2016, U-R LAB v EUIPO (THE DINING EXPERIENCE) , T‑422/15 and T‑423/15, not published, EU:T:2016:314, paragraphs 4 and 51).

34 In the second place, it should be noted that the fact that the relevant public is more attentive does not mean that it will examine down to the smallest detail the mark before it, or that it will compare that mark in minute detail to another mark (see judgments of 21 November 2013, Equinix (Germany) v OHIM – Acotel (ancotel.) , T‑443/12, not published, EU:T:2013:605, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited, and of 13 March 2018, Kiosked v EUIPO – VRT (K) , T‑824/16, EU:T:2018:133, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).

35 In the third place, it must be noted that it cannot be accepted that there are cases in which, owing to the level of attention displayed by the relevant public, any likelihood of confusion can, a priori, be ruled out. On the contrary, what is required is a global assessment of that likelihood on a case-by-case basis, as is required by the settled case-law cited in paragraph 24 above. In the context of that global assessment, the concerned public’s level of attention is only one of the various factors which have to be taken into consideration. (see judgment of 28 May 2020, Ntolas v EUIPO – General Nutrition Investment (GN GENETIC NUTRITION LABORATORIES) , T‑333/19, not published, EU:T:2020:232, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

36 Thus, as EUIPO correctly observes, and contrary to what the applicant seeks to claim (see paragraph 30 above), the heightened level of attention of the relevant public is not sufficient to rule out a likelihood of confusion in the present case.

37 Consequently, the applicant’s claim relating to the level of attention of the relevant public must be rejected as unfounded.

The comparison of the services

38 In assessing the similarity of the goods or services at issue, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, in particular, their nature, their intended purpose, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account such as the distribution channels of the goods concerned (see judgment of 14 May 2013, Sanco v OHIM – Marsalman (Representation of a chicken) , T‑249/11, EU:T:2013:238, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

39 Complementary goods or services are those between which there is a close connection, in the sense that one is indispensable or important for the use of the other with the result that consumers may think that the same undertaking is responsible for manufacturing those goods or for providing those services. By definition, goods or services intended for different publics cannot be complementary (see judgment of 22 January 2009, easyHotel , T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraphs 57 and 58 and the case-law cited).

40 It is apparent from paragraphs 28 to 31 of the contested decision that, according to the Board of Appeal, the services at issue in Class 36 are included in or overlap with the services covered by the earlier mark and are therefore identical. By contrast, in paragraph 32 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the services at issue in Class 43, namely ‘temporary accommodation; accommodation bureaux (hotels, boarding houses), hotel reservations, hotels; providing campground facilities; holiday camp services [lodging]; hotel services’, were similar, at least to a low degree, to real estate activities; lending; rental and leasing of real estate in Class 36, covered by the earlier mark. It also stated that all the services under comparison could be offered through the same distribution channels and that, therefore, they shared the same purpose to provide accommodation for people, targeted the same public, and could also coincide in distribution channels and commercial origin.

41 The applicant does not contest the grounds of the contested decision on the basis of which the Board of Appeal found that the services in Class 36 covered by the mark applied for were identical to those covered by the earlier mark in the same class. However, it criticises the Board of Appeal for having found, in paragraph 32 of the contested decision, that the services covered by the mark applied for in Class 43 were ‘similar at least to a low degree to the … real estate activities[, to] lending[, to] rental and leasing of real estate in Class 36 [covered by the earlier mark]’. It also disputes the Board of Appeal’s finding, in the same paragraph of the contested decision, that ‘all the services under comparison may be offered through the same distribution channels’ and, consequently, ‘share the same purpose to provide accommodation for people, target the same public, and may also coincide in distribution channels and commercial origins.’

42 The applicant submits, in essence, that, although the mark applied for is intended to be used for services linked to transport, real estate and tourism, Agora, the proprietor of the earlier mark, is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of beer and non-alcoholic beverages. Consequently, there is no link between the services at issue as regards their nature, their purpose, their complementarity, their providers or their distribution channels. The services in Class 43 are therefore different from those in Class 36.

43 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

44 It that respect, it should be noted that, as stated by EUIPO, for the purposes of assessing whether there is a likelihood of confusion, only the description of the goods in respect of which registration of the mark was sought is relevant; the intended or actual use of that mark cannot be taken into account, since the registration does not contain a restriction to that effect. It follows that the specific use which the proprietor of the contested mark has made of its sign is not capable of changing the goods or services taken into account for the purposes of the assessments underlying the finding of the existence of a likelihood of confusion, such as the definition of the relevant public and its level of attention or the similarity between those goods or services in the mind of that public (see, to that effect, order of 30 June 2010, Royal Appliance International v OHIM , C‑448/09 P, not published, EU:C:2010:384, paragraphs 71 and 72).

45 Furthermore, as EUIPO correctly submits, the applicant did not provide any argument capable of calling into question the comparison made by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision between, on the one hand, the services covered by the mark applied for in Class 43, as they appear in the application for registration of that mark, and, on the other hand, the services in Class 36 in respect of which the earlier mark is registered, in particular real estate activities; lending; rental and leasing of real estate.

