Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) 7 October 2026

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)

7 October 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – EU figurative mark MID season For When It’s Not Quite Cold Not Quite Warm – Absolute grounds for refusal – Descriptive character – Lack of distinctiveness – Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑9/26,

Milestone Sportswear Handels GmbH, established in Lenting (Germany), represented by A. Haberl, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by T. Frydendahl, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

John Peter Srl, established in Asti (Italy), represented by V. Merlo, lawyer,

THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber),

composed of K. Kecsmár, President, P. Nihoul and L. Truchot (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Milestone Sportswear Handels GmbH, seeks the annulment of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 12 November 2025 (Case R 239/2025-2) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 18 December 2023, the applicant filed with EUIPO an application for a declaration of invalidity of the EU trade mark which had been registered following an application filed on 2 December 2022 for the following figurative sign:

3 The goods and services covered by the contested mark in respect of which a declaration of invalidity was sought were in Classes 18, 25 and 35 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and corresponded, for each of those classes, to the following description:

– Class 18: ‘Shoulder belts [straps] of leather; girths of leather; bags [envelopes, pouches] of leather, for packaging; bags; purses; roll bags; all-purpose carrying bags; multipurpose purses; work bags; cross-body bags; fashion handbags; evening handbags; travel baggage; travelling sets [leatherware]; small clutch purses; handbags made of leather; slouch handbags; leather bags and wallets; shopping bags made of skin; garment bags for travel made of leather; leather purses; card wallets [leatherware]; leathercloth; studs of leather; briefcases [leather goods]; document cases of leather; attache cases made of leather; leather suitcases; leather coin purses; leather wallets; leather credit card wallets; key cases; key cases made of leather’;

– Class 25: ‘Leather shoes; leather belts [clothing]; gloves including those made of skin, hide or fur; leather jackets; trousers of leather; leather waistcoats; clothing of leather; leather headwear; leather suits; jerseys [clothing]; trousers; jackets [clothing]; sheepskin jackets; fur jackets; fur coats and jackets; men’s and women’s jackets, coats, trousers, vests; raincoats; rainproof jackets; overcoats; skirts; clothing; gloves [clothing]; belts [clothing]; casualwear; clothing made of fur; short sets [clothing]; shoes; hats; fur hats; casual jackets; ladies’ clothing’;

– Class 35: ‘Retail services connected with the sale of clothing and clothing accessories; retail services in relation to clothing; wholesale services in relation to clothing; retail store services in the field of clothing; online retail store services relating to clothing; online retail services relating to clothing; retail services in relation to girths of leather; wholesale services in relation to girths of leather; retail services in relation to purses; wholesale services in relation to purses; retail services in relation to multi-purpose purses; wholesale services in relation to multi-purpose purses; retail services in relation to leather purses; wholesale services in relation to leather purses; retail services in relation to briefcases [leather goods]; wholesale services in relation to briefcases [leather goods]; retail services in relation to card wallets [leatherware]; wholesale services in relation to card wallets [leatherware]; retail services in relation to leathercloth; wholesale services in relation to leathercloth; retail services in relation to studs of leather; wholesale services in relation to studs of leather; retail services in relation to document cases of leather; wholesale services in relation to document cases of leather; retail services in relation to leather suitcases; wholesale services in relation to leather suitcases; retail services in relation to key rings of leather; wholesale services in relation to key rings of leather; retail services in relation to leather wallets; wholesale services in relation to leather wallets; retail services in relation to key cases; wholesale services in relation to key cases; retail services in relation to leather credit card wallets; wholesale services in relation to leather credit card wallets; retail services in relation to umbrellas; wholesale services in relation to umbrellas’.

4 The grounds relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity were those set out in Article 59(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), read in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of that regulation.

5 On 31 January 2025, the Cancellation Division dismissed the application for a declaration of invalidity.

6 On 6 February 2025, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Cancellation Division.

7 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground, first, that the contested mark was not descriptive within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 and, second, that that mark was sufficiently distinctive, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation, to serve as a badge of commercial origin and to distinguish the goods and services of the proprietor of the mark from those of other undertakings. In essence, the Board of Appeal found that the contested mark, at most allusive or evocative, did not possess any clear meaning capable of being perceived, by the relevant public, as a description of the characteristics of the goods and services at issue.

