Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) 16 September 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

16 September 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Application for the EU word mark ULTRADRY – Absolute grounds for refusal – Descriptive character – Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – No distinctive character – Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑827/25,

Cobra Golf Inc., established in Carlsbad, California (United States), represented by M. Schunke, P. Trieb and C. Zickler, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by V. Ruzek and M. Eberl, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),

composed of E. Buttigieg, President, M. Kancheva (Rapporteur) and F. Bestagno, Judges,

Registrar: P. Núñez Ruiz, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 14 July 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Cobra Golf Inc., seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 22 September 2025 (Case R 624/2025-5) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 30 October 2024, the applicant filed with EUIPO an application for registration of an EU mark in respect of the word sign ULTRADRY.

3 The mark applied for covered goods in Class 28 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding to the following description: ‘Golf bags’.

4 By decision of 20 March 2025, the examiner refused registration of the mark applied for on the basis of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), read in conjunction with Article 7(2) thereof.

5 On 7 April 2025, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the examiner’s decision.

6 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that, in essence, the mark applied for, ULTRADRY, described one of the characteristics of ‘golf bags’, specifically their capacity to keep golf equipment, as well as, generally speaking, the contents of that bag, dry. The mark applied for was, therefore, regarded as descriptive within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001. While acknowledging that it is sufficient for one of the absolute grounds for refusal to apply in order for a trade mark application to be refused, the Board of Appeal took the view, following a separate examination of the ground for refusal under Article 7(1)(b) of the same regulation, that the mark applied for was also devoid of distinctive character within the meaning of the latter provision.

Forms of order sought

7 The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– order EUIPO to pay the costs, including those incurred before the Board of Appeal.

8 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.

Law

9 The applicant relies, in essence, on two pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 and, second, infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation.

The first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7 (1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001

10 The first plea in law is divided into six complaints. According to the applicant, in the first place, the Board of Appeal was incorrect to find there to be a sufficiently direct and concrete link between the mark applied for and the designated goods. In the second place, it failed to recognise the non-descriptive or, at the very most, suggestive character of that mark. In the third place, its assessment is incompatible with EUIPO’s decision-making practice and, therefore, contrary to the principles of equal treatment and sound administration. In the fourth place, the Board of Appeal did not assess the mark applied for in its entirety. In the fifth place, it did not produce any evidence demonstrating that the term ‘ultradry’ was actually used in the relevant sector in connection with the goods in question. In the sixth and final place, the contested decision fails to have regard to the public interest underlying Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001.

11 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

12 Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service, are not to be registered. Under Article 7(2) thereof, Article 7(1) is to apply notwithstanding that the grounds of non-registrability obtain in only part of the European Union.

13 Such signs are regarded as incapable of performing the essential function of a trade mark, namely that of identifying the commercial origin of the goods or services (judgments of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley , C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 30, and of 27 February 2002, Eurocool Logistik v OHIM (EUROCOOL) , T‑34/00, EU:T:2002:41, paragraph 37).

14 For a sign to be caught by the prohibition set out in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, there must be a sufficiently direct and concrete relationship between the sign and the goods or services in question to enable the relevant public immediately, and without further thought, to perceive a description of the goods and services in question or one of their characteristics (see judgments of 12 January 2005, Deutsche Post EURO EXPRESS v OHIM (EUROPREMIUM) , T‑334/03, EU:T:2005:4, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited, and of 22 June 2005, Metso Paper Automation v OHIM (PAPERLAB) , T‑19/04, EU:T:2005:247, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

15 The descriptive character of a sign can be assessed only by reference to the goods or services concerned and to the way in which it is understood by the relevant public (see judgment of 25 October 2018, Devin v EUIPO – Haskovo (DEVIN) , T‑122/17, EU:T:2018:719, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

16 It should be borne in mind that Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 pursues an aim which is in the public interest, namely that descriptive signs or indications relating to the characteristics of goods or services in respect of which registration is sought may be freely used by all. That provision accordingly prevents such signs and indications from being reserved to one undertaking alone because they have been registered as trade marks (see judgment of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley , C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

17 As a preliminary point, it should be observed that the Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 18 to 21 of the contested decision, that the public targeted by the goods in question were golf players, both amateurs and professionals, and that, since the mark applied for, ULTRADRY, combined basic English terms, the relevant public was the English-speaking public of the European Union, in particular of Ireland and Malta, as well as of the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Finland and Cyprus.