46 As regards Decision B 3 215 987 of the Opposition Division of EUIPO, cited in paragraph 29 of the application, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the legality of the decisions of the Board of Appeal must be assessed solely on the basis of Regulation 2017/1001 and not on the basis of a previous decision-making practice of EUIPO (see judgment of 9 November 2022, Société Elmar Wolf v EUIPO – Fuxtec (Representation of the head of an animal) , T‑596/21, not published, EU:T:2022:697, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited). Although the case-law accepts that, in the light of the principles of equal treatment and sound administration, EUIPO must take into account the decisions already taken in respect of similar applications and consider with special care whether it should decide in the same way or not, that same case-law specifies that the application of those principles must, however, be consistent with respect for the principle of legality (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM , C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraphs 73 to 75).

47 Furthermore, it must be noted that the services in Class 43, in respect of which the contested mark in the case at issue in paragraph 46 above was applied for, and which were found to be different to the services in Class 36, were different from the services in Class 43 covered by the mark applied for in the present case, and which were found to be similar, at least to a low degree, to real estate services, to lending, and to the rental and leasing of real estate in Class 36, as covered by the earlier mark. Therefore, it cannot be inferred from the decision of the Opposition Division of EUIPO relating to that case that, as the applicant claims, all the services in Class 43 are different from those in Class 36.

48 Lastly, as regards Decision B 3 215 987 of the Opposition Division of EUIPO produced by the applicant in Annex A.5 to the application, it should be emphasised that it is not relevant in the present case in so far as it does not concern services in Class 43 and does not contain any assessment concerning the comparison of the services in that class with those in Class 36.

49 Consequently, it must be held that the Board of Appeal’s assessment on the comparison of the services at issue is not vitiated by any error of assessment.

The comparison of the signs

50 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker , C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

51 In the present case, before addressing the question of the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the marks at issue, it is necessary to examine the assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements of those signs.

– The distinctive and dominant elements of the marks at issue

52 In the present case, the earlier mark is a figurative mark composed of the word elements ‘grupo’ and ‘agora’, arranged on two lines. As the Board of Appeal observed in paragraph 35 of the contested decision, the word element ‘grupo’ appears on the top line, in smaller, dark grey standard upper-case letters, whereas the word element ‘agora’ appears on the bottom line, in larger upper-case letters. The letters ‘a’ and ‘o’ are yellow and the letters ‘g’, ‘r’ and ‘a’ are dark grey, while both letters ‘a’ are slightly stylised by means of an interrupted tilted line on one side.

53 The mark applied for is a word mark composed of the single element ‘magora’.

54 In paragraph 36 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the word element ‘grupo’ in the earlier mark was a Spanish word meaning a group of companies and that it was non-distinctive for the Spanish public, since it was a simple reference to the type of company concerned.

55 Furthermore, in paragraph 37 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal, adopting the Opposition Division’s assessment, found that part of the Spanish public may associate the word element ‘agora’ with the Spanish word ‘ágora’ (with an accent on the first letter), which means ‘a central public square in ancient Greek cities’ or ‘a place for gathering and discussion’. However, the Board of Appeal also noted that a dictionary not only contains well-known and regularly used terms, but also terms that are rare, poetic, outdated or that relate to highly specialised fields, the meaning of which is likely known only to a small number of specialists in the relevant sectors. Thus, according to the Board of Appeal, it is more likely, in the case of such terms, that the relevant public, faced with a sign containing them, will not immediately perceive their meaning or, as the case may be, their connection with the goods or services covered. Indeed, the three Wikipedia articles which the applicant produced before the Board of Appeal, irrespective of their reliability, merely confirm a highly specialised use of the term ‘ágora’ in historical and literary contexts. Those aspects would be irrelevant to the perception of that word element by the Spanish public as regards the relevant real estate, financial, and insurance services of the earlier mark.

56 Furthermore, in paragraph 38 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal, departing from the Opposition Division’s view, stated that it was highly unlikely that the word element ‘agora’ may be perceived as a misspelling of the Spanish word ‘ahora’ (meaning ‘now’, ‘at this moment’).

57 Thus, in paragraph 39 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal concluded that at least a non-negligible part of the Spanish public was likely to perceive the word element ‘agora’ in the earlier mark as meaningless and, therefore, as a distinctive term in relation to the services concerned.

58 By focusing the analysis on the part of the relevant Spanish public referred to in paragraph 57 above, the Board of Appeal thus found, in paragraph 40 of the contested decision, that the word element ‘agora’ was the dominant and most distinctive element of the earlier mark. According to the Board of Appeal, first, the slight stylisation of the word element ‘agora’ in the earlier mark and the use of colours will be perceived as decorative and will not divert the public’s attention from the main verbal element ‘agora’. Second, in view of its reduced size and non-distinctive character, the word element ‘grupo’ occupies a secondary position and is liable to be ignored by consumers in the overall impression conveyed by the earlier mark.