Forms of order sought

8 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– declare the contested mark invalid in respect of all the goods and services at issue;

– order EUIPO to pay the costs.

9 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the appeal;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened.

10 The intervener contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the appeal;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

The jurisdiction of the Court

11 As regards the second head of claim, it must be pointed out that it requests that the Court declare the contested mark invalid. In that regard, it is sufficient to bear in mind that, when exercising judicial review of legality under Article 263 TFEU, the Court does not have jurisdiction to make declaratory rulings (see, to that effect, order of 9 December 2003, Italy v Commission , C‑224/03, not published, EU:C:2003:658, paragraphs 20 and 21, and judgment of 4 February 2009, Omya v Commission , T‑145/06, EU:T:2009:27, paragraph 23). It follows that the second head of claim must be rejected on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Substance

12 The applicant relies, in essence, on two pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, and second, infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation.

The first plea, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, relating to the descriptive character of the contested mark

13 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the contested mark was not descriptive of the goods and services at issue within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001. According to the applicant, the interpretation assumed by the Board of Appeal that the element ‘mid season’ would be understood by the relevant public as referring to ‘middle of the season’ is incorrect. The applicant maintains, in that regard, that the relevant public will, on the contrary, understand the contested mark, taken as a whole, to mean that the goods and services at issue are designed to be used during the mid-season, that is to say, between the two main seasons – summer and winter.

14 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes the applicant’s arguments. It submits that the Board of Appeal did not commit an error of assessment by finding that the element ‘mid season’, even read in conjunction with the element ‘for when it’s not quite cold not quite warm’, conveys no concrete descriptive meaning that is immediately perceptible by the relevant public.

15 Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service must not be registered. Under Article 7(2) of that regulation, Article 7(1) of that regulation is to apply notwithstanding that the grounds of non-registrability obtain in only part of the European Union.

16 Those signs or indications are regarded as incapable of performing the essential function of a trade mark, namely that of identifying the commercial origin of the goods or services (judgments of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley , C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 30, and of 27 February 2002, Eurocool Logistik v OHIM (EUROCOOL) , T‑34/00, EU:T:2002:41, paragraph 37).

17 For a sign to fall within the scope of the prohibition in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, it must suggest a sufficiently direct and concrete link to the goods or services in question to enable the relevant public immediately, and without further thought, to perceive a description of the goods and services in question or of one of their characteristics (see judgments of 12 January 2005, Deutsche Post EURO EXPRESS v OHIM (EUROPREMIUM) , T‑334/03, EU:T:2005:4, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited, and of 22 June 2005, Metso Paper Automation v OHIM (PAPERLAB) , T‑19/04, EU:T:2005:247, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

18 By prohibiting the registration as trade marks of such signs and indications, Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 pursues an aim which is in the public interest, namely that descriptive signs or indications relating to the characteristics of goods or services in respect of which registration is sought may be freely used by all. That provision accordingly prevents such signs or indications from being reserved to one undertaking alone because they have been registered as trade marks (see judgment of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley , C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). A sign’s descriptiveness cannot be assessed other than by reference to the goods or services concerned, on the one hand, and by reference to the understanding which the relevant public has of it, on the other (see judgment of judgment of 25 October 2005, Peek & Cloppenburg v OHIM (Cloppenburg) , T‑379/03, EU:T:2005:373, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

19 Lastly, it is also apparent from the case-law that a word sign must therefore be refused registration under Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 if at least one of its possible meanings designates a characteristic of the goods or services concerned (judgments of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley , C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 32, and of 12 February 2004, Campina Melkunie , C‑265/00, EU:C:2004:87, paragraph 38).

20 It is in the light of those considerations, having regard to the Board of Appeal’s assessment in the contested decision, that the applicant’s line of argument must be examined.

– The relevant public

21 In the present case, in paragraphs 33 to 37 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the relevant territory was the European Union and that the relevant public was the English-speaking part of the general public and of the professional public in the field of retail and wholesale services related to goods in Classes 18 and 25. The Board of Appeal recalled that, in principle, the level of attention of the general public is at least average, whereas that of the specialised public is high.

22 The applicant does not dispute the definition of the relevant public adopted by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision.