18 Those assessments are not disputed by the applicant.

19 In the first place, with regard to the meaning of the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal, first of all, found, in paragraph 22 of the contested decision, that that mark will be perceived as the combination of the terms ‘ultra’ and ‘dry’. Next, it observed, in paragraphs 23 to 29 of that decision, that the term ‘ultra’ conveyed the notion of ‘going beyond what is usual or ordinary’. According to the Board of Appeal, that term, which comes from Latin and means ‘beyond’ or ‘extremely’, is often used to intensify the meaning of the adjective it precedes. In the composition of the mark applied for, as an adjective, the element ‘ultra’ functions merely to qualify the further adjective ‘dry’. The Board of Appeal thus noted that, according to the case-law, the common and generic term ‘ultra’, used as a prefix or alone, was understood by the relevant English-speaking public as referring to a quality or a heightened characteristic of the goods or services concerned. As for the term ‘dry’, the Board of Appeal observed, in paragraph 30 of the contested decision, that, according to the entry in the Collins English Dictionary , it was an adjective describing that something has no water or moisture on or in it. Ultimately, according to the Board of Appeal, the combination ‘ultradry’ refers to the quality of being ‘extremely dry’ or ‘dry beyond what is normal or ordinary’. In its view, it is a known combination in English, as is illustrated by several English dictionaries mentioned in paragraph 32 of the contested decision, which refer to the ability to keep something or someone extremely or extraordinarily dry. Therefore, the Board of Appeal concluded, in essence, that the overall impression produced by those terms when joined together was the same as when they were positioned next to one another.

20 In the second place, with regard to the relationship between the meaning of the mark applied for and the goods designated by that mark, first of all, the Board of Appeal noted, in paragraphs 36 to 42 of the contested decision, that, in order to refuse the registration of a mark on the basis of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, EUIPO did not have to prove that the term constituting the mark applied for appeared in dictionaries, nor that the signs making up that mark were actually in use, at the time when registration was applied for, in a way that was descriptive of goods, such as those in respect of which the application was made, or characteristics of those goods. Next, the Board of Appeal observed that it was sufficient to assess whether that mark represented, at the time that application was made, in the mind of the relevant class of persons, a description of the characteristics of the goods concerned or whether it was reasonable to assume that that might be the case in the future. Lastly, with regard to the sign applied for, ULTRADRY, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 43 to 46 of the contested decision, that it was more than reasonable to assume that it was being used for descriptive purposes for ‘golf bags’, since such bags could contain personal items that need to be kept dry, especially given that golf can be played throughout the winter months and may be subject to changing weather conditions. Furthermore, wet grips on golf clubs could affect a player’s swing. According to the Board of Appeal, there is thus a sufficiently direct and concrete link between the meaning of the mark applied for and the designated goods, and no mental steps are required to understand immediately that that mark describes the nature, quality and intended purpose of the ‘golf bags’, namely that they keep their contents extremely or extraordinarily dry.

21 The Board of Appeal therefore concluded, in paragraph 46 of the contested decision, that the descriptive content of the element ‘ultradry’ was clear and unequivocal, precise and not open to a number of interpretations with respect to the essential characteristics of the goods for which protection was sought. Therefore, even when being confronted for the first time with the mark applied for, ULTRADRY, the relevant public will not require any analytical effort to grasp its descriptiveness, which is based on the common meanings of the words ‘ultra’ and ‘dry’ and of their combination.

22 In the first place, with regard to the meaning of the mark applied for, the applicant alleges, in essence, by its fourth complaint, that the Board of Appeal dissected the mark applied for into its two components, ‘ultra’ and ‘dry’, the combination of which creates a new, unique and potentially incongruous commercial impression, which is not descriptive of the goods in question. Consequently, the mark applied for, ULTRADRY, as a whole, creates a distinct impression in the mind of the consumer through the combination of those words, with many possible interpretations that are not immediately apparent.