59 As regards the mark applied for, in paragraph 41 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal noted that it was a word mark composed of the word element ‘magora’, for which it was irrelevant whether it was written in upper or lower-case letters. The element is meaningless and distinctive in regard to the Spanish relevant public.

60 The applicant agrees with the Board of Appeal that the mark applied for has no specific meaning to the relevant public and is therefore distinctive. It also acknowledges that the word element ‘grupo’ of the earlier mark is a Spanish word commonly understood as a generic expression for a group of companies and that it cannot function as an indication of commercial origin.

61 However, unlike the Board of Appeal, the applicant argues that the word element ‘grupo’ cannot be disregarded by the consumer, as it alone constitutes half of the word elements of the earlier mark, occupies the first position in the earlier mark and is likely to be pronounced. In addition, the applicant submits that, according to the definition of the Diccionario de la lengua española de la Real Academia Española (namely the Spanish-language dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy) or the website Wiktionary, the word element ‘agora’ of the earlier mark can be clearly interpreted and defined as a place of gathering, a marketplace or a shopping area. In particular, the Spanish public would understand the word ‘agora’ as designating a place of consultation and discussion linked to the services in Class 35, namely retail services for alcoholic beverages and the organisation of trade fairs and exhibitions for commercial or advertising purposes, and as relating to a place of decision-making, which directly corresponds to the services in Class 36, namely insurance, financial, banking and real estate services. Thus, it is a weakly distinctive, or even descriptive, element of the services in respect of which the earlier mark had been registered. Lastly, the applicant submits that the earlier mark features distinct colour differences, with the result that its visual aspect is not merely decorative, but is such as to distract consumers’ attention away from the word elements of which it is composed.

62 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

63 In this connection, it should be observed that the Board of Appeal was right to find that the word element ‘agora’ was the dominant and the most distinctive element of the earlier mark.

64 As regards the distinctive character of the word element ‘agora’ in the earlier mark, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the distinctive character of an element of a mark depends on the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods or services for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, account should be taken of the inherent characteristics of the element in question in the light of whether it is at all descriptive of the goods or services for which the mark has been registered (judgments of 13 June 2006, Inex v OHIM – Wiseman (Representation of a cowhide) , T‑153/03, EU:T:2006:157, paragraph 35, and of 19 September 2019, La Caixa v EUIPO – Imagic Vision (imagin bank) , T‑761/18, not published, EU:T:2019:627, paragraph 26).

65 As the Board of Appeal rightly observed, it is apparent from the definitions in the Spanish-language dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy, an extract of which was produced by the applicant before the Board of Appeal, that the word ‘ágora’ means, in Spanish, ‘a central public square in ancient Greek cities’ or ‘a place for gathering and discussion’. The definitions relied on by the applicant in languages other than Spanish, such as English, cannot be taken into consideration when assessing the perception of the Spanish public, since, according to settled case-law, knowledge of a foreign language by the relevant public cannot, in general, be assumed (see judgment of 8 July 2020, Pablosky v EUIPO – docPrice (mediFLEX easySTEP) , T‑21/19, EU:T:2020:310, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).

66 However, it is not certain that the Spanish public will associate the term ‘agora’ with the Spanish word ‘ágora’, given that that word is written with a tilde on the first letter and that, as EUIPO rightly points out, tildes play an important role in Spanish, since they indicate a different accent or meaning.

67 In any event, it should be emphasised, as EUIPO has done, that the mere inclusion of a term in one or more dictionaries cannot suffice to show that it is a commonly used term, the meaning of which will immediately be perceived by the general public, even in the case of native speakers of the language concerned. Indeed, as the Board of Appeal highlighted in paragraph 37 of the contested decision, a dictionary not only contains well-known and regularly used terms, but also terms that are rare, poetic, outdated or that relate to highly specialised fields, the meaning of which is known only to a small number of specialists in the relevant sectors. It is more likely, consequently, in the case of such terms, that the relevant public, faced with a sign containing them, will not immediately perceive their meaning or, as the case may be, their connection with the goods or services covered (see order of 26 September 2019, Nissin Foods Holdings v EUIPO – The GB Foods (Soba JAPANESE FRIED NOODLES) , T‑663/18, not published, EU:T:2019:716, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

68 In the present case, it should be noted that the few examples of the use of the term ‘agora’ in Spanish literature or thought produced by the applicant in Annexes A.22 to A.24 to the application show only that the term ‘agora’ in the earlier mark is a term relating to highly specialised fields, such as the history and literature of ancient Greece. As the applicant itself acknowledges, the term ‘agora’ is used in that context as a learned borrowing from Greek, the use of which may vary according to culture and linguistic context. Thus, the meaning of that term is unlikely to be known to the whole of the relevant public, but only, within that public, to a small number of specialists with an education in the humanities.

69 Even assuming that the Spanish public as a whole perceives the term ‘agora’ as designating a central public square in ancient Greek cities, the applicant has not shown how that meaning could be descriptive of real estate, financial, and insurance services covered by the earlier mark. The examples of the use of the term ‘agora’ produced by the applicant do not prove that the term is understood by the Spanish public as a place of decision-making directly and immediately relating to insurance, financial, banking and real estate services covered by the earlier mark. Therefore, as the Board of Appeal correctly pointed out in paragraph 37 of the contested decision, those examples do not provide any information as to how the term ‘agora’ will be perceived by the Spanish public in relation to those services.