– The meaning of the contested mark

23 As regards the meaning of the contested mark, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 46 and 47 of the contested decision, that the element ‘mid season’ did not possess any specific meaning in the clothing sector and that it would be understood, by the relevant public, in its literal meaning, namely ‘middle of the spring, summer, autumn and winter’. It added that, even in combination with the element ‘for when it’s not quite cold not quite warm’, the contested mark will be at most allusive of the goods in Class 25, but not descriptive of those goods.

24 The Board of Appeal concluded, in paragraph 50 of the contested decision, that the contested mark did not provide any concrete meaning which could be perceived as descriptive of the characteristics of the goods and services at issue, with the result that Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 was not applicable.

25 The applicant, for its part, claims that both the element ‘mid season’ and the element ‘for when it’s not quite cold not quite warm’ have a clear meaning that will be immediately understood by the relevant public without further reflection.

26 In that regard, the applicant submits, first, that, due to its long-standing use in the fashion industry, the element ‘mid season’ is widely understood, without further explanation, by the relevant public as referring to clothing and accessories worn during the mid-season between summer and winter. Next, the applicant claims that the element ‘for when it’s not quite cold not quite warm’ could have only one possible meaning, namely that the goods at issue are designed to be worn during the mid-season, when the temperature is neither too high nor too low. Lastly, the applicant argues that the interpretation assumed by the Board of Appeal that the element ‘mid season’ would be understood as referring to the middle of each season is ruled out, since the element ‘for when it’s not quite cold not quite warm’ refers specifically to the period between the two main seasons – summer and winter.

27 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes the applicant’s arguments and notes that, in the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that no concrete descriptive meaning could be derived from the contested mark in relation to the goods and services at issue. In that regard, EUIPO observes that the Board of Appeal found, correctly, that the element ‘mid season’ would be understood exclusively as referring to the middle of one of the four seasons and that it was so impenetrable and opaque to the relevant public that that public may not possibly derive any concrete descriptive meaning from it, irrespective of the element ‘for when it’s not quite cold not quite warm’ and the fact that the goods and services at issue may be particularly suitable for use during the spring and autumn or in the middle part of any season of the year.

28 EUIPO also submits that the applicant has not, in any event, provided evidence that the element ‘mid season’ was commonly used in the fashion industry in the sense of ‘midseason sales’, nor that the relevant public would recognise the element ‘mid season’ as a reference to clothing and accessories worn during the classic mid-season period between summer and winter.

29 In the present case, it is apparent from the file relating to the proceedings before EUIPO submitted to the Court that, in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity, the applicant produced – in addition to dictionary extracts concerning the definitions of the individual terms ‘mid’ and ‘season’ – numerous extracts from websites, from which it is apparent that the expression ‘mid season’ is commonly used in the fashion industry to be suggestive of clothing or accessories suitable for changing weather conditions, which are, in particular, characteristic of intermediary or transition seasons between a dry season and a wet season or between summer and winter, like the transition in spring and autumn when the temperatures are generally cooler than in summer but warmer than in winter.

30 It is also apparent from the file relating to the proceedings before EUIPO submitted to the Court that, in support of its action against the decision of the Cancellation Division, the applicant produced other dictionary extracts concerning the definition of the expression ‘mid season’ rather than each of the individual terms of which it is composed. In essence, according to those documents, the expression ‘mid season’, or its variants ‘mid-season’ and ‘midseason’, refers to a temperate period of the year, between the extreme temperatures of winter and summer, that is to say, more specifically, spring and autumn.

31 It follows that, after reading the evidence produced by the applicant during the proceedings before EUIPO, the Board of Appeal was not entitled to disregard the fact that, in at least one of its potential meanings, for the purposes of the case-law cited in paragraph 19 above, the element ‘mid season’ of the contested mark refers to the transitional seasons of the year, such as spring and autumn, when the weather conditions are not too warm or too cold.

32 That statement is supported by the presence, in the contested mark, of the element ‘for when it’s not quite cold not quite warm’, which, by referring to a significant (‘quite’) absence (‘it’s not’) of coolness (‘cold’) and a significant (‘quite’) absence (‘it’s not’) of warmth (‘warm’), refers implicitly but unequivocally to weather conditions characterised by temperatures that are neither very high nor very low, which an English-speaking public will immediately be able to understand.