23 In that regard, it is sufficient to recall, first, that, to find that a word sign is descriptive, pursuant to Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, the signs and indications comprising the trade mark that are referred to in that article need not actually be in use, at the time when registration is applied for, for the purpose of describing goods or services such as those in respect of which the application is made or the characteristics of those goods or services. It is sufficient, as the wording of that provision itself indicates, that such signs and indications may be used for such purposes. A word sign must therefore be refused registration if at least one of its possible meanings designates a characteristic of the goods or services concerned (see judgment of 16 October 2014, Larrañaga Otaño v OHIM (GRAPHENE) , T‑458/13, EU:T:2014:891, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited), which is the case here, as is correctly stated in the contested decision, as summarised in paragraph 19 above.

24 Second, it should be noted that the terms in question, whether considered separately or juxtaposed as they are within the mark applied for, convey one and the same meaning in the mind of the relevant public in that, in both cases, reference is being made to the quality of being extremely dry or dry beyond what is usual or ordinary. As the Board of Appeal correctly observed, in paragraphs 31 to 33 of the contested decision, the combination is known in English, as evidenced by several English dictionaries, even as a one-word term, referring to the ability to keep something or someone extremely or extraordinarily dry. Therefore, contrary to what the applicant claims, the general meaning of those basic English terms, taken on their own, is identical to the meaning conveyed when they are juxtaposed as a single term.

25 The applicant’s line of argument must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

26 In the second place, with regard to the relationship between the meaning of the mark applied for and the goods which it designates, the applicant, by its first complaint, disputes that there is a sufficiently direct and concrete link. It claims that the Board of Appeal’s interpretation of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 is overly broad and abstract, relying on the general meaning of the terms concerned without, however, demonstrating that they are used in the relevant trade to describe the designated goods. In the context of such goods, the applicant is of the view that dryness is neither measurable nor measured. Accordingly, the consumer must engage in a multi-stage process of abstraction and imagination in order, first, to consider the possibility of rain, second, to take account of the effect of rain on the contents of the golf bag and, third, to interpret the mark applied for as referring to the bag’s ability to keep its contents dry. At the hearing, while acknowledging that golf is played outdoors, the applicant repeated that a mental process is required to see that a characteristic of the designated goods is being described, and argued that the meaning conveyed by the mark applied for is different from the meaning conveyed by the basic terms making up that mark, because the combination ‘ultradry’ is unconnected with the game of golf or with the functionalities of the golf bags.

27 In that regard, first of all, as the Board of Appeal correctly recalled (see paragraph 20 above), it should be noted that it is not necessary to establish that the term in question is used amongst the relevant class of persons in relation to the goods designated by the mark applied for in order to establish the connection between those goods and the semantic content of that mark. Instead, it is necessary to determine simply whether or not that mark contains an unequivocal message serving to identify a characteristic of the goods in question and whether that mark can be used for descriptive purposes, as correctly stated in paragraphs 40 to 42 of the contested decision (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley , C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 32, and, by analogy, of 12 February 2004, Koninklijke KPN Nederland , C‑363/99, EU:C:2004:86, paragraphs 56 and 97 and the case-law cited ) .

28 Next, as regards the claim that a mental process must be engaged in in order to grasp that the mark applied for is descriptive, the applicant briefly disputes the semantic content conveyed by the mark applied for, ULTRADRY, arguing that the overall impression produced by the combination of the terms ‘ultra’ and ‘dry’ is different from that resulting from each of those terms taken on its own, because that combination is not used in connection with golf bags or their characteristics. In the applicant’s view, that fact essentially prevents the relevant public from perceiving immediately the meaning adopted by the Board of Appeal, namely the ability to keep the contents of a golf bag extremely or extraordinarily dry. In that regard, it should be observed that the simpler and more ordinary a term is, the more directly and immediately perceptible it is by the relevant public, since there is, in principle, only one interpretation of it. This is the case here, contrary to what the applicant claims.

29 Furthermore, contrary to what the applicant claimed at the hearing in response to a question put by the Court, it should be observed that the meaning to which the term ‘ultradry’ refers cannot be dependent on its use or the lack of such use in relation to the golf bags designated by the mark applied for or their functionalities. In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the applicant does not dispute the fact that ‘ultra’ and ‘dry’ are basic English terms which are widely and immediately understood as such. Therefore, the combination of the two basic terms, the meaning of which is clear and immediately perceptible, is liable to be understood immediately by the relevant public, without requiring any particular thought process or interpretation.