70 Consequently, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding, in the contested decision, that at least a non-negligible part of the Spanish public was likely to perceive the word element ‘agora’ in the earlier mark as meaningless as regards the services mentioned in paragraph 69 above and, therefore, as a distinctive term.

71 As regards the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the word element ‘agora’ is dominant in the earlier mark, it must be held, contrary to what the applicant claims, that the Board of Appeal was also correct in finding that the yellow and grey colours making up the word element ‘agora’ of the earlier mark, as well as the slight stylisation of the two letters ‘a’ in that word element by means of an interrupted tilted line on one side, would be perceived as decorative elements which are not capable of visually distracting the relevant public’s attention from the word element ‘agora’. It is clear from the case-law that, where a sign consists of both verbal and figurative elements, in principle the word element of the sign generally has a greater impact on the consumer than the figurative element. That is explained by the fact that the public does not tend to analyse the signs and that it will more easily refer to the signs at issue by citing their word element than by describing their figurative elements (judgment of 20 October 2021, St. Hippolyt v EUIPO – Raisioaqua (Vital like nature) , T‑351/20, not published, EU:T:2021:719, paragraphs 41 and 47). There is no justification for a departure from that principle in the present case, meaning that the Board of Appeal was justified in considering that the figurative elements of the earlier mark were, in that mark, of less importance than the word elements.

72 Furthermore, it should be noted, as the Board of Appeal did, that the word element ‘grupo’ in the earlier mark is smaller in size and occupies a secondary position in relation to the other word element, with the result that the latter element will prevail in the overall visual impression produced by that mark. Moreover, as the applicant itself acknowledges, when the term ‘grupo’ is included in a mark, the Spanish public will assign to it only its generic meaning, namely ‘a group of undertakings’. Thus, the relevant public will not perceive the term ‘grupo’ as the principal component of the mark applied for (judgment of 11 May 2005, Grupo Sada v OHIM – Sadia (GRUPO SADA) , T‑31/03, EU:T:2005:169, paragraph 54).

73 In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s arguments seeking to call into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements of the marks at issue must be rejected.

– Visual similarity

74 In paragraph 42 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that, visually, the signs at issue coincided as regards the sequence of letters ‘a’, ‘g’, ‘o’, ‘r’, ‘a’, which was the dominant and most distinctive element of the earlier mark and which included five of the six letters of the sole word element of the mark applied for. By contrast, the signs at issue differ in the first letter ‘m’ of the mark applied for and by the word element ‘grupo’ of the earlier mark, which, on account of its size, position and non-distinctive character, is likely to be ignored by the relevant public in the overall impression conveyed by the earlier mark. Moreover, according to the Board of Appeal, the stylisation of the earlier mark is rather decorative and will not distract consumers’ attention from the word element ‘agora’.

75 Furthermore, in paragraph 43 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeals added that, while it is true that the relevant public will generally pay greater attention to the beginnings of word marks (or word elements of figurative marks) than to their ends, that does not mean that the other parts of those marks are irrelevant and that those signs cannot be visually similar. In particular, in the present case, according to the Board of Appeal, the additional letter ‘m’ at the beginning of the mark applied for does not prevent the relevant public from perceiving the common letter combination ‘a’, ‘g’, ‘o’, ‘r’, ‘a’ contained in the signs at issue. The Board of Appeal thus concluded that the signs at issue were visually similar to an above-average degree.

76 The applicant submits that, although the earlier mark is fully included in the mark applied for, the marks at issue differ in structure, the number of characters and syllables, length and physiognomy. In the first place, as regards the structure, although the mark applied for is characterised by a monolithic composition containing six letters, the earlier mark is composed of two indivisible words, containing ten letters in total. In the second place, the signs at issue also differ from a stylistic perspective, given that the mark applied for is purely a word sign, presented in a standard font without any stylistic embellishment, whereas the earlier mark is a figurative sign that includes the verbal elements ‘grupo’ and ‘agora’, with a specific aesthetic. The juxtaposition of the elements ‘grupo’ and ‘agora’, combined with deliberate spacing and accentuated stylistic elements, gives the earlier mark a more complex visual dimension, in contrast to the more homogeneous structure of the mark applied for. Additionally, the earlier mark features distinct colour differences, such that its visual aspect is not merely decorative and may distract consumers’ attention away from the verbal elements. In the third place, the signs at issue differ visually as regards their completely different initial elements, namely the word ‘grupo’ in the earlier mark and the letter ‘m’ in the mark applied for. In any event, even when comparing only the elements ‘agora’ and ‘magora’, the difference resulting from the presence of a single additional letter in the second word element is enough to create a distinct visual impression, particularly considering the brevity of those elements.