33 Accordingly, it must be held that, by finding in paragraphs 46 and 47 of the contested decision that the element ‘mid season’ did not possess any specific meaning in the fashion industry and that it will be exclusively understood by the relevant public as meaning ‘middle of the spring, summer, autumn and winter’, the Board of Appeal committed an error of assessment.

– The link between the meaning of the contested mark and the goods and services at issue

34 For the purposes of applying Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, it is appropriate to examine whether, from the point of view of the relevant public, there exists a sufficiently direct and specific link between the contested mark and the goods and services at issue (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 September 2020, Daw v EUIPO (SOS Innenfarbe) , T‑625/19, not published, EU:T:2020:398, paragraph 47, and of 23 March 2022, Team Beverage v EUIPO (Beverage Analytics) , T‑113/21, not published, EU:T:2022:152, paragraph 35). In the present case, it must be stated that the error of assessment committed by the Board of Appeal as regards the meaning of the contested mark necessarily vitiated its analysis of the link between that meaning and the goods and services at issue.

35 It follows from the foregoing that the Board of Appeal infringed Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 when it found, in paragraph 50 of the contested decision, that the contested mark did not provide any concrete meaning which could be perceived as descriptive of the characteristics of the goods and services at issue.

36 The first plea in law must therefore be upheld.

The second plea, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, relating to the distinctive character of the mark applied for

37 The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the contested mark was distinctive, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. It submits that, even assuming that the contested mark is not descriptive of the goods and services concerned, it will be perceived by the relevant public as a mere generic advertising message, and not as an indication of the commercial origin of those goods and services.

38 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes the applicant’s arguments. EUIPO asserts that the Board of Appeal did not commit an error of assessment by finding that the contested mark was sufficiently distinctive to serve as an indication of commercial origin and to distinguish the goods and services at issue from those of other undertakings.

39 Under Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character are not to be registered.

40 For a trade mark to possess distinctive character for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, it must serve to identify the goods in respect of which registration is applied for as originating from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods from those of other undertakings (see judgment of 21 January 2010, Audi v OHIM , C‑398/08 P, EU:C:2010:29, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

41 The descriptive signs referred to in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 are also devoid of any distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation. Conversely, a sign may be devoid of distinctive character for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) for reasons other than the fact that it may be descriptive (judgment of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM , C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraph 46).

42 In the present case, it is apparent from paragraph 57 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal found that the contested mark was distinctive based on the premiss that it had been established, in paragraph 50 of that decision, that that mark was not descriptive, because it possessed no clear meaning in relation to the goods and services at issue.

43 It is apparent from the analysis carried out in the examination of the first plea that such a premiss is itself based on an error of assessment as regards the meaning of the contested mark. Accordingly, the assessment that the contested mark is distinctive is incorrect, inasmuch as it relies on an equally incorrect meaning of that mark.

44 The same assessment must be made in respect of paragraph 58 of the contested decision, in which the Board of Appeal stated that the link between the contested mark and the goods and services at issue was ‘too unclear and indefinite’, with the result that it had to find that that mark was sufficiently distinctive to serve as an indication of commercial origin and to distinguish the goods and services at issue from those of undertakings other than the undertaking of the proprietor of that mark. In order to reach the conclusion in paragraph 58 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal also, implicitly but necessarily, relied on an incorrect meaning of the contested mark.

45 It follows that the Board of Appeal infringed Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 when it found that the contested mark was distinctive.

46 The second plea in law must therefore also be upheld.

47 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the action must be upheld in its entirety and the contested decision must therefore be annulled, without there being any need to rule on the admissibility of the documents submitted for the first time before the Court.

Costs

48 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. In addition, under Article 134(2) of those rules, where there are several unsuccessful parties, the Court is to decide how the costs are to be shared.

49 Since EUIPO and the intervener have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the applicant, in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant. In that regard, EUIPO and the intervener shall each pay half of the applicant’s costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)

hereby:

1. Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 12 November 2025 (Case R 239/2025-2);

2. Orders EUIPO and John Peter Srl each to bear their own costs and to pay half of those incurred by Milestone Sportswear Handels GmbH.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 7 October 2026.

* Language of the case: English.