30 Accordingly, the semantic content of the combination of those terms, in the present case, is no different from the semantic content which they immediately convey separately, as is also apparent from the dictionaries cited in paragraph 32 of the contested decision.

31 Lastly, it should be observed that it is not true that moisture is not a relevant factor for golf players or that a mental process will be necessary to see the link between the possibility of rain and the ability of the golf bags to keep their contents dry, because, as the Board of Appeal correctly stated in paragraph 44 of the contested decision, golf can be played throughout the winter months and, as a result, may be influenced by changing weather conditions. Accordingly, the relevant public will spontaneously and naturally perceive the need to protect their personal items from moisture and keep them dry, which will allow that public to make a direct and immediate connection between the mark applied for and the description of one of the characteristics of the designated goods.

32 Consequently, the link between the ‘golf bags’ and the mark applied for, ULTRADRY, is based on the need to keep what is placed inside those bags dry, without it being necessary first to give consideration to rain or to the clear need to protect the personal items contained in such bags, and therefore the applicant’s line of argument must be rejected as unfounded.

33 The Board of Appeal did not therefore err in finding that, since the semantic content of the mark applied for is immediately perceptible by the relevant public in the context of the use of the goods designated by that mark, the mark described a characteristic of those goods.

34 That conclusion is not called into question by the applicant’s other complaints.

35 First, according to the applicant’s sixth complaint, the contested decision is incompatible with the public interest underlying Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, the purpose of which is to ensure that descriptive terms remain freely available for all traders. That public interest is not engaged where the term in question is not used, in trade, to describe the designated goods or where it is not immediately and unambiguously descriptive. In addition, in refusing to register an EU trade mark containing terms that may be used for descriptive purposes, even though such use is highly unlikely, the Board of Appeal went beyond what is necessary to protect that public interest.

36 In that regard, as was noted in paragraph 27 above, it is not necessary to establish that the term constituting the trade mark applied for is used by the relevant class of persons in relation to the goods designated by that mark, but merely to identify if at least one of its possible meanings designates a characteristic of the goods or services concerned. Therefore, the public interest underlying Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 applies regardless of the use of the term in question amongst the relevant class of persons from the moment it is conceivable that that term describes or could describe one of the characteristics of the designated goods or services (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 12 February 2004, Koninklijke KPN Nederland , C‑363/99, EU:C:2004:86, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited). Such a probability is a sufficient basis for finding that the registration of the mark applied for must be refused under Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 (see judgment of 16 October 2014, GRAPHENE , T‑458/13, EU:T:2014:891, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited). The applicant’s line of argument must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

37 Second, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 36 above, the applicant’s fifth complaint – namely that the Board of Appeal did not provide any evidence that the term ‘ultradry’, which constitutes the sign applied for, was used in trade in relation to the goods designated by that sign – must be rejected. Indeed, as it correctly found in paragraphs 40 to 42 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal does not have to prove that the term in question is used amongst the relevant class of persons in relation to the goods designated by the mark which is not to be registered within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001.

38 Third, relying on the premiss that a mental process is required to identify that the mark applied for, ULTRADRY, describes a characteristic of the ‘golf bags’, the applicant submits, by its second complaint, that that mark is, at the very most, suggestive. However, since that premiss was found to be incorrect in paragraphs 28 and 32 above, the applicant’s argument based on that same premiss must be rejected as unfounded.

39 Fourth, by the third complaint, the applicant claims (i) that the present case is not comparable with the decision of 5 August 2024 in Case R 826/2024-5, ‘superdry’, cited in paragraph 75 of the contested decision, and (ii) that the Board of Appeal failed to take account of its own previous decision-making practice and the fact that there are many EU trade marks containing the terms ‘ultra’ and ‘dry’, on their own or combined with other elements, in breach of the principles of equal treatment and sound administration. Similarly, the applicant produced a list of five trade marks containing the term ‘dry’, some of which are registered for ‘golf bags’, arguing that it is impossible to understand why those marks are not descriptive whereas the mark applied for is, according to the Board of Appeal.