77 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

78 In that respect, it should be noted that, as the Board of Appeal correctly found, the signs at issue coincide as regards the sequence of five letters repeated in the same order, namely ‘a’, ‘g’, ‘o’, ‘r’, ‘a’. As the applicant itself acknowledges, those signs differ only in the additional first letter of the mark applied for, namely the ‘m’, and by the word element ‘grupo’ in the earlier mark.

79 However, it has already been held that the fact that the first letter of the earlier mark was not reproduced in the sign applied for cannot alone counteract the at least average degree of similarity arising from the identity of the last five letters of the two signs (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 October 2020, Rothenberger v EUIPO – Paper Point (ROBOX) , T‑49/20, not published, EU:T:2020:492, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited). In the present case, although it is true that the first letter of the mark applied for, namely ‘m’, is not reproduced in the dominant word element ‘agora’ of the earlier mark, it nevertheless follows from the identity of the last five letters of the mark applied for and of that word element that there is an above-average visual similarity between the signs at issue.

80 Moreover, as regards the word element ‘grupo’ in the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal was right to find that, in view of its size, its position, and its non-distinctive character, that word element would not be perceived by the relevant public in the overall impression created by the earlier mark (see paragraph 71 above). Furthermore, that conclusion cannot be called into question by the fact that, as the applicant notes, in essence, the word element ‘grupo’ alone constitutes half of the letters present in the earlier mark.

81 The Board of Appeal was also right to find that the yellow and grey colours making up the word element ‘agora’ of the earlier mark, as well as the slight stylisation of the two letters ‘a’ in that word element by means of an interrupted tilted line on one side, would be perceived as decorative elements which are not capable of visually distracting the relevant public’s attention from the word element ‘agora’ (see paragraph 71 above), which is the dominant and the most distinctive element of the earlier mark. Furthermore, in that respect, it should be noted, as observed by EUIPO, that the graphical representation of the earlier sign, in which the two word elements ‘grupo’ and ‘agora’ are placed above and below each other, is commonplace and will not attract the attention of the relevant public either.

82 Consequently, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in considering that the signs at issue had an above-average degree of visual similarity.

– Phonetic similarity

83 In paragraphs 45 and 46 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue also coincided in the pronunciation of the sequence of letters ‘a’ ‘g’, ‘o’, ‘r’, ‘a’, present in the same manner in both signs. Those signs differ in the pronunciation of the first letter of the mark applied for, namely the ‘m’. Furthermore, according to the Board of Appeal, the sound of the additional letter ‘m’ at the beginning of the mark applied for does not prevent consumers from perceiving the sound of the common letter combination ‘agora’ in the signs at issue, all the more so given that both verbal elements will be pronounced as three syllables with the same rhythm and intonation, namely ‘ma-go-ra’ and ‘a-go-ra’.

84 Moreover, according to the Board of Appeal, taking into account the non-distinctive character of the word element ‘grupo’ in the earlier mark, that word element is only of minor importance in the phonetic comparison of the marks at issue. In view of its small size in comparison to the dominant and most distinctive element, ‘agora’, of the earlier mark, it is unlikely that the consumers will pronounce it. That is also because consumers tend to shorten signs and only refer to the dominant elements in the mark.

85 The applicant argues that the signs at issue differ in their pronunciation and rhythm. First, it submits that the earlier mark is composed of five syllables, whereas the mark applied for is composed of three syllables. Second, it submits that the signs at issue do not contain the same sequences of vowels and do not have the same stresses. Third, the signs at issue differ in their initial sounds, namely ‘gru’ and ‘ma’. Although the signs at issue share a similar ending, the phonetic differences between them effectively counterbalance that partial phonetic similarity at the end. Fourth, there are evident differences between the signs at issue due to the difference of length (one consisting of a single word and the other of two) and the distinct sounds of the additional letters at the beginning of the earlier sign. Those differences significantly influence the respective rhythms of the pronunciation of the signs at issue, given that the earlier mark offers a more pronounced alternation of sounds and a sharper break between the words ‘grupo’ and ‘agora’, contrasting with the more fluid pronunciation of the element ‘magora’ which makes up the mark applied for.

86 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

87 Contrary to what the applicant claims, it must be held, as the Board of Appeal and the Opposition Division also held, that the word ‘grupo’, present in the earlier mark, will probably not be pronounced by the relevant public because of its secondary position, its much smaller size and its non-distinctive character. The General Court has already held that the relevant public tends to pronounce only the distinctive and dominant element of the marks at issue (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 February 2013, Marszałkowski v OHIM – Mar-Ko Fleischwaren (WALICHNOWY MARKO) , T‑159/11, not published, EU:T:2013:56, paragraph 44, and of 3 July 2013, GRE v OHIM – Villiger Söhne (LIBERTE american blend against a red background) , T‑206/12, not published, EU:T:2013:342, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

88 It is also apparent from case-law that the relevant public tends to omit certain word elements of a mark comprising several elements to make it easier to pronounce in the interests, inter alia, of economising on words, if those elements are easily separable (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 2017, SDSR v EUIPO – Berghaus (BERG OUTDOOR) , T‑139/16, not published, EU:T:2017:705, paragraph 61, and of 26 March 2025, Unite Network v EUIPO – Unión Detallistas Españoles (unite mercateo) , T‑1186/23, not published, EU:T:2025:335, paragraphs 85 and 87 and the case-law cited).

89 In any event, even if the word element ‘grupo’ in the earlier mark were pronounced, its impact on the phonetic similarity of the signs at issue would be considerably reduced, given that that element is devoid of distinctive character, as the applicant acknowledges. It has already been held that a first non-distinctive word element present in a sign at issue was not sufficiently important to offset a high phonetic similarity between the second word element of that mark, which was the most distinctive element, and the other mark at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 May 2005, GRUPO SADA , T‑31/03, EU:T:2005:169, paragraph 62). Thus, in the present case, the phonetic difference resulting from the non-distinctive verbal element ‘grupo’ in the earlier mark is not sufficiently significant to counterbalance the high phonetic similarity between the most distinctive word element ‘agora’ of that mark and the word element ‘magora’ which makes up the mark applied for.

90 In that connection, as the Board of Appeal and EUIPO correctly observed, the signs at issue coincide as regards the pronunciation of the sequence of letters ‘a’, ‘g’, ‘o’, ‘r’, ‘a’, present in the same manner in each of them. The mere difference in the pronunciation of the first letter of the mark applied for, namely the ‘m’, which produces a bilabial nasal sound, cannot outweigh the high degree of phonetic similarity between the word elements ‘agora’ and ‘magora’, in particular considering that they have the same number of syllables and the stress when pronouncing them will lie on the same syllable, ‘go’.

91 Accordingly, the Board of Appeal likewise did not make an error of assessment in finding that the signs at issue were phonetically similar to a high degree.

– Conceptual similarity

92 Focusing the analysis on the non-negligible part of the Spanish public which is likely to perceive the verbal element ‘agora’ of the earlier mark as meaningless and, therefore, a distinctive term in relation to the services concerned, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 48 of the contested decision, that, although one of the marks at issue, namely the mark applied for, was meaningless, the relevant public would perceive the concept conveyed by the word element ‘grupo’ in the earlier mark. In that respect, according to the Board of Appeal, the marks at issue were not conceptually similar. However, that conceptual difference was of very limited relevance in the overall comparison of the signs as it originated from a non-distinctive element.

93 The applicant submits that the word element ‘agora’ may be interpreted as designating a place of gathering, a marketplace or a shopping area. It is therefore incorrect to assert, as the Board of Appeal did, that the term ‘agora’ would be perceived as having no meaning for the relevant public, namely the Spanish public.

94 First, the applicant submits that, in other decisions in which the earlier mark had been examined from the point of view of the Spanish public, EUIPO expressly took the view that the word ‘agora’ had a clear and specific meaning for the Spanish public, namely that of a public space or place for gathering and discussion. Consequently, the diametrically opposed position as regards the perception of the term ‘agora’ by the same relevant public, as adopted by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision, is difficult to reconcile with the principles of legal certainty and equal treatment, which should guide EUIPO’s practice.

95 Second, the applicant argues that the term ‘agora’ is widely used by the Spanish public to designate places where people gather. That widespread and common usage shows that the relevant public understands the word ‘agora’ as designating a place where people gather, in particular in the context of the services in Classes 35 and 36. The relevant public could therefore easily understand the meaning of the word ‘agora’. Furthermore, there is a clear link between the two words making up the earlier mark, given that the agora is the space where groups of individuals come together to exchange ideas, debate, and make decisions, making it a place where group dynamics are expressed. Therefore, the signs at issue are not conceptually similar.

96 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

97 According to the case-law, conceptual similarity means that the signs at issue coincide in their semantic content (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 November 1997, SABEL , C‑251/95, EU:C:1997:528, paragraph 24).

98 Where one of the marks at issue has a meaning from the perspective of the relevant public and the other has no meaning, it must be held that the marks at issue are conceptually dissimilar (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2017, RP Technik v EUIPO – Tecnomarmi (RP ROYAL PALLADIUM) , T‑768/15, not published, EU:T:2017:630, paragraphs 88 and 89).

99 It should be noted at the outset that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Board of Appeal did not state, in the contested decision, that the term ‘agora’ would be perceived as ‘as having no real meaning for the relevant public, namely the Spanish public’. On the contrary, it clearly acknowledged that a section of the Spanish public might associate the word element ‘agora’ with the Spanish word ‘ágora’ (written with an accent on the first letter), which means ‘a central public square in ancient Greek cities’ or ‘a place for gathering and discussion’. Nevertheless, it found that at least a non-negligible part of the Spanish public would be likely to perceive the word element ‘agora’ of the earlier mark as meaningless and, therefore, as a distinctive term in relation to the services concerned.

100 Contrary to what the applicant claims, it has been found that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in reaching that conclusion (see paragraph 70 above).

101 Moreover, the existence of the three earlier decisions of EUIPO cited by the applicant, in which the word element ‘agora’ was considered to have a meaning for the Spanish speaking public, and even as being capable of counterbalancing the visual and phonetic similarities between the marks at issue, cannot call that conclusion into question.