40 In that regard, it should be observed that, as in the present case, the goods concerned by the ‘superdry’ case were, inter alia, in Class 28 and that the word element was formed by the juxtaposition of the elements ‘super’ and ‘dry’. Given the conceptual proximity between the terms ‘ultra’ and ‘super’, the analogy made by the Board of Appeal with the present case may be deemed relevant, without however being decisive on its own.

41 In addition, in the present case, it is also apparent from the contested decision that the Board of Appeal found, correctly, on the basis of a diligent and full examination and taking into account the perception of the relevant public and the goods designated by the mark applied for, that that mark was caught by the absolute ground for refusal set out in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, such that the applicant cannot validly rely, for the purposes of invalidating that conclusion, on EUIPO’s earlier decisions, from which, moreover, in so far as they contain either the word element ‘ultra’ or the word element ‘dry’, but not the two word elements together, it cannot be inferred that EUIPO has a ‘consistent decision-making practice’ for ‘similar situations’. The registration of a sign as a mark depends on specific criteria, which are applicable in the factual circumstances of the particular case and the purpose of which is to ascertain whether the sign at issue is caught by a ground for refusal (see judgment of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM , C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).

42 Thus, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the decisions concerning registration of a sign as an EU trade mark which the Boards of Appeal are led to take under Regulation 2017/1001 are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers and are not a matter of discretion. Accordingly, the legality of the decisions of the Boards of Appeal must be assessed solely on the basis of that regulation as interpreted by the EU judicature and not on the basis of a previous decision-making practice (see judgment of 26 April 2007, Alcon v OHIM , C‑412/05 P, EU:C:2007:252, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

43 As for the applicant’s request that the Court take account of the registration of the trade mark applied for by authorities of third States, it is sufficient to note in that regard that the EU trade mark system is an autonomous system with its own set of objectives and rules peculiar to it; it applies independent of any national system (see judgment of 5 February 2026, EUIPO v Nowhere , C‑337/22 P, EU:C:2026:71, paragraph 168 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, EUIPO and, if appropriate, the EU judicature is not bound by a decision given in a Member State, or indeed a third country, that the sign in question is registrable as a national mark (judgment of 27 February 2002, Streamserve v OHIM (STREAMSERVE) , T‑106/00, EU:T:2002:43, paragraph 47).

44 In addition, it should be observed that, to illustrate the alleged decision-making practice of EUIPO which the Board of Appeal disregarded, the applicant relies on a list of five EU trade marks. EUIPO’s favourable opinion as to the registration of those marks, in the light of the absolute grounds laid down in Article 7 of Regulation 2017/1001, has given rise only to decisions by examiners and the Boards of Appeal cannot, in any case, as the applicant acknowledges in its application, be bound by the decisions of EUIPO’s lower-ranking adjudicating bodies (see judgment of 4 July 2018, Deluxe Entertainment Services Group v EUIPO (deluxe) , T‑222/14 RENV, not published, EU:T:2018:402, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).

45 That line of argument must therefore be rejected as ineffective.

46 It is apparent from all the foregoing considerations that the first plea in law must be rejected as in part ineffective and in part unfounded, since the Board of Appeal correctly found that the mark applied for, ULTRADRY, was descriptive of the ‘golf bags’ designated by that mark.

The second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7 (1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001

47 The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal erred in finding the mark applied for to be devoid of distinctive character. In its view, the combination ‘ultradry’ is neither common nor immediately understood as describing a characteristic of the goods designated by that mark. To arrive at that finding, a mental process is required. Similarly, the Board of Appeal failed to take account of the perception of the relevant public.

48 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

49 As is apparent from Article 7(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, it is sufficient that one of the absolute grounds for refusal listed applies for the sign not to be registrable as an EU trade mark (see judgment of 10 July 2014, BSH v OHIM , C‑126/13 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2065, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

50 Accordingly, since the Board of Appeal correctly concluded that the mark applied for was descriptive of the goods which it covered, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, there is no need to rule on the present plea in law.

51 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

52 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

53 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful and a hearing was held, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by EUIPO.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Cobra Golf Inc. to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 16 September 2026.

* Language of the case: English.