102 It should be noted that the three previous earlier EUIPO decisions mentioned in paragraph 101 above, which were produced by the applicant before the Board of Appeal, were examined by the latter. It rightly noted that two of those decisions, including decision B 3 161 200, concerning the marks Anora and Grupo Agora, had been delivered by the Opposition Divisions of EUIPO. As is apparent from the case-law, the decisions given by the Opposition Divisions of EUIPO are not binding on the Boards of Appeal of that body (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 November 2024, Washtower IP v EUIPO – LG Electronics (WASHTOWER) , T‑376/23, not published, EU:T:2024:849, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

103 As regards the third decision referred to by the applicant, it must be pointed out, as the Board of Appeal did, that it was delivered by a Board of Appeal of EUIPO. In particular, that Board of Appeal was called upon to assess the similarity and the likelihood of confusion between the word mark AGORA and the figurative mark agrola from the point of view of the Italian-speaking public, that is to say, a different public to the relevant public in the present case, which is Spanish-speaking. Accordingly, the third decision is not capable of calling into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment in the contested decision.

104 In any event, in that connection, it should be borne in mind that the decisions which the Boards of Appeal of EUIPO are called on to take under Regulation 2017/1001 are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers and are not a matter of discretion. Accordingly, in accordance with the case-law recalled in paragraph 46 above, the legality of those decisions must be assessed solely on the basis of that regulation, as interpreted by the EU judicature, and not on the basis of a previous decision-making practice. Moreover, in the present case, as is apparent from paragraphs 102 and 103 above, EUIPO duly took into consideration and examined its earlier decisions taken in the context of similar applications.

105 Furthermore, it should be noted, as EUIPO has done, that the fact that the earlier mark contains the word element ‘grupo’ has no impact on the perception of the meaning of the word element ‘agora’, which is also present in that mark, given that the relevant public will not establish any link between those two words.

106 In those circumstances, there is no reason to call into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment, in paragraph 48 of the contested decision – which, moreover, is not contested by the applicant – that, although one of the marks at issue is meaningless, the relevant public will perceive the concept conveyed by the word element ‘grupo’ in the earlier mark. The relevant public will give the term ‘grupo’ its generic meaning, namely that of a ‘group of companies’ (judgment of 11 May 2005, GRUPO SADA , T‑31/03, EU:T:2005:169, paragraph 65).

107 Thus, as the Board of Appeal correctly found, the marks at issue are not conceptually similar, but that conceptual difference is of very limited relevance in the overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion since it originates from a non-distinctive element, and since, moreover, the relevant public will attribute no particular meaning to the marks at issue taken as a whole. It is apparent from the case-law that, where the conceptual comparison of the marks at issue relates to a non-distinctive or descriptive element and where those marks, taken as a whole, have no specific meaning, the conceptual comparison plays a limited role and is of less importance in the assessment of the likelihood of confusion (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 15 October 2020, ROBOX , T‑49/20, not published, EU:T:2020:492, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited).

108 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, it must be held that the assessment of the Board of Appeal as regards the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the marks at issue is not vitiated by any error of assessment.

The overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion

109 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trademarks and that of the goods or services covered. Thus, a low degree of similarity between the goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon , C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others) , T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

110 In the present case, after finding, in paragraph 52 of the contested decision, that the inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark had to be considered, in essence, to be average, despite the presence of a non-distinctive element, the Board of Appeal concluded, in paragraph 54 of the contested decision, that, taking into account the identity or similarity between the services, the above-average degree of visual similarity between the signs at issue, the high degree of phonetic similarity between those signs and the normal degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark, there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 for the non-negligible part of the Spanish public that does not perceive any meaning in the word element ‘agora’, even taking into account a higher level of attention and a low level of similarity for some of the contested services. In paragraph 55 of the contested decision, it also stated that, since those signs did not convey a different concept for the part of the relevant Spanish public on which the analysis focused, the principle of neutralisation is not applicable in the present case.

111 First, the applicant disputes the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the earlier trade mark has, in essence, an average distinctive character. In that regard, it submits that, although the mark applied for is distinctive because it has no meaning, the earlier mark is descriptive of the services for which it is registered, namely services relating to the manufacture and distribution of beer and non-alcoholic beverages. In particular, the weak distinctive character of the word ‘agora’ is, in essence, confirmed by the existence of an exceptionally high number of Spanish marks and EU marks as well as Spanish company names including the word ‘agora’. By contrast, the applicant is the only proprietor of a mark containing the word ‘magora’.

112 Second, the applicant submits that, while the mark applied for is meaningless, the word ‘agora’ from the earlier mark refers to a place of gathering, to a marketplace or to a shopping area. Those conceptual differences between the signs at issue are capable of neutralising the phonetic and visual similarities between them and will prevent the public from believing that the services assumed to be identical or similar come from the same undertaking or economically linked undertakings. Any likelihood of confusion must therefore be ruled out, as was the case in numerous previous decisions of EUIPO concerning signs whose word elements shared five identical letters, like ‘agora’ and ‘magora’.

113 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

114 First, as regards the applicant’s argument challenging the average inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark, first, it should be noted, as EUIPO did, that the earlier mark was not registered for any of the services claimed by the applicant, namely the manufacture and distribution of beer and distribution of beer and non-alcoholic beverages (see paragraph 5 above). Furthermore, in that connection, it should be stressed that, as stated in paragraph 44 above, for the purposes of assessing whether there is a likelihood of confusion, only the description of the services in respect of which registration of the mark was sought is relevant. By contrast, the intended or actual use of that mark cannot be taken into consideration.

115 Second, as EUIPO submits, the Board of Appeal was right to find that at least a non-negligible part of the Spanish public was likely to perceive the word element ‘agora’ of the earlier mark as meaningless and, therefore, as a distinctive term in relation to the services at issue (see paragraph 70 above). Furthermore, as stated in paragraph 69 above, even assuming that the Spanish public perceives that word element as designating a central public square in ancient Greek cities, the applicant has not shown how that meaning could be descriptive, by referring in a sufficiently direct and immediate way to insurance, financial, banking and real estate services covered by the earlier mark.

116 Third, as regards the applicant’s argument that the weak distinctive character of the term ‘agora’ is confirmed by the fact that that term appears in numerous marks covering the same services, it is sufficient to note, as observed by EUIPO, that the relevant factor for the purposes of disputing the distinctive character of an element is its actual presence on the market and not its having been entered in registers or databases (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 March 2013, Mayer Naman v OHMI – Daniel e Mayer (David Mayer) , T‑498/10, not published, EU:T:2013:117, paragraph 77). The registration of a trade mark does not in itself imply that it is actually used on the market or that it is used in respect of all the goods or services covered by the registration in question, which is why additional evidence demonstrating its actual use on the market is essential in that context (judgment of 6 March 2024, Drinks Prod v EUIPO – Coolike-Regnery (VIVIASEPT) , T‑796/22, not published, EU:T:2024:153, paragraph 46).

117 In the present case, the applicant submitted Annex A.30 to the application in support of its claims, which contains a list of Spanish marks and EU trade marks containing the word ‘agora’ and a list of Spanish company names containing that word. However, as regards the part of that annex containing the list of Spanish company names containing the word ‘agora’, it should be noted that it has been rejected as inadmissible (see paragraph 20 above).

118 As regards the part of Annex A.30 containing examples of Spanish marks and EU trade marks containing the word ‘agora’, it should be noted that it does not contain any additional information on the actual use of those marks. Therefore, the evidence submitted by the applicant is not sufficient to prove the actual use of those marks containing the term ‘agora’.

119 Consequently, there is no need to call into question the Board of Appeal’s finding that the earlier mark has, in essence, an average degree of inherent distinctiveness, despite the presence, in that mark, of the non-distinctive element ‘grupo’.

120 Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s argument that the signs at issue exhibit conceptual differences capable of counteracting the visual and phonetic similarities between them, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, conceptual differences between two signs may counteract phonetic and visual similarities between them, provided that at least one of those signs has, from the point of view of the relevant public, a clear and specific meaning, so that the public is capable of grasping it immediately (judgments of 18 December 2008, Les Éditions Albert René v OHIM , C‑16/06 P, EU:C:2008:739, paragraph 98, and of 14 October 2003, Phillips-Van Heusen v OHIM – Pash Textilvertrieb und Einzelhandel (BASS) , T‑292/01, EU:T:2003:264, paragraph 54).

121 In the present case, it has been held that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that at least a non-negligible part of the Spanish public was likely to perceive the word element ‘agora’ of the earlier mark as meaningless and, therefore, as a distinctive term in relation to the services concerned (see paragraph 70 above). Thus, the signs at issue do not have a clear and specific meaning that the relevant public would be likely to grasp directly. Accordingly, as the Board of Appeal rightly found at paragraph 55 of the contested decision, the principle of neutralisation is not applicable in the present case.

122 Furthermore, the Board of Appeal was right to consider that the only conceptual difference between the marks at issue resulted from the meaning of the word element ‘grupo’ of the earlier mark. However, as EUIPO argues, that difference alone is insufficient to counteract the visual and phonetic similarities between the marks at issue and cannot therefore rule out the existence of a likelihood of confusion.

123 Therefore, the Board of Appeal was right to find, in the present case, that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

124 Furthermore, that conclusion cannot be called into question by the decisions of EUIPO cited by the applicant. In accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraphs 46 and 104 above, the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal must be assessed solely on the basis of Regulation 2017/1001, as interpreted by the EU judicature, and not on the basis of a previous decision-making practice of those Boards of Appeal.

125 In the light of all of the foregoing considerations, since the single plea in law relied on by the applicant in support of its claims must be rejected, the action must be dismissed.

Costs

126 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

127 Although the applicant has been unsuccessful, EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened. Since no hearing was held, it is appropriate to order each party to bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Holding Tourisme and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) each to bear their own costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 14 October 2026.

* Language of the case: